People of the Philippines vs. Santos, Jr.

A conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the transaction or sale, the corpus delicti, and the identities of the buyer and seller; the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Salvador Santos, Jr. y Salvador was charged under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The charges were tried jointly before the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77. The prosecution’s case depended on an alleged buy-bust operation conducted by officers of the San Mateo, Rizal Police Station, with PO3 Juanito L. Tougan acting as poseur-buyer. The statutory framework imposes severe penalties for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.

Salvador Santos, Jr. y Salvador was charged before the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 in two criminal cases. In Criminal Case No. 6365, the Information alleged that on or about August 28, 2002, in San Mateo, Rizal, he willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sold, delivered, and gave away to another person one heat-sealed plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.08 gram, which tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, without authority of law. In Criminal Case No. 6366, the Information alleged that on the same date and place, he unlawfully had in his possession and control white crystalline substance placed in twelve heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with a total weight of 1.36 grams, which also tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, without authority of law. Both charges were filed under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Santos entered a negative plea to both charges, and the two cases were jointly heard.

At trial, the prosecution presented its lone witness, PO3 Juanito L. Tougan of the Intelligence Section of the San Mateo, Rizal Police Station. Tougan testified that at around 9:50 p.m. on August 28, 2002, he, together with SPO1 Arellano and PO2 Pontilla, received information from a civilian informant that a certain Badong Santos was selling illegal drugs. The officers planned an arrest and agreed that Tougan would act as poseur-buyer. With the informant, they proceeded to appellant’s residence; Arellano and Pontilla positioned themselves about ten meters away, where they could observe without being noticed. It was dark outside, but the house was well-lit. Appellant opened the gate and, upon seeing the informant, said “Pare.” The informant replied, “Pare, kukuha kami ng panggamit.” Tougan handed appellant marked money worth ₱200.00 bearing Tougan’s initials, “JLT.” After taking the money, appellant went back inside the house and returned with a plastic sachet of shabu. Tougan took the sachet, held appellant’s hand, and introduced himself as a policeman. He then directed appellant to empty his pockets, and recovered the two ₱100.00 bills used as marked money and twelve plastic sachets of shabu contained inside a white box. The officers brought appellant to the police station, where Tougan wrote his initials on all thirteen sachets. A document was prepared for examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory, and Tougan executed a sworn statement regarding the buy-bust incident.

On cross-examination, Tougan stated that appellant had been included in a drug-watch list submitted by the barangay captain containing the names of drug pushers in the area, although at the time of appellant’s apprehension the barangay captain had already discontinued submitting the list to the police. The judge directed Tougan to bring the watch list to court. At the next hearing, Tougan presented watch lists for 2000 and 2001 and explained that appellant was not included in those lists because appellant was then detained in the provincial jail for another criminal charge. He disclosed that the latest watch list in the police department’s possession was dated July 2003.

As the lone witness for the defense, appellant testified that at around 11:00 p.m. on August 28, 2002, he was at home fixing a fluorescent lamp with his wife and three children. They heard a sound from the gate; appellant peeped through the window and saw policemen Tougan, Arellano, and Pontilla, whom he recognized because he had served as their informer for almost three months. He went out to greet them, and the policemen told him they had been looking for him. They then held his hands and pushed him into the house. Tougan shoved him onto the sofa, while Arellano and Pontilla searched the house. Tougan frisked him and confiscated his money of ₱180.00. Pontilla searched the table and took a set of dart pins owned by appellant’s son. When appellant asked why they had come to his house, the officers replied that they harbored a grudge against him because he no longer wanted to serve as their informer. Appellant saw Pontilla take a box out of his pocket and heard him say that it contained shabu and drug paraphernalia. Appellant told Pontilla that if the box were his, he would not have placed it on the table but would have hidden it from his children; Pontilla replied, “tumigil ka diyan, tumahimik ka.” During the commotion, appellant’s family stayed in another room and were very afraid. Pontilla told appellant’s wife, “ilabas mo na iyan,” to which she replied, “Ano ang ilalabas ko? Pinerwisyo ninyo na nga kami.” Appellant was then handcuffed and dragged to the police station, where he was detained at once without being informed of his rights.

Appellant also testified that he worked as a tricycle driver, was applying for a job at the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, and had a recommendation from police officer Amatong. He denied being a drug pusher and denied receiving the marked money. Although he believed the evidence against him had been planted, he did not file a complaint against the police officers because nobody would attend to his complaint. On cross-examination, he stated that he had volunteered to be a police informer and served from May to July 2002; during that period he reported to the police officers four times and acted three times as a poseur-buyer. He decided to sever his ties with the officers because they reneged on their promise to give him money each time a drug pusher was arrested. He claimed the officers arrested him to conceal illegal acts they had committed during arrests, such as confiscating the belongings and money of arrested persons, but he admitted having been previously indicted in two cases for selling and possessing shabu. On re-direct examination, he revealed that he was released from imprisonment on December 13, 2001, after which he worked as a tricycle driver and applied for a job in the municipal government of San Mateo, Rizal. The trial court found Tougan’s testimony credible and appellant’s defense of frame-up unsubstantiated; it also gave weight to appellant’s prior convictions and his admission that he had served as a police informer. The Court of Appeals found no arbitrariness or oversight in the trial court’s appreciation of the facts, held that the watch-list discrepancy did not render Tougan’s entire testimony doubtful, and dismissed the frame-up defense as self-serving and uncorroborated.

• Failure to Prove Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crimes charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness.
• Frame-Up: Petitioner maintained that he was framed up by the police officers, who planted the evidence because they harbored a grudge against him after he stopped serving as their informer.

• Reasonable Doubt: Respondent OSG submitted that reasonable doubt existed on the culpability of appellant.
• Identity of Corpus Delicti: Respondent OSG submitted that the identity of the corpus delicti was not sufficiently established.
• Doubtful Veracity of Lone Witness: Respondent OSG maintained that the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Tougan, was of doubtful veracity.
• Equipoise Rule: Respondent OSG maintained that should there be reservations regarding the innocence of appellant, the equipoise rule should apply.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
• Credibility of the Lone Prosecution Witness: Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence to the testimony of PO3 Juanito L. Tougan.
• Identity of the Corpus Delicti: Whether the identity of the corpus delicti was sufficiently established despite the marking of the sachets at the police station rather than at the scene of the alleged buy-bust.
• Presumption of Regularity: Whether the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty could sustain the conviction and overcome the presumption of innocence.
• Frame-Up and Rebuttal Evidence: Whether the prosecution’s failure to present rebuttal evidence against appellant’s defense of frame-up, and the inconsistencies in Tougan’s testimony, created reasonable doubt.
• Collateral Offenses: Whether the trial court erred in considering appellant’s previous convictions as evidence of the crimes charged.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: No. The prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt because the alleged buy-bust operation was established only by the lone, unsubstantiated testimony of PO3 Tougan, and the prosecution presented no other evidence to support it.
• Credibility of the Lone Prosecution Witness: Yes, the lower courts erred. Tougan’s lack of candor regarding whether appellant’s name appeared in the drug-watch list rendered the rest of his testimony doubtful, and his bare statements were reduced to self-serving assertions.
• Identity of the Corpus Delicti: No. The identity of the corpus delicti was not sufficiently established because the confiscated sachets were not shown to have been marked or inventoried at the scene in accordance with the required procedure.
• Presumption of Regularity: No. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• Frame-Up and Rebuttal Evidence: Yes. The prosecution never offered rebuttal evidence to refute appellant’s defense of frame-up, and the lack of corroboration for Tougan’s testimony created doubts on whether any buy-bust operation took place.
• Collateral Offenses: Yes, the trial court erred. Evidence of collateral offenses must not be received as substantive evidence of the offenses on trial.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution bears the burden to overcome that presumption by the required quantum of evidence, and it must rest on its own merits and not rely on the weakness of the defense. In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that the transaction or sale took place, that the corpus delicti or illicit drug was presented as evidence, and that the buyer and seller were identified. Here, the prosecution’s version consisted solely of Tougan’s testimony regarding the buy-bust operation. Although Tougan claimed that Arellano and Pontilla were his backup team, the prosecution did not present them or any other evidence to corroborate his account. The lack of any other evidence reduced Tougan’s declaration into a self-serving assertion. The prosecution also never offered rebuttal evidence to refute appellant’s defense of frame-up. These omissions created doubts on whether there had actually been any buy-bust operation at all.
• Credibility of the Lone Prosecution Witness: The usual rule is for the Court to respect the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses, it having had the opportunity to hear the witnesses and observe their deportment during trial. The rule admits of exceptions, and the factual findings of the trial court may be reversed if, by the evidence or the lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred. During trial, Tougan categorically answered that appellant’s name appeared in the drug-watch list, but the list he brought to court did not contain appellant’s name. His lack of candidness on this detail rendered the rest of his testimony doubtful. The trial court therefore erred in relying heavily on Tougan’s sole testimony.
• Identity of the Corpus Delicti: The identity of the corpus delicti was not sufficiently established. Tougan’s testimony did not definitively express that the confiscated plastic sachets of shabu had been marked or initialed at the scene of the crime according to proper procedure; he marked them only at the police station. People vs. Lim specifies that any apprehending team having initial control of illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if any, and/or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was the same drug and/or paraphernalia as that actually recovered from the accused. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers.
• Presumption of Regularity: The trial court erred in allowing Tougan to use the mantle of regularity of official functions to prop up his allegations. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As held in People vs. Ambrosio, the presumption is precisely just that—a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, it cannot be regarded as binding truth. It also cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• Frame-Up and Rebuttal Evidence: While buy-bust operations deserve judicial sanction if carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, the very nature of anti-narcotics operations—the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which drugs can be planted, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals—makes the possibility of abuse great. Courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases. The prosecution never offered rebuttal evidence to refute appellant’s defense of frame-up. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, such that one is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit.
• Collateral Offenses: The trial court wrongly considered appellant’s previous convictions for the purpose of showing that he was likely to commit the crimes charged in the indictment. Evidence of collateral offenses must not be received as substantive evidence of the offenses on trial. Although the evidence of the defense was weak and uncorroborated, this cannot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution, as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.

• Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof — The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution bears the burden to overcome this presumption by the required quantum of evidence; it must rest on its own merits and cannot rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum, the defense may logically not even present evidence, and the accused shall be acquitted. Applied here, the prosecution failed to prove the alleged buy-bust operation and the identity of the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt.
• Reasonable Doubt — Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. The Court entertained serious doubts as to appellant’s culpability because the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient and inconsistent.
• Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duty — The presumption of regularity is a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, it cannot be regarded as binding truth. It cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court erred in using it to sustain Tougan’s allegations and the conviction.
• Corpus Delicti and Chain of Custody in Dangerous Drugs Cases — In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove the transaction or sale, the corpus delicti or illicit drug presented as evidence, and the identities of the buyer and seller. Any apprehending team having initial control of illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused and/or his representative, who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Failure to comply raises doubt whether the drug submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was the same drug recovered from the accused, and it negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. The marking of the sachets at the police station rather than at the scene, without the required inventory and photograph, left the identity of the corpus delicti insufficiently established.
• Evidence of Collateral Offenses — Evidence of collateral offenses must not be received as substantive evidence of the offenses on trial. The trial court wrongly considered appellant’s previous convictions to show that he was likely to commit the crimes charged.
• Equipoise Rule — When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. The Court applied this rule because the evidence admitted of an inference consistent with appellant’s innocence.
• Frame-Up Defense — Frame-up, like alibi, is viewed with disfavor for it is self-serving, can easily be fabricated, and is a common defense in dangerous drugs prosecutions; clear and convincing evidence is required to prove it. However, the prosecution’s evidence must stand or fall on its own weight, and the prosecution’s failure to rebut the frame-up defense may contribute to reasonable doubt. Here, the prosecution never offered rebuttal evidence against appellant’s claim of frame-up.
• Credibility Findings on Appeal — The usual rule is to respect the trial court’s findings on witness credibility because it had the opportunity to hear the witnesses and observe their deportment during trial. The rule admits of exceptions, and factual findings may be reversed if, by the evidence or the lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred. The Court found such error because Tougan’s testimony was unsubstantiated and marked by lack of candor.

• “The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellant’s conviction because, [f]irst, the presumption is precisely just that—a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, x x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.” — This passage, quoting People vs. Ambrosio, states the controlling rule that the presumption of regularity cannot substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt or overcome the presumption of innocence.
• “In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.” — This passage sets out the elements the prosecution must establish in an illegal-sale prosecution; the Court found them insufficiently proved.
• “The failure of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was the same drug and/or paraphernalia as that actually recovered from the accused. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers.” — This passage, discussing People vs. Lim, explains why non-compliance with the required inventory and photograph procedure undermines the identity of the corpus delicti and the presumption of regularity.
• “When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit.” — This passage states the equipoise rule applied by the Court in acquitting appellant.

• People vs. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 — Cited for the rule that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for conviction because it is a mere presumption that cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence.
• People vs. Lim, G.R. No. 141699, 7 August 2002, 386 SCRA 581, 597-598 — Cited for the requirement that any apprehending team having initial control of illegal drugs must immediately inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or representative; failure raises doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.
• People vs. Bandang, G.R. No. 151314, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 570, 579 — Cited for the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs: transaction or sale, corpus delicti, and identities of buyer and seller.
• People vs. Zeng Hua Dian, G.R. No. 145348, 14 June 2004, 432 SCRA 25, 34 — Cited for the rule that delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and receipt of the marked money consummates the buy-bust transaction.
• People vs. Samson, 421 Phil. 104, 122 (2001) — Cited for the rule that the prosecution’s evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
• People vs. Batoctoy, 449 Phil. 500, 521 (2003) — Cited for the equipoise rule: where circumstances admit of two or more inferences, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail.
• People vs. Uy, 392 Phil. 773, 782-783 (2000) — Cited in connection with the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of innocence.
• People vs. Tan, 401 Phil. 259, 273 (2000), citing People vs. Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 (1995) — Cited for the need for courts to be extra vigilant in drug cases because of the possibility of abuse in anti-narcotics operations.
• People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 129376, 29 May 2000, 382 SCRA 419, 445 — Cited for the requirement that courts put prosecution evidence through severe testing and consider every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused.

• Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 — Defines and penalizes the illegal sale, delivery, or giving away of dangerous drugs. Appellant was charged under this provision; the lower courts convicted him, but the Supreme Court reversed because the prosecution failed to prove the sale beyond reasonable doubt.
• Section 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 — Defines and penalizes illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Appellant was charged under this provision; the conviction was reversed for insufficiency of evidence.
• Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, S. 1990 — Cited in People vs. Lim as the basis for the requirement that the apprehending team immediately inventory and photograph seized drugs in the presence of the accused or representative; non-compliance undermined the identity of the corpus delicti.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the certification accompanying the decision, stating that the conclusions were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.