People of the Philippines vs. Vicente Rabanillo y Magolong

Evident premeditation cannot qualify a killing absent proof of the time the offender determined to commit the crime and a sufficient interval for reflection; a 30-minute interval between the determination and the execution is insufficient for full meditation. Abuse of superior strength requires proof that the assailant actually took advantage of superior strength, not merely that he was bulkier than the victim.

Vicente Rabanillo and Raul Morales were barriomates in Barangay Amansabina, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, whose houses stood about 15 meters apart; Rabanillo was the barangay’s chief tanod, and Morales’s mother, Narcisa, operated a store in the barangay. The charge was brought under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which penalizes murder.

On August 9, 1996, in the afternoon, Vicente Rabanillo, Raul Morales, prosecution witnesses Perfecto Suarez, Samuel Magalong, and Ramil Morales, and several other persons were having a drinking spree at the store of Narcisa Morales, mother of Raul Morales, at Barangay Amansabina, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Rabanillo was the barangay’s chief tanod, and he and Morales were barriomates whose houses were about 15 meters apart. At about 5:00 p.m., Willy Vito, one of the participants, took a bath at a nearby artesian well and jokingly doused Suarez with water. Suarez tried to retaliate but failed, then ran after the others and splashed them with water. Rabanillo joined the game, filled a container with water, and tried to pour its contents at someone but drenched Morales instead. Morales reprimanded him because water got into his ear. A heated argument ensued and culminated in a fistfight. Cooler heads pacified them and ushered them to their respective houses; the others milled around by the road.

The prosecution and the defense gave different versions of what happened next. According to the prosecution, half an hour after the fistfight, while Morales, Suarez, and Mauro Pascua were conversing in the terrace of Morales’s house, Rabanillo went out of his house wielding a one-meter samurai. He went straight to Morales and hacked him. Morales instinctively parried the blow but was hit on his right hand. When he attempted to run away, he tripped and fell to the ground. Rabanillo hacked him two more times, hitting him at his back and left shoulder. Morales died that same day.

The defense presented a different account. A while later, Rabanillo heard Morales, then in the terrace of their house beside Rabanillo’s house, shouting and challenging him to come out. Irked by the challenge, Rabanillo emerged from his house with a bolo and attacked Morales, killing him. Thereafter, accompanied by the barangay captain, he went to the Town Hall of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, and surrendered.

At trial, Rabanillo did not deny killing Morales and offered testimony to prove the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, drunkenness, and voluntary surrender. The trial court found that the fight was ignited by Rabanillo when he poured water into Morales’s ear; that Morales had not inflicted bodily injury on Rabanillo; that Rabanillo was not intoxicated; and that the barangay captain went to Rabanillo’s house and brought him to the police station. It also found that Morales was forewarned of Rabanillo’s intention and that the initial attack was frontal.

• Evident Premeditation: Rabanillo maintained that the killing was not planned; it was only when Morales and his friends taunted him, “You come out, Tanod Commander,” that he emerged from his house in a fit of anger and attacked Morales, with no sufficient time for meditation and reflection on the nature and consequences of his act.
• Passion and Obfuscation: He argued that the words “You come out, Tanod Commander” were enough to blind a barangay folk who is characteristically sensitive; in his Brief he abandoned his allegations that Morales boxed him and threw bottles, claiming instead that the obfuscation was generated by the victim’s words, which he considered a challenge to his person and honor as chief tanod.
• Intoxication: He asserted that having imbibed liquor from 2:00 to 5:00 p.m., he must have been drunk enough to be so sensitive as to accept the victim’s challenge.
• Voluntary Surrender: He claimed that after killing the victim, he voluntarily went with the barangay captain to the police station to surrender and willingly obliged to be committed in jail even without a warrant of arrest or an information against him.

• Evident Premeditation: The Office of the Solicitor General recommended that Rabanillo be convicted of homicide only, not murder, because the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not present.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: The Office of the Solicitor General stated that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was correctly appreciated by the trial court but was not alleged in the information.
• Other Respects: The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court in all other respects.

• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing of Morales.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the trial court erred in finding that the killing of Morales was qualified by evident premeditation.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was properly appreciated.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Whether Rabanillo is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
• Intoxication: Whether Rabanillo is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether Rabanillo is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Penalty: Whether the trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
• Damages: Whether the awards of damages were warranted.

• Treachery: No. Morales was facing Rabanillo’s direction, saw him approaching with a samurai, knew he would be the target after the recent fight, and was about 10 meters away with an opportunity to escape or avoid the assault.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The qualifying circumstance was not established; there was no showing of the time Rabanillo determined to commit the crime, and only 30 minutes elapsed before the attack, which is insufficient for full meditation. The crime is homicide only.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rabanillo took advantage of superior strength; mere bulkier physique compared to the victim’s slimmer body was insufficient.
• Passion and Obfuscation: No. The assault arose from anger and resentment after a public reprimand, not from lawful feelings, and 30 minutes elapsed between the fistfight and the killing.
• Intoxication: No. Intoxication was not sufficiently established; Rabanillo’s ability to resume routine work belied his claim of heavy drunkenness.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. The barangay captain fetched Rabanillo from his house; he did not voluntarily present himself to a person in authority, and voluntary surrender presupposes repentance.
• Penalty: The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death was erroneous. With neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty applies; under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty is 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
• Damages: Actual damages were reduced to P26,024.70 due to P15,000 in contributions; moral damages of P30,000 to Narcisa Morales were sustained; exemplary damages were not awarded; civil indemnity, actual damages, and attorney’s fees were payable to all heirs.

• Treachery: The trial court ruled out treachery, and the Supreme Court agreed. The evidence showed that Morales was facing towards the direction where Rabanillo came from. He must have caught sight of Rabanillo approaching with a samurai in his hands. Considering that a fight between them had just taken place, Morales knew or must have known that he would be the target of Rabanillo’s attack. Since he was still about 10 meters away from Rabanillo, he had an opportunity to escape or avoid the assault. Hence, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime.
• Evident Premeditation: For evident premeditation to be considered, the following elements must be established: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the offender time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. Here, there was no showing as to the time Rabanillo decided to commit the crime. Even assuming that it was right after he was escorted to his house that he conceived the idea of killing the victim, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated because only 30 minutes intervened between that time and the time he went out of his house to attack Morales. A lapse of 30 minutes between the determination to commit a crime and the execution thereof is insufficient for full meditation on the consequences of the act. The attending circumstances also negated evident premeditation: it was still daylight; the persons who were previously drinking were just milling around by the road; Rabanillo did not wait until Morales was alone; he came out with the samurai parallel to his head and went straight to the victim while the latter was conversing with two friends; and he did not disguise his weapon but raised it high for all to see. Cool thought and calm judgment were absent. Since the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were not present, Rabanillo could be convicted of homicide only.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: There is abuse of superior strength if the assailant takes advantage of his superior strength. It must be established that not only did the assailant enjoy superior strength over the victim, but that he took advantage thereof in the commission of the crime. That Morales was “slimmer/thinner” while Rabanillo was “bulkier and stronger” was not enough proof that the latter enjoyed superior strength. There should have been proof that Rabanillo’s bulkier physique provided him physical strength superior to that of Morales. A man of “slimmer/thinner body” need not necessarily be physically weak; he could even be physically stronger than a bulkier person. Moreover, even granting that Rabanillo was physically stronger than Morales, the circumstances failed to convince that Rabanillo took advantage of his superior strength.
• Passion and Obfuscation: To prove passion and obfuscation, Rabanillo testified that the group of Morales shouted at him, “You come out, Tanod Commander”; that Meljhones Soriano approached him and held his hands; that Morales boxed him and threw bottles at him; and that he was so “blinded by their shouting” that he did not know what happened next. In his Brief, however, Rabanillo abandoned these allegations and merely stated that the obfuscation was generated by the victim’s words, which he considered a challenge against his person and honor as chief tanod. The prosecution witnesses Perfecto Suarez and Samuel Magalong were one in saying that Morales was just having a conversation with his friends when Rabanillo came out of his house ready to attack. Rabanillo himself testified that Samuel Magalong is the son of Rabanillo’s first cousin, and he did not deny Suarez’s testimony that Rabanillo is Suarez’s grandfather. Since Magalong and Suarez are Rabanillo’s nephew and grandson, respectively, they would unlikely omit anything that would mitigate his liability. Suarez and Magalong testified that before the hacking incident, Morales reprimanded Rabanillo in front of their drinking mates for dousing him with water, which entered his ear; Rabanillo resented it and felt humiliated; a fistfight ensued but was broken up. The event must have continued to dominate Rabanillo’s thought that he decided to strike back by hacking the victim to death. The assault was made in a fit of anger. For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason that naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The excitement inherent in all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute obfuscation. Moreover, the act producing obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might have regained his normal equanimity. Where at least half an hour elapsed between the previous fight and the killing, the accused cannot be given the benefit of the attenuating circumstance of obfuscation. Here, 30 minutes intervened between the fistfight and the killing. The attack cannot be said to be the result of a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury. Having been actuated more by the spirit of revenge or by anger and resentment for having been publicly berated by Morales, Rabanillo cannot be credited with passion and obfuscation.
• Intoxication: To be mitigating, the accused’s state of intoxication should be proved or established by sufficient evidence. It should be such an intoxication that would diminish or impair the exercise of his willpower or the capacity to know the injustice of his act. The accused must show that (1) at the time of the commission of the criminal act, he has taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degree of self-control; and (2) such intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. Rabanillo merely stated in his testimony that he joined his friends Domingo de Guzman and Elde Soriano in a drinking session, but only for a short time. His friends started their drinking spree at about 11:00 a.m.; he was the one serving their “pulutan”; he joined them at about 12:00 noon; at past 12:00 noon he helped his daughter-in-law in selling cooked foods; and from 3:00 to 5:00 p.m. he was cleaning his house. The fact that he was able to resume his routine work belied his claim that he was heavily drunk at the time he attacked the victim. The testimony of his daughter-in-law that Rabanillo had been drinking 4 x 4 Ginebra San Miguel from 10:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. was not sufficient to establish drunkenness. There remained no proof that Rabanillo had taken such quantity of liquor as to impair his mental faculties. His own witness testified that he would drink liquor twice a week; this regularity of intake must have increased his tolerance for alcohol to such an extent that he could not easily get drunk.
• Voluntary Surrender: For voluntary surrender to be considered, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender was not actually arrested; (2) he surrendered to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) he acknowledges his guilt or (b) he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. That Rabanillo submitted himself to the custody of law even though there was yet no warrant of arrest or information against him is of no moment. The barangay captain had to go to the house of Rabanillo to take the latter to the police station. Rabanillo did not present himself voluntarily to the barangay captain, who is a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; neither did he ask the barangay captain to fetch him at his house so he could surrender. The fact alone that he did not resist but went peacefully with the barangay captain does not mean that he voluntarily surrendered. Besides, voluntary surrender presupposes repentance; this condition could not have existed because at the moment he was brought to the police station, he had “mental blackout.” Moreover, he merely reported to the police that “there was trouble in Amansabina.” Hence, voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated.
• Penalty: The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. This was clearly erroneous, even if it were conceded that the crime committed was murder. While Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code punishes murder with “reclusion perpetua to death,” it does not follow that courts should impose these two indivisible penalties. What should be imposed is one or the other depending on the presence of modifying circumstances. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties: (1) when there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied; (2) when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied; (3) when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied; and (4) when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance established, the penalty that may be meted out is the medium period of that prescribed by law for the offense. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate penalty whose minimum should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and whose maximum should be that of reclusion temporal in its medium period, may be imposed. Concretely, such indeterminate penalty should be ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.
• Damages: Although Rabanillo did not question the awards of damages, an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, so the Court determined whether the awards were warranted. As to actual damages, the sister of Morales testified that as a result of his death, her family spent P41,024.70 for funeral services, food served during the wake, coffin, tomb, masses, and novena. On cross-examination, however, she admitted the existence of contributions in the amount of P15,000.00. The award of P41,024.70 should therefore be reduced to P26,024.70. The award of moral damages in favor of Narcisa Morales, mother of Morales, was sustained because she testified on her suffering brought about by the untimely death of her son. In view of the finding that no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, no exemplary damages may be awarded. The award of attorney’s fees may be allowed under circumstance (11) of Article 2208 of the Civil Code. However, the awards of civil indemnity, actual damages, and attorney’s fees should be payable not only to the mother but also to the other heirs of Morales.

