People of the Philippines vs. Victoriano Castro y Calagno

In a prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, conviction requires proof that the sale actually took place and the presentation in court of the corpus delicti; a "Receipt for Property Seized" signed by the accused without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible as a document tacitly admitting the offense, but its exclusion does not preclude conviction where the detailed testimonies of the law officers who conducted the buy-bust operation independently establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, penalized the sale of prohibited drugs, and enforcement was carried out by the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) through buy-bust operations in which an operative poses as a buyer and a civilian informer effects the introduction to the target. Victoriano Castro y Calagno was a resident of San Manuel, Pangasinan, whose house became the site of such an operation conducted by a NARCOM team on March 19, 1991. The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 38, which had convicted him.

Victoriano Castro y Calagno was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 38, under an information dated March 21, 1991, with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The information alleged that on or about March 19, 1991, at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, in the Municipality of San Manuel, Province of Pangasinan, he wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sold to a NARCOM agent who acted as poseur-buyer approximately one thousand (1,000) grams of marijuana dried leaves, a prohibited drug, without the corresponding permit or authority from the proper authorities. Castro entered a plea of not guilty, and trial on the merits commenced.

According to the prosecution, at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of March 19, 1991, Capt. Allyn Evasco, together with Sgt. Rogelio Raguine, Sgt. Emilio de Guzman, and CIC Julian Discargar, formed a team for the purpose of conducting a buy-bust operation. The team proceeded to their target area in San Rogue, San Miguel, Pangasinan, and deployed themselves as planned. Sgt. de Guzman, who acted as poseur-buyer, and civilian informer Discargar proceeded to Castro's house, while Sgt. Raguine hid in a grassy spot near the house. Discargar introduced Castro to Sgt. de Guzman, who said that he wanted to purchase a kilo of dried marijuana leaves. After going inside the house, Castro emerged with a plastic bag which he handed to Sgt. de Guzman, who in turn paid him P600.00. After the exchange, Sgt. de Guzman made the pre-arranged signal indicating that the transaction was complete by raising his right hand. Upon espying the signal, Sgt. Raguine and the other team members approached Castro, introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, and arrested him. He was thereafter brought to the San Manuel Police Station. While the arresting team went to San Fernando, La Union for further investigation, the marijuana leaves were sent to Camp Crame for examination, where it was discovered that the actual weight of the confiscated marijuana leaves was 930 grams.

Castro presented an altogether different version of what transpired. He testified that around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, he was resting in his house when a certain Nolly Selga arrived and offered to sell him some marijuana leaves, which he declined since he was not a marijuana user. While they were conversing, NARCOM agents suddenly arrived and allegedly proceeded to search his house for illegal drugs but were not able to find any. Undaunted, the NARCOM agents asked him to go with them to the headquarters for investigation. Instead of acceding to the agents' demand, he told them that it was Nolly Selga who actually possessed and sold marijuana. As a result, both of them were taken to the San Manuel Police Station for investigation. From there, they were brought to Barangay Nancalabasan, where Selga was allegedly able to bribe himself out of the predicament, thus leaving Castro all alone to answer the charges. Subsequently, he was brought to the NARCOM Headquarters at San Fernando, La Union, where he was further investigated and allegedly forced to sign a "Receipt for Property Seized" without the assistance of counsel.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's account of the buy-bust operation and found Castro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. On appeal, Castro faulted the trial court for crediting the allegedly inconsistent testimonies of prosecution witnesses Sgt. Raguine and Sgt. de la Cruz — the former having stated that he showed the confiscated marijuana to Sgt. de la Cruz, the police officer on duty at the San Manuel police station, while the latter testified that the confiscated marijuana was never presented to him.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Castro maintained that the trial court erred in giving credence to the unreliable testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in rejecting the more credible evidence of the defense, pointing specifically to the inconsistency between Sgt. Raguine, who stated that he showed the confiscated marijuana to Sgt. de la Cruz, and Sgt. de la Cruz, who testified that the confiscated marijuana was never presented to him.
• Admissibility of the Receipt of Property Seized: Castro argued that the trial court erred in admitting the "Receipt of Property Seized" as evidence against him despite the fact that it was signed by him without the assistance of counsel, he having allegedly been forced to sign it during investigation at the NARCOM Headquarters in San Fernando, La Union.
• Failure to Prove Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Castro contended that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and he asserted his innocence by claiming that Nolly Selga was the real drug dealer who had bribed himself out of the case.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in rejecting the evidence of the defense, in light of the alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of Sgt. Raguine and Sgt. de la Cruz.
• Admissibility of the Receipt of Property Seized: Whether the "Receipt of Property Seized" signed by the accused without the assistance of counsel is admissible in evidence against him.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the illegal sale of marijuana under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. No compelling reason existed to disturb the trial court's factual findings, and the inconsistency pointed out by Castro was so trivial and collateral as not to affect the substance of the prosecution witnesses' declarations or the weight of their testimony.
• Admissibility of the Receipt of Property Seized: No. The signature on the "Receipt of Property Seized" is inadmissible, there being no showing that Castro was assisted by counsel when he signed it, since the document tacitly admits the offense charged and the constitutional safeguard must be observed.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: Yes. The prosecution complied with the twin requirements for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs — proof that the transaction or sale actually took place and the presentation in court of the corpus delicti — and the verdict of conviction must be upheld.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses are best addressed to the sound judgment of the trial court, whose averments should rightly be accorded due respect on appeal. The inconsistency Castro pointed out — Sgt. Raguine's statement that he showed the confiscated marijuana to Sgt. de la Cruz against Sgt. de la Cruz's testimony that the marijuana was never presented to him — concerned a minor detail and a collateral matter and did not affect the substance of the witnesses' declarations or the veracity or weight of their testimony. The prosecution firmly established the fact of Castro's valid entrapment by the police operatives: Sgt. de Guzman, who acted as poseur-buyer, was presented in court and testified on Castro's arrest and the reasons therefor, and his testimony was bolstered by Sgt. Raguine, who was present during the buy-bust operation and the apprehension of Castro. Castro, on the other hand, had no substantial defense other than his unsubstantiated and self-serving denial, which is evidence unworthy of any weight in law, mere denials being unable to prevail against the positive identification of an accused as the seller of prohibited drugs. It was likewise odd that Castro never made any effort to present Nolly Selga, the person who, according to him, was the real drug dealer, since any individual wrongfully accused of a crime would be expected to exculpate himself by producing the real perpetrator. His allegation that the arresting officers were bribed by Nolly Selga deserved little consideration, as there was no evidence that the arresting officers were motivated by dubious motives in apprehending him or that a bribery indeed took place, and the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by said officers stood uncontroverted.

• Admissibility of the Receipt of Property Seized: The Court agreed with Castro that his signature on the "Receipt of Property Seized" is inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing that he was assisted by counsel when he signed the same. Because the document tacitly admits the offense charged, the constitutional safeguard must be observed. Even disregarding this document, however, there remained ample evidence to prove Castro's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the same having been shown by the detailed testimonies of the law officers who took part in the buy-bust operation.

• Sufficiency of the Evidence: In the prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. Both requirements were met. The testimony of Sgt. de Guzman, the poseur-buyer, as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the buy-bust operation was clear and straightforward, and it was corroborated by the undisputed statements of Sgt. Raguine as to the actual exchange of marijuana for cash (marked money), so that a sale of illicit drug was consummated between Castro and the poseur-buyer. There was also no dispute that the seized marijuana was presented in court as evidence for the prosecution, which drug Sgt. de Guzman categorically identified in court as the seized items confiscated from Castro during the buy-bust operation. Moreover, when the drug seized was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for examination, Major Teresita Ancid, Acting Chief of the Chemistry Division therein, confirmed in her Chemistry Report No. D-022-91 dated March 25, 1991, that the contents of the plastic bag confiscated from Castro were positively marijuana with a total weight of 930 grams. The corpus delicti of the offense was thus duly established, and the requirements of law for a valid charge and conviction for the illegal sale of marijuana under the Dangerous Drugs Act were complied with by the prosecution.

• Credibility of witnesses is a matter for the trial court — Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses are best addressed to the sound judgment of the trial court, whose findings should rightly be accorded due respect on appeal. The Court applied this rule in declining to disturb the trial court's assessment of the NARCOM operatives' testimonies, there being no compelling reason shown to warrant a departure from the factual findings below.
• Minor inconsistencies do not impair testimony — Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declarations or the veracity or weight of their testimony. The discrepancy between Sgt. Raguine's statement that he showed the seized marijuana to Sgt. de la Cruz and the latter's testimony that it was never presented to him was held trivial and collateral, and thus did not dent the prosecution's case.
• Mere denial cannot prevail against positive identification — An unsubstantiated and self-serving denial is evidence unworthy of any weight in law and cannot prevail against the positive identification of an accused as the seller of prohibited drugs. Castro's denial, uncorroborated and unsupported by any effort to present Nolly Selga, was rejected against the positive identification made by the poseur-buyer and corroborated by Sgt. Raguine.
• Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties — Official duties are presumed to have been regularly performed, and this presumption, uncontroverted, stands in favor of the arresting officers. The Court invoked it in rejecting Castro's claim that the arresting officers had been bribed by Nolly Selga, there being no evidence of dubious motive or of any bribery.
• Twin requirements in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs — In the prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, what is material is (a) proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, and (b) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. Both were satisfied through the clear and straightforward testimony of the poseur-buyer, corroborated as to the actual exchange of marijuana for marked money, and through the presentation and identification in court of the seized marijuana, confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D-022-91 to be marijuana weighing 930 grams.
• Inadmissibility of an extrajudicial admission signed without counsel — A "Receipt for Property Seized" is a document tacitly admitting the offense charged; where there is no showing that the accused was assisted by counsel when he signed it, the constitutional safeguard must be observed and the signature is inadmissible in evidence. The Court nonetheless held that the exclusion of the document did not preclude conviction, because the detailed testimonies of the law officers who took part in the buy-bust operation independently established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• "It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration or the veracity or weight of their testimony." — This states the ratio for rejecting Castro's principal assignment of error on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and it is the formulation routinely cited for the rule that collateral inconsistencies do not impair a witness's testimony.
• "This Court has laid down the unwavering rule that in the prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence." — This is the canonical statement of the twin requirements for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the framework against which the Court measured the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.
• "We agree, however, with Castro's contention that his signature on the 'Receipt of Property Seized' is inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing that he was assisted by counsel when he signed the same. Since this is a document tacitly admitting the offense charged, the constitutional safeguard must be observed." — This is the Court's sole ruling in Castro's favor, characterizing the receipt as a tacit admission and applying the constitutional safeguard notwithstanding the affirmance of the conviction.
• "Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of an accused as the seller of prohibited drugs." — This articulates the evidentiary weight accorded to a bare denial against a positive identification, the ground on which Castro's defense of denial was discarded.

• People vs. Peralta, 251 SCRA 6 (1994) and People vs. Aboga, 147 SCRA 409 (1987) — Cited as authority for the rule that questions concerning the credibility of witnesses are best addressed to the sound judgment of the trial court, whose findings should be accorded due respect on appeal.
• People vs. Ang Chun Kit, 251 SCRA 660 (1995) — Cited for the rule that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declarations or the veracity or weight of their testimony.
• People vs. Cobre, 239 SCRA 159 (1994), People vs. Cuachon, 238 SCRA 540 (1994), and People vs. Manyao, 207 SCRA 732 (1992) — Cited for the rule that an unsubstantiated and self-serving denial is evidence unworthy of any weight in law.
• People vs. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376 (1990) — Cited for the rule that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of an accused as the seller of prohibited drugs.
• People vs. Juma, 220 SCRA 432 (1993) and People vs. Balidiata, 222 SCRA 409 (1993) — Cited for the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the arresting officers.
• People vs. Bay, 222 SCRA 723 (1993) — Cited for the twin requirements in the prosecution of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

• Section 4, Article II, Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) — The provision under which Castro was charged and convicted for the sale of approximately one thousand grams of marijuana dried leaves without the corresponding permit or authority. The Court applied it by holding that the prosecution had complied with the requirements of law for a valid charge and conviction for the illegal sale of marijuana, the sale having been consummated and the corpus delicti duly established.
• Constitutional safeguard against uncounselled extrajudicial admissions (as referenced in the decision) — The Court held that because the "Receipt for Property Seized" is a document tacitly admitting the offense charged, "the constitutional safeguard must be observed," and Castro's signature on it, taken without the assistance of counsel, was inadmissible in evidence. The decision refers to the safeguard in general terms and does not specify a particular constitutional provision.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.