People of the Philippines vs. Salustiano Callos

The death penalty for qualified rape is properly imposed when the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship are both alleged and proved; proof of minority may rest on the victim's testimony, the accused's own testimony, and documentary evidence whose authenticity the defense admitted, and the accused's conviction may stand on the victim's credible testimony alone.

Salustiano Callos is the father of Lorilyn Callos, the complainant in two rape cases. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship raise the penalty for rape from reclusion perpetua to death. Because the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty in each case, the matter was before the Supreme Court on automatic review.

Salustiano Callos was charged in two separate informations filed on January 22, 1996 upon the complaint of his daughter, Lorilyn Callos, then 12 years old. The first information, Criminal Case No. T-2708, alleged that on or about November 17, 1994, at about 8:00 in the evening, at Purok 4, Barangay Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, he had carnal knowledge of Lorilyn by means of force and intimidation against her will. The second information, Criminal Case No. T-2709, charged a rape committed on November 29, 1994 in the same place.

According to the prosecution, on the night of November 17, 1994, Lorilyn was sleeping in their house with her brothers Arjay (9), Gerald (7), Jason (5), Mark John (3), and Jessa May (2). She was suddenly awakened when appellant went on top of her. He pulled down her panties; she pulled them back, but he prevailed. He held her breasts and inserted his penis into her private part. She wanted to free herself but could not because he pinned her down. She felt pain and cried; appellant told her not to cry. He was on top of her only for a while because one of her brothers woke up. After the act, Lorilyn noticed blood on her private part. She further testified that appellant was always doing it to her but she could not recall the dates, and that he would threaten her whenever she did not follow his wishes. Her mother knew about the incident but did nothing, and told Lorilyn not to tell her uncles because they might hurt appellant.

Lorilyn finally revealed her experience to Rosemarie and her Ate Chu when the latter found her crying in their house. When asked why she was crying, she told Ate Chu about the incident. Ate Chu got mad at appellant and said they should tell her uncle, but Lorilyn pleaded that they not tell him. Despite her mother's threats, Lorilyn continued to narrate her experience. She testified that on November 29, 1994, at about 2:00 p.m., she and her brothers were in their house when appellant told her brothers to leave and take a bath in the river. Appellant prevented Lorilyn from leaving and told her that if she disobeyed, he would punish her. After her brothers left, appellant told her to get inside the house. She refused, but appellant got a whip and commanded her to do as told. Inside, he ordered her to undress. She initially refused, but when he threatened to whip her with a piece of wood, she complied out of fear. Appellant then inserted his penis into her private part. She tried to free herself but failed because he was on top of her. While on top of her, he sucked and mashed her breast. She kept crying. Thereafter, she told appellant she would tell her mother what he did; appellant threatened her not to tell her mother or brothers, otherwise he would punish her. He then ordered her to change clothes and leave the house.

Dr. Amalia Guiruba, the rural health physician of Tabaco, Albay, examined Lorilyn on December 1, 1995. She found Lorilyn's labia majora and minora coaptated and deep lacerations at the 6:00 o'clock, 9:00 o'clock, and 3:00 o'clock positions, which could have been caused by the insertion of an erect penis. She testified that it was possible the lacerations were inflicted on the dates of the rape incidents appearing in the medico-legal report (Exhibit E). Resurreccion Barasona, a policeman stationed at Tabaco, Albay, testified that on November 30, 1995, Lorilyn and Lourdes Callos went to the police station and lodged a complaint for rape against appellant; Barasona entered the complaint in the police blotter as Blotter Entry No. 27541 (Exhibit F).

Appellant claimed that on November 17, 1994, he attended the birthday party of his uncle and came home so drunk that he passed out right outside his house. He admitted he did something wrong, that he almost molested his daughter had it not been for the timely intervention of his wife, and that he whipped his daughter because she broke the radio. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he had asked for forgiveness because he had done something wrong, and that the wrong was the sexual intercourse he had with his daughter on November 17, 1994. He also stated that the following morning his wife informed him about it, and that he cried a lot when he learned of it. Regarding the November 29, 1994 incident, appellant was absolutely silent.

As to Lorilyn's age, she testified that she was 13 years old when she took the stand and that she was born on August 6, 1982, making her 12 years old at the time of the commission of the crimes. She also disclosed to the examining physician that she was 13 years old at the time of her examination, and informed Policeman Barasona that she was 13 years old when she lodged the complaint on November 30, 1995. Appellant himself declared that his daughter was 14 years old at the time of his testimony, making her 12 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. The minutes of the hearing indicated that Lorilyn's birth certificate was presented and marked during trial; although it was never formally offered in evidence, the defense counsel admitted its authenticity (Order of Judge Mamerto M. Buban, Jr., October 2, 1996). The trial court found appellant guilty as charged in both cases.

• Proof of Real Age: Appellant advanced a lone, shot-gun argument that the real age of the victim was not duly established.
• Death Penalty Not Proper: Appellant maintained that the death penalty imposed by the trial court was not in accord with People vs. Perez (G.R. No. 122764, September 28, 1998) and People vs. Javier (G.R. No. 126096, July 26, 1999), where the special qualifying circumstances required in Republic Act No. 7659 must be duly alleged and proved before the death penalty may be properly imposed.
• Conviction Not Questioned: Appellant did not question the propriety of his conviction on the two counts of rape, limiting himself to the penalty.

• Proof of Minority: The People, in its brief, claimed that there was sufficient evidence to establish the age of the victim at the time of rape, citing Lorilyn's testimony that she was 13 at the time she testified and was born on August 6, 1982, hence 12 at the time of the crime; her disclosure to the examining physician and Policeman Barasona that she was 13; and appellant's own declaration that his daughter was 14 at the time of his testimony, making her 12 at the time of the commission of the offense.

• Guilt for Two Counts of Rape: Whether the evidence supports appellant's conviction for two counts of rape.
• Proof of Minority and Relationship: Whether the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were sufficiently alleged and proved to justify the death penalty under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
• Civil Indemnity and Moral Damages: Whether the lower court's award of civil indemnity should be modified and moral damages awarded.
• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance: Whether appellant's motion to set aside his plea of not guilty and to re-arraign him so he could plead guilty, made after the prosecution had presented its evidence, could be considered a mitigating circumstance.

• Guilt for Two Counts of Rape: Yes. The conviction was affirmed; the record supports the trial court's finding, including appellant's admission of the November 17, 1994 rape and Lorilyn's credible testimony on both incidents.
• Proof of Minority and Relationship: Yes. Both qualifying circumstances were alleged and proved; the death penalty was properly imposed under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
• Civil Indemnity and Moral Damages: Modified. Civil indemnity was increased to P75,000 per count and moral damages of P50,000 per count were awarded, for a total of P250,000.
• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance: No. Under Section 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, a plea of guilty is mitigating only if made before the prosecution presents its evidence; appellant moved after the prosecution had presented its evidence, the prosecution did not consent, and the trial court did not re-arraign him.

• Guilt for Two Counts of Rape: The conviction was reviewed on automatic review because of the death penalty, even though appellant did not question it. On the November 17, 1994 incident, appellant admitted in open court on cross-examination that he had sexual intercourse with his daughter on that date and had asked for forgiveness for it. On the November 29, 1994 incident, appellant was absolutely silent, which was treated as an eloquent admission of the crime charged, citing People vs. Calayca. More importantly, Lorilyn categorically testified that appellant raped her on November 29, 1994, aside from other occasions. Such testimony, often the only evidence that can prove the guilt of the perpetrator, is sufficient to sustain conviction if it meets the test of credibility, citing People vs. Villaluna and People vs. Banela. The principle that no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a horrendous tale, allow examination of her private parts, and subject herself to public trial and relive the experience unless motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished was applied, even if the family's honor is at stake and even if her own father would be sent to prison, citing People vs. Almaden, People vs. Ayo, People vs. Monfero, and People vs. Bation. The trial court's findings on credibility were upheld.
• Proof of Minority and Relationship: Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, minority and relationship qualify rape and increase the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. To impose the higher penalty, the duality and concurrence of both circumstances must be alleged and proved, citing People vs. Perez. Sufficient proof of Lorilyn's age was found. She testified she was 13 at the time she testified and was born on August 6, 1982, making her 12 at the time of the crimes. She told the examining physician and Policeman Barasona that she was 13. Appellant himself declared that his daughter was 14 at the time of his testimony, making her 12 at the time of the commission of the offense. The minutes showed that Lorilyn's birth certificate was presented and marked during trial; although not formally offered and therefore strictly not part of the record of exhibits, the defense counsel admitted its authenticity. In determining each element, only moral certainty is required. In People vs. De la Cruz, the prosecution proved the minority of the victim beyond reasonable doubt through the testimony of the victim's mother; here, appellant himself, the victim's own father, testified that his daughter was a minor at the time of the offense. Adding the documents and testimony, no doubt remained that Lorilyn was a minor when raped. The relationship was likewise established by the fact that appellant was Lorilyn's own father. Because both qualifying circumstances were alleged and proved, the death penalty was proper. Imposing the death penalty requires extreme caution and proof beyond reasonable doubt with substantive and procedural due process.
• Civil Indemnity and Moral Damages: Civil indemnity, actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of rape, citing People vs. Banago. If the crime of rape is effectively qualified by any circumstance authorizing the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall not be less than P75,000, citing People vs. Mahinay, People vs. Ambray, and People vs. Bolatete. In addition, moral damages fixed at P50,000 per count should be awarded to the rape victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof, citing People vs. Banela and People vs. Alba. The lower court's award of civil indemnity was therefore modified.
• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance: After the prosecution had presented its evidence, defense counsel moved to set aside appellant's plea of not guilty and requested re-arraignment so that he could voluntarily change his plea to guilty, hoping to turn it into a mitigating circumstance. Under Section 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, a plea of guilty can be considered a mitigating circumstance if made before the prosecution presents its evidence. The prosecution did not consent to this attempt, and the trial court did not re-arraign appellant. Dura lex sed lex was applied, and the late plea was not treated as mitigating.

• Qualified Rape and Qualifying Circumstances — Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship qualify rape and increase the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. The duality and concurrence of both circumstances must be alleged and proved before the death penalty may be imposed. In this case, both minority and relationship were alleged and proved, so the death penalty was upheld.
• Proof of Minority in Qualified Rape — The minority of the victim may be established by moral certainty. It can be proved through the victim's testimony, the accused's own testimony, and documentary evidence whose authenticity the defense admitted. Sufficient proof was found where Lorilyn testified she was 12 at the time of the crimes, the appellant himself said she was 14 at trial, and the defense admitted the authenticity of her birth certificate.
• Credibility of the Rape Victim's Testimony — When an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was inflicted on her; so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. This rule was applied to Lorilyn's categorical testimony, especially for the November 29, 1994 incident, and the trial court's credibility findings were upheld.
• Muteness as Eloquent Admission — Appellant's absolute silence on the November 29, 1994 rape charge was treated as an eloquent admission of the crime charged, citing People vs. Calayca. This supplemented the victim's testimony and the admission on the first incident.
• Civil Indemnity and Moral Damages in Qualified Rape — Civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of rape. If the rape is qualified by circumstances authorizing the death penalty, civil indemnity shall not be less than P75,000. Moral damages of P50,000 per count are awarded without need for pleading or proof of basis. These rules were applied to modify the lower court's award.
• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance — Under Section 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, a plea of guilty is mitigating only if made before the prosecution presents its evidence. Appellant's attempt to change his plea after the prosecution had rested was not considered mitigating because the prosecution did not consent and the trial court did not re-arraign him.
• Death Penalty Review and Due Process — In automatic review of death penalty cases, the record must be examined to determine liability. Imposing the death penalty requires extreme caution and proof beyond reasonable doubt, with both substantive and procedural due process observed. These requirements were found satisfied.

• "Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the crime of rape, increasing the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. In order to impose the higher penalty, the duality and concurrence of both circumstances must be alleged and proved (People vs. Perez, 296 SCRA 17 [1998])." — This states the controlling rule on qualified rape and the necessity of alleging and proving both qualifying circumstances.
• "The long standing rule is that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on her, and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof" — This is the canonical formulation of the credibility rule for rape victims, which was used to sustain the conviction.
• "Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape (People vs. Banago, 309 SCRA 417 [1999]). If the crime of rape is effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the penalty of death is authorized, the civil indemnity for the victim shall not be less than P75,000 (People vs. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 [1999], People vs. Ambray, 303 SCRA 697 [1999]; People vs. Bolatete, 303 SCRA 709 [1999])." — This defines the mandatory civil indemnity in qualified rape and supports the modification of the award.
• "Imposing the death penalty should be exercised with extreme caution, and only in instances where the guilt of the accused is proven beyond reasonable doubt, wherein both substantive and procedural due process are observed, can it be upheld." — This articulates the standard for imposing the death penalty, which was found satisfied.

• People vs. Perez, G.R. No. 122764, September 28, 1998; People vs. Perez, 296 SCRA 17 (1998) — Cited by appellant and relied on for the rule that the special qualifying circumstances required in Republic Act No. 7659, specifically the duality and concurrence of minority and relationship, must be alleged and proved before the death penalty may be imposed.
• People vs. Javier, G.R. No. 126096, July 26, 1999 — Cited by appellant for the same requirement that special qualifying circumstances must be alleged and proved before the death penalty may be imposed.
• People vs. Calayca, 301 SCRA 192 (1999) — Cited for treating appellant's absolute silence on the November 29, 1994 charge as an eloquent admission of the crime charged.
• People vs. Villaluna, 303 SCRA 518 (1999); People vs. Banela, 301 SCRA 84 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the victim's testimony, often the only evidence that can be offered to prove the guilt of the perpetrator, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
• People vs. Almaden, 305 SCRA 157 (1999); People vs. Ayo, 305 SCRA 543 (1999); People vs. Monfero, 308 SCRA 396 (1999) — Cited for the principle that no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a horrendous tale, allow examination of her private parts, and subject herself to public trial unless motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.
• People vs. Bation, 305 SCRA 253 (1999) — Cited for the same principle even if the family's honor is at stake and even if the victim's own father would be sent to prison.
• People vs. Ambray, 303 SCRA 697 (1999); People vs. De La Cuesta, 304 SCRA 83 (1999); People vs. Maglantay, 304 SCRA 272 (1999); People vs. Vaynoco, 305 SCRA 93 (1999) — Cited for the rule that when an alleged rape victim says she was violated, her testimony is sufficient if it meets the test of credibility.
• People vs. De la Cruz, G.R. Nos. 131167-68, August 23, 2000 — Cited for the holding that the prosecution proved the minority of the victim beyond reasonable doubt through the testimony of the victim's mother.
• People vs. Banago, 309 SCRA 417 (1999) — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.
• People vs. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999); People vs. Ambray, 303 SCRA 697 (1999); People vs. Bolatete, 303 SCRA 709 (1999) — Cited for the rule that if rape is qualified by circumstances authorizing the death penalty, civil indemnity shall not be less than P75,000.
• People vs. Banela, 301 SCRA 84 (1999); People vs. Alba, 305 SCRA 811 (1999) — Cited for the rule that moral damages of P50,000 per count should be awarded to the rape victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Provides that the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the crime of rape, increasing the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death; the provision was applied because both circumstances were alleged and proved.
• Section 7, Article 13, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a plea of guilty can be considered a mitigating circumstance if made before the prosecution presents its evidence; the provision was applied to reject appellant's post-prosecution attempt to change his plea.
• Article 83, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 — Directs that upon finality of a death penalty decision, a certified true copy of the record be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency; this was ordered in the dispositive portion.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — The law that amended Article 335 and authorized the death penalty for qualified rape; the decision noted that four members maintained their position that it is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, but submitted to the majority ruling that it is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur. The decision also notes that four members maintained their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional, but submitted to the majority ruling that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed.