People of the Philippines vs. Viernes, et al.

An accused who pleads self-defense must prove by clear and convincing evidence the three elements of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation; when these elements are established, the accused is entitled to acquittal. The Court further held that conspiracy must be proven as convincingly as the crime itself, and mere presence at the scene or the act of holding the victim does not necessarily demonstrate a concurrence of will or unity of purpose to kill.

The case arose from a criminal information filed by the provincial prosecutor of Cagayan charging four individuals with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by abuse of superior strength and nighttime. The charge stemmed from the stabbing death of Herminio Doniego on December 19, 1991, in Buguey, Cagayan. The trial court convicted all four accused, and they appealed to the Supreme Court.

On the evening of December 19, 1991, at about 8 p.m., Sonny Doniego, Dionisio Crisostomo, and Herminio Doniego went to the house of Nanding Tomas in Buguey, Cagayan, where films were being shown for a fee. The house was located about twelve meters from the road, with a fence seven meters from the road and a concrete wall of an improvised terrace three meters from the fence. Several adults and children were already seated inside, while others who could not be accommodated stood outside. Sonny Doniego and Dionisio Crisostomo stood between the fence and the improvised terrace, while Herminio Doniego stood at the entrance of the terrace.

According to the prosecution witnesses, accused-appellant Viernes approached Herminio "from the feeder of the road" as the latter was coming out to urinate. Viernes allegedly stabbed Herminio frontally while co-accused Joel Sosa, Romy Patulay, and Cornelio Unciano held him. After the incident, all four accused ran away, leaving the victim lying on the ground. Dionisio testified that he saw Viernes stab the deceased only once, while Sonny Doniego testified that he saw Viernes stab his brother twice. Dr. Teddy Unida, the municipal health officer, conducted a post-mortem examination and found two stab wounds: one on the left breast, which caused death, and another on the left thigh.

Accused Viernes gave a different version of the incident. He testified that he alone went to the house of Nanding Tomas to watch a betamax movie and was seated on a bench near the door but outside the house. Five minutes later, some persons arrived who smelled of liquor and placed themselves behind him. Herminio Doniego, who was immediately behind Viernes, pushed his head so that he could watch the movie. Viernes obliged but later returned his head to its former position. Herminio pushed his head a second time, after which Viernes heard Herminio's companion say "tiroemon" (hit him). Herminio then slit Viernes' back with a razor, to which Viernes responded by facing Herminio and stabbing him on the left breast. Viernes testified during cross-examination that he stabbed the deceased twice. After stabbing Herminio, Viernes ran away for fear of being harmed by Herminio's companions. He went home to rest, then proceeded to the house of Hermenegildo Rugal, the barangay captain of Quinawegan, Buguey, Cagayan, to seek shelter and surrender. The barangay captain treated his wound, and the next day accompanied him to the police department to surrender. Dr. Teddy Unida's findings revealed an incised wound measuring six inches in length and one-half inch in depth at the lumbar region of Viernes' back, with no vital organs or veins affected.

Co-accused Cornelio Unciano and Romy Patulay raised the defense of alibi. Unciano declared that on December 18 and 19, 1991, he was in his house in Buguey, Cagayan, suffering from sore eyes and an impacted tooth. He stated that he became friends with Viernes only after both had been detained following the incident, though he knew Viernes as a barriomate. Patulay averred that on December 19, 1991, he went to watch a betamax movie at the house of Sonny Doniego, discovered he had previously viewed the film, and left with three companions, passing by the house of Nanding Tomas on the way home, where he learned from a second cousin that there had been a stabbing incident.

The trial court's decision contained no findings of fact regarding the commission of the offense; its conclusion was contained in one paragraph. The court stated that the prosecution had established the guilt of Sosa, Unciano, and Patulay beyond reasonable doubt, found the prosecution witnesses more credible, and noted that Viernes' guilty plea made conspiracy assume an important role—if conspiracy attended the commission of the offense, the act of Viernes was the act of all the other accused. The court also declined to credit Viernes with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, finding that he surrendered out of fear for his life.

• Self-Defense: Appellant Viernes argued that the trial court erred in not finding that he acted in self-defense, maintaining that he was attacked by the deceased who slit his back with a razor, prompting him to stab the deceased in response.
• Conspiracy and Evident Premeditation: Appellants Sosa, Unciano, and Patulay argued that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy and evident premeditation, asserting that no evidence was presented by the prosecution to support its theory that they held the deceased while Viernes stabbed him.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of superior strength were present in the commission of the crime.

• No Unlawful Aggression: The Office of the Solicitor General argued that there was no more unlawful aggression by the deceased when Viernes stabbed him, as there was no showing that the deceased had continually attacked him or had persisted in hurting him until the stab blow was delivered, noting that the wound sustained by Viernes was only shallow and did not affect vital organs or veins.
• Self-Defense as Afterthought: The prosecution argued that Viernes' theory of self-defense was not credible because it suffered from lack of corroboration and was belied by his behavior after the crime—when he surrendered to the barangay captain and the police, he did not say he acted in self-defense.

• Self-Defense: Whether appellant Viernes acted in complete self-defense when he stabbed the deceased Herminio Doniego.
• Conspiracy: Whether the prosecution proved conspiracy among the four accused beyond reasonable doubt.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of superior strength were present in the commission of the crime.

• Self-Defense: Yes. Viernes acted in complete self-defense, having proven by clear and convincing evidence the three elements of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not established, the prosecution having shown no overt act in furtherance of a common design; the suddenness of the attack rules out the theory of conspiracy, and the evidence against the three co-accused does not meet the standard of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Aggravating Circumstances: No. Since the accused were acquitted, the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of superior strength were not considered; the Court found no basis to sustain the conviction.

• Self-Defense: The Court applied the well-settled rule that in cases where the accused pleads self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of the plea. The three indispensable elements of complete self-defense under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) unlawful aggression against the pleader of self-defense; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The Court found all three elements present. The unlawful aggression was the attack made by the deceased on Viernes while the latter was watching a betamax movie—the gash at the lumbar region of Viernes' back must have been made when he was unaware of the deceased's intent to attack. The locations of the wounds inflicted on both parties indicated their relative positions and revealed that the deceased was the unlawful aggressor. On the second element, the Court cited People vs. Encomienda for the proposition that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense; what the law requires is rational equivalence, considering the emergency, the imminent danger, and the instinct of self-preservation. The Court found that the knife was the only instrument within manageable distance from Viernes, and a person required to act instantaneously to resist an attack is justified in rendering the aggressor harmless even if the resulting injury is fatal. On the third element, the Court found that Viernes' act of covering the screen could perhaps be considered a provocation but not adequate enough to evoke the particular act of aggression adopted by the deceased. The Court rejected the prosecution's argument that self-defense was an afterthought, noting that Viernes' testimony was consistent with the evidence on record, including the number and location of the wounds, the laceration at his back, and his immediate surrender to the barangay captain. The Court also noted the absence of motive for Viernes to kill the victim, which is important in ascertaining the truth between two antagonistic theories of the killing.

• Conspiracy: The Court applied the rule from People vs. Custodio that conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement, and it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged in the crime be present when it was perpetrated; there must be a logical relationship between the commission of the crime and the supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more ultimate connection through overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design. The Court found that the prosecution's evidence fell short of this requirement. The evidence mainly pointed to the act of stabbing and what occurred thereafter, but the prosecution witnesses admitted that minutes before the commotion they were watching a betamax and their attention was focused on the screen. The Court noted that the mere holding of the deceased's hand does not necessarily prove intention to kill, because the co-accused may have been trying to prevent the stabbing when the prosecution witnesses saw them. Absent any act or circumstance from which a common design among the accused may be logically inferred, the theory of conspiracy remains a speculation, not a fact.

• Trial Court's Failure to Make Findings of Fact: The Court noted the trial court's decision contained no findings of fact, which are essential in decision-making. Citing Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution, the Court reiterated that it is mandatory on all judges to observe the rule that no decision shall be rendered without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

• Complete Self-Defense — Under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code, complete self-defense requires: (1) unlawful aggression against the pleader of self-defense; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The burden of proof shifts to the accused to prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence. The Court applied this doctrine to acquit Viernes, finding that the deceased's razor attack on his back constituted unlawful aggression, the stabbing was a reasonably necessary response given the instinct of self-preservation, and Viernes' conduct did not constitute sufficient provocation.

• Reasonable Necessity of Means Employed — Reasonable necessity does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense; what the law requires is rational equivalence, considering the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than reason, that moves or impels the defense. Proportionateness does not depend upon the harm done but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. The Court applied this doctrine, citing People vs. Encomienda, to hold that Viernes' use of a knife to repel a razor attack was reasonable under the circumstances.

• Conspiracy Must Be Proven as Convincingly as the Crime Itself — Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement, and it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged in the crime be present when it was perpetrated; there must be a logical relationship between the commission of the crime and the supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more ultimate connection through overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design. The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is required to support a finding of conspiracy. The Court applied this doctrine to acquit the three co-accused, finding that the mere holding of the deceased's hand did not necessarily prove intention to kill.

• "Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury." — This passage from People vs. Encomienda, quoted by the Court, defines the canonical formulation of the second element of self-defense and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on justifying circumstances.

• "Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement and in order to establish the existence of such a circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged or connected with the same be present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be established a logical relationship between the commission of the crime and the supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more ultimate connection between and among the latter, such as by their overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design." — This passage from People vs. Custodio, quoted by the Court, articulates the strict standard for proving conspiracy and was the basis for acquitting the three co-accused.

• "The mere holding of the deceased's hand does not necessarily prove intention to kill, because it may be that they (co-accused) were trying to prevent the stabbing of the deceased when the prosecution witnesses saw them." — This statement by the Court explains why the prosecution's evidence of conspiracy was insufficient, as the act of holding the victim could be consistent with an innocent purpose.

• People vs. Encomienda, No. L-26750, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 522 — Cited as controlling authority for the doctrine that reasonable necessity of the means employed in self-defense requires rational equivalence, not material commensurability, between the means of attack and defense.
• People vs. Custodio, No. L-30463, October 30, 1972, 47 SCRA 289 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that conspiracy must be proven as convincingly as the crime itself, requiring a logical relationship between the commission of the crime and the supposed conspirators.
• People vs. Boholst-Caballero, No. L-23249, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180 — Cited for the proposition that the law on self-defense finds justification on man's natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person from impending danger, and for the rule that absence of motive is important in ascertaining the truth between two antagonistic theories of the killing.
• People vs. Lualhati, G.R. No. 105289-90, July 21, 1994, 234 SCRA 325 — Cited for the rule that in cases where the accused pleads self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of the plea.
• People vs. Jorge, G.R. No. 99379, April 22, 1994, 231 SCRA 693 — Cited for the proposition that the mere holding of the deceased's hand does not necessarily prove intention to kill.
• People vs. Lara, 48 Phil. 153 — Cited within People vs. Encomienda for the principle that in emergencies, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation.

• Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — The provision defining the justifying circumstance of self-defense, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. The Court applied this provision to acquit Viernes.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing murder. The accused were charged under this provision, but the conviction was reversed on appeal.
• Article VIII, Section 14, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional provision requiring that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The Court cited this provision in noting the trial court's failure to make findings of fact.

Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concurred.