• Evident premeditation — The requisites are: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the offender time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Its essence is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. The Court applied this doctrine to reject evident premeditation because there was no showing of the time of determination and only 30 minutes elapsed before the attack, which was insufficient for full meditation.
• Abuse of superior strength — There is abuse of superior strength if the assailant takes advantage of his superior strength. It must be established that not only did the assailant enjoy superior strength over the victim, but that he took advantage thereof in the commission of the crime. The Court held that mere proof that the accused was “bulkier and stronger” while the victim was “slimmer/thinner” was insufficient, and that even assuming superior strength, the circumstances did not show that Rabanillo took advantage of it.
• Treachery — Treachery is not present where the victim was forewarned of the attack and had an opportunity to escape or avoid the assault. The Court agreed with the trial court that Morales was facing Rabanillo’s direction, saw him approaching with a samurai, knew he would be the target after the recent fight, and was about 10 meters away with an opportunity to escape or avoid the assault.
• Passion and obfuscation — For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason that naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The excitement inherent in all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute obfuscation. Moreover, the act producing obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might have regained his normal equanimity. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the mitigating circumstance because 30 minutes elapsed between the fistfight and the killing, and the attack was actuated by revenge or anger and resentment for having been publicly berated.
• Intoxication — To be mitigating, the accused’s state of intoxication should be proved or established by sufficient evidence. It should be such an intoxication that would diminish or impair the exercise of his willpower or the capacity to know the injustice of his act. The accused must show that (1) at the time of the commission of the criminal act, he has taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degree of self-control; and (2) such intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. The Court found the claim unproven because Rabanillo was able to resume routine work and his own witness testified that he drank liquor twice a week, increasing his tolerance.
• Voluntary surrender — The requisites are: (1) the offender was not actually arrested; (2) he surrendered to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) he acknowledges his guilt or (b) he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance. The Court held that no voluntary surrender occurred because the barangay captain had to go to Rabanillo’s house to take him to the police station, and Rabanillo did not voluntarily present himself.
• Application of indivisible penalties — Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The trial court erred in imposing reclusion perpetua to death instead of selecting the proper indivisible penalty based on modifying circumstances.
• Appellate review in criminal cases — An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review. The Court applied this doctrine to review the awards of damages even though Rabanillo did not question them, reducing actual damages, removing exemplary damages, and clarifying that certain awards are payable to all heirs.

• “For evident premeditation to be considered, the following elements must be established: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the offender time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.” — This passage states the canonical requisites of evident premeditation, which the Court used to reject the qualifying circumstance and reduce the conviction from murder to homicide.
• “There is abuse of superior strength if, as expressly provided by law, the assailant takes advantage of his superior strength. It must then be established that not only did the assailant enjoy superior strength over the victim, but that he took advantage thereof in the commission of the crime.” — This passage defines abuse of superior strength and explains why mere disparity in physique was insufficient to appreciate the aggravating circumstance.
• “For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from lawful feelings.” — This passage states the controlling rule on passion and obfuscation, which the Court applied to deny the mitigating circumstance because the attack arose from anger and resentment after a public reprimand.
• “A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) he acknowledges his guilt or (b) lie wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.” — This passage sets out the standard for voluntary surrender, which the Court used to reject Rabanillo’s claim because the barangay captain fetched him from his house.

• People vs. Cruz, 262 SCRA 237, 243-244 [1996] — Cited for the elements of evident premeditation; the Court used the requisites to test whether the qualifying circumstance was established.
• People vs. Villanueva, 265 SCRA 216, 226 [1996] — Cited for the essence of evident premeditation as execution preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent.
• People vs. Pantoja, 25 SCRA 468, 471 [1968] — Cited for the rule that a 30-minute lapse between the determination to commit a crime and its execution is insufficient for full meditation on the consequences of the act.
• People vs. Bautista, 254 SCRA 621, 629 [1996] — Cited for the rule that passion and obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings.
• U.S. vs. Herrera, 13 Phil. 583, 585 [1909] — Cited for the rule that the excitement inherent in a quarrel or fight does not constitute obfuscation.
• People vs. Matbagon, 60 Phil. 887, 890 [1934] — Cited for the rule that where at least half an hour elapsed between the previous fight and the killing, the accused cannot be given the benefit of obfuscation.
• People vs. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798, 813 [1968] — Cited for the requirement that intoxication, to be mitigating, must be proved by sufficient evidence.
• People vs. Boduso, 60 SCRA 60, 70-71 [1974] — Cited for the requisites of intoxication as a mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Rapanut, 263 SCRA 515, 529-530 [1996] — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Ramilla, 227 SCRA 583, 590 [1993] — Cited for the rule that where the barangay captain had to go to the accused’s house to take him to the police station, there was no voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Marasigan, 70 Phil. 583 [1940] — Cited for the rule that voluntary surrender presupposes repentance.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder; the information charged Rabanillo under this provision, but the Court found the qualifying circumstances absent.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes homicide with reclusion temporal; the Court convicted Rabanillo under this provision.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties; the trial court erred in imposing reclusion perpetua to death instead of selecting the proper indivisible penalty based on modifying circumstances.
• Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the deed, the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law is imposed; applied to homicide.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate penalty.
• Article 152, Revised Penal Code — Defines persons in authority; the barangay captain was a person in authority for purposes of voluntary surrender.
• Article 2208(11), Civil Code — Allows attorney’s fees under the circumstances stated; the Court sustained the award.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Governs exemplary damages in criminal offenses; because no aggravating circumstance attended the crime, exemplary damages were not awarded.

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Santiago, JJ., concur.