People of the Philippines vs. Sgt. Rogelio Repiroga

An accused who sets up the plea of self-defense has the burden to show, to the satisfaction of the court, the concurrence of all the elements constituting self-defense: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. When the prosecution's witnesses fail to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the defense presents credible, disinterested corroborating witnesses, the claim of self-defense may be validated and the accused acquitted.

The accused-appellant, Sgt. Rogelio Repiroga, was a member of the Philippine Army stationed at the NCO Academy, 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal, where he resided with his family. The deceased, Sgt. Eduardo H. Dino, was also a member of the Philippine Army and a fellow resident of Camp Capinpin. The case implicates the statutory framework governing jurisdiction over military personnel: RA 7055, which returned to civil courts the jurisdiction over offenses committed by AFP members that are not service-connected, repealing PDs 1822, 1822-A, 1850, and 1852. The case also involves the preliminary investigation procedure under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and the Ombudsman's authority over military cases under Administrative Order No. 08.

Sgt. Rogelio Repiroga, a member of the Philippine Army at the NCO Academy, 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal, was charged with murder for the death of Sgt. Eduardo H. Dino, also a member of the Philippine Army and a fellow resident of Camp Capinpin. The charge arose from an incident on June 19, 1995, when Repiroga failed to submit his counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation, leading Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rolando G. Ramirez to recommend the filing of the Information based solely on the complaining witness's evidence.

The prosecution presented Editha Dino, widow of the deceased, and their son Darwin, who testified that at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on June 19, 1995, the family was in a huddle in their tricycle parked in front of their house, some five to ten meters below road level. They were discussing that Sgt. Dino was suspected by Sgt. Repiroga as responsible for the former's water disconnection. Earlier that afternoon, at around 3:00 o'clock, Repiroga had gone to the Dino house to inquire about the disconnection, which Dino disclaimed any knowledge of. In the midst of their discussion, Editha looked behind her and saw Repiroga approaching with an M-16 rifle. Alarmed, she exclaimed, "Pa, si Repiroga may dalang baril." Dino answered, "Takbo! Takbo kayo Ma!" and Editha and Darwin scampered away. When she stopped to look back, Editha saw Repiroga approach her husband, cock his rifle, and call out, "Pare!" Dino raised his hands as if to ward off Repiroga, pleaded "Pare, Pare," and turned to run, but Repiroga shot him. As Dino stumbled on the grass, Repiroga sprayed him with bullets. Repiroga later turned over his rifle to Sgt. Nodo and gave himself up at the NCO Headquarters. Dino was rushed to Camp Capinpin Station Hospital but died. Dr. Jesusa N. Vergara, medico-legal officer, reported hemorrhage as the cause of death from gunshot wounds on the trunk, with multiple lacerated wounds and abrasions on various parts of the body.

Accused-appellant, in his defense, claimed that on the same date and time, he and his wife were walking home after his duty at the NCO Headquarters. He was advised by his superior that the battalion should be ready for any attack, so he brought his M-16 rifle. When they passed in front of Dino's house, Repiroga noticed a tricycle parked along the road. Suddenly, Dino came out of the tricycle and aimed his 9-mm pistol at him. Dino fired but missed. To protect himself, Repiroga raised his M-16 rifle and shot Dino, who fell to the ground. After he fell, Dino aimed his pistol at Repiroga, who let out another burst of gunfire at the fallen Dino. At this juncture, Editha and Darwin appeared from the direction of their house and ran towards Dino. Darwin picked up the 9-mm pistol of his father. Repiroga turned over his rifle to Sgt. Nodo, who happened to be passing by, and later went back to the NCO Headquarters with his wife and gave himself up to Col. de Vela and Sgt. Delito, who placed him in the military stockade.

The defense presented three witnesses: Vicky Ercilla, a komadre of Sgt. Dino; Roberto Joaquin, a carpenter working on a house being constructed inside the camp; and Josefina Gorgon, a laundry woman. The crux of their testimonies was that while walking on the road, they saw Sgt. Dino suddenly emerge from the tricycle and fire at Sgt. Repiroga, corroborating the accused's claim that he only fired back to defend himself. The trial court rejected the claim of self-defense, holding that from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Repiroga had fired at the defenseless Dino, and appreciated the presence of treachery and evident premeditation considering that a few hours before the shooting, Repiroga inquired about the water pipe that was disconnected from their house supposedly upon instigation of Dino.

• Jurisdiction over Military Personnel: Accused-appellant contended that at the time of the incident he was a member of the AFP with the rank of staff sergeant, subject to CA 408 (Articles of War), which vests jurisdiction over members of the AFP with the courts-martial, and that the trial court, a civil court, had no jurisdiction over his person or the offense.
• Preliminary Investigation Authority: Accused-appellant argued that under Art. 71 of CA 408, preliminary investigation should be conducted by an authorized military officer before any information could be filed against AFP members, and that the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
• Ombudsman Jurisdiction: Accused-appellant contended that the authority to file charges against him lay within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, as members of the armed forces are public officials of an instrumentality of the government.
• Improper Filing of Information: Accused-appellant argued that the filing of the Information was improper since he failed to file his counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation, and that the ex-parte resolution warranted a re-investigation.
• Self-Defense: Accused-appellant claimed that he acted in lawful self-defense, as the deceased was waiting in ambush behind a tricycle, fired at him with a .9 mm pistol but missed, and that he instinctively raised his rifle and shot the victim as an act of self-preservation, shooting him again when he was down because the latter attempted to shoot him once more.

• Waiver of Right to Counter-Affidavit: State Prosecutor Marianito C. Santos claimed that the accused was not deprived of his right to refute the charges and present counter-affidavits, but it was the accused who failed to do so within the reglementary period of ten days.
• Propriety of Preliminary Investigation: The State Prosecutor asserted that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor was proper because the shooting was not related to the performance of the official duties of the accused, and the accused was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman since he had already been discharged from the service.

• Jurisdiction over the Person and Offense: Whether the trial court, a civil court and not a court-martial, had jurisdiction over the person of the accused-appellant, who was then a military officer, as well as over the offense.
• Authority to Conduct Preliminary Investigation: Whether the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
• Propriety of Filing the Information: Whether the filing of the Information was proper since the accused failed to file his counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation.
• Self-Defense: Whether the accused-appellant acted in lawful self-defense.

• Jurisdiction over the Person and Offense: Yes. Under RA 7055, the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who commit crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts. The fact of accused-appellant's separation from the service is of no moment since from the outset, the civil courts have jurisdiction over his offense and his person.
• Authority to Conduct Preliminary Investigation: Yes. There is nothing in Art. 71 of CA 408 that exclusively vests the authority on a military officer to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving AFP members. Under AO 08, the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation over a military case may be exercised together with any provincial or city prosecutor or his assistants since all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
• Propriety of Filing the Information: Yes. If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the 10-day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. Accused-appellant failed to present his counter-affidavit despite due notice.
• Self-Defense: Yes. The accused-appellant acted in lawful self-defense. The prosecution failed to show proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant feloniously and willfully killed the deceased, and the defense's claim of self-defense was validated by the credible testimonies of disinterested witnesses.

• Jurisdiction over the Person and Offense: The Court traced the evolution of jurisdiction over military personnel: CA 408 vested jurisdiction in courts-martial over crimes committed by soldiers; PD 1822 qualified this to offenses related to the performance of duties; PD 1850 provided for trial by civil authorities when court-martial jurisdiction had prescribed or could no longer be exercised; PD 1852 amended PD 1850 to include situations where the President may order trial by civil court. RA 7055 repealed these decrees and placed upon civil courts the jurisdiction over offenses committed by AFP members penalized under the RPC, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case it shall be tried by court-martial. Since the offense was not service-connected, the civil courts had jurisdiction from the outset.

• Authority to Conduct Preliminary Investigation: The Court found nothing in Art. 71 of CA 408 that exclusively vests authority on a military officer to conduct preliminary investigation. The provision simply mentions an "investigating officer" who shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused, without reference to his being a military officer. Furthermore, under AO 08, the Ombudsman's power to conduct preliminary investigation over a military case may be exercised together with any provincial or city prosecutor or his assistants, as all prosecutors are deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. It is only in the prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan where the Ombudsman enjoys exclusive control and supervision.

• Propriety of Filing the Information: The Court agreed that a preliminary investigation guarantees the accused his right to submit counter-affidavits and present evidence. However, under Sec. 3, par. (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, if the respondent does not submit counter-affidavits within the 10-day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. Accused-appellant failed to present his counter-affidavit despite due notice, and for his own negligence, he cannot blame the investigating officer.

• Self-Defense: The Court applied the elementary rule that an accused who sets up the plea of self-defense has the burden to show the concurrence of all elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part. The Court examined the credibility of witnesses, noting that the testimonies of Editha and Darwin Dino, being relatives of the deceased, must be viewed with caution. The Court found gaps and inconsistencies in their testimonies: Editha claimed the mere sight of Repiroga approaching with a gun was the sole reason she told her husband to run, yet she denied knowing of any misunderstanding between the two soldiers prior to the incident, and she panicked at the sight of a gun inside a military camp where gunslinging soldiers are common. Darwin's testimony was laconic and bereft of details, and he disclaimed recollection of any family discussion regarding the water disconnection or any feud. These gaps indicated that the prosecution witnesses did not actually witness the crime and their narration was a mere fabrication. The Court found that the records did not disclose sufficient provocation on the part of accused-appellant, who was simply walking on the road with his wife. His prior inquiry regarding the water disconnection could not constitute sufficient provocation, and the wife of the deceased even testified that accused-appellant appeared calm and composed during that inquiry. The Court found that the use of the M-16 rifle to counter the attack of the deceased using a .9 mm pistol was reasonably necessary and justified to repel the aggression. The three defense witnesses were disinterested, not related to accused-appellant, held no grudge against the deceased, and one was even the komadre of the deceased. Their testimonies were clear, corroborative, and consistent with the claim of self-defense. At the very least, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

• Self-Defense — An accused who invokes self-defense has the burden of proving the concurrence of three elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. In this case, the Court found all elements present: the deceased initiated the attack, the M-16 rifle was reasonably necessary to counter the .9 mm pistol, and the accused's prior inquiry about water disconnection did not constitute sufficient provocation.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Related to the Victim — Testimonies of witnesses related to the deceased must be viewed with caution, if not suspicion. When such testimonies contain gaps and inconsistencies indicating that the witnesses did not actually witness the crime, the prosecution fails to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this principle to find that Editha and Darwin Dino's narrations were a mere fabrication.

• Jurisdiction over Military Personnel under RA 7055 — RA 7055 repealed PDs 1822, 1822-A, 1850, and 1852, and placed upon civil courts the jurisdiction over offenses committed by AFP members penalized under the RPC, except when the offense is service-connected, in which case it shall be tried by court-martial. The determination of whether an offense is service-connected is made before arraignment by the civil court.

• Preliminary Investigation under Rule 112 — Under Sec. 3, par. (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the 10-day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. A respondent who fails to submit counter-affidavits despite due notice cannot later blame the investigating officer for resolving the case solely on the complainant's evidence.

• "It is elementary that an accused who sets up the plea of self-defense has the burden to show, to the satisfaction of the court, the concurrence of all the elements constituting self-defense, to wit: (a) that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) that there was a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the elements of self-defense, which the Court applied to validate the accused's claim.

• "The gaps and inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses seem to indicate that they did not actually witness the commission of the crime and their narration was a mere fabrication. This failure to show proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant feloniously and willfully killed the deceased validated accused-appellant's claim of self-defense." — This passage articulates the Court's finding that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient and explains how this failure operated to validate the defense's claim.

• "The three (3) witnesses for the defense are disinterested witnesses. They are not related to accused-appellant. They do not hold any grudge against the deceased and his family. To note, one of them is even the komadre of the deceased." — This passage underscores the Court's assessment of the defense witnesses' credibility, which was central to the acquittal.

• N/A — The decision does not cite any specific case names or citations as controlling precedent.

• Art. 71, CA 408 (Articles of War) — The Court interpreted this provision to hold that it does not exclusively vest authority on a military officer to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving AFP members; it simply mentions an "investigating officer" without reference to his being a military officer.
• Sec. 1, CA 408 — Cited as the original source vesting jurisdiction in courts-martial over crimes committed by soldiers belonging to the regular force of the Philippine Army.
• Sec. 1, PD 1822 — Cited as qualifying court-martial jurisdiction to include offenses committed in relation to the performance of military duties.
• Sec. 1, par. (b), PD 1850 — Cited as providing that a case shall be disposed of or tried by proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed or can no longer be exercised over the person of the accused military personnel.
• PD 1852 — Cited as amending Sec. 1 of PD 1850 to include situations where the President may order that a case involving a military officer be tried by the appropriate civil court.
• RA 7055 — The Court applied this statute as the controlling law that repealed PDs 1822, 1822-A, 1850, and 1852, placing upon civil courts the jurisdiction over offenses committed by AFP members penalized under the RPC, except when the offense is service-connected.
• Sec. 3, par. (d), Rule 112, Rules of Court — The Court applied this provision to hold that the investigating officer may base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant when the respondent fails to submit counter-affidavits within the 10-day period.
• AO 08, Office of the Ombudsman — The Court applied this issuance to hold that the Ombudsman's power to conduct preliminary investigation over a military case may be exercised together with any provincial or city prosecutor or his assistants, as all prosecutors are deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.

Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred. Quisumbing, J., was on leave.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided text.