People of the Philippines vs. Susan Canton

A warrantless search of a departing airline passenger conducted pursuant to routine airport security procedures authorized by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 is a valid exception to the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures, and the prohibited drugs thereby recovered are admissible in evidence. Such a search is not confined to a search for weapons as under the "Terry search" doctrine, and the passenger's subsequent warrantless arrest is lawful as one effected flagrante delicto upon the discovery and recovery of the drugs.

Susan Canton was a departing passenger at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport bound for Saigon, Vietnam, and the State prosecuted her for possession of a regulated drug under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 requires every airline ticket issued to a passenger to bear a printed condition that the holder and his hand-carried luggage are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances, and that a holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft, which condition forms part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. That statutory notice, posted at the final security checkpoint of the departure lounge, supplies the backdrop against which the validity of the airport search and the admissibility of the seized drugs were assessed.

On 12 February 1998, at about 1:30 p.m., Susan Canton was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism and the frisker on duty at that time, accordingly called her attention, saying, "Excuse me ma'am, can I search you?"

Upon frisking Susan, Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under Susan's skirt, pinched the package several times, and noticed that it contained what felt like rice granules. Passing her hand further, she felt similar packages in front of Susan's genital area and thighs. She asked Susan to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said, "Money, money only." Mylene forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty.

De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and to bring Susan to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies' room, Mylene touched something in front of Susan's sex organ and directed her to remove her skirt, girdles and panty; Susan obliged. Mylene and Lorna then discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which Susan voluntarily handed to them — the first taken from her abdominal area, the second from in front of her genital area, and the third from her right thigh. Mylene turned over the packages to De los Reyes.

De los Reyes forthwith informed his superior officer, Police Superintendent Daniel Santos, about the incident. Together with Susan, they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened the same, and found that they contained white crystalline substances which, when submitted for laboratory examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified that no investigation was ever conducted on Susan. Susan, however, signed a receipt of the following articles seized from her: (a) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (b) one American passport bearing Number 700389994; (c) one Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (d) two panty girdles. He said that he informed Susan of her constitutional rights but admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the receipt, although he told her that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. When recalled as a witness for the defense, Mylene merely reiterated the circumstances surrounding the arrest and search of Susan and the seizure of the prohibited items found on her person. The defense opted not to let Susan take the witness stand.

The trial court found Susan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. In denying her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial and her Motion to Inhibit, the trial judge held that Susan's conviction was not based on the medical report that was not presented in court; that there was no violation of her constitutional rights because she was never interrogated during her detention without counsel; and that the specimens seized from her were found after a routine frisk at the airport and were therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.

• Warrantless Search — Absence of Probable Cause: Susan asserted that the strip search conducted on her in the ladies' room was constitutionally infirm because it was not incidental to an arrest; at the time of the strip search, the arresting officers could not have known what was inside the plastic containers hidden on her body, which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape, and thus could not have determined whether she was actually committing a crime. The strip search was therefore nothing but a fishing expedition, and it was erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante delicto.
• Terry Search Doctrine: Susan maintained that, following the doctrine enunciated in Terry vs. Ohio, the stop-and-frisk search should have been limited to the patting of her outer garments in order to determine whether she was armed or dangerous and therefore a threat to the security of the aircraft.
• Custodial Investigation Without Counsel: Susan alleged that from the moment frisker Mylene felt a package at her abdominal area, started inquiring about the contents thereof, detained her, and decided to submit her to a strip search in the ladies' room, she was under custodial investigation without counsel, violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
• Admission of the Medical Report: Susan assailed the propriety of the admission of the medical report executed by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was neither testified on nor offered in evidence, and questioned the trial court's cognizance of the same under the rule on judicial notice.
• Applicability of People vs. Johnson: Susan questioned the application of People vs. Johnson because of its sweeping statement allowing searches and seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the gravity of the safety interests involved, and stressed that the pertinent case should have been Katz vs. United States, which upholds the Fourth Amendment principle that it "protects people and not places."
• Grounds Raised in the Motion for Reconsideration: Susan alleged that the trial judge erred in (a) giving weight to the medical certificate executed by Dr. Arcena although it was not presented in court nor marked or admitted and was therefore hearsay; (b) upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of police officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a police officer; (c) making statements which gave the impression that the burden of proof was shifted to the accused; and (d) deliberately ignoring the decisive issue of how the evidence was secured. She also assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without warrant on the ground that the seized items were not in plain view, and alleged bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge.

• Flagrante Delicto and Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest: The Office of the Solicitor General declared that Susan was found flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law, so that the case falls squarely within the exception of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
• Consent and Waiver: The OSG maintained that Susan voluntarily submitted herself to the search and seizure when she allowed herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room for further inspection by airport security personnel.
• Airport Security Procedure: The OSG argued that the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from Susan during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
• Medical Certificate: The OSG argued that Susan's conviction was not solely based on the questioned document but also on the fact that she was caught flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law.
• Fine: The OSG supported Susan's conviction but recommended the reduction of the fine from P1 million to P100,000.

• Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest: Whether the warrantless search and seizure conducted on Susan were incidental to a lawful arrest, given that the arrest followed rather than preceded the search.
• Scope of the Airport Security Search: Whether the strip search exceeded the limits of the "Terry search" doctrine, which confines a stop-and-frisk to the patting of outer garments for weapons.
• Applicability of People vs. Johnson: Whether the ruling in People vs. Johnson applies to the instant case.
• Lawful Warrantless Arrest: Whether Susan, having allegedly been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
• Custodial Investigation: Whether Susan's constitutional right to counsel under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution was violated.
• Admission of the Medical Report: Whether the admission of the medical report executed by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena was erroneous.
• Conviction and Penalty: Whether Susan's conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
• Return of the Other Seized Items: Whether the other items seized from Susan should be returned to her.

• Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest: No. The search was not incidental to a lawful arrest, because the arrest did not precede the search; the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made, and the process cannot be reversed.
• Scope of the Airport Security Search: No. The search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined to a search for weapons under the "Terry search" doctrine, since Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances as well.
• Applicability of People vs. Johnson: Yes. People vs. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues, finds application, there being a disparity in the factual milieu of Katz vs. United States that precludes the application of the latter.
• Lawful Warrantless Arrest: Yes. Susan, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a warrant under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
• Custodial Investigation: No. The right to counsel under Section 12, Article III attaches only upon custodial investigation, and no custodial investigation was conducted; no statement was taken from Susan and used in evidence against her.
• Admission of the Medical Report: Yes, the admission was erroneous because the document was not properly identified; nevertheless, the conviction stands even without the medical report, the finding of guilt not having been based on that document.
• Conviction and Penalty: Yes. The three packages of shabu recovered from Susan are admissible in evidence, and the conviction and the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a P1 million fine are correct.
• Return of the Other Seized Items: Yes. The seizure of Susan's passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the limits of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and they must be returned to her.

• Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest: The trial court and the OSG characterized the search as incidental to a lawful arrest, but the sequence of events refutes that characterization. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense." When the metal detector alarmed while Susan was passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat-down search and, in the process, felt a bulge on Susan's abdomen; the strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what the packages concealed on her body were. Even if Susan was deprived of her will and liberty at that point, such restraint did not amount to an arrest. Prior to the strip search in the ladies' room, the airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what was hidden on Susan's body and therefore did not know yet whether a crime was being committed; it was only after the strip search, upon the discovery of the white crystalline substances inside the packages which they believed to be shabu, that Susan was arrested. A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that a lawful arrest first be made before a search can be conducted; the process cannot be reversed.
• Scope of the Airport Security Search: The Terry search, or the "stop and frisk" situation, refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person acting suspiciously for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, and may validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. The search in this case, however, was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235. That provision requires every ticket issued to a passenger to contain the printed condition that the holder and his hand-carried luggage are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances, and that a holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft, which condition constitutes part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. As admitted by Susan and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the provision is stated in the "Notice to All Passengers" located at the final security checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the provision, it is clear that the search, unlike the Terry search, is not limited to weapons; passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances. After the metal detector alarmed, Susan consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of packages on her body; it was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that Susan was hiding something illegal. To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home, and thereby depriving them of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society. The strip search in the ladies' room was thus justified under the circumstances.
• Applicability of People vs. Johnson: People vs. Johnson involves similar facts and issues. It concerned accused-appellant Leila Johnson, also a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912; Olivia Ramirez, the frisker on duty, felt something hard on Johnson's abdominal area, and Johnson explained that she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Olivia reported the matter to her superior, who directed her to take Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection, where Johnson was asked "to bring out the thing under her girdle" and acceded, bringing out three plastic packs containing a total of 580.2 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The Court ruled that the packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride seized during the routine frisk at the airport were acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and were therefore admissible in evidence, and that the subsequent warrantless arrest was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto. The Court quoted Johnson to the effect that persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, and that such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures; that with increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports, with passengers routinely passing through metal detectors and their carry-on and checked luggage routinely subjected to x-ray scans, and physical searches conducted where these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects; and that such searches are reasonable given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel, travelers being notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and that prohibited materials or substances found would be subject to seizure. Susan's reliance on Katz vs. United States is misplaced; that case involved the electronic surveillance of a public telephone booth and its facts and circumstances are entirely different. Under the maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, when the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same; there being a disparity in the factual milieu of Katz and the instant case, the ruling in Katz cannot be applied.
• Lawful Warrantless Arrest: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, authorizes a peace officer or a private person to arrest a person without a warrant, among others, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The present case falls under that paragraph. The search conducted on Susan resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline substances which, upon examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The warrantless search and seizure being legal, the airport security personnel and police authorities, armed with the knowledge that Susan was committing a crime, were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People vs. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.
• Custodial Investigation: The rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody interrogation." Custodial investigation refers to the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; it presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him, and the right to counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation. The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation was conducted after Susan's arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution to prove its case, and no statement was taken from her during her detention and used in evidence against her. Hence, her claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
• Admission of the Medical Report: Susan assailed, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the admission of the medical report on the physical and medical examination conducted upon her request, which contained, among others, the statements "This is the first time I carried shabu. I need the money." The argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned document was erroneous because it was not properly identified. Nevertheless, even without the medical report, the conviction will stand, as the court's finding of guilt was not based on that document.
• Conviction and Penalty: Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted in this case to be valid, the three packages of shabu recovered from Susan are admissible in evidence against her. Supported by this evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, her conviction must inevitably be sustained. Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, provide that the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10 million shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20; and that the penalties for offenses under Section 16 of Article III shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved are 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code. As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law; for possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million, and in view of the net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession of Susan, the trial court's imposition of a fine in the amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by law.
• Return of the Other Seized Items: Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the confiscation of personal property that is (a) the subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. The seizure of Susan's passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the limits of the provision; they therefore have to be returned to her.

• Airport Security Search Exception — The warrantless search of departing airline passengers conducted pursuant to routine airport security procedures is a recognized exception to the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 requires every airline ticket to contain the condition that the holder and his hand-carried luggage are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances, and that a holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft, which condition forms part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. Travelers are thereby placed on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. In this case, the search of Susan — including the strip search in the ladies' room — was upheld under this exception, and the drugs recovered were held admissible.
• Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest — Arrest Must Precede the Search — A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that a lawful arrest first be made before a search can be conducted; the process cannot be reversed. In this case, the search was not incidental to a lawful arrest because the airport security personnel had no knowledge of what was hidden on Susan's body before the strip search and thus did not know whether a crime was being committed; the arrest came only after the discovery of the shabu.
• Terry Search (Stop and Frisk) — A police officer who approaches a person acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, may validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. In this case, the airport security search was held not to be a Terry search, because it was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure and, unlike the Terry search, is not limited to weapons but extends to prohibited materials or substances.
• Custodial Investigation Rights — The rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when a person is under custodial investigation or in custody interrogation, which refers to questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; it presupposes that the person is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him, and the right to counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation. The objective is to prohibit incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. In this case, no custodial investigation was conducted; Susan signed a receipt but was told she had the option to sign or not, and no statement was taken from her and used in evidence.
• Improper Admission of an Unidentified Document — A document that is not properly identified, testified on, or offered in evidence is erroneously admitted. In this case, the medical report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena was erroneously admitted, but the conviction stood because the finding of guilt was not based on that document.
• Limits on the Seizure of Personal Property — Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the seizure only of (a) the subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. In this case, the seizure of Susan's passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded these limits, and the items were ordered returned to her.
• Stare Decisis et Non Quieta Movere — Adherence to precedents mandates not to unsettle things which are established; when the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. In this case, because the facts of Katz vs. United States differ from those of the instant case, its ruling could not be applied.

• "In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed." — This states the ratio decidendi for rejecting the trial court's and the OSG's characterization of the airport search as incidental to a lawful arrest, and supplies the sequence requirement frequently cited in subsequent search-and-seizure jurisprudence.
• "From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances." — This defines the scope of the airport security search exception under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 and distinguishes it from the limited stop-and-frisk permitted under Terry vs. Ohio.
• "Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures." — Quoted from People vs. Johnson and adopted as the doctrinal basis for holding that reduced privacy expectations in airline travel justify routine airport searches.
• "Custodial investigation refers to the 'questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'" — This supplies the canonical definition of custodial investigation, on which the rejection of Susan's right-to-counsel claim rested.

• People vs. Johnson, 348 SCRA 526 [2000] — Controlling precedent, followed and applied. It involved a departing passenger frisked at the airport, and the Court ruled that the shabu seized during the routine frisk was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and was admissible, and that the subsequent warrantless arrest was justified as effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu flagrante delicto.
• Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 [1968] — Source of the stop-and-frisk doctrine; distinguished, because the airport security search is not limited to weapons but extends to prohibited materials or substances.
• Katz vs. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 [1967] — Distinguished. Its facts, involving electronic surveillance of a public telephone booth, are entirely different, and its ruling could not be applied in light of stare decisis.
• People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 [1999] — Cited for the rule that the Constitution bars State intrusions into a person's body, personal effects, or residence except by virtue of a valid search warrant, and for the requirement that a lawful arrest precede the search.
• Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 [1997] — Cited, through People vs. Chua Ho San, for the same requirement that a lawful arrest must precede a search incidental to it.
• People vs. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991] — Cited for the proposition that limiting airport security personnel to refusing a passenger's entry into the aircraft would sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
• People vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 145371, 28 September 2001 — Cited for the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere.
• Sebastian vs. Garchitorena, 343 SCRA 463 [2000] and People vs. De la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 [1997] — Cited for the rule that the rights under Section 12, Article III may be invoked only when a person is under custodial investigation or in custody interrogation.
• People vs. Salonga, 359 SCRA 310 [2001] — Cited for the definition of custodial investigation.
• People vs. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 [1989] — Cited for the objective of the right to counsel, namely, to prohibit incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere.
• Manuel vs. P.C. Construction Supply, 282 SCRA 326 [1997] — Cited for the rule that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of custodial investigation.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and prescribes the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest. It supplied the constitutional baseline against which the warrantless airport search was measured.
• Section 3(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that any evidence obtained in violation of Section 2 or Section 3 shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Because the search was held valid, the exclusionary sanction did not attach to the seized shabu.
• Section 12, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Enumerates the rights of a person under custodial investigation, including the right to counsel. Susan invoked it, but the Court held it inapplicable because no custodial investigation had been conducted.
• Section 9, Republic Act No. 6235 — Requires every airline ticket issued to a passenger to contain the printed condition that the holder and his hand-carried luggage are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances, and that a holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft, which condition forms part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. This provision was the basis for upholding the warrantless airport search as a recognized exception.
• Sections 16 and 20, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended — Section 16 penalizes the possession or use of regulated drugs with reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10 million, subject to Section 20; Section 20 applies those penalties where the dangerous drugs involved are 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride. These provisions supplied the penalty imposed on Susan.
• Section 1, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Defines arrest as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It was used to show that the restraint on Susan before the strip search did not amount to an arrest.
• Section 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Authorizes a warrantless arrest, among others, when, in the presence of the arresting officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Susan's warrantless arrest was justified under paragraph (a) of this provision.
• Section 3, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Limits the personal property that may be seized to (a) the subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. The seizure of Susan's passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded these limits.
• Article 63(2), Revised Penal Code — Applied in fixing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance.

Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.