People of the Philippines vs. Sabas Raquel, et al.

The extrajudicial statement of an accused implicating a co-accused is hearsay and inadmissible against the co-accused unless repeated in open court and subject to cross-examination; it is likewise inadmissible if taken during custodial investigation without counsel, and a conviction cannot rest on evidence that does not establish moral certainty of guilt.

At midnight on July 4, 1986, spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. were in their home in Barangay Osias, Kabacan, Cotabato. Agapito responded to a knock at the backdoor of their kitchen. Heavily armed men emerged, declared a hold-up, and fired at him. Juliet heard gunshots, went out, and saw her husband lifeless while a man took his gun and hurried away. She shouted for help at the window and saw one man fall beside the water pump while two others ran away.

George Jovillano responded to Juliet’s plea for help and reported the incident to the police. When the police arrived, they found a wounded man lying about eight meters from the victim’s house; he was identified as Amado Ponce. Ponce was first treated at a clinic before being brought to the police station. According to the prosecution, Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators and could be found at their residence. The police failed to find them there because the brothers had fled immediately after the shooting. They were later apprehended on different occasions.

The prosecution’s identification evidence was weak. Juliet, the lone eyewitness, testified that she saw a person fall beside the water pump and two persons running away, but she could not identify them. She did not know the person who fell until the police arrived and identified him as Amado Ponce. On cross-examination, she confirmed that she had no way of identifying the masked man who took her husband’s gun, that she saw only one person enter the house and take the gun, and that she could not identify the two persons running toward the road. George Jovillano, the corroborating witness, likewise made no mention of who shot Agapito. In his sworn statement executed on July 5, 1986, he described three men passing about five meters away but stated that he did not recognize any of them because they walked fast.

The defense relied on alibi. Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986, with his parents’ permission, he left Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato, for Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao, and stayed in the house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased brother. With Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3 and 4. On July 5, while still asleep, police accompanied by his father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan. He admitted on cross-examination that their house and the Gambalan residence were in the same barangay and that he bore no grudge against the victim before July 4. Antonio Raquel, 64, testified that on July 2, 1986, Valeriano told him he was going to Tungol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao, to harvest palay, and that Sabas, a soldier, asked permission to leave for his assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came looking for his two sons; he gave them pictures and accompanied them to Tungol, where they arrested Valeriano. T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986, he was assigned to the 2nd Infantry Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City, and that Sabas Raquel was under his division and on duty on that date.

The trial court convicted all three accused, and the Raquel brothers appealed. The record showed that Ponce’s extrajudicial statement was taken by Sgt. Pangato, who admitted that he did not inform Ponce of his constitutional rights and that Ponce had no counsel. Dr. Anulao also testified that he treated no person by the name Danny Clemente, negating the testimony that Sabas was wounded and treated at his clinic under the name Dante Clemente.

• Insufficient Identification: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in convicting Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of robbery with homicide despite the absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime.
• Alibi: Accused-appellants relied on alibi, presenting evidence that Valeriano Raquel was in Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao, harvesting palay on July 3 and 4, 1986, and that Sabas Raquel was a soldier on duty at his assigned unit on July 4, 1986.

• Positive Identification: Whether the prosecution positively identified accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel as the perpetrators of robbery with homicide.
• Extrajudicial Confession of Co-Accused: Whether the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce implicating appellants is admissible against them despite his escape and the absence of any opportunity to cross-examine him.
• Custodial Investigation Rights: Whether the extrajudicial statement of Amado Ponce is admissible given that it was taken without informing him of his constitutional rights and without assistance of counsel.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution’s evidence established the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding their defense of alibi.

• Positive Identification: No. The lone eyewitness Juliet Gambalan did not identify the assailants, and George Jovillano also failed to recognize any of the men; without positive identification, the prosecution’s evidence cannot overcome the presumption of innocence.
• Extrajudicial Confession of Co-Accused: No. The extrajudicial statement of Amado Ponce is hearsay and inadmissible against appellants because he escaped before testifying and was never cross-examined; the res inter alios rule binds the confession only upon the confessant.
• Custodial Investigation Rights: No. The statement was taken without informing Ponce of his constitutional rights and without counsel; extrajudicial statements during custodial investigation without assistance of counsel are inadmissible, and waiver requires counsel.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The prosecution failed to establish moral certainty of guilt; alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution’s evidence is weak, and reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

• Positive Identification: The Court reviewed the testimony of Juliet Gambalan, the lone eyewitness. She testified that after hearing gunshots she saw a person fall beside the water pump and two persons running away, but she did not know the person who fell and only learned it was Amado Ponce when the police arrived. On cross-examination, she admitted she could not identify the masked man who took her husband’s gun, that she saw only one person enter the house and take the gun, and that she could not identify the two persons running toward the road. George Jovillano, the corroborating witness, made no mention of who shot Agapito; in his sworn statement of July 5, 1986, he described three men passing about five meters away but said he did not recognize any of them because they walked fast. Because no witness positively identified appellants as the perpetrators, the prosecution failed to prove the identities of the culprits beyond reasonable doubt. The Court also noted that the testimony of Sgt. Pangato that Sabas was wounded and treated at Dr. Anulao’s clinic under the name Dante Clemente was negated by Dr. Anulao, who testified that he treated no person by the name Danny Clemente. Thus, apart from Ponce’s extrajudicial statement, there was no evidence linking appellants to the crime.

• Extrajudicial Confession of Co-Accused: The identification of appellants rested chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of Amado Ponce, who pointed to them as co-perpetrators. Ponce escaped from jail before he could testify and had been at large since then. The Court held that the extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be used against the latter unless repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter’s extrajudicial statements, the statements are hearsay as against him. The res inter alios rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the act, declaration, or omission of another; an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. Although the rule admits jurisprudential exceptions, none applied. Except for Ponce’s statement, there was no evidence linking appellants to the crime; and the statement itself was taken in violation of Ponce’s constitutional rights.

• Custodial Investigation Rights: The Court found that Ponce’s extrajudicial statement was made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel and without informing him of his constitutional rights. Sgt. Andal S. Pangato, chief of the intelligence and investigation section, admitted that he did not inform Ponce of his constitutional rights because his purpose was only to get information, and that Ponce had no counsel. The Court held that extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, the waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. These constitutional and statutory rights were never observed. Hence, the statement could not support the conviction.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than moral certainty of guilt. Without positive identification of appellants, the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The Court acknowledged that the alibi of appellants may be assailable, but the prosecution cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. Alibi need not even be inquired into where the prosecution’s evidence is weak. Every reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused, and the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. In this case, that test was neither met nor fulfilled.

• Res inter alios acta / Extrajudicial confession of a co-accused — An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused, because the latter is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant. The extrajudicial statement of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter unless repeated in open court. The rule admits exceptions: (a) if the co-accused impliedly acquiesced in or adopted the confession by not questioning its truthfulness, as where it was made in his presence and he did not remonstrate; (b) if the accused persons voluntarily and independently executed identical confessions without collusion (interlocking confessions), corroborated by other evidence and without contradiction by the other co-accused who was present; (c) where the accused admitted the facts stated by the confessant after being apprised of the confession; (d) if they are charged as co-conspirators of the crime confessed by one accused and the confession is used only as corroborating evidence; (e) where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator; (f) where the confessant testified for his co-defendant; or (g) where the co-conspirator’s extrajudicial confession is corroborated by other evidence of record. None applied because no other evidence linked appellants, and the confession was constitutionally inadmissible.
• Custodial investigation rights — Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. The right to counsel may be waived, but the waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. The Court applied this rule to exclude Amado Ponce’s statement, which was taken without informing him of his rights and without counsel.
• Proof beyond reasonable doubt / moral certainty — A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than moral certainty of guilt. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. Alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution’s evidence is weak. The Court applied this by acquitting appellants because the prosecution failed to positively identify them and its evidence was probatively low and partly inadmissible.
• Presumption of innocence — The presumption of innocence is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Without positive identification, the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to overcome it. The Court relied on this in reversing the conviction.
• Positive identification — A conviction for a crime requires positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator. Where eyewitnesses cannot identify the accused and the only link is an inadmissible extrajudicial confession, the evidence fails the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• "The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the inadmissibility of a co-accused’s extrajudicial statement and is the core ground for excluding Amado Ponce’s statement against the Raquel brothers.
• "The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused." — This is the canonical formulation of the res inter alios rule as applied to extrajudicial confessions, explaining why Ponce’s statement could not bind appellants.
• "Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel." — This passage defines the constitutional rule on custodial investigation and supplies the independent ground for excluding Ponce’s statement.
• "A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt. Without the positive identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to them." — This excerpt articulates the proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt standard and the presumption of innocence, which the Court used to reverse the conviction.

• People vs. Ola, L-47147, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 1 — Cited for the rule that extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter unless repeated in open court; otherwise they are hearsay if there was no cross-examination.
• People vs. Flores, et al., G.R. No. 71980, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 295 — Cited for the distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions: the former deprives the other accused of cross-examination, while the latter is open to cross-examination and rebuttal.
• People vs. Tena, G.R. No. 100909, October 21, 1992, 21 SCRA 43; People vs. Pamon, G.R. No. 102005, January 25, 1993, 217 SCRA 501 — Cited for the res inter alios rule and the reason why an extrajudicial confession binds only the confessant.
• People vs. Salangga, et al., G.R. No. 100910, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 407 — Cited for the rule that extrajudicial statements during custodial investigation without assistance of counsel are inadmissible, and waiver of the right to counsel must be with counsel’s assistance.
• People vs. Argawanon, et al., G.R. No. 106538, March 30, 1994, 231 SCRA 614 — Cited for the requirement that a conviction in a criminal case must rest on moral certainty of guilt.
• People vs. Salguero, et al., G.R. No. 89117, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 357 — Cited for the insufficiency of evidence to overcome the presumption of innocence and for the principle that alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution’s evidence is weak.
• People vs. Dural, et al., G.R. No. 84921, June 8, 1993, 223 SCRA 201 — Cited for the same principle that alibi need not be considered where the prosecution’s evidence is weak.

• Bill of Rights — Presumption of Innocence: The Court held that without positive identification, the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
• Bill of Rights — Right to Counsel During Custodial Investigation: The Court held that extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without assistance of counsel are inadmissible; waiver of the right to counsel must be made with the assistance of counsel.

Romero, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ.