People of the Philippines vs. Ruperto Balderas y Cabusog

An accused may be convicted only of attempted murder, not murder, where the prosecution fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he inflicted the fatal wound causing death, although the proven non-fatal attack was sudden, from behind, and with intent to kill; circumstantial evidence must exclude all others, and conspiracy must be alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruperto Balderas y Cabusog and his companions Samuel Casido and Mckinly Diada were sugar cane plantation workers; the victim, Gilbert Cadiente, was the brother of Rudy Cadiente, a barangay tanod. The incident occurred during a benefit dance at Sitio Matambok, Barangay Mandalupang, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental. The prosecution proceeded under the Revised Penal Code.

On the evening of March 16, 1991, William Devila met accused-appellant Ruperto Balderas and his companions Mckinly Diada and Samuel Casido as they were on their way home from work in Sitio Matambok, Barangay Mandalupang, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental. The three were sugar cane plantation workers carrying their “lading” or cane knives. Devila invited them to the Mayflower dance at Sitio Matambok, and they agreed. They arrived at the dance hall at 8:00 p.m., proceeded to a store beside the place, and had a drinking session, consuming one flat bottle of Añejo Rhum compliments of Balderas.

According to prosecution eyewitness Vicente Calidguid, at around midnight there was an altercation between Samuel Casido and Rudy Cadiente. The two grappled for the hunting knife held by Casido. Calidguid saw Gilbert Cadiente approaching, presumably to help his brother Rudy, but Gilbert was struck from behind with a cane knife by Balderas. Gilbert was hit on the back of the head. Seriously wounded, he ran toward Rudy’s house 12 meters away. Calidguid said he was three to four meters away from the protagonists and was unaware of any previous quarrel between the deceased and the accused. Rudy Cadiente, a barangay tanod, testified that at around midnight he saw Samuel Casido pull out a hunting knife in the middle of the dance floor. As he tried to disarm Casido, William Devila intervened and told him to leave Casido alone and that Devila would take care of Casido. As Rudy released Casido’s hand, Casido boxed him. They wrestled for possession of the hunting knife. As they fought, the Petromax lamp nearby went off, rendering the place partly dark. Knowing that Casido had armed companions, Rudy ran away and went home. He identified Casido’s companions as Balderas, Diada, and Devila. Upon reaching his house, Rudy saw his brother downstairs wounded, with injuries on the nape, right foot, and middle of the chest. He took Gilbert to the Bais Emergency Hospital, but Gilbert was dead on arrival. On cross-examination, Rudy said he did not see his brother attacked.

Dr. Norberto J. Baldado, Jr., resident physician of the Bais General Hospital, issued a medical certificate listing the wounds as (1) a stab wound, 1 cm, penetrating the 6th ICS along the left parasternal line; (2) an incised wound, 3 cm, on the right foot distal third anterior; and (3) a lacerated wound, 5 cm, on the occiput. Dr. Baldado testified that Injury No. 1, located just below the nipple on the left side of the breast bone, was “penetrating” and “most probably . . . fatal” as it “most probably” injured the blood vessels of the heart. Injury No. 2, on the right foot, was not fatal unless complications set in. Injury No. 3, at the back of the head, was also not fatal because it only lacerated the soft tissue and did not fracture the skull; brain damage from it was “possible but quite remote.”

The defense was alibi. Balderas testified that in the evening of March 16, 1991, while he, Samuel Casido, and Mckinly Diada were on their way to Cagihayan, Lamugong, Manjuyod, after coming from work in Alangilan, they met William Devila, who invited them to the dance. They went with Devila, bringing their cane knives wrapped in the sleeves of their jackets. They arrived at the dance at around 8:00 p.m., had drinks at a small store until 10:00 p.m., and Balderas then went home with Diada. Casido had gone with his uncle Vicente Calidguid, while Devila had joined his gang. Balderas’s residence was four kilometers away from Sitio Matambok. Upon arriving home, he went to sleep; Diada proceeded to his house farther down the road. The following morning, Julio Palagtiw told Balderas that he and Diada were wanted for the killing of Gilbert Cadiente. They went to the Office of the Chief of Police of Manjuyod to verify the information, but were taken into custody. Samuel Casido, who had earlier been arrested, pointed to them as his companions. Balderas and Diada stayed in jail from March 19 to 24 until released on the 25th upon the intercession of Alberto and Rudy Cadiente and Devila. Balderas’s alibi was corroborated by Diada and Devila. Devila added that after failing to stop the fight, he left the protagonists, but as he stepped back he bumped the lamp post and the light was extinguished. He moved to a place 30 meters away where there was light and saw the fight break up as Casido ran away and Rudy Cadiente went home, although before going Rudy hurled a stone at Casido. Rudy’s house could be seen from where Devila was, and the people in the house were agog as they found Gilbert crawling on the ground wounded. On cross-examination, Devila was shown his affidavit dated March 20, 1991; he denied having made the answer to Question No. 3, in which he pointed to Samuel Casido as having stabbed Gilbert, and said he had merely been made to make the answer by Rudy Cadiente.

The defense also called SPO1 Jaime Tolete, who had filed the original criminal complaint. He testified on entries in the police blotter of the PNP Police Station of Manjuyod. The entries reported that Gilbert Cadiente was found wounded after a benefit dance and was allegedly stabbed by unknown person/persons; that Rudy Cadiente told the investigator he saw the assailants at the dancing area making trouble, naming Samuel Casido, Perto Balderas, and Misoy; that Samuel Casido was picked up and stated he was at the scene with William Devila, Perto Balderas, and Mckinly Diada, and that Devila struck first the Petromax; that Diada and Balderas were brought to the station and detained as subjects of the murder case; that William Devila was apprehended; and that a plastic bag with a cane knife, clothing, and two plastic plates owned by Samuel Casido was turned over by Rudy Cadiente. The trial court disregarded Exhs. 1-4 of the defense, which were affidavits taken during preliminary investigation and xerox copies of police blotter pages. Exh. 1 was William Devila’s affidavit in the dialect dated May 22, 1991, retracting his affidavit dated March 20, 1991 (Exh. 1-a); Exh. 2 was Alberto Cadiente’s affidavit; Exh. 3 was Rudy Cadiente’s affidavit; and Exhs. 4 and 4-a were xerox copies of police blotter pages. The court explained that Exh. 1 was inadmissible because it was not accompanied by a translation in an official language as required by Section 33, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence; that Exhs. 1-a, 2, and 3 were not only unidentified by the affiants but had not been testified to as authentic by the person who certified them as true copies; and that Exh. 4 was not certified as a faithful reproduction of the original entries and was worthless as secondary evidence. With the exception of Devila’s affidavit, the affidavits pointed to Samuel Casido as the person who assaulted Gilbert Cadiente during the dance.

The trial court found Balderas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Gilbert Cadiente in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay costs. In its decision, the trial court stated that the evidence had shown the treacherous participation of Balderas in inflicting injuries on Gilbert, but also observed that justice had not been fully served because the author or authors of the other injuries, particularly the stab wound described by the medical officer as “most probably fatal,” had not been determined; it suggested another inquiry by the police and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to identify the person or persons responsible for the stab and incised wounds.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
• Non-Fatal Wound: He maintained that, even granting that he hacked the victim once at the back of the head according to the lone testimony of Vicente Calidguid, the wound was not fatal as testified by the doctor.
• Preliminary Investigation Evidence and Identity of Assailant: He relied on the fact that during preliminary investigation, witnesses including the victim’s brother Rudy Cadiente pointed to Samuel Casido as the one who attacked the victim with a cane knife and an icepick; he argued that even if he indeed hacked the victim, he could not be held liable for murder because the wound he inflicted was not fatal.

• Sufficiency of the Wound: The Solicitor General argued that infliction of the wound on the back of the head was sufficient to convict accused-appellant of murder because it “could have caused brain injury as admitted by the attending physician [and] contributed as cause of the death of the victim.”
• Intent to Kill: The Solicitor General maintained that the weapon used and the location of the wound at the back of the head, a vital part of the body, unmistakably show an intent to kill.
• Conspiracy Not