People of the Philippines vs. Sebastian S. Lambino

A plea of guilty entered after the prosecution has already presented evidence sufficient to prove the offense is not a mitigating circumstance, and the withdrawal of a plea of guilty before judgment is not a matter of strict right but lies in the sound discretion of the trial court; the right to preliminary investigation may likewise be waived expressly or impliedly.

Sebastian S. Lambino was the municipal treasurer of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, an accountable public officer. The charge against him was malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, with the alleged amount falling within the range that carries reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. The case also implicated the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the preliminary investigation requirement under Section 4 of Rule 108.

Sebastian S. Lambino was the municipal treasurer of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. On August 25, 1952, the provincial fiscal filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan charging him with malversation of public funds in the amount of P16,267.65; the information was later amended to change the amount to P16,287.65. After his arrest, the case was set for arraignment on February 12, 1953, but upon his petition the arraignment was postponed several times. He was eventually arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.

The case was set for hearing on May 11 and 12, 1954, but upon his petition the hearing was postponed to May 26, June 17, June 29, and July 13, 1954. On July 13, 1954, Lambino filed a motion alleging that there had been no preliminary investigation and that the information contained a vague and indefinite averment of the date of the commission of the crime; the court postponed the hearing to July 29, 1954, to allow a written argument. No action was taken on the motion, but the case was called for hearing on July 29, 1954. Before trial began, Lambino reiterated his petition for preliminary investigation; it was denied on the ground that the court had studied the record and was satisfied with the preliminary investigation conducted.

Trial proceeded, and the prosecution presented Auditor Dalmacio Ramos, who testified that he examined Lambino’s accounts as municipal treasurer and found the shortage alleged in the information. When the witness was about to finish his testimony, Lambino, through counsel, asked permission to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and substitute a plea of guilty, to be given the benefit of the indeterminate sentence, and to defer the reading of the sentence. The trial court granted the petition, ordered a re-arraignment, and Lambino voluntarily entered a plea of guilty. The court fixed August 17, 1954, as the date of promulgation.

On July 31, 1954, the court rendered a decision finding Lambino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds. Taking into account his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance, the court imposed a penalty of not less than eight years and one day of prision mayor and not more than twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, a fine of P8,133.82, perpetual special disqualification from holding public office, indemnity to the municipal government of Sta. Barbara in the amount of P16,267.65, and costs.

On August 14, 1954, Lambino filed a petition to withdraw his plea of guilty, claiming that he had inadvertently and inadvisedly entered it after being seduced and influenced by outside intervention, that he did not understand its true import and full consequences, and that after more intelligent consultation he regretted it. Despite this motion, the lower court promulgated the decision, impliedly overruling the motion. Lambino then filed on August 24, 1954, a motion for reconsideration and new trial, alleging errors of law and irregularities and newly discovered evidence consisting of a list of Naric rice debtors and chits or promissory notes; this motion was overruled. The trial court found that as early as June 17, 1954, Lambino was already considering pleading guilty, that he pleaded guilty after the prosecution witness had testified convincingly and after consultation with counsel, and that the newly discovered evidence would at most show he disposed of the rice entrusted to him by selling it on credit without authority, thus malversing the proceeds, and would not relieve him of responsibility.

• Preliminary Investigation: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in not granting his motion for preliminary investigation filed on July 13, 1954, alleging that no preliminary investigation had been conducted and that the information contained a vague and indefinite averment of the date of the crime.
• Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty: Petitioner maintained that the lower court erred in not granting his August 14 petition to withdraw his plea of guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty, claiming he had inadvertently and inadvisedly pleaded guilty after being seduced and influenced by outside intervention and without understanding the true import and full consequences of the plea.
• Reconsideration and New Trial: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in overruling his motion for reconsideration and new trial, which alleged errors of law and irregularities and newly discovered evidence—a list of Naric rice debtors and chits or promissory notes—that would probably change the judgment.

• Affirmance of Penalty: The Solicitor General recommended that the principal penalty imposed upon the accused be affirmed in toto.

• Preliminary Investigation: Whether the lower court erred in not granting appellant’s motion for preliminary investigation filed on July 13, 1954.
• Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty: Whether the lower court erred in not granting appellant’s petition of August 14, 1954, to withdraw his plea of guilty and substitute it with a plea of not guilty.
• Reconsideration and New Trial: Whether the lower court erred in overruling appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the decision and new trial.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed upon appellant was erroneous, specifically whether his plea of guilty was properly considered a mitigating circumstance and whether the indeterminate sentence was correctly fixed under Article 217, No. 4 of the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Preliminary Investigation: No. The right to preliminary investigation may be waived expressly or impliedly, and Lambino waived it by pleading not guilty, delaying, and allowing trial to proceed without timely objection.
• Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty: No. Withdrawal of a plea of guilty before judgment is not a matter of strict right but of sound discretion, and no abuse of discretion was shown.
• Reconsideration and New Trial: No. A plea of guilty admits all the facts alleged in the information, and the newly discovered evidence would not relieve Lambino of responsibility.
• Penalty: Yes, the penalty was erroneous. The guilty plea entered after the prosecution had presented evidence was not mitigating, and under Article 217, No. 4 and the Indeterminate Sentence Law the minimum should be not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and the maximum 16 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal.

• Preliminary Investigation: The Court found no irregularity. A preliminary investigation may be waived expressly or impliedly; under People vs. Magpale, 70 Phil. 176, the right is waived by failure to claim it before the accused pleads. Lambino had already entered a plea of not guilty on March 12, 1903 (as stated in the text). The information was filed originally with the Court of First Instance, and after its filing the accused was ordered arrested; the Court presumed that before the order of arrest the judge must have made the corresponding investigation under Section 4 of Rule 108. Although Lambino reiterated his petition before trial, it was overruled, and he took no steps to bring the matter to a higher court or stop the trial; instead, he allowed the prosecution to present its first witness, who testified and showed the commission of the crime. By that conduct, he waived the right and was estopped from claiming it.
• Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty: The contention was untenable. The record showed that as early as June 17, 1954, Lambino was already considering pleading guilty, as his counsel announced when they petitioned for postponement. He entered the plea after a prosecution witness had testified convincingly that he committed the crime, and he was assisted by an attorney and pleaded guilty only after consultation. It could hardly be conceived that he involuntarily pleaded guilty without realizing the consequences. The withdrawal of a plea of guilty to interpose a motion to quash or substitute a plea of not guilty, at any time before judgment, is not a matter of strict right but of sound discretion of the trial court, as held in U.S. vs. Patala, 2 Phil. 752; U.S. vs. Molo, 5 Phil. 412; U.S. vs. Schneer, 7 Phil. 523; U.S. vs. Neri, 8 Phil. 669; U.S. vs. Sanchez, 13 Phil. 336; U.S. vs. Gran, 18 Phil. 122; People vs. Quinta, 51 Phil. 820; and People vs. Ubaldo, 55 Phil. 95. Lambino should not be allowed to gamble with his plea of guilty by withdrawing it after learning the penalty.
• Reconsideration and New Trial: The contention was also untenable. By the plea of guilty, Lambino admitted all the facts alleged in the information and was precluded from showing that he had not committed them. Even if the newly discovered evidence had some influence, it would only tend to prove that he disposed of the rice entrusted to him, selling it on credit without authority, thus malversing the proceeds; the evidence would not relieve him from responsibility and would not alter the decision.
• Penalty: The principal penalty was erroneous. The lower court considered the plea of guilty as mitigating, but such a plea cannot be given consideration when it was entered after the prosecution had presented part of the evidence, as held in People vs. Co Chan, 60 Phil. 293, and People vs. De la Cruz, 63 Phil. 874. Under Article 217, No. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for malversation where the amount involved is more than P12,000 but less than P20,000 is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be prision mayor in its maximum to reclusion temporal in its minimum, or from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal. Consequently, the minimum was not 8 years and 1 day but not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and the maximum should be 16 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal instead of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal.

• Waiver of Preliminary Investigation — A preliminary investigation may be waived expressly or impliedly, and the right is waived by failure to claim it before the accused pleads or by proceeding to trial without timely objection. In this case, Lambino pleaded not guilty, delayed the proceedings, reiterated his petition only before trial, did not elevate the denial, and allowed the prosecution to present its first witness; he was held to have waived the right and to be estopped from asserting it.
• Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty — The withdrawal of a plea of guilty before judgment is not a matter of strict right but lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. The Court found no abuse of discretion because Lambino pleaded guilty after a prosecution witness had testified convincingly, with assistance of counsel, and after earlier considering a guilty plea; he could not withdraw the plea merely because he later learned the penalty.
• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance — A plea of guilty entered after the prosecution has presented part of its evidence is not a mitigating circumstance. The trial court erred in crediting Lambino’s plea as mitigating because he entered it only after the prosecution witness had sufficiently proved the crime.
• Effect of Plea of Guilty — A plea of guilty admits all the facts alleged in the information and precludes the accused from showing that he did not commit them. Thus, Lambino’s newly discovered evidence could not alter the judgment, as it would at most show unauthorized disposition of the rice and malversation of the proceeds.
• Indeterminate Sentence for Malversation — Under Article 217, No. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, malversation involving more than P12,000 but less than P20,000 is punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum must be taken from prision mayor in its maximum to reclusion temporal in its minimum, and the maximum from the prescribed penalty. The Court corrected the minimum to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and the maximum to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal.

• "It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a preliminary investigation may be waived and that the accused may waive it expressly or impliedly." — States the controlling rule on waiver of preliminary investigation, which the Court applied to hold that Lambino had waived the right by his conduct.
• "the withdrawal of a plea of guilty in order to interpose a motion to quash or substitute therefore a plea of not guilty, at any time before judgment, is not a matter of strict right to the accused but of sound discretion to the trial court." — Articulates the discretionary standard governing withdrawal of a guilty plea, the ratio for denying Lambino’s August 14 petition.
• "Obviously appellant herein should not be allowed to gamble with his plea of guilty by withdrawing it after he learned the penalty imposed upon him." — Captures the Court’s rationale against allowing an accused to withdraw a guilty plea after discovering the severity of the penalty.
• "Obviously, such plea of guilty cannot be given consideration as mitigating circumstance for it was entered after the prosecution had presented part of the evidence" — States the rule that a late guilty plea is not mitigating, the basis for modifying the principal penalty.

• People vs. Magpale, 70 Phil. 176 — Controlling precedent for the rule that the right to preliminary investigation is waived by failure to claim it before the accused pleads.
• U.S. vs. Patala, 2 Phil. 752; U.S. vs. Molo, 5 Phil. 412; U.S. vs. Schneer, 7 Phil. 523; U.S. vs. Neri, 8 Phil. 669; U.S. vs. Sanchez, 13 Phil. 336; U.S. vs. Gran, 18 Phil. 122; People vs. Quinta, 51 Phil. 820; People vs. Ubaldo, 55 Phil. 95 — Cited collectively for the rule that withdrawal of a guilty plea before judgment is not a strict right but a matter of sound discretion.
• People vs. Co Chan, 60 Phil. 293 — Cited for the rule that a plea of guilty entered after the prosecution has presented part of its evidence is not mitigating.
• People vs. De la Cruz, 63 Phil. 874 — Cited with Co Chan for the same rule on the non-mitigating effect of a late guilty plea.

• Article 217, No. 4, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods for malversation where the amount involved is more than P12,000 but less than P20,000; applied to determine the maximum penalty and the range for the indeterminate minimum.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Requires the court to fix a minimum and maximum term; applied to correct the minimum to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and the maximum to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal.
• Section 4, Rule 108 — Provides for preliminary investigation by the judge before issuance of an order of arrest; the Court presumed compliance because the information was filed originally with the Court of First Instance and the accused was thereafter ordered arrested.

Paras, C.J.; Bengzon, J.; Montemayor, J.; Bautista Angelo, J.; Labrador, J.; Concepcion, J.; Reyes, J.B.L., J.; and Felix, J.