People of the Philippines vs. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig

Circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction for murder where more than one circumstance is proven, the facts from which the inference is drawn are established, and their combination produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt; conspiracy and treachery may likewise be established by circumstantial evidence of the accused's conduct before, during, and after the killing. Evident premeditation, however, cannot be appreciated absent proof of when the plan to kill was hatched and sufficient lapse of time for reflection.

Appellant SPO1 Alfredo Alawig and the victim PO3 Miel de Ocampo Café were both members of the Philippine National Police Force assigned at the Valenzuela Police Station. The killing of a fellow police officer prompted a reinvestigation upon the motion of the victim's mother, Percelita Café, which led to an Amended Information charging appellant and five other police officers with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The case was transferred from the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela to the Regional Trial Court of Manila by minute resolution of the Court en banc.

In the early morning of November 30, 1996, the victim, PO3 Miel de Ocampo Café, and his friend MacGregor Reyes went to a nearby market. Upon their return, Reyes left the victim at the latter's residence and came back at noon. He did not immediately enter the house because he noticed several policemen strategically positioned on the premises. He saw appellant SPO1 Alfredo Alawig and PO3 Romeo Ventinilla standing by the door shortly before entering the victim's house; SPO2 Enrique Dabu at the front gate; PO2 Armando de Vera on top of the septic tank; and PO2 Vivencio Corpuz at the main door. To avoid being noticed, Reyes took the alternative road and entered through the back gate.

From his position, Reyes heard the conversation among appellant, PO3 Ventinilla, and the victim. The victim, who had just woken up, was told to dress up and bring his firearm because he was summoned by SPO4 Ponciano Miraples to join a police team in an operation regarding illegal drugs. After the group left the victim's residence, Reyes entered the house. While inside, he received a telephone call from the victim, who told him, "Pare wala pala kaming tatrabahuhin, ako pala ang tatrabahuhin, tulungan mo ako, sumundo ka ng tao na tutulong sa akin." Before Reyes could say anything, the telephone conversation was cut. Not long after, Reyes learned that the victim had died from gunshot wounds in different parts of his body while inside the premises of Police Kababayan Center I in Doña Ata Subdivision, Marulas, Valenzuela City.

Dr. Fernando Mandapat, the physician on duty when the victim was brought to Fatima Hospital, conducted the initial postmortem examination and noticed that the victim had no upper clothing and shoes when he was brought in by PO2 Corpuz. Dr. Valentin Bernales, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, corroborated the initial findings; his autopsy report indicated that the victim sustained three gunshot wounds, contusions on the chest, subclavicular area, and forearm, lacerated wounds on the ear and posterior axillary line, and abrasions in post aurical and anterolateral areas. Sr. Insp. Edison Lopez, Team Leader of the Scene of the Crime Operatives, found the crime scene disturbed and tampered with; he noticed a pool of blood leading to the door of the police station, observed that six spent shells taken from the office of SPO4 Miraples were placed on the floor by members of the police station contingent when the team was about to take pictures, and noted that the holes on the wall were caused not by gunshots but by a concrete nail. He invited all members of the police station contingent to undergo paraffin examination, but only appellant and PO3 Ventinilla acquiesced; both tested positive for gunpowder nitrates. Dr. Olga Bausa, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, examined the blood-stained hat, face towel, and T-shirt worn by the victim and submitted by the Valenzuela police, and found that the T-shirt had no bullet holes on the areas where the victim was apparently shot and had no trace of blood.

Percelita Café, the victim's mother, testified that sometime in September 1996, the victim confided to her that he had earned the ire of his superior and fellow police officers after he apprehended a drug pusher in Valenzuela. She recalled that on November 28, 1996, the victim told her, "Inay, ang Valenzuela ay bulok," as some high-ranking officials were involved in a drug syndicate, and that unknown persons were following him from time to time. As a result of her son's death, she testified that she suffered moral damages and actual damages amounting to ₱104,000.00, and spent ₱221,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Appellant and SPO2 Dabu presented a different account. According to the defense, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 30, 1996, appellant, PO3 Ventinilla, and PO2 De Vera were dispatched by their Precinct Commander SPO4 Miraples to ARTY Subdivision to respond to a report involving illegal drugs, but SPO4 Miraples instead directed them to Gumamela Street to investigate a reported trouble. When they arrived, the reported trouble was already over, so they proceeded to the victim's house within the vicinity. The victim was playing darts with a certain Tomas Beroy and invited the police officers inside; only appellant and Ventinilla entered. The victim admitted that he had quarreled with his wife, which caused him to shoot a thermos bottle. Thereafter, the victim joined them in reporting back to the police station, bringing his armalite rifle and .45 pistol and boarding Ventinilla's owner-type jeep. When they were about to leave, Ventinilla noticed that the victim was holding a plastic sachet containing "shabu" and said, "Matagal kanang tinatrabaho ng DILG Parak." Upon arrival at the police station, appellant went to a store to buy cigarettes; when he returned, he saw the victim and Ventinilla having a heated argument. Dabu and De Vera left the station to respond to a reported illegal gambling. The victim and Ventinilla went inside the station, where the victim made a telephone call and the heated argument resumed. Appellant, seated outside, saw the victim kick his armalite rifle and point it at Ventinilla, who tried to impede him by holding the end part of the weapon and pointing it upward. Ventinilla kicked the table towards the victim, causing the latter to fall to his knees. At that moment, the victim fired his armalite rifle and, in retaliation, Ventinilla shot the victim several times. Appellant told Ventinilla to stop, after which the latter left the scene. For his part, Dabu testified that he was not among those who fetched the victim at his house; he remained at the police station to wait for De Vera before responding to a reported illegal gambling in Pasong Balete Hills. Immediately after De Vera arrived, Dabu left the station with De Vera, apprehended three persons, and brought them to the station. Upon arrival, Dabu learned that a shooting incident had transpired between the victim and Ventinilla while they were away, and he released the persons he apprehended pursuant to an order of his superior, SPO4 Miraples.

The trial court found the prosecution's version credible and discredited the defense, finding that the accused had manipulated entries in the police logbook and dispatch log to make it appear that they were elsewhere and performing independent acts, that none of them attempted to prevent the killing, and that they tampered with evidence by placing six spent cartridges at the crime scene and submitting a T-shirt that bore no bullet holes or blood. The Court of Appeals agreed with the prosecution's factual presentation and discredited the defense version.

• Burden of Proving Self-Defense: Appellant argued that the Court of Appeals erred in imposing on him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense, contending that it was PO3 Ventinilla who acted in self-defense and that his own defense was total denial, as found by the trial court.
• Insufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Appellant maintained that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to convict him, as the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of events showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, entitling him to the constitutional presumption of innocence.
• Lack of Conspiracy: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in ruling that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to prove that he conspired in killing the victim.
• Absence of Motive: Appellant asserted that the trial court erred in ruling that there was motive on his part.
• Treachery: Appellant disputed the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
• Evident Premeditation: Appellant disputed the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
• Flight: Appellant faulted the Court of Appeals for not resolving the issue of whether the trial court erred in appreciating flight on his part.

• Burden of Proving Self-Defense: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in imposing upon appellant the burden of proving the elements of self-defense notwithstanding his claim that his defense was denial.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in holding that appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence.
• Conspiracy: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to prove that appellant conspired in killing the victim.
• Motive: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that there was motive on the part of appellant.
• Treachery: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
• Flight: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating flight on the part of appellant.

• Burden of Proving Self-Defense: No. The Court of Appeals committed no error in imposing upon appellant the burden of proving the elements of self-defense, since he was the only witness who testified on the circumstances of the victim's death and had himself interposed self-defense in his Answer to the administrative complaint and in his co-accused's Counter-Affidavit.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: No. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inference is derived are proven, and the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt; all these requisites were established.
• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was established by circumstantial evidence of the accused's conduct before, during, and after the killing, showing a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.
• Motive: No. The finding of conspiracy rendered proof of motive unnecessary, the evidence of concerted action being adequate to establish unity of purpose.
• Treachery: No. Treachery attended the killing, the victim having been first manhandled and then shot while kneeling or stooping by assailants positioned on a higher level, leaving him no opportunity to defend himself.
• Evident Premeditation: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in appreciating evident premeditation, the circumstances relied upon being indicative only of conspiracy and not of clear and positive outward acts showing a plan to kill.
• Flight: No. The trial court properly disregarded appellant's non-flight, since non-flight is not proof of innocence and is not a sufficient ground to exculpate him from proven criminal liability.

• Burden of Proving Self-Defense: Appellant was confused in faulting the Court of Appeals for imposing on him the burden of proving self-defense. He was the only witness who testified on the circumstances surrounding the victim's tragic death, and it was he who supplied the evidence showing unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. In the Counter-Affidavit of SPO4 Miraples, appellant's co-accused, it was stated that appellant acted in self-defense when the victim allegedly went berserk; more importantly, in his Answer to the administrative complaint filed by the victim's widow, appellant himself interposed self-defense by alleging that it was the victim who initiated the attack through unlawful aggression. The Court of Appeals thus committed no error in imposing upon him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense. At any rate, the claim deserved no credence: the defense presented no credible evidence to establish self-defense, and the claim was belied by appellant's assertion that he was outside the police station premises when the victim was killed. Even his denial deserved scant consideration, as the physical evidence placed him at the crime scene — he tested positive for gunpowder nitrates, proving that he fired his firearm — and Dr. Bernales testified that the victim was killed by more than one assailant.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Although no prosecution witness actually saw the commission of the crime, direct evidence is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt; the rules on evidence allow reliance on circumstantial evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General synthesized the circumstances culled from the testimony of Reyes: (1) around noon of November 30, 1996, Reyes saw appellant and PO3 Ventinilla enter the victim's house; (2) Reyes saw them carrying an armalite rifle and a .38 caliber pistol; (3) Reyes heard them tell the victim that he was being instructed by SPO4 Miraples to join a police team that would apprehend a big person involved in illegal drugs; (4) Reyes saw the victim leave his house with appellant and PO3 Ventinilla around 1:00 p.m.; (5) a few minutes later, Reyes received a telephone call from the victim, who nervously said, "Pare wala pala kaming tatrabahuhin, ako pala ang tatrabahuhin. Tulungan mo ako sumundo ka ng tao na tutulong sa akin," before the line was cut; and (6) later in the afternoon, Reyes learned that the victim was already dead. Corroborating evidence formed an unbroken chain: the presence of gunpowder nitrates on appellant after a paraffin test; the firearm used in the killing, which could be a .38 caliber or 9 mm pistol, dovetailing with Reyes's testimony that he saw appellant carrying a .38 caliber short firearm later found to have been recently fired; and the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the victim's hands, which belied appellant's claim that the victim was shot or exchanged fire with PO3 Ventinilla. All the requisites of circumstantial evidence were sufficiently established.

• Conspiracy: Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy if two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it; it must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of the agreement, either by direct or circumstantial evidence of the conspirators' conduct before, during, and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. The findings of the RTC, affirmed by the Court, showed that the record was enmeshed with acts indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. Before the victim was fetched, the accused made it appear in the dispatch log that on November 30, 1996 at 2:45 p.m. they were dispatched to an unnamed place to conduct surveillance on a drug suspect, yet appellant testified that they proceeded to Gumamela Street at 1:00 p.m. — a change of dispatch not recorded in the logbook, and an impossibility since a later dispatch could not have been changed by an earlier instruction. The police blotter entry at 3:00 p.m. regarding a trouble in Gumamela Street further strengthened the theory that the purported police operations were part of a grand design to muddle the events. The alleged call about people playing tong-its was not recorded in the police blotter, while the dispatch for that purpose was recorded at a precise time with signs of peculiarity and alteration. After the victim was brought to the station, appellant tried to paint the deceased Ventinilla as the sole perpetrator, a version at odds with Dr. Bernales's conclusion that there was more than one assailant. No accused attempted to prevent the killing. Appellant falsely claimed he brought the victim to the hospital when it was actually PO2 Corpuz. The accused tampered with evidence by placing six spent cartridges at the crime scene and submitting a T-shirt that bore no bullet holes or blood, and failed to record the killing in the police blotter. The Firearms Identification Report showed the cartridges were fired from three M16 rifles, and the Physical Sciences Report indicated all the firearms were fired, yet the victim tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. These circumstances sufficed to establish unity of purpose and unity in execution.

• Motive: The finding of conspiracy rendered proof of motive unnecessary, the evidence of concerted action being adequate to establish unity of purpose and unity in execution of the offense.

• Treachery: For treachery to qualify the crime to murder, it must be shown that (a) the malefactor employed such means, method, or manner of execution as to ensure his safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, and (b) the said means, method, or manner of execution were deliberately adopted. The circumstances surrounding the killing must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself, and treachery cannot be presumed. The Medico-Legal Record showed the victim sustained two puncture wounds at his lower neck and three gunshot wounds; the Autopsy Report showed contusions and abrasions. The gunshot wounds were inflicted by more than one assailant using three different firearms, as established by their size and location. Dr. Bernales opined on the relative positions of the victim and assailants: the first assailant was facing the victim but more to his left; the second was at the left side but more at the back; and the third was at the right side, with the assailants positioned on a higher level than the victim, indicating the victim was kneeling or stooping. Considering the contusions, abrasions, and puncture wounds, the victim was first manhandled prior to the shooting. As the RTC pointed out, based on the nature and location of the wounds, the victim could not have put up any defense even if armed, which explained why he tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. The attack was thus perpetrated with alevosia, qualifying the killing to murder.

• Evident Premeditation: For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites must concur: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The courts below based their finding on the entries in the Dispatch Logbook, the alleged pretense that the accused were going to conduct a police operation regarding illegal drugs, and the telephone call made by the victim to Reyes. These circumstances do not constitute clear and positive evidence of outward acts showing a premeditation to kill; at most, they are indicative only of conspiracy among the accused. When it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. It must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt. Even the Office of the Solicitor General admitted that the lapse of time from the moment the victim was fetched until the shooting could not be considered sufficient for appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

• Flight: The trial court properly disregarded appellant's non-flight. While an accused's decision not to flee after the crime despite an opportunity to do so is not characteristic of a guilty person, the opposite has also been upheld in some cases. Appellant may not have fled from the scene and even allowed himself to be subjected to a paraffin test, but these are not necessarily indicative of a clear conscience. Non-flight is not proof of innocence. The fact that appellant did not flee may be a badge of innocence, but it is not a sufficient ground to exculpate him from his proven criminal liability.

• Circumstantial Evidence — Circumstantial evidence is evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. It is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this test to the six circumstances drawn from Reyes's testimony, together with the corroborating physical evidence, and found all requisites established.

• Conspiracy — Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy if two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. It must be proven during trial with the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of the agreement, either by direct or circumstantial evidence of the conspirators' conduct before, during, and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. The Court found conspiracy from the manipulation of logbook and blotter entries, the failure of any accused to prevent the killing, the false attribution of sole responsibility to the deceased Ventinilla, and the tampering with evidence.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — For treachery to qualify a killing to murder, two requisites must concur: (a) the malefactor employed such means, method, or manner of execution as to ensure his safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (b) the said means, method, or manner of execution were deliberately adopted. Treachery cannot be presumed; the circumstances surrounding the killing must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. The Court found treachery from the medical evidence showing the victim was first manhandled and then shot while kneeling or stooping by assailants positioned on a higher level, leaving him no opportunity to defend himself.

• Evident Premeditation — For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites must concur: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. It must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt. The Court discarded evident premeditation because the circumstances relied upon did not show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed.

• Non-flight — An accused's decision not to flee after the crime despite an opportunity to do so is not characteristic of a guilty person, but non-flight is not proof of innocence. The Court held that appellant's non-flight and submission to paraffin testing were not sufficient to exculpate him from his proven criminal liability.

• Loss of Earning Capacity — Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity for loss of earning capacity. The net earning capacity is computed as: Net Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual Income – Living Expenses) = [2/3 (80 – age of death)] x (GAI – 50% of GAI). The Court applied the formula to the victim, who died at 31 with a gross annual income of ₱88,530.00, yielding ₱1,445,990.00.

• "Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage states the canonical three-part test for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, which the Court applied to uphold the conviction despite the absence of an eyewitness to the shooting.
• "Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code [RPC], there is conspiracy if two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. It must be proven during trial with the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of the agreement of the parties either by direct or circumstantial evidence of the conspirators' conduct before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose." — This passage defines conspiracy and the quantum of proof required, and was the basis for affirming the finding of conspiracy among the accused.
• "For treachery to qualify the crime to murder, it must be shown that: a) the malefactor employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and b) the said means, method and manner of execution were deliberately adopted." — This passage enumerates the requisites of treachery, which the Court found satisfied by the medical evidence of the victim's position and wounds.
• "In order 'for evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites must concur: (1) the time when accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and, (3) sufficient lapse of time between [such a determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act." — This passage states the requisites of evident premeditation, which the Court found wanting, leading to the discarding of the aggravating circumstance.

• People vs. Manchu, G.R. No. 181901, November 29, 2008, 572 SCRA 752 — Cited for the rule that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.
• People vs. Osianas, G.R. No. 182548, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 319 — Cited for the definition of circumstantial evidence as evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference drawn by the fact-finder.
• People vs. Gaffud, Jr., G.R. No. 168050, September 19, 2008, 566 SCRA 76 — Cited for the requisites of circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction.
• Asetre vs. Asetre, G.R. No. 171536, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 471 — Cited for the definition of conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code and the quantum of proof required.
• People vs. Balais, G.R. No. 173242, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 555 — Cited for the requisites of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
• People vs. Nueva, G.R. No. 173248, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 449 — Cited for the rule that treachery cannot be presumed and that the circumstances surrounding the killing must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself, and for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Iligan, 369 Phil. 1005 (1999) — Cited for the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.
• People vs. Eribal, 364 Phil. 829 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the decision to commit the crime must be the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt.
• People vs. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 180925, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 752 — Cited for the rule that non-flight is not proof of innocence.
• People vs. Berondo, Jr., G.R. No. 177827, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 547 — Cited for the award of civil indemnity without need of proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accused's responsibility.
• People vs. Casta, G.R. No. 172871, September 16, 2008, 565 SCRA 341 — Cited for the rule that moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder and homicide without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.
• People vs. Dulay, 401 Phil. 400 (2000) — Cited for the rule that credence can be given only to claims duly supported by receipts or other credible evidence.
• People vs. Pondivila, G.R. No. 188969, February 27, 2013 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages conformable to prevailing jurisprudence.
• People vs. Lopez, G.R. No. 188902, February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 524 — Cited for the formula adopted in computing compensation for loss of earning capacity.
• People vs. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013 — Cited for the imposition of interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded from date of finality until fully paid.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it; applied to hold that the accused conspired in the killing of the victim.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder; applied to hold that the killing was qualified by treachery, making the crime murder.
• Article 63, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of penalties when no attendant circumstances are present; applied to impose reclusion perpetua in the absence of any modifying circumstance.
• Section 3, Republic Act No. 9346 — Prohibits parole eligibility for persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua; applied to declare appellant ineligible for parole.
• Article 2206, Civil Code — Entitles the heirs of the victim to indemnity for loss of earning capacity; applied to award ₱1,445,990.00 computed under the established formula.

• Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson)
• Roberto A. Abad
• Jose Portugal Perez
• Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe