People of the Philippines vs. Salvador Lomerio

Rape is consummated upon the slightest penetration of the female organ — mere touching of the external genitalia or labia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act suffices — and the intact state of the hymen does not negate the commission of rape. Where the victim is under twelve years of age, the crime is statutory rape under the third paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and the credible testimony of the child-victim, corroborated by medical findings and eyewitness testimony, sustains conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Salvador Lomerio is the younger brother of Vilma Bunagan and the maternal uncle of the victim, Leonila Bunagan. At the time of the incident, Leonila was ten years old, having been born on November 10, 1982, and lived with her siblings in Antipolo, Rizal, while her mother stayed in Marikina and her father worked as a mason in Divisoria. The case is governed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalized rape committed against a woman under twelve years of age even absent force or intimidation, and by Republic Act No. 7659, the Heinous Crimes Law, which took effect only on December 31, 1993 — after the March 23, 1993 incident — such that the earlier provision and its penalty of reclusion perpetua applied.

Vilma Bunagan lived with her six children in Antipolo, Rizal, while her husband Mario worked as a mason in Divisoria. On May 23, 1993, Vilma brought her two-year-old son, who was sick, to her parents' house at Tuazon Street, Marikina, leaving behind in Antipolo her five other children — Leonila, Marvie, Lotis, Marichu, and Edmar, then aged ten, eight, seven, six, and one, respectively. Concerned that no adult was attending to them, Vilma instructed her eldest son Roberto to fetch his younger siblings from Antipolo, but Roberto failed to do so because he attended a job interview that same day. At about 8:00 p.m., Vilma asked her youngest brother, Salvador Lomerio, to fetch the children from Antipolo and bring them to Marikina. Salvador agreed and left that night for Antipolo accompanied by Roberto.

Salvador and Roberto arrived at the Antipolo house at about 11:00 p.m. Roberto left, and Salvador stayed for the night. Leonila was awakened by their arrival, opened the door for Salvador, and then went back to sleep. Salvador stayed in the sala smoking cigarettes while Leonila and her siblings lay down. Later, Salvador took off his clothes and went near Leonila, grabbed her hands and pinned her down, removed her shorts and panty, placed himself on top of her, and forcibly inserted his organ into hers for a long time. Leonila felt pain and could only cry. Salvador then returned to the sala and slept. At about 12:00 midnight of the same date, he went back to Leonila and raped her a second time, threatening to kill all of them if she reported the rapes. Marvie was likewise raped by Salvador in the early morning of the following day. As if nothing untoward had happened, Salvador instructed the children to dress up so they could go to Tuazon in Marikina and join their mother.

Vilma learned of the rape on March 25, 1993 from a "kumare," Anita Fernandez, who had heard of it from a certain Totoy, one of Marvie's playmates. When Vilma asked Leonila, the latter confirmed that Salvador had abused her. Vilma then brought Marvie and Leonila to Camp Crame for examination, after which she filed a complaint against Salvador with the Cogeo Police Station. The examination conducted by Dr. Jesusa Nieves Vergara, Medico Legal Officer at Camp Crame, revealed that Leonila was in a virgin state physically, with an absence of external signs of recent application of violence, although there were congestions or redness on her genital and sex organ which could have been caused by possible penetration of the labia minora. Dr. Renato Bautista, Medico Legal Officer of the NBI, testified that there was a possibility of sexual intercourse although there was no medical evidence to prove it, while Dr. Nieves Vergara opined that the redness could have been caused by forcible entry of a hard blunt object such as an erect male sex organ.

Salvador, testifying as the lone witness for the defense, claimed that on March 23, 1993 he was at the Bunagans' house to accompany his sister's children; that there was no bedroom in the house and the children slept on the floor in the main sala while he slept on one side near the window, separated from them; and that when he woke at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning, he did not remember any unusual incident that night except that he accidentally touched Leonila's breast upon waking, for which he apologized. He believed that the accidental touching of Leonila's breasts triggered the filing of the complaint for rape.

The trial court found Salvador guilty of statutory rape, crediting the prosecution's evidence and the credibility of the child-victim, and found the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of confidence attendant to the crime.

• No Rape Committed: Appellant maintained that no rape was committed at all, relying on selected portions of the direct examinations of Vilma Bunagan, Leonila, Dr. Jesusa Nieves, and Dr. Renato Bautista, and capitalizing on the medico-legal finding that the complainant was "in virgin state with no signs of injury in the genitalia," from which he concluded that in the absence of such injuries, there was doubt that rape was committed against the victim.
• Unnatural Testimony of the Victim: Appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the victim's testimonies, which he characterized as unnatural for a person allegedly raped, and questioned the composed behavior of Leonila after the rape.
• Inconsistent and Rehearsed Prosecution Testimonies: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in giving credence to the allegedly inconsistent and rehearsed testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, pointing to supposed lapses as to the location of the floor where Leonila was sleeping, which brother or sister woke up, the size of the room, whether a knife was used during the rape, and whether three or five persons were in the bedroom.
• Failure of Marvie to Intervene: Appellant faulted Marvie for not helping Leonila if the former truly saw him rape her.

• Overwhelming Evidence of Guilt: The prosecution, through the Solicitor General, maintained that the overwhelming evidence established Salvador's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that the testimonies of Vilma Bunagan, Leonila, Dr. Jesusa Nieves, and Dr. Renato Bautista, taken in their entirety, told a credible account of the rape.
• Credibility of the Child-Victim: The prosecution argued that in a prosecution for rape, courts exercise circumspection in determining the credibility of the victim, and that if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof; Leonila's convincing and credible testimony sealed the conviction.
• Corroboration by Marvie: The prosecution drew strength from Marvie, Leonila's sister, who saw how Salvador ravished Leonila that fateful night, and who was herself allegedly raped the morning after.
• Medico-Legal Findings Do Not Negate Rape: The prosecution argued that Dr. Nieves and Dr. Bautista did not absolutely rule out rape, as borne out by their testimonies that there was a possibility of sexual intercourse and that the congestion could have been caused by forcible entry of a hard blunt object such as an erect male sex organ.
• Denial Is Weak: The prosecution contended that the defense of denial is intrinsically weak and must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence, and cannot prevail over the unwavering and consistent testimony of Leonila.

• Commission of Rape: Whether the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that rape was committed against Leonila Bunagan.
• Credibility of the Victim: Whether the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the victim's testimony, which the appellant claimed was unnatural for a person allegedly raped.
• Inconsistencies in Prosecution Testimony: Whether the alleged inconsistencies and rehearsed nature of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses impaired their credibility.
• Nocturnity: Whether nighttime qualified as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the rape.
• Abuse of Confidence: Whether abuse of confidence qualified as an aggravating circumstance.
• Relationship and Penalty: Whether relationship is an aggravating circumstance in crimes against chastity and how it affects the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

• Commission of Rape: Yes. Carnal knowledge was established by the credible testimony of the victim and the medical finding of congestion in the labia minora caused by forcible entry of a hard blunt object, since rape is consummated upon the slightest penetration and does not require rupture of the hymen.
• Credibility of the Victim: Yes, the trial court correctly credited the victim. Testimonies of rape victims of tender age are credible, and the trial court's findings on credibility, based on firsthand observation of demeanor, will not be disturbed absent a showing that significant facts were arbitrarily overlooked.
• Inconsistencies in Prosecution Testimony: No. The alleged inconsistencies related to trivial and immaterial matters and did not touch upon the essential aspects of the crime; the minor lapses in fact strengthened rather than weakened credibility by erasing any suspicion of coached or rehearsed testimony.
• Nocturnity: No. The subjective test was not passed because there was no showing that the appellant purposely sought the cover of nighttime; the mere fact that the rape was committed at nighttime, with nothing more, does not make nocturnity an aggravating circumstance.
• Abuse of Confidence: No. The bare allegation that the victim's mother asked the appellant to fetch her children did not prove that she reposed in him such confidence as would give him an advantage or facilitate the commission of the crime.
• Relationship and Penalty: Yes, relationship is aggravating in crimes against chastity, the victim being the appellant's niece; however, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, being indivisible, must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Commission of Rape: The term "carnal knowledge" as used in the Revised Penal Code does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured; rape is deemed consummated even when the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ, as by the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act. The straightforward and credible testimony of Leonila as to how she was raped, coupled with the medical finding that her hymen suffered congestion due to the forcible entry of a hard blunt object, convinced the Court with clear certainty that the appellant had carnal knowledge of her. The medico-legal opinion that the victim remained in a virgin state physically did not negate rape, because Dr. Nieves Vergara testified that the congestion on the vestibule could have resulted from possible penetration of the labia minora caused by an erect male sex organ, and Dr. Bautista conceded the possibility of sexual intercourse. The appellant's reliance on the absence of genital injuries was thus misplaced.

• Credibility of the Victim: In a prosecution for rape, courts exercise circumspection in determining the credibility of the victim, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit, as the willingness of the complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint. Leonila was proven to be only ten years old when the appellant raped her. The issue of credibility is best addressed to the trial court judge who observed firsthand the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses, and appellate courts will not disturb the findings on credibility unless it is clearly shown that the trial court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily certain facts and circumstances of significance in the case. The appellant's insistence that the victim's composed behavior after the rape was unnatural was rejected, there being no standard form of behavior expected of rape victims, since people react differently to emotional stress. The Court likewise rejected the argument that Marvie's failure to help Leonila impaired her credibility, as Marvie was only eight years old when she witnessed the rape and could have been gripped by fear. The absence of any evidence of a dubious reason or improper motive for the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against the appellant, and the improbability that a ten-year-old girl would cry rape against her own uncle and embroil her sister in the case, further bolstered the testimony's worth.

• Inconsistencies in Prosecution Testimony: The so-called lapses in Leonila's testimony — regarding the location of the floor where she was sleeping, which sibling woke up, or the size of the room — were trivial and did not touch upon the material aspects of the crime. An ample margin of error and understanding should be accorded to young witnesses who, much more than adults, would be gripped with tension due to the novelty of testifying before a court. Errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness recounting details of an experience so humiliating and painful as rape. The other alleged inconsistencies, such as whether a knife was used or whether the rape had already finished when Marvie woke up, related to minor matters and did not vitiate the finding that the rape was adequately proven; indeed, the minor lapses served to strengthen rather than weaken credibility because they erased any suspicion of coached or rehearsed testimony.

• Nocturnity: The elements of nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance are: (a) when it facilitated the commission of the crime; or (b) when it was especially sought by the offender to insure the commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity; or (c) when the offender took advantage thereof also for purposes of impunity. There are two tests — the objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense, and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender — and these two tests should be applied in the alternative. In this case, the subjective test was not passed because there was no showing that the appellant purposely sought the cover of nighttime; the mere fact that the rape was committed at nighttime, with nothing more, did not make nocturnity an aggravating circumstance.

• Abuse of Confidence: To establish abuse of confidence as an aggravating circumstance, it is essential to show that the confidence between the parties was immediate and personal, such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act; the confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the former would not abuse said confidence. The bare allegation that the victim's mother asked the appellant to fetch her children from Antipolo to Marikina did not prove that she reposed such confidence in him that he could have used to his advantage in committing the crime.

• Relationship and Penalty: The aggravating circumstance present in the case was relationship, since Leonila is the niece of the appellant; in crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship is aggravating. However, the penalty of reclusion perpetua would not be affected because it is an indivisible penalty which, under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime of rape. The crime was committed before the effectivity of the Heinous Crimes Law, Republic Act No. 7659 having taken effect only on December 31, 1993, so Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code applied. The birth certificate of Leonila showed that she was born on November 10, 1982, and this was admitted by the appellant during the formal offer of evidence; since the prosecution established that she was only ten years old when the rape occurred on March 23, 1993, the crime fell under the third paragraph of Article 335. In accordance with current rulings, the appellant was ordered to pay civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 and moral damages of ₱50,000.00, the latter being automatically granted in rape cases, separate and distinct from the indemnity.

• Consummation of Rape by Slightest Penetration — Carnal knowledge, as used in the Revised Penal Code, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured; rape is consummated even when the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ, as by the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the appellant's argument that the medico-legal finding of an intact hymen negated rape, holding that the congestion in the labia minora caused by forcible entry of a hard blunt object established carnal knowledge.

• Credibility of Child Rape Victims — Testimonies of rape victims who are of tender age are credible, and the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit, as the willingness of the complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint. The Court relied on this doctrine in sustaining the conviction on the basis of the ten-year-old victim's testimony.

• Finality of Trial Court's Credibility Findings — The issue of credibility is best addressed to the trial court judge who observed firsthand the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses, and appellate courts will not disturb the findings on credibility unless it is clearly shown that the trial court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily certain facts and circumstances of significance in the case. The Court applied this rule in declining to overturn the trial court's assessment of the prosecution witnesses.

• Minor Inconsistencies Do Not Vitiate Credibility — Trivial lapses in a witness's testimony that do not touch upon the material aspects of the crime do not impair credibility; an ample margin of error and understanding should be accorded to young witnesses, and errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness recounting details of an experience so humiliating and painful as rape. The Court held that the minor lapses in fact strengthened rather than weakened credibility because they erased any suspicion of coached or rehearsed testimony.

• Denial as an Intrinsically Weak Defense — Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence, and affirmative testimony is far stronger than negative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. The Court applied this rule in rejecting the appellant's claim that the only unusual incident was his accidental touching of the victim's breast.

• No Standard Behavior for Rape Victims — There is no standard form of behavior expected of rape victims right after they have been defiled, because people react differently to emotional stress; the experience is relative and may be dealt with in many ways by the victim depending on the circumstances, and the victim's credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the appellant's challenge to the victim's composed behavior.

• Nocturnity as an Aggravating Circumstance — The elements of nocturnity are: (a) when it facilitated the commission of the crime; (b) when it was especially sought by the offender to insure the commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity; or (c) when the offender took advantage thereof also for purposes of impunity. Two tests apply in the alternative: the objective test (nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the offense) and the subjective test (nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought). The Court found the subjective test unmet, there being no showing that the appellant purposely sought the cover of nighttime.

• Abuse of Confidence as an Aggravating Circumstance — The confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal, such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act; the confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the former would not abuse said confidence. The Court held that the bare allegation that the victim's mother asked the appellant to fetch her children did not establish such confidence.

• Relationship as Aggravating in Crimes Against Chastity — In crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship is an aggravating circumstance. The Court recognized relationship as the aggravating circumstance present, the victim being the appellant's niece.

• Indivisible Penalties Under Article 63 — An indivisible penalty must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime. The Court held that the presence of relationship as an aggravating circumstance did not affect the penalty of reclusion perpetua because it is indivisible.

• "The term 'carnal knowledge' as used in the Revised Penal Code, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the consummation of rape, rejecting the appellant's argument that the absence of genital injuries and the intact hymen negated the commission of the crime.
• "In fact, rape is deemed consummated even when the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ, e.g., by 'the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act'." — This is the canonical formulation of the slightest-penetration rule, frequently cited in subsequent rape jurisprudence.
• "The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit as the willingness of the complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint." — This passage articulates the doctrine on the credibility of child rape victims, which the Court used to sustain the conviction on the victim's testimony.
• "Errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness especially when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape." — This passage defines the treatment of minor inconsistencies in rape prosecutions, holding that trivial lapses do not impair credibility and may even negate the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

• People vs. Quiñanola, G.R. No. 126148, May 5, 1999 — Cited for the rule that rape is consummated upon the slightest penetration or mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act, and for the principle that where there is no evidence of a dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution witness to testify falsely, the testimony deserves full faith and credit.
• People vs. Sagun, G.R. No. 110554, February 19, 1999 — Cited for the rule that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings on credibility absent a showing that significant facts were arbitrarily overlooked, and for the doctrine that there is no standard form of behavior expected of rape victims.
• People vs. Garigadi, G.R. No. 110111, October 26, 1999 — Cited for the rule that minor lapses in a witness's testimony strengthen rather than weaken credibility by erasing any suspicion of coached or rehearsed testimony, and for the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in rape cases.
• People vs. Mengote, G.R. No. 130491, March 25, 1999 — Cited for the rule that testimonies of rape victims of tender age are credible and that the willingness of the complainant to face public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint.
• People vs. Narciso, 262 SCRA 1 (1996) — Cited for the elements of nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance.
• People vs. Parazo, 272 SCRA 512 (1997) — Cited for the two tests of nocturnity — the objective and subjective tests — which are to be applied in the alternative.
• People vs. Gelera, 277 SCRA 450 — Cited for the requisites of abuse of confidence as an aggravating circumstance, namely, that the confidence be immediate and personal and a means of facilitating the commission of the crime.
• People vs. Perez, 270 SCRA 526 (1997) — Cited for the rule that relationship is aggravating in crimes against chastity and for the application of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code to indivisible penalties.
• People vs. Calayca, 301 SCRA 192 (1999) — Cited for the rule that minor inconsistencies in a witness's testimony do not impair credibility.
• People vs. Rivera, G.R. No. 130607, November 17, 1999 — Cited for the rule that the testimony of a prosecution witness deserves full faith and credit absent any evidence of improper motive.
• People vs. Siulvano, G.R. No. 127356, June 29, 1999 — Cited for the rule that no standard form of behavior is expected of rape victims.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code — Defines rape as committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. The Court applied the third paragraph because the prosecution established that Leonila was only ten years old at the time of the rape on March 23, 1993, the crime having been committed before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of indivisible penalties, providing that they must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime. The Court applied this provision in holding that the aggravating circumstance of relationship did not affect the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
• Republic Act No. 7659 (Heinous Crimes Law) — Took effect on December 31, 1993. The Court noted that because the rape was committed on March 23, 1993, prior to the effectivity of the law, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rather than the Heinous Crimes Law, governed the case.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concurred in the decision.