People of the Philippines vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan (4th Div.) and Henry Barrera

A grant of a demurrer to evidence that dismisses a criminal case on the merits is tantamount to an acquittal and may not be appealed; certiorari under Rule 65 lies only for jurisdictional error or grave abuse of discretion, and no grave abuse exists where the prosecution failed to prove the elements of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019—specifically, actual undue injury and manifest partiality or evident bad faith—and where the People failed to first seek reconsideration.

Mayor Henry E. Barrera of Candelaria, Zambales, and the private complainants were connected to the Candelaria Public Market: Barrera had served as vice-mayor from 1986 to 1992 and was himself a stallholder or lessee, while the complainants were among the vendors displaced when the old public market was razed by fire on March 11, 1995. The dispute implicated lease contracts over stalls in the rebuilt public market awarded by outgoing Mayor Fidel Elamparo before Barrera assumed office. The governing statutes included Republic Act No. 3019, which penalizes corrupt practices by public officers, and Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, which defines the municipal mayor's powers and requires sanggunian authorization for local contracts.

On March 11, 1995, a fire razed the Candelaria, Zambales public market, displacing about 60 market vendors. The displaced vendors were temporarily sheltered along Perla St. and Ruby St., adjacent to the burned public market. Former Mayor Fidel Elamparo assured the displaced vendors, together with Congressman Antonio Diaz, that they would enjoy priority or preference over the new stalls once the public market was rebuilt. Before the oath-taking of the new mayor on June 30, 1998, Elamparo awarded individual contracts of lease for stalls in the new Candelaria Public Market to twenty persons, including Ermelinda Abella and others. The lease contracts were dated June 25, 1998. Henry E. Barrera was elected municipal mayor and took his oath on June 30, 1998; he had been vice-mayor from 1986 to 1992 and was himself a stallholder or lessee in the public market.

After taking his oath, Barrera went to the public market and pleaded with the complainants not to occupy the new market stalls. He then caused the issuance of Memorandum No. 1, Series of 1998, effective 1:00 PM, June 30, 1998, which temporarily suspended the transferring to and occupancy of stalls inside the Public Market. The memorandum applied to all stallholders at the new public market, whether or not they supported Barrera. A public hearing on the public market issue was conducted on July 8, 1998 by the Sangguniang Bayan with Barrera as presiding officer.

The People charged Barrera, together with Rufina Escala and Santos Edquiban, in 14 separate Informations with violation of Sections 3(e) and 9 of Republic Act No. 3019. The Informations alleged that on or about June 30, 1998, in Candelaria, Zambales, the accused public officers, acting in conspiracy and through manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith, prevented the private complainants from exercising their contractual and/or proprietary rights to transfer to, occupy, and/or operate their assigned stalls under the subsisting lease contract dated June 25, 1998, without valid or justifiable reason, by issuing and implementing Memorandum No. 1, causing undue injury. Escala and Edquiban were later dropped from the Informations upon motion after the Ombudsman approved the Special Prosecutor's recommendation. Barrera pleaded not guilty.

During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that Barrera was municipal mayor; the complainants were awarded individual lease contracts by former Mayor Elamparo before Barrera's oath-taking; Barrera pleaded with complainants not to occupy the new stalls; a public hearing was held; Barrera had been vice-mayor and a stallholder; the old market was razed on March 11, 1995; about 60 vendors were displaced; former Mayor Elamparo assured displaced vendors priority; and displaced vendors were temporarily sheltered. The parties agreed the only issue was whether Barrera was liable under Section 3(e) and 9 of Republic Act No. 3019. Complainants Abella, Jaquias, John Espinosa, Lerma Espinosa, Sison, Hebron, Cansas, Palma, Saberon, Bagasina, Educalane, Eclarino, and Josephine Elamparo testified for the People. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaints of Basa, Norma Elamparo, Lopez, Miraflor, Gatdula, and Egenias because they could not be prosecuted successfully without those complainants' testimony. The People proceeded with Abella and 13 others and formally offered documentary exhibits, which were admitted.

Barrera filed a demurrer to evidence, claiming no bad faith because he issued Memorandum No. 1 due to former Mayor Elamparo's awards less than a week before his term ended and without regard to pertinent laws; no manifest partiality because the memorandum applied to all awardees; and no undue injury because complainants continued working and earning as market vendors at the temporary site. The People opposed, asserting sufficient evidence and that Barrera forcibly evicted complainants and padlocked stalls without court order. The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution failed to prove actual injury and damage: the complainants admitted they continued working and earning as market vendors or in their professions, and their claims of business losses were contradictory or incredible. It also found no manifest partiality or evident bad faith, noting that Barrera exercised powers under the Local Government Code; that former Mayor Elamparo's lease contracts were irregular because they were entered into near the end of his term, without prior sanggunian authorization, and without verified applications, application fees, drawing of lots, and bidding; that a rally was held from June 26 to 30, 1998 to denounce unfair awarding; and that Memorandum No. 1 applied to all stallholders, not just Barrera's opponents or supporters.

• Insufficient Decision under Article VIII, Section 14: The People argued that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion because its Decision never clearly and distinctly expressed the facts and the evidence on which it was based, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
• Failure to Prove Undue Injury: The People maintained that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove and quantify actual injury and damage suffered by the private complainants.
• Failure to Prove Evident Bad Faith: The People argued that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove evident bad faith on the part of Mayor Barrera.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Forcible Eviction: The People asserted that the evidence it adduced was more than sufficient to sustain Barrera's conviction; it maintained that Barrera should explain why on June 30, 1998, assisted by police, he forcibly evicted Abella, et al., from the new public market and padlocked the market stalls without any court order, which displayed a wanton disregard of the constitutional rights to life and property and to due process and resulted in business losses.
• Excuse for Failure to File Motion for Reconsideration: The People asserted that they were deprived of due process, that there was extreme urgency for relief, and that under the circumstances a motion for reconsideration would be useless.

• No Bad Faith: Respondent Mayor Barrera argued that there was no bad faith in his issuance of Memorandum No. 1 because he needed to issue it since the previous Municipal Mayor, Fidel Elamparo, awarded the lease contracts over the new public market stalls less than a week before the end of his term and without regard to the requirement of pertinent laws.
• No Manifest Partiality: Barrera claimed that he did not act with manifest partiality because Memorandum No. 1 applied not only to Abella, et al., but also to all awardees of the questionable lease contracts.
• No Undue Injury: Barrera pointed out that Abella, et al., did not suffer any undue injury even when they were unable to occupy the new public market stalls because they were able to continue working and earning as market vendors at the temporary public market site.
• Damnum Absque Injuria: Barrera argued that any purported damage sustained by Abella, et al., by reason of the issuance and implementation of Memorandum No. 1 should be solely borne by them, being damnum absque injuria.

• Procedural Propriety of Certiorari (Motion for Reconsideration): Whether the People's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be entertained despite the absence of a motion for reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan.
• Constitutional Sufficiency of the Sandiganbayan Decision: Whether the Sandiganbayan violated Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution by failing to clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which its Decision was based.
• Undue Injury under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019: Whether the prosecution proved actual injury or damage to the private complainants as an element of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
• Manifest Partiality or Evident Bad Faith under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019: Whether the prosecution proved that Mayor Barrera acted with manifest partiality or evident bad faith in issuing and implementing Memorandum No. 1.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Granting Demurrer to Evidence: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting Mayor Barrera's demurrer to evidence and dismissing the criminal cases.

• Procedural Propriety of Certiorari (Motion for Reconsideration): No. The petition was dismissible for failure to file a motion for reconsideration; a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, absent concrete, compelling, and valid reasons.
• Constitutional Sufficiency of the Sandiganbayan Decision: No. The Sandiganbayan Decision contained a summary of antecedent facts and proceedings, relevant statutory provisions, the elements of the offense, and testimonial and documentary evidence; the People could identify alleged errors, so Article VIII, Section 14 was not violated.
• Undue Injury under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019: No. The prosecution failed to prove actual injury or damage; the complainants admitted they continued working and earning, and their claims of business losses were contradictory or incredible. Undue injury must be specified, quantified, and proven to moral certainty.
• Manifest Partiality or Evident Bad Faith under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019: No. Memorandum No. 1 was rooted in the municipal mayor's powers under Republic Act No. 7160, applied to all awardees, and did not give any unwarranted benefit; the former mayor's lease awards were irregular. No manifest partiality or evident bad faith was shown.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Granting Demurrer to Evidence: No. The Sandiganbayan acted within its jurisdiction; the grant of a demurrer to evidence is tantamount to an acquittal and may not be appealed, and certiorari was not warranted.

• Procedural Propriety of Certiorari (Motion for Reconsideration): Rule 65 requires that there be no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court, citing Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, held that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari because it gives the lower court an opportunity to correct its error. The People did not file a motion for reconsideration. Their assertions of due process deprivation, extreme urgency, and uselessness of a motion for reconsideration were insufficient; they had to show concrete, compelling, and valid reasons and demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan acted capriciously, whimsically, and arbitrarily by reason of passion and personal hostility, apparent on the face of the assailed resolution. No such showing was made.

• Constitutional Sufficiency of the Sandiganbayan Decision: Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution requires that no decision be rendered without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The purpose is to inform the parties how the court reached its conclusion and to allow the losing party to pinpoint possible errors for appeal. A decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal can assign errors against it. The Sandiganbayan Decision contained a summary of antecedent facts and proceedings, a discussion of the relevant statutory provisions, the elements of the offense, and the testimonial and documentary evidence. The People were able to identify and discuss with particularity the alleged grave abuse of discretion in their petition. Thus, the Decision did not violate Article VIII, Section 14.

• Undue Injury under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019: Section 3(e) requires, among others, that the public officer cause undue injury to any party, including the Government, or give any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The first two elements—that the accused is a public officer and that the prohibited acts were committed during the performance of official duties or in relation to public position—were clearly present. The third and fourth elements were absent or doubtful. Undue injury requires proof of actual injury and damage; it cannot be presumed even after a wrong or violation of a right has been established. It must be specified, quantified, and proven to the point of moral certainty. The prosecution failed to do so. The complainants admitted they continued working and earning as market vendors or in their professions from the time their stalls were closed, and their claims of business losses were contradictory or incredible. Under Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, actual injury or damage must be established by evidence.

• Manifest Partiality or Evident Bad Faith under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019: Manifest partiality requires a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other; it is synonymous with bias. Evident bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of sworn duty through motive, intent, or ill will, and partakes of the nature of fraud. It connotes a manifest and deliberate intent to do wrong or cause damage. The prosecution's evidence fell short. Barrera exercised legitimate powers under the Local Government Code of 1991, which authorizes the municipal mayor to enforce laws and ordinances and to issue executive orders necessary for their proper enforcement and execution. Former Mayor Elamparo's lease contracts were irregular: they were entered into when his term was about to expire, without prior authorization by the sanggunian as required by Section 22(c) of Republic Act No. 7160, and without other requirements such as verified applications, application fees, drawing of lots, and bidding. Only 32 stalls were available for 60 displaced vendors. A rally was held from June 26 to 30, 1998 to denounce the unfair awarding. Memorandum No. 1 applied equitably to all awardees, not just Abella, et al., and did not give any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to any particular private party.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Granting Demurrer to Evidence: Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case; when granted, it calls for an appreciation of the prosecution's evidence and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal. Such dismissal may not be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. Certiorari is available only to correct errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion, not errors of judgment. The Sandiganbayan acted within its jurisdiction and did not gravely abuse its discretion.

• Motion for Reconsideration as Condition Sine Qua Non for Certiorari — Under Rule 65, before filing a petition for certiorari, the petitioner must first file a motion for reconsideration to give the lower court an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. To dispense with this requirement, the petitioner must show concrete, compelling, and valid reasons, such as that the lower court acted capriciously, whimsically, and arbitrarily by reason of passion and personal hostility, apparent on the face of the assailed order. The People's failure to file a motion for reconsideration warranted dismissal of the petition.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. The Sandiganbayan's grant of the demurrer did not meet this standard.

• Demurrer to Evidence and Double Jeopardy — In criminal cases, a demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case. When granted, it calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Such dismissal may not be appealed because doing so would place the accused in double jeopardy. Certiorari lies only if the court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

• Elements of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 — The elements are: (1) the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with public officers; (2) the public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of official duties or in relation to his public position; (3) he causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or private individuals; and (4) he acts with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The first two elements were present, but the third and fourth were not proven.

• Undue Injury under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 — Undue injury requires proof of actual injury and damage. It cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established; its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. It must be specified, quantified, and proven to the point of moral certainty. The complainants' admissions that they continued working and earning, and their contradictory or incredible claims of business losses, failed to prove actual injury or damage.

• Manifest Partiality and Evident Bad Faith — Manifest partiality requires a showing of a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other; it is synonymous with bias. Evident bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of sworn duty through motive, intent, or ill will, and partakes of the nature of fraud. It connotes a manifest and deliberate intent to do wrong or cause damage. Memorandum No. 1 applied to all awardees and was based on the mayor's powers under the Local Government Code, negating both.

• Municipal Mayor's Power to Issue Executive Orders and Sanggunian Authorization for Contracts — Under Section 444 of Republic Act No. 7160, the municipal mayor enforces all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and may issue executive orders necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of laws and ordinances. Under Section 22(c), no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. The former mayor's lease awards violated Section 22(c) and other requirements; Barrera's Memorandum No. 1 was a legitimate exercise of his power.

• Adequate Decision under Article VIII, Section 14 — A decision is adequate if it informs the parties how the court reached its conclusion after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws, and if a party desiring to appeal can assign errors against it. The Sandiganbayan Decision contained the facts, law, and evidence, and the People were able to assign alleged errors; thus, no constitutional violation occurred.

• "The motion for reconsideration, therefore, is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari." — States the procedural ground for dismissing the People's petition for certiorari.
• "Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty." — States the evidentiary standard for the third element of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
• "Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law." — Defines the standard for certiorari and explains why the Sandiganbayan's grant of the demurrer was not correctible by certiorari.
• "Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there." — Explains why the Sandiganbayan's grant of the demurrer was not appealable and why certiorari was the only possible remedy.

• Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 499 Phil. 138, 150-152 (2005) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari; the Court quoted it extensively.
• Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan — Cited in the Sandiganbayan Decision quoted by the Supreme Court for the rule that undue injury under Section 3(e) cannot be presumed and must be specified, quantified, and proven to moral certainty; no citation is provided in the case text.
• Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111399, November 14, 1994, 238 SCRA 116, 133 — Cited for the rule that actual injury or damage under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 must be established by evidence.
• People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 137707-11, December 17, 2004, 447 SCRA 291, 306-308 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.
• People vs. Orbita, 433 Phil. 761, 771-772 (2002) — Cited for the principle that a decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal therefrom can assign errors against it.

• Article VIII, Section 14, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The Court applied this provision to reject the People's claim that the Sandiganbayan Decision was constitutionally deficient.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — Penalizes causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference in the discharge of official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court found the elements of undue injury and manifest partiality or evident bad faith not proven.
• Section 9, Republic Act No. 3019 — Provides the penalties for violations of Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Act. It was referred to in the Complaints and the Pre-Trial Order but was not central to the dismissal.
• Section 444, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Defines the powers, duties, and functions of the municipal mayor, including the power to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and to issue executive orders necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of laws and ordinances. The Court relied on this provision to hold that Memorandum No. 1 was rooted in Barrera's legitimate powers.
• Section 22(c), Republic Act No. 7160 — Provides that, unless otherwise provided in the Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. The Court noted that former Mayor Elamparo's lease contracts violated this requirement.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for certiorari, which lie only when the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied this rule in dismissing the People's petition.

Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Jose Portugal Perez.