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People of the Philippines vs. Urbano Damaso

The conviction for parricide was affirmed. Urbano Damaso appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac sentencing him to life imprisonment for killing his wife, Raymunda Pascua, on the evening of February 10 to 11, 1959. The prosecution's principal eyewitness was Antonio Valdoz, about seven years old, who lived with the couple and testified that Damaso quarreled with and stabbed Raymunda with a scythe. The defense relied on alibi, claiming that Damaso was at his brother Macario's house about a kilometer away, helping prepare for a baptismal party. The Supreme Court declined to disturb the trial court's findings, finding the eyewitness testimony corroborated by circumstances and the alibi not physically impossible.

Primary Holding

The positive identification of the accused by a child eyewitness, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, is sufficient to sustain a parricide conviction notwithstanding the accused's alibi; the trial court's findings on witness credibility will not be disturbed absent a plausible reason.

Background

Urbano Damaso was married to Raymunda Pascua. Antonio Valdoz, then about seven years old, lived with the couple because Raymunda was childless and his mother, Consolacion Pascua, was Raymunda's sister. Cipriano Pascua, Raymunda's father, lived only six meters from the couple's house. Magdalena Damaso was appellant's cousin and neighbor.

History

  1. Court of First Instance of Tarlac, first heard in 1961 before Judge Bernabe Aquino and later in 1963 before his successor — tried the parricide case against Urbano Damaso.

  2. Court of First Instance of Tarlac

    Convicted Urbano Damaso of parricide, sentencing him to life imprisonment, with accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to indemnify the heirs of Raymunda Pascua in the sum of P6,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as well as to pay the costs.

  3. Urbano Damaso

    Appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of the decision.

  4. Nov 24, 1966

    Supreme Court, En Banc

    Affirmed the decision appealed from, with costs against the appellant.

Facts

Urbano Damaso was married to Raymunda Pascua. Antonio Valdoz, about seven years old at the time of the occurrence, lived with the couple because Raymunda was childless and his mother, Consolacion Pascua, was Raymunda's sister. Cipriano Pascua, Raymunda's father, lived only six meters from the couple's house. Magdalena Damaso was appellant's cousin and neighbor.

Raymunda Pascua died in her house in the barrio of San Agustin, municipality of Victoria, Tarlac, in the evening of February 10 to 11, 1959, in consequence of four stab wounds in the thorax, on the left side of the mammary line, aside from several injuries sustained in other parts of the body. The prosecution's main direct evidence was the testimony of Antonio Valdoz. He testified that Raymunda was crying when appellant returned home late in the evening; that soon thereafter the spouses quarreled; that in the course of the quarrel appellant held Raymunda by the neck and then wounded her several times with a scythe; that appellant subsequently put off the lamp and left; and that, overcome with fear, Antonio left appellant's house and went to that of his aunt Magdalena Damaso, whom he told that Raymunda was dead already, but Magdalena bade him to sleep. The next morning, upon seeing his mother while she was proceeding to appellant's house but before either had reached it, Antonio embraced her and said, weeping: "My aunt Andang (Raymunda's nickname) is dead; my uncle Banong (appellant's nickname) killed her."

Soon later that same morning, Pat. Pacheco of the local police force, who investigated the occurrence, noticed that Antonio Valdoz was not in appellant's house and located him in that of his natural parents, Alfredo Valdoz and Consolacion Pascua. When Pacheco inquired why he was there, Antonio replied: "I am afraid to go back to the house" of appellant and his deceased wife. Pacheco asked the reason for his fear, and Antonio replied that "Tatang Banong had killed Nanang Andang." When Pacheco and Patrolman Custodio thereafter brought him to appellant's house, Antonio began to cry and told them that he was afraid. Prompted to explain what he was afraid of, the boy answered: "Tatang co Banong patay na Nanang co Andang." Urged to describe how appellant had killed his wife, Antonio answered: "dugsol, dugsol, dugsol Nanang," meaning that he "stabbed, and stabbed and stabbed, auntie." As Pacheco searched appellant's house, he found tucked into one of its walls a wet bolo or scythe (Exh. C) with blood stains near the ring around the base of the blade. Upon seeing the scythe, Antonio said: "That is the instrument. That is the instrument with which my uncle stabbed my Aunt." Antonio reiterated this in substance in an affidavit made that same date before the justice of the peace of Victoria, Tarlac, and at the preliminary investigation conducted the next day. He similarly testified before Judge Bernabe Aquino, who presided over the lower court when the case was first heard in 1961, and later in 1963, upon Judge Aquino's retirement, before his successor in office.

The theory of the defense was that from 8:00 p.m. on February 10, 1959, to 5:00 a.m. the next morning, appellant was in the house of his brother, Macario Damaso, about a kilometer away from the scene of the occurrence, helping butcher, slice, and cook a pig and two goats, which were served during a party to celebrate the baptism of Macario's children later on February 11, 1959. When appellant reached his house at about 6:00 a.m., he found his wife dead with the injuries described above. Sometime later that same morning, he noticed that the P200 in cash that he and his wife kept at the foot of a cardboard was missing. In addition to his testimony, appellant introduced the testimonies of Escolastica Gadia and Feliciano Cordova as regards his presence in the house of his brother Macario in the evening of February 10 to 11, 1959. Through the testimony of Magdalena Damaso, he likewise tried to prove that Antonio Valdoz could not have witnessed the killing because Antonio had spent that evening in Magdalena's house.

Cipriano Pascua, father of the deceased, testified that sometime before the occurrence he had overheard appellant and his wife quarreling in their house, which was only six meters away from his own dwelling; that the argument between the couple was due to the illicit relations of appellant with his cousin and neighbor Magdalena Damaso; and that on January 8, 1959, Raymunda Pascua reported to her father that three days before, she had caught appellant having carnal relations with Magdalena in the latter's house, and that they threatened to kill her if she did not stop "broadcasting" their affair.

The records further disclosed circumstances indicating that the prosecution's theory was substantially true and that the evidence for the defense merited no credence: an echymosis on the anterior left forearm of the deceased, indicating that she had struggled with her assailant, was confirmed by a scratch on appellant's forearm, which he tried to explain by saying it had been caused by the pig slaughtered in the house of his brother Macario; clotted spots of blood were found on the left pocket of his polo shirt and on the portion of his trousers corresponding to his left thigh and left leg, and although the blood was admittedly that of the deceased, appellant claimed it was due to his lifting her body upon finding her dead, but Dr. Briones, the municipal health officer of Victoria, testified that the spots were caused by the spurting blood of a person still alive or dying; appellant did not report the death of his wife either to the authorities or even to his father-in-law, Cipriano Pascua, whose house was only a few meters away, and when Cipriano expressed the wish to have the death investigated, appellant objected, saying: "Why should you ask for the investigation when she is already dead?"; the scythe with which Raymunda had been wounded, according to Antonio Valdoz, was found washed, although still with traces of human blood, and tucked in a wall of appellant's house; by testifying that soon after he had found his wife dead he noticed the disappearance of P200, appellant sought to insinuate that robbery was the motive for her assassination, but he had never mentioned the alleged loss of said amount to the peace officers who investigated him; and the witnesses for the defense, namely, Escolastica Gadia, Feliciano Cordova, and Magdalena Damaso, were appellant's cousin-in-law, brother-in-law, and cousin, respectively, apart from the fact that their testimonies were contradictory in many respects, and Magdalena was the alleged mistress of appellant, who likewise tried to deny his relationship with Gadia and Cordova. The lower court gave no credence to these witnesses for the defense and accepted the version of the prosecution.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Alibi: Appellant maintained that from 8:00 p.m. on February 10, 1959, to 5:00 a.m. the next morning, he was in the house of his brother Macario Damaso, about a kilometer away from the scene of the occurrence, helping butcher, slice, and cook a pig and two goats for a baptismal party, and therefore could not have killed his wife.
  • Alternative Explanation and Robbery Motive: Appellant claimed that when he reached his house at about 6:00 a.m., he found his wife dead and later noticed that the P200 in cash kept at the foot of a cardboard was missing, insinuating that robbery was the motive for her assassination.
  • Impeachment of the Eyewitness: Through the testimony of Magdalena Damaso, appellant sought to prove that Antonio Valdoz could not have witnessed the killing because Antonio had spent the evening in Magdalena's house.
  • Explanations for Physical Evidence: Appellant explained the scratch on his forearm as caused by the pig slaughtered at Macario's house, and the blood spots on his clothing as due to his lifting his wife's body upon finding her dead.

Issues

  • Identity of the Culprit: Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Urbano Damaso was the person who killed Raymunda Pascua.

Ruling

  • Identity of the Culprit: Yes. The identity of Urbano Damaso as the killer was established beyond reasonable doubt by the positive testimony of Antonio Valdoz, corroborated by circumstances, and the trial court's credibility findings were affirmed.

Ruling Rationale

  • Identity of the Culprit: The only question for determination was the identity of the culprit. The prosecution's main direct evidence was the testimony of Antonio Valdoz, about seven years old, who lived with the couple. He testified that Raymunda was crying when appellant returned home late in the evening, that the spouses quarreled, that appellant held Raymunda by the neck and wounded her several times with a scythe, and that appellant then put off the lamp and left. His testimony was corroborated by a number of circumstances about which there could be no doubt. He left appellant's house on the evening of the occurrence and spent part of it in another house because of the fear generated by the commission of the crime in his presence; when he went to Magdalena's house that evening, he told her that Raymunda Pascua was already dead. The next morning, before reaching appellant's house, Antonio embraced his mother and said, weeping: "My aunt Andang is dead; my uncle Banong killed her." Pat. Pacheco found Antonio at his natural parents' house, where Antonio said he was afraid to return and that "Tatang Banong had killed Nanang Andang." When brought to appellant's house, Antonio cried and said: "Tatang co Banong patay na Nanang co Andang," and described the killing as "dugsol, dugsol, dugsol Nanang." Pacheco found a wet bolo or scythe with blood stains tucked into a wall of appellant's house, and Antonio identified it as the instrument used. Antonio reiterated his account in an affidavit before the justice of the peace, at the preliminary investigation, and in his testimony before Judge Bernabe Aquino in 1961 and before the latter's successor in 1963. Cipriano Pascua testified that he had overheard appellant and his wife quarreling, that the quarrel was due to appellant's illicit relations with Magdalena Damaso, and that Raymunda had reported catching appellant with Magdalena and being threatened with death if she did not stop "broadcasting" their affair. Physical circumstances further corroborated the prosecution: the echymosis on the deceased's left forearm and the scratch on appellant's forearm; the blood spots on appellant's clothing, which Dr. Briones testified came from the spurting blood of a person still alive or dying, not from lifting a corpse; appellant's failure to report the death and his objection to an investigation; the washed scythe with traces of human blood; and the belated claim of missing P200, never mentioned to the investigating officers. The defense of alibi was not airtight because Macario's house was only a kilometer away from appellant's house, and appellant could have slipped away after midnight, committed the crime, and returned to mingle with those helping in the preparations for the baptismal party, thereby bolstering his alibi; it was also not unlikely that he returned home earlier than he claimed. The defense witnesses were appellant's relatives and their testimonies were contradictory, while Magdalena was appellant's alleged mistress. The trial court gave no credence to the defense and accepted the prosecution's version, and no plausible reason appeared to interfere with its findings of fact and conclusions, the trial judge having been in a better position to pass upon the veracity of the opposing witnesses. Antonio had no possible motive to falsely incriminate appellant and, in fact, owed him gratitude for having in effect adopted and treated him as his own son. The conviction was therefore affirmed.

Doctrines

  • Trial Court's Credibility Findings — Findings of fact and conclusions of the trial judge on witness credibility are entitled to great weight because the judge observed the witnesses firsthand; appellate courts will not disturb them absent a plausible reason. The Supreme Court found no plausible reason to interfere with the trial court's acceptance of the prosecution's version and rejection of the defense witnesses.
  • Alibi — Alibi must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene; it cannot prevail where the distance and circumstances allowed him to slip away and return. The house of Macario Damaso was only one kilometer away, and appellant could have left after midnight, killed his wife, and returned to the baptismal preparations.
  • Positive Identification and Corroboration — Positive identification by an eyewitness, when corroborated by independent circumstances, prevails over alibi and denial. Antonio Valdoz's testimony was corroborated by his immediate statements to Magdalena, his mother, and the police; the bloodstained scythe; the physical injuries; and appellant's conduct.
  • Child Witness Testimony — The testimony of a child witness may be given full credence where it is corroborated and no improper motive is shown. Antonio, about seven years old, had no possible motive to falsely incriminate appellant and owed him gratitude for having treated him as an adopted son.
  • Motive as Corroboration — Evidence of motive may corroborate the prosecution's theory. Cipriano Pascua testified to a prior quarrel caused by appellant's illicit relations with Magdalena Damaso and to a threat to kill Raymunda if she did not stop broadcasting the affair.

Key Excerpts

  • "The only question for determination in this case is the identity of the culprit." — This frames the sole issue on appeal and defines the analytical scope of the decision.
  • "Upon a review of the record, we find no plausible reason to interfere with the findings of fact and the conclusions reached by His Honor, the trial Judge, who was in a better position than we are to pass upon the veracity of the opposing witnesses." — This states the standard of review on credibility and is the basis for affirming the trial court's factual findings.
  • "Besides, the house of Macario Damaso was only a kilometer away from that of herein appellant, who could have slipped away from Macario's house and gone to his (appellant's) own house, sometime after midnight, and then, after committing the crime charged, returned to the house of Macario, to mingle with those helping in the preparations for the forthcoming baptismal party, and this bolstering up his alibi." — This explains why the alibi did not establish physical impossibility and why it failed to overcome the prosecution's evidence.
  • "More important still, is the fact that his (Antonio's) testimony has been corroborated by a number of circumstances about which there can be no doubt." — This articulates the corroboration that gave the child eyewitness's testimony full credence.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Reyes, J.B.L.; Barrera; Dizon; Regala; Makalintal; Bengzon, J.P.; Zaldivar; Sanchez; and Castro, JJ., concurred.