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People of the Philippines vs. Talledo

The murder conviction of Leonora Talledo and Buenaventura Timbreza was affirmed, with both sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of Gregorio Preza. The prosecution established that Leonora summoned Gregorio to her house, where Timbreza shot him from behind the door; Gregorio struck his assailant with a bolo and later identified him by the wounds and implicated Leonora. The trial court rejected the accused’s trial defenses and relied on Timbreza’s extrajudicial affidavits and Gregorio’s ante mortem statement. On appeal, the admission of the dying declaration was challenged, but the Court found Gregorio conscious of impending death and also admitted his spontaneous statement to Billen as res gestae. The killing was murder qualified by treachery, with Leonora liable as principal by induction and Timbreza as principal by actual participation; the death penalty could not be imposed for lack of sufficient votes.

Primary Holding

The conviction for murder is affirmed where the victim’s dying declaration and spontaneous res gestae statement are admissible, and the evidence shows that one accused induced another to shoot the victim with treachery, making the inducer a principal by induction and the shooter a principal by actual participation.

Background

Gregorio Preza, a married man, had been maintaining amorous relations with Leonora Talledo, one of the appellants. Buenaventura Timbreza, the other appellant, was implicated as the actual gunman. The killing took place in Dolores, Abra.

History

  1. Court of First Instance of Abra

    Convicted Leonora Talledo and Buenaventura Timbreza of murder, sentenced both to reclusion perpetua, ordered them to indemnify the heirs of Gregorio Preza jointly and severally in the amount of P2,000 with accessories of the law, and to pay the costs.

  2. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court to reverse the judgment of conviction.

  3. Feb 23, 1950

    Supreme Court

    Affirmed the decision appealed from with costs, finding no reversible error.

Facts

On July 9, 1946, at about 8:30 p.m., Gregorio Preza and Adriano Billen were on their way to attend a meeting in the house of the barrio lieutenant of Quimalaba, Dolores, Abra. They stopped at the house of Juan Timbreza. Before reaching that house, Billen, passing by the house of appellant Leonora Talledo, was requested by her to ask Gregorio to come to her house because she wanted to see him. When informed of Leonora’s desire, Gregorio left Juan Timbreza’s house and repaired to Leonora’s abode.

Upon entering her door, Gregorio was shot in the stomach by a man hiding behind the panel of the door. Gregorio immediately unsheathed the bolo he was carrying and attacked his assailant, hitting him four or five times. His assailant fled from the house; Leonora also fled. Gregorio shouted for help, and Billen responded. Billen found Gregorio still in Leonora’s house. Gregorio asked Billen to help him because, according to him, Leonora had him shot, at the same time expressing the opinion that his assailant was, if not Alejandro Talledo, Venancio Talledo; if not, the one who boloed him. With Billen’s help, Gregorio walked to and went up the house of his mother-in-law about 150 meters away, where the justice of the peace took from him a written statement (Exhibit F) with its translation (Exhibit F-1) at about midnight. Four hours later, at 4 o’clock the following morning, he died of gunshot wound.

In his statement, Gregorio told the justice of the peace that he supposed Venancio Talledo shot him but that, to be sure, his attacker may be identified by the bolo wounds Gregorio inflicted on him. He further stated that he maintained amorous relations with Leonora, who called him to her house that night; that upon meeting her at the door of her house, she pleaded with him, asking that he pity her and that he comply with their agreement; and that it was then that he was shot from behind the door, after which he attacked his assailant with his bolo. Acting upon the information in this written statement and that given by Billen, the police contacted Venancio Talledo but, finding that he bore no wounds, continued their search until they found appellant Buenaventura Timbreza, who had fresh bolo wounds on his head, arms, and hands and who readily admitted that the wounds were inflicted by Gregorio. He was arrested and, during his confinement and investigation, made written statements (Exhibits H and I) ratified before the justice of the peace of Dolores, in which he admitted having fired the shot that killed Gregorio in pursuance of instructions given to him by Leonora, who even gave him the gun (paltik) and who promised him that he would not in any way be implicated in the case; and that she promised to pay him for shooting Gregorio.

When questioned by the police, Leonora made an elaborate statement, which she even ratified before the justice of the peace, to the effect that on the night in question, while she was sleeping, the deceased came up to her house, kissed her, seized her hands, pulled her up to her feet, and took her to the door where he tried to abuse her; that she wanted to cry out for help but Gregorio threatened her with his gun; that finding it impossible to physically resist the intruder, she adopted another strategy and spoke to him in a gentle and conciliatory manner, caressed him, and took hold of his hand that was holding the revolver and succeeded in maneuvering said hand as well as the gun until the end of the barrel pointed to Gregorio’s body, at which instant she pressed the trigger and shot him. She further stated that Gregorio had been courting her for about six months and that she rejected his advances because he was a married man.

At the trial, however, Leonora claimed that the contents of her statement were false and had merely been taught her by the chief of police, and told a different story: that the deceased came up the house and tried to rape her; that she shouted for help and evidently one person came to her aid; that not long after her cry for help, she heard a noise, got up from her bed, and went to the door; and that soon thereafter she heard the shot that wounded Gregorio. She then jumped down from the house and ran to the house of her uncle Quintin Talledo. On the witness stand, Timbreza abandoned the story told to the police in his affidavits (Exhibits H and I), even claiming that he signed said affidavits to avoid suffering and further pain when the police pressed his wounds, and told the court something else, evidently to fit into the mental picture of the event given by Leonora at the trial. He said that hearing Leonora’s shouts for help, he went up her house unarmed; that at the door he was immediately attacked by Gregorio with a bolo; that he retreated until the two men reached the kitchen porch (batalan) where Gregorio pressed his bolo attack; that during this unequal struggle, Timbreza saw something gleaming fall from the waist of Gregorio; that he stopped in his efforts at defense, picked up the object, which happened to be a paltik, and held it in his hand; and that when Gregorio struck another bolo blow, his hand was hit, causing the gun which he was holding to explode or fire.

The trial court rejected Leonora’s in-court version and accepted Timbreza’s affidavits as competent evidence, having been made voluntarily by the affiant. The Supreme Court likewise found Timbreza’s trial story fantastic and incredible and rejected Leonora’s trial story as untrue, noting that people do not usually go up other’s houses at about 8:30 in the evening to rape women inmates therein, especially in a neighborhood where houses are near each other and where other people, including Leonora’s mother-in-law, were present; and that despite her alleged desperate cries for help, neither her nearby brother nor uncle responded.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Dying Declaration: Appellants questioned the propriety of admitting Gregorio Preza’s statement (Exhibit F and its translation Exhibit F-1), arguing that there was no proof he believed he was going to die when he made it, because he answered “May be judge” when asked whether he believed he would die.
  • Reversal of Conviction: The two accused brought the case on appeal to reverse the judgment of conviction.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Affirmation of Conviction: The Solicitor General asked for confirmation of the trial court’s decision.
  • Incredibility of Timbreza’s Trial Story: The Solicitor General maintained that Timbreza’s in-court version was fantastic and incredible.

Issues

  • Admissibility of Dying Declaration: Whether the statement of Gregorio Preza (Exhibit F and Exhibit F-1) was admissible as a dying declaration despite his answer “May be judge” when asked if he believed he was going to die.
  • Res Gestae: Whether Gregorio’s spontaneous statement to Adriano Billen, identifying his assailant and implicating Leonora, was admissible as part of the res gestae.
  • Guilt and Participation: Whether the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that Leonora Talledo and Buenaventura Timbreza were guilty of murder, with Leonora as principal by induction and Timbreza as principal by actual participation.
  • Treachery: Whether the killing was qualified by treachery.
  • Penalty: Whether the death penalty should be imposed due to alleged aggravating circumstances, or whether reclusion perpetua was the proper penalty.

Ruling

  • Admissibility of Dying Declaration: Yes. The statement was admissible; “cas la casta” could mean positive belief, and the circumstances showed Gregorio was conscious of impending death.
  • Res Gestae: Yes. Even without the dying declaration, Gregorio’s spontaneous statement to Billen was admissible as part of the res gestae.
  • Guilt and Participation: Yes. Both appellants were guilty of murder; Leonora as principal by induction and Timbreza as principal by actual participation.
  • Treachery: Yes. The killing was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
  • Penalty: Reclusion perpetua. The death penalty could not be imposed because the evidence of aggravating circumstances was not strong or conclusive, and the lack of sufficient votes prevented the extreme penalty.

Ruling Rationale

  • Admissibility of Dying Declaration: The Court examined the original statement and found the phrase “cas la casta” could be translated as “may be” but equally as “so it seems,” “most probably,” or “I believe so.” Because Gregorio was questioned by a government official and a superior in social scale, his answer could be regarded as a positive belief expressed modestly, mildly, and courteously. He died four hours later; the justice of the peace described him as slowly bleeding to death, and the doctor testified that he died of hemorrhage, with three pellets having plowed through the stomach, spleen, and large and small intestines. These circumstances established that he was conscious of his impending death when he made the statement.
  • Res Gestae: Even without the dying declaration, Gregorio’s spontaneous statement to Billen—made as Billen came to his aid in response to his cry for help, describing the person who shot him as one who must have sustained several bolo wounds and implicating Leonora as the person who had him shot—was admissible as part of the res gestae.
  • Guilt and Participation: The evidence and surrounding circumstances showed that Gregorio, a married man, and Leonora had been maintaining amorous relations; that Leonora possibly became dissatisfied with her disadvantageous and precarious situation or that Gregorio did not live up to a promise or agreement vital to her interest; and that she induced and employed Timbreza to shoot him when he came to her house in response to her summons. Timbreza’s trial story was fantastic and incredible, and the trial court did not err in accepting his affidavits as voluntarily made. Leonora’s trial story was likewise rejected because people do not usually go up other’s houses at about 8:30 in the evening to rape women inmates therein, especially where other people were present and nearby relatives did not respond to her alleged cries for help. Both appellants were therefore clearly guilty of murder, Leonora as principal by induction and Timbreza as principal by actual participation.
  • Treachery: The killing was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Gregorio was shot by a concealed assailant behind the door panel as he entered Leonora’s house in response to her summons, which ensured the execution of the killing without risk to the assailant arising from any defense the victim might make.
  • Penalty: Some members believed that aggravating circumstances such as premeditation, consideration of a price, reward, or promise, and the use of craft warranted the death penalty, but others found the evidence not strong, much less conclusive. The alleged planning and promised reward in Timbreza’s affidavit could not be considered against Leonora because an extrajudicial admission or confession is admissible only against the one making it. The price or reward could not be considered against Leonora because it was not she who committed the crime in consideration of said price or reward. Except for premeditation, these aggravating circumstances were not alleged in the information, not mentioned or discussed in the decision appealed from, and not considered by the Office of the Solicitor General for increasing the penalty. The Solicitor General only asked for confirmation of the decision. Considering the case as a whole, some justices believed reclusion perpetua was sufficient, and because of lack of sufficient votes, the extreme penalty of death could not be imposed.

Doctrines

  • Dying Declaration — A statement made by a person conscious of impending death is admissible. The declarant’s belief need not be expressed in absolute terms; an equivocal answer may be interpreted in light of the circumstances. In this case, “cas la casta” was treated as a positive belief because Gregorio was bleeding to death and died four hours later.
  • Res Gestae — A spontaneous statement made by a victim immediately after a startling occurrence, while under its influence and before opportunity to contrive, is admissible. Gregorio’s statement to Billen upon being aided was admitted as res gestae.
  • Extrajudicial Admission or Confession — An extrajudicial admission or confession is admissible only against the one making it. Timbreza’s affidavit statements could not be used against Leonora to establish aggravating circumstances.
  • Principal by Induction — One who induces another to commit a crime is a principal by induction. Leonora induced and employed Timbreza to shoot Gregorio.
  • Principal by Actual Participation — One who takes direct part in the commission of the crime is a principal by actual participation. Timbreza fired the fatal shot.
  • Treachery — A qualifying circumstance in murder where the offender employs means to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense the victim might make. The concealed shooting of Gregorio as he entered Leonora’s house qualified the killing as murder.
  • Aggravating Circumstances — Aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information and proved. The circumstance of price or reward cannot be considered against one who did not commit the crime in consideration thereof. The Court declined to impose the death penalty because the evidence of aggravating circumstances was not strong or conclusive and because of lack of sufficient votes.

Key Excerpts

  • "Both appellants are clearly guilty of murder, Leonora as principal by induction and Timbreza as principal by actual participation, the killing having been committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery." — This is the Court’s core holding on criminal liability, identifying the modes of participation and the qualifying circumstance.
  • "Said statement is admissible as part of the res gestae." — This states the alternative evidentiary basis for admitting Gregorio’s statement to Billen.
  • "an extra-judicial admission or confession is admissible only against the one making it." — This rule barred the use of Timbreza’s affidavit against Leonora for aggravating circumstances.
  • "because of lack of sufficient votes, the extreme penalty of death cannot here be imposed." — This explains why the death penalty was not imposed despite the discussion of aggravating circumstances.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.