People of the Philippines vs. Salvador Alapan

A private complainant may not appeal the criminal aspect of a conviction, including the penalty of fine and subsidiary imprisonment for nonpayment, because only the Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal; and subsidiary imprisonment for insolvency must be expressly imposed in the judgment of conviction, which, once final and executory, cannot be modified except for clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice, or void judgments.

Brian Victor Britchford was the private complainant in eight criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Salvador Alapan and his wife Myrna Alapan. The charges arose from a loan extended by Britchford to the Spouses Alapan, for which Salvador issued postdated checks as security. B.P. Blg. 22 penalizes the issuance of checks drawn against closed accounts, and Administrative Circulars No. 12-2000 and 13-2001 govern the imposition of fines instead of imprisonment and the possible application of subsidiary imprisonment under the Revised Penal Code. The dispute before the Supreme Court concerned the criminal aspect of the conviction—the fine and subsidiary imprisonment—as distinguished from the civil liability to Britchford.

Brian Victor Britchford extended a loan to the Spouses Salvador and Myrna Alapan. In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 from Britchford and promised to pay the amount within three months. To secure the indebtedness, Salvador issued eight postdated checks in favor of Britchford.

When the checks matured, Britchford deposited them at the Philippine National Bank, Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter, the bank informed him that the checks had been dishonored because the account against which they were drawn had been closed. Britchford immediately informed Salvador of the dishonor. The Spouses Alapan, for their part, averred that their account was closed only in the last week of October 2005 because they suffered business reverses; they nevertheless stated that they were willing to settle their monetary obligation.

The dishonor of the checks led to criminal proceedings. In an Information dated 26 May 2006, Salvador and Myrna were charged with eight counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Upon arraignment on 1 September 2006, both pleaded not guilty to the charges.

The Municipal Trial Court, San Felipe, Zambales, thereafter rendered its decision. It found that Salvador's act of issuing the bounced checks was not tainted with bad faith and that he was a first-time offender. It also found that Myrna did not participate in the issuance of the dishonored checks.

• Legal Standing / OSG: Petitioner argued that Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code is applicable only in cases wherein the government or any of its branches or instrumentalities is directly involved; that the said law does not cover matters wherein it is the interest of the private complainant that is directly affected.
• Subsidiary Imprisonment: Petitioner argued that Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 expressly states that there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine.
• Deterrence: Petitioner averred in reply that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment would emphasize the gravity of the offense committed by respondent and would serve as a deterrent to others not to emulate the malicious act.

• OSG's Exclusive Authority: Respondent countered, citing Gonzales vs. Chavez, that it is mandatory upon the OSG to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer; that it is only the State, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, which has the sole right and authority to institute criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
• State Interest / Private Complainant's Standing: Respondent argued that the imposition or the non-imposition of subsidiary penalty is a matter that involves the interest of the State, thus, the private offended party is without legal personality to bring an appeal on the criminal aspect of the case.
• Express Imposition Required: Respondent maintained that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment must be clearly stated in the judgment.

• Petitioner's Legal Standing to Assail Penalty: Whether petitioner may assail the penalty imposed in the judgment of conviction.
• Subsidiary Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fine: Whether respondent may undergo subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay the fine.

• Petitioner's Legal Standing to Assail Penalty: No. The authority to represent the People on appeal is vested solely in the Solicitor General; the private complainant's interest is limited to civil liability, so petitioner could not appeal the criminal aspect, including the fine.
• Subsidiary Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fine: No. Subsidiary imprisonment must be expressly stated in the judgment of conviction; the MTC judgment imposed only a fine and did not provide subsidiary imprisonment, and the final and executory judgment cannot be modified.

• Petitioner's Legal Standing to Assail Penalty: The authority to represent the People in criminal appeals before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court is vested solely in the Solicitor General under Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Revised Administrative Code. The OSG is the appellate counsel of the People in all criminal cases. Jurisprudence has settled that the private complainant's interest is limited to the civil liability arising from the crime. In Bautista vs. Cuneta-Pangilinan, the ruling was that if a criminal case is dismissed or there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General; the private offended party may not undertake such appeal. Here, respondent was convicted of eight counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and was imposed a fine instead of imprisonment pursuant to Administrative Circulars No. 12-2000 and 13-2001. The penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment pertain to the criminal aspect, while indemnification for the face value of the dishonored checks pertains to the civil aspect. Petitioner therefore could not appeal the imposition of fine, which was not even questioned by the People through the OSG. Although a private prosecutor may intervene on appeal, his participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, and he cannot adopt a position contrary to the Solicitor General; to do so would give the private prosecutor direction and control of the criminal proceeding contrary to law. Thus, the CA properly dismissed the petition.
• Subsidiary Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fine: Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly stated in the judgment of conviction. In People vs. Fajardo, in relation to Republic Act No. 5465 amending Article 39 of the RPC, the explanation was that Article 39 provides for subsidiary penalty, while Article 78 provides that no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment and that a penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized. Since subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty and no judgment sentenced the accused to suffer it in case of insolvency, the court could not legally compel him to serve it; a contrary holding would violate the RPC and due process. There is no provision in the Code from which it may be logically inferred that an accused may automatically be made to serve subsidiary imprisonment where he has been sentenced merely to pay a fine and is found insolvent. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment, but the Circular does not sanction indiscriminate imposition; it must still comply with the law. Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without violating the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process. Finally, the doctrine of immutability of judgment precludes modification of a final and executory judgment. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, whether by the court that rendered it or by the highest court. The exceptions are correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice to any party, and void judgments. None applies; the MTC decision had long attained finality, so any other question involving it must be put to rest.

• Legal Standing of Private Complainant in Criminal Appeals — In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising from the crime. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal; the private offended party or complainant may not undertake an appeal of the criminal aspect. A private prosecutor may be allowed to intervene on appeal, but his participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, and he cannot adopt a position contrary to the Solicitor General. Applied here, petitioner, as private complainant, lacked legal standing to appeal the penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment, which pertain to the criminal aspect of the case.
• Subsidiary Imprisonment Must Be Expressly Imposed in the Judgment — Subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty. Under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, it is imposed upon the accused and served in lieu of the fine he fails to pay on account of insolvency. Article 78 provides that no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment and that a penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized. There is no provision from which it may be logically inferred that an accused may automatically be made to serve subsidiary imprisonment where he has been sentenced merely to pay a fine and is found insolvent. Applied here, because the MTC judgment did not expressly provide subsidiary imprisonment, it could not be imposed without violating the RPC and due process.
• Immutability of Final Judgments — A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, whether made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court. The exceptions are (1) correction of clerical errors, (2) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. Applied here, the MTC decision had long attained finality and none of the exceptions applied, so it could not be modified to include subsidiary imprisonment.
• Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 Does Not Sanction Indiscriminate Imposition — The Circular provides that should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment. However, the Circular does not sanction indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary imprisonment, which must still comply with the law. Applied here, the Circular could not justify imposing subsidiary imprisonment absent an express provision in the final judgment of conviction.

• "In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General." — This states the ratio on legal standing: the private complainant cannot appeal the criminal aspect of the case because only the Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal.
• "Thus, the penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the criminal aspect of the case. On the other hand, the indemnification for the face value of the dishonored checks refers to the civil aspect of the case." — This distinguishes the criminal aspect, which the private complainant cannot appeal, from the civil aspect, which is the limit of the private complainant's interest.
• "Indeed, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that "should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment." However, the Circular does not sanction indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for the same must still comply with the law." — This clarifies that the Circular does not authorize subsidiary imprisonment unless the law's requirements are met, including an express provision in the judgment.
• "A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law." — This is the canonical formulation of the immutability of final judgments, applied to bar modification of the final MTC decision.

• Bautista vs. Cuneta-Pangilinan, 698 Phil. 111 (2012) — Cited for the rule that the private complainant's interest is limited to civil liability; if a criminal case is dismissed or there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General, and the private offended party may not undertake such appeal.
• People vs. Fajardo, 65 Phil. 539 (1938) — Cited in relation to Republic Act No. 5465 amending Article 39 of the RPC; it explains that subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty and that an accused sentenced by final judgment to pay a fine only cannot be compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment if the judgment did not expressly impose it.
• United States vs. Miranda, 2 Phil. 606, 610 — Cited within the Fajardo discussion for the principle that a judgment failing to impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency is erroneous and should be modified.
• Macasaet vs. People, 492 Phil. 355, 375 (2005) — Cited for the rule that the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.
• Carino vs. De Castro, 576 Phil. 634, 640 (2008) — Cited for the rule that while a private prosecutor may intervene on appeal, his participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, and he cannot adopt a position contrary to the Solicitor General.
• Gonzales vs. Chavez, 282 Phil. 858 (1992) — Cited by respondent for the mandatory duty of the OSG to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.

• Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, Administrative Code — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer; it shall represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings. Applied to hold that the authority to represent the People on appeal is vested solely in the Solicitor General, so the private complainant lacked standing to appeal the criminal aspect.
• Article 39, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 5465) — Provides for subsidiary penalty if the convict has no property with which to meet the fine, at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to specified rules. Applied to hold that subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty and must be expressly imposed in the judgment.
• Article 78, Revised Penal Code — Provides that no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment, and that a penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized. Applied to hold that subsidiary imprisonment cannot be executed absent an express provision in the final judgment.
• Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 — Provides that should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment. Applied with the qualification that the Circular does not sanction indiscriminate imposition and must still comply with the law.
• Administrative Circulars No. 12-2000 and 13-2001 — Cited as the basis for the imposition of a fine instead of imprisonment on respondent. The Court noted that the penalty of fine and subsidiary imprisonment pertain to the criminal aspect of the case.
• Section 3, Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Court — Cited by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for review. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.
• Constitutional due process provision — The Court reiterated that subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without violating the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.

• PREBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
• LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
• MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
• ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO