People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), Relampagos, et al.

Certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from a final order of the Sandiganbayan dismissing a criminal case for lack of probable cause, and the Sandiganbayan possesses independent authority to judicially determine probable cause upon the filing of an information, which may result in dismissal if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.

The case originates from the "pork barrel scam" involving the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Whistleblower Benhur Luy disclosed a scheme where lawmakers, in conspiracy with Janet Lim Napoles, would funnel PDAF allocations to dummy NGOs. The National Bureau of Investigation and the Ombudsman’s Field Investigation Office conducted inquiries into the PDAF allocations of then-Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula, specifically regarding funds transferred to Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation, Inc. (CARED), a Napoles-controlled NGO, through the Technology Resource Center (TRC).

• The PDAF Scam Scheme: The scheme involved lawmakers negotiating with Janet Lim Napoles to funnel PDAF allocations to Napoles-controlled NGOs. Benhur Luy, an employee of Napoles, would prepare listings of projects. The lawmaker would request release from the DBM, which would issue Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of Cash Allocation (NCAs) to implementing agencies like the Technology Resource Center (TRC). The TRC would then release checks to the NGO.
• The Subject Transactions: In 2007, three SAROs (Nos. ROCS-07-00580, ROCS-07-00861, and ROCS-07-05450) were issued covering P30,000,000.00 from Jaraula's PDAF, transferred from TRC to CARED.
• Ombudsman’s Findings: Based on Luy's testimony, Marina Sula's testimony, Merlina Suñas's testimony, and COA Special Audits Office Report No. 2012-03, the Ombudsman found probable cause against Relampagos, et al. for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and malversation. The Ombudsman alleged that Relampagos, et al., assigned to the Office of the Undersecretary for Operations, processed the SAROs and NCAs and exhibited manifest partiality by expediting the releases.
• Defense of Relampagos, et al.: Relampagos claimed his participation was limited to signing SAROs only in the absence of the DBM Secretary, and specifically denied signing SARO No. ROCS-07-05450. Nuñez, Paule, and Bare claimed they had no participation in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009 and that Luy's follow-ups were regular office practice. They argued that the PDAF Process Flow showed they had no means of expediting releases.
• The Critical Evidence: Upon the Sandiganbayan’s order, the prosecution submitted SARO No. ROCS-07-05450, which revealed it was signed by DBM Secretary Rolando G. Andaya, Jr., and not by Relampagos, et al.

• Exclusive Executive Function: Petitioner maintained that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the cases because the determination of probable cause is an executive function vested solely in the Ombudsman, and the court’s role is merely ministerial.
• Failure to Consider Evidence: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan wantonly disregarded other evidence for the prosecution, specifically (a) Luy’s affidavit identifying Relampagos, et al. as "contacts" within the DBM who expedited releases, and (b) COA Report No. 2012-03 finding that SAROs and NCAs were hastily released despite the absence of required documents under DBM National Budget Circular No. 476.

• Proper Judicial Authority: Respondents countered that the Sandiganbayan properly exercised its independent authority to judicially determine probable cause under the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Lack of Participation: Respondents argued that the SARO itself controverted the allegations against them, establishing that they had no participation in the preparation and issuance of SARO No. ROCS-07-05450, which was signed by the DBM Secretary.

• Proper Remedy: Whether certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail a final order of the Sandiganbayan dismissing a criminal case for lack of probable cause.
• Grave Abuse in Probable Cause Determination: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in reversing the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause and dismissing the criminal cases against Relampagos, et al.

• Proper Remedy: Certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy; appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is the correct mode. The assailed Resolutions were final orders disposing of the criminal cases against Relampagos, et al., and since they had not been arraigned, the prohibition against appeal from a dismissal of a criminal case (double jeopardy) did not apply. Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, mandates that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan are appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The petition was also filed out of time, having been filed on September 8, 2015, more than 15 days after receipt of the July 9, 2015 Resolution denying reconsideration.
• Judicial Determination of Probable Cause: The Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion. The executive determination of probable cause by the Ombudsman is distinct from the judicial determination by the court. Once an information is filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and becomes the "best and sole judge" of whether the case should proceed. Under Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. The Sandiganbayan’s examination of SARO No. ROCS-07-05450, which showed it was signed by the DBM Secretary and not by Relampagos, et al., was sufficient to negate the allegation of their participation in the preparation and issuance of that specific SARO.
• Merits of Probable Cause: The dismissal was proper. The basis for indicting Relampagos, et al. was their participation in preparing and issuing the SAROs. Since SARO No. ROCS-07-05450 was issued by the Office of the Secretary, and the Ombudsman’s findings only established their involvement with SAROs issued by the Office of the Undersecretary for Operations, their participation in the subject SARO was highly improbable. The Sandiganbayan properly insulated respondents from a hasty and oppressive prosecution where the evidence patently demonstrated the absence of their involvement in the specific transaction.

• Two Stages of Probable Cause Determination — Probable cause is determined at two distinct stages: first, at the executive level by the prosecutor during preliminary investigation; and second, at the judicial level by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The judicial determination is independent and may result in dismissal even if the prosecutor found probable cause.
• Remedy from Sandiganbayan Final Orders — Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan are appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising pure questions of law. Certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal under Rule 45.
• Standard for Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion must be patent and gross, amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Errors in weighing evidence or erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
• Purpose of Preliminary Investigation — The purpose of requiring courts to determine probable cause is to insulate from the very beginning those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial, and to protect the State from useless and expensive trials.

• "The executive determination of probable cause is not to be confused with the judicial determination of probable cause. In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages: first, the executive level where probable cause is determined by the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation and before the filing of the criminal information; and second, the judicial level where probable cause is determined by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest."
• "While it is true that the Ombudsman retains full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter gains full control as soon as the case has been filed before it."
• "The purpose of requiring the courts to determine probable cause is to insulate from the very beginning those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial."
• "Where the evidence patently demonstrates the innocence of the accused, x x x [there is] no reason to continue with his prosecution; otherwise, persecution amounting to grave and manifest injustice would be the inevitable result."

• Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman, 802 Phil. 190 (2016) — Distinguished. The Court noted that in Cambe and its consolidated cases, the SAROs were issued by the Office of Relampagos as DBM Undersecretary, whereas in this case, SARO No. ROCS-07-05450 was issued by the DBM Secretary, making the application of the Cambe findings inappropriate for this specific SARO.
• Principio v. Judge Barrientos, 514 Phil. 799 (2005) — Followed. Cited for the principle that courts should protect the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution.
• Spouses Hao v. People, 143 Phil. 204 (2014) — Followed. Cited for the distinction between executive and judicial determination of probable cause.

• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Mandates that appeals from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court must be by petition for review on certiorari raising only questions of law.
• Section 7, P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 — Provides that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Section 5(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires the judge to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and supporting evidence, and allows immediate dismissal if the evidence clearly fails to establish probable cause.
• Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Requires that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge.
• Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Defines the offense of causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
• Article 217, Revised Penal Code — Defines malversation of public funds or property.

Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, Hernando, and Carandang, JJ.