People of the Philippines vs. Tamil Selvi Veloo and N. Chandrar Nadarajan

Non-compliance with the inventory and photographing requirements under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not automatically render seized dangerous drugs inadmissible; the saving clause in the implementing rules excuses deviations where (1) justifiable grounds exist for the non-compliance, and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The mere failure to secure the presence of a Department of Justice representative is not fatal when the totality of circumstances—including the unplanned nature of an airport customs search, the presence of other insulating witnesses, and the establishment of an unbroken chain of custody—demonstrates that the evidence remains reliable and untainted.

On June 16, 2012, Tamil Selvi Veloo and N. Chandrar Nadarajan, both Malaysian nationals, arrived at Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 2 aboard Philippine Airlines Flight PR 319 from Hong Kong. They were seated beside each other during the flight. At the baggage conveyor, Veloo took a black Dibola luggage, while Nadarajan took a black Phoenix bag. The two queued at adjacent lanes in the Customs Area. When Customs Examiner Carol B. Buenconsejo examined Veloo’s Customs Declaration Form, Veloo stated she had nothing to declare and claimed to be on a honeymoon, though she appeared to have no companion. Suspicious of the large luggage, Buenconsejo requested that Veloo open it. Inside, beneath a false bottom, Buenconsejo discovered ten heat-sealed transparent plastic packs containing white crystalline granules. Veloo then pointed to Nadarajan, identifying him as her husband. Nadarajan, who was about to exit the Customs Area, was also apprehended; his Phoenix bag was later retrieved from a hotel representative and, upon examination, yielded six similar plastic packs containing crystalline substances. Field tests on the contents of both bags returned positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

• The Arrival and Inspection: On June 16, 2012, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Veloo and Nadarajan, both Malaysian nationals, arrived at NAIA Terminal 2 from Hong Kong aboard Philippine Airlines Flight PR 319. At the conveyor belt, Veloo took a black Dibola luggage; Nadarajan took a black Phoenix bag. Both proceeded to the Customs Area and queued at adjacent lanes.

• Veloo’s Apprehension: Customs Examiner Carol B. Buenconsejo, on duty at around 4:00 p.m., received Veloo’s Customs Declaration Form indicating nothing to declare. When asked about her purpose for visiting the Philippines, Veloo replied that she was on a honeymoon, although she appeared to have no companion. Buenconsejo became suspicious upon seeing the large luggage and requested that Veloo open it. Removing some contents, Buenconsejo noted many peanut brittles; Veloo stated they would be eaten during the honeymoon. Veloo later testified that upon seeing the contents, she disclaimed ownership, asserting the luggage tag bore Nadarajan’s name. Buenconsejo searched the false bottom of the luggage, felt a bulging hard rough object, and opened the zipper, revealing a small clear plastic pack containing crystallized granules. Upon seeing the pack, Veloo pointed to Nadarajan, saying “my husband, my husband.” Buenconsejo’s superior, co-examiner, and customs police were present.

• Nadarajan’s Apprehension and the Phoenix Bag: SAII Antonio Punzalan instructed Special Agents Alona De Guzman and Edmund Mozo to apprehend Nadarajan, who was already near the Customs exit gate. Nadarajan entered the exclusion room without his luggage. He denied being Veloo’s husband, claiming they had only met on the plane and that he did not know why she identified him as such. Punzalan verified with the Philippine Airlines counter that Nadarajan had checked luggage. Upon Punzalan’s instruction, De Guzman and Mozo retrieved the Phoenix bag from a hotel representative outside the airport. Nadarajan testified that the bag arrived more than an hour later, already opened, at which point he was accused of carrying illegal drugs. Buenconsejo observed that the Phoenix bag was a black bag similar to the Dibola bag but smaller; its false bottom yielded six clear plastic packs filled with crystallized granules, larger than those in the Dibola bag.

• Inventory and Marking: Photographing and inventory of the seized items from both bags were conducted in the presence of the accused, SAII Punzalan, Kagawad Jaime Abasola, and ABS-CBN/DWIZ Media Reporter Raoul Esperas. No Department of Justice representative was present; the Booking Sheets/Arrest Reports noted that the “DOJ representative serving as witness was not available but was logged.” Buenconsejo weighed the drug specimens from the Dibola bag, indicated weights and markings on each plastic pack, and prepared the Inventory Report dated June 16, 2012, at 9:00 p.m.

• Chain of Custody: Buenconsejo turned over the two bags and the accused to IO2 Julie Lucero of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) via a Turn-Over Receipt dated June 16, 2012, witnessed by Punzalan, Abasola, and Esperas. On June 17, 2012, at 6:50 a.m., Forensic Chemist Arlene Arcos received the specimens from IO2 Lucero after verifying the consistency of the markings with the Request for Laboratory Examination. Chemistry Report No. PDEA-DD-12-221 confirmed the seized substances were methamphetamine hydrochloride. The parties stipulated that the specimens examined by the forensic chemist were the same specimens submitted to the trial court. During trial, the forensic chemist opened the two bags she had previously sealed.

• Disputed Testimonies: Veloo claimed she mistakenly took the Dibola bag believing it was hers and that it actually belonged to Nadarajan, as the luggage tag indicated. She confirmed on cross-examination that the two bags, while of similar height, looked different. Nadarajan claimed his bag was the Phoenix bag and denied knowing why Veloo identified him as her husband. Their respective e-ticket receipts, however, showed similarities: identical reservation code, issuing agent, issuance date, and consecutive ticket number patterns, indicating simultaneous booking. Their Booking Sheets/Arrest Reports listed a common relative and address.

• Breach of Chain of Custody — Absence of DOJ Representative: Accused-appellants maintained that the apprehending officers failed to faithfully comply with the chain of custody requirement under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, specifically citing the absence of a Department of Justice representative during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs. This deviation, they argued, rendered the evidence inadmissible and warranted acquittal.

• Failure to Prove the Elements of the Crime: Accused-appellants imputed grave error upon the trial court for convicting them despite the prosecution’s alleged failure to establish all elements of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs beyond reasonable doubt.

• Preservation of Integrity and Evidentiary Value: The prosecution contended that despite the absence of a DOJ representative, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved throughout every link in the chain of custody, from seizure and marking to turnover to the forensic chemist and eventual presentation in court.

• Justifiable Grounds for Non-Compliance: The prosecution invoked the principle that law enforcement authorities operate under varied field conditions and cannot always attend to all procedural niceties, relying on the saving clause in the IRR of R.A. No. 9165. This justification, quoting People v. Sanchez, was raised for the first time on appeal and was not elicited from any prosecution witness at trial.

• Integrity of the Drugs from the Phoenix Bag: Whether the prosecution established the corpus delicti and preserved the integrity of the drug specimens seized from the Phoenix bag, given that the bag was retrieved from a third party outside the airport after more than an hour and arrived at the exclusion room already opened.

• Effect of the Absence of the DOJ Representative (Dibola Bag): Whether the absence of a Department of Justice representative during the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs seized from the Dibola bag rendered those specimens inadmissible in evidence and fatal to the prosecution’s case.

• Criminal Liability of Both Accused for the Dibola Bag: Whether both Veloo and Nadarajan may be held criminally liable for the illegal transportation of the dangerous drugs found in the Dibola bag, given Veloo’s claim of mistaken identity of the luggage and Nadarajan’s denial of any relationship.

• Penalty and Fines Imposed: Whether the penalty of a fine of P800,000.00 should be imposed per criminal case or only for the case in which the conviction was sustained.

• Integrity of the Drugs from the Phoenix Bag: The integrity of the drug specimens from the Phoenix bag was not preserved. The bag was not in the accused’s possession when seized; it was retrieved from a hotel representative outside the airport after approximately one hour, without explanation for the delay, and was already opened upon arrival at the exclusion room. The prosecution presented neither the hotel representative who had actual custody nor the customs police who retrieved the bag. This unexplained gap in the first link of the chain of custody—seizure and marking—engendered reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the contents. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty could not cure the lapse, as the lapse itself constituted affirmative proof of irregularity, consistent with People v. Sipin.

• Effect of the Absence of the DOJ Representative (Dibola Bag): The absence of a DOJ representative did not render the drugs from the Dibola bag inadmissible. The saving clause of Section 21(a) of the IRR excuses non-compliance where (1) justifiable grounds exist and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. While the prosecution failed to elicit testimony explaining the absence or showing earnest efforts to secure a DOJ representative—and the notation “was not available but was logged” was considered a flimsy excuse under People v. Umipang—the totality of circumstances justified the deviation. The seizure occurred during an unplanned airport customs check, a routine checkpoint operation akin to the situation in De Villa v. People, where slight deviations from Section 21 have been excused. Moreover, officers of the Bureau of Customs, who are state agents comparable to DOJ personnel, were present during the seizure and effectively served as insulating witnesses. Most critically, the prosecution demonstrated an unbroken chain of custody for the Dibola bag specimens: Buenconsejo marked, weighed, and inventoried the packs in the presence of the accused, a media representative, and an elected public official; the items were properly turned over to PDEA investigating officer IO2 Lucero; Lucero delivered them to Forensic Chemist Arcos; and Arcos produced them in court. The total quantity of drugs—four kilograms packed in heat-sealed containers—was hardly miniscule, further minimizing the risk of tampering and tempering the level of strictness required under Mallillin v. People and People v. Holgado.

• Criminal Liability of Both Accused for the Dibola Bag: Both Veloo and Nadarajan were properly held liable for the illegal transportation of the drugs found in the Dibola bag. Veloo’s claim of mistakenly taking the bag was rejected; the two bags were visibly different in size and brand, and it is contrary to human experience for a traveler not to verify ownership of luggage. Her disclaimer of ownership occurred only after the bag was opened before customs officials, indicating at least an intent to possess. Nadarajan’s denial of a relationship with Veloo was contradicted by documentary evidence: their e-ticket receipts bore the same reservation code, issuing agent, issuance date, and consecutive ticket numbers, indicating simultaneous booking, and their Booking Sheets listed a common relative and address. Their concerted effort to travel together, coupled with the switching of bags, supported the inference of a common criminal purpose. The crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is malum prohibitum; intent, motive, knowledge, or proof of ownership are not essential elements. The dispositive presumption under Rule 131, Section 3(j) of the Rules of Court—that a person in possession of a thing is the owner thereof—applied, and Nadarajan never denied ownership of the Dibola bag despite Veloo’s claim that the luggage tag bore his name, consistent with People v. Tang Wai Lan.

• Penalty and Fines Imposed: Because the guilt of both accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt with respect to the second Information (Criminal Case No. R-PSY-12-05298-CR, involving the Phoenix bag), the imposition of a fine of P800,000.00 in that case was vacated. Both accused remain liable to pay the fine of P800,000.00 only for the first case (Criminal Case No. R-PSY-12-05297-CR, involving the Dibola bag), in addition to the penalty of life imprisonment.

• Saving Clause Under Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 — Non-compliance with the physical inventory and photographing requirements under Section 21 is excused when two requisites concur: (1) there exists a justifiable ground for the deviation, and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. The prosecution bears the burden of proving both requisites; the justifiable ground must be established as a fact according to the rules on evidence and cannot be presumed by the Court. Mere invocation of jurisprudential platitudes is insufficient.

• Presumption of Regularity Inapplicable When Lapses Exist — Judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is fundamentally flawed when the apprehending officers committed lapses in the procedures required by Section 21. The lapses themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity; the presumption arises only upon a showing that the officers followed the statutory requirements or that the saving clause is triggered. (Citing People v. Sipin)

• Chain of Custody as Authentication of Real Evidence — In dangerous drugs cases, the chain of custody rule serves as a method of authenticating object evidence. The State must prove that the substance presented in court is the very same substance seized from the accused. The four links that must be established are: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover to the investigating officer; third, the turnover to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked drug to the court. The level of strictness in applying the rule is dictated by the exhibit’s susceptibility to fungibility, alteration, or tampering; larger quantities in sealed containers require less exacting compliance than miniscule amounts. (Citing Mallillin v. People and People v. Holgado)

• Unplanned Airport Searches and Justifiable Grounds — Arrests and seizures lawfully made in airports or seaports, where time is of the essence and the operation is not planned or scheduled in advance, fall within the category of cases where strict adherence to Section 21 may be relaxed, provided the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved. A routine customs check at an airport is akin to the checkpoint operation in De Villa v. People, where slight deviations from the witness requirement were excused.

• Malum Prohibitum Nature of Illegal Transportation — The crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is malum prohibitum; proof of intent, motive, knowledge, or ownership is not essential. The crime is consummated upon the act of bringing a prohibited drug into the country without legal authority.

• Disputable Presumption of Ownership from Possession — Under Rule 131, Section 3(j) of the Rules of Court, a person who possesses a thing or exercises acts of ownership over it is presumed to be its owner. This presumption, based on the principle that direct proof is rarely available, applies to luggage bearing an accused’s name.

• “Numerous times this Court did not hesitate to acquit the accused for unjustified failure of law enforcement officers to strictly comply with Section 21 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. However, just as compliance therewith will not automatically result in conviction, failure to strictly comply therewith will not automatically result in acquittal, for as long as the saving clause in the law’s Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) is triggered.” — The opening paragraph, framing the decisive legal tension and signaling the Court’s pragmatic approach to Section 21 violations.

• “From the foregoing, it is clear that in order for non-compliance to be excusable, two requirements must be met: (1) there must be justifiable ground for non-compliance, and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.” — The articulation of the two-pronged test for the application of the saving clause.

• “The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the trial proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained, and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.” — An emphatic statement of the prosecution’s burden and the evidentiary requirement for invoking the saving clause.

• “It bears stressing that the chain of custody procedure is not merely a procedural technicality but a matter of substantive law. This is because the law has been ‘crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment.’” — The pronouncement elevating chain of custody compliance beyond procedural formality, rooted in the gravity of the penalty and the risk of abuse.

• People v. Sipin, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018 — Cited for the rule that judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity despite lapses in Section 21 procedures is fundamentally flawed; the lapses themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity.

• Mallillin v. People, 576 Phil. 576 (2008) — Established that the level of strictness in applying the chain of custody rule is dictated by the exhibit’s susceptibility to fungibility, alteration, or tampering; smaller quantities demand more exacting compliance.

• People v. Holgado, et al., 741 Phil. 78 (2014) — Applied to underscore that miniscule amounts of narcotics require more exacting compliance with Section 21, whereas larger quantities in sealed containers reduce such necessity.

• De Villa v. People, G.R. No. 224039, September 11, 2019 — Held that an in flagrante delicto arrest during a routine checkpoint constituted sufficient justification for slight deviation from Section 21’s requirements; the absence of a planned buy-bust operation was a relevant circumstance.

• People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018 — Clarified that the relaxation of strict adherence to Section 21 applies to seizures lawfully made in airports, seaports, checkpoints, and other unplanned contexts where time is of the essence.

• People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024 (2012) — Declared that a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable, without explanation of serious attempts to secure them, is a flimsy excuse.

• People v. Tang Wai Lan, 341 Phil. 831 (1997) — Applied for the proposition that a luggage tag bearing the name of the accused creates a presumption of ownership.

• People v. Burton, 335 Phil. 1003 (1997) — Cited for the rule that an explanation contrary to human experience is insufficient to overcome prima facie evidence of knowledge of possession of prohibited drugs.

• Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 — Defines and penalizes the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs with life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. The essential element is the movement of dangerous drugs from one place to another without legal authority; intent and ownership are not elements of the offense.

• Section 21, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 — Prescribes the mandatory procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs, requiring immediate physical inventory and photographing in the presence of the accused, a representative from the media, a representative from the Department of Justice, and an elected public official.

• Section 21(a), Article II, IRR of R.A. No. 9165 — Contains the saving clause, providing that non-compliance with the inventory and photographing requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved, does not render the seizure and custody void or invalid.

• Rule 131, Section 3(j), Rules of Court — The disputable presumption that a person in possession of a thing or who exercises acts of ownership over it is the owner thereof. Applied to Nadarajan, whose name appeared on the luggage tag of the Dibola bag.

Carandang, Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred. Justice Caguioa concurred with a separate opinion, emphasizing that chain of custody is properly understood as a rule of admissibility, not merely evidentiary weight. The concurring opinion argued that Section 21 is an exclusionary rule legislated by Congress; non-compliance renders evidence void and invalid, not merely of reduced probative value. The distinction, Caguioa stressed, is critical: if chain of custody were merely a matter of weight, the Court’s directive to law enforcement to strictly comply would be diluted. Caguioa further explained that dangerous drugs, as non-unique objects requiring scientific analysis for identification, demand a more exacting authentication standard. The conviction was nevertheless warranted because the saving clause was triggered by justifiable grounds—the unplanned airport seizure, the presence of Bureau of Customs officers as state agents akin to DOJ representatives, and the demonstrated preservation of integrity—making the evidence admissible, not merely weighty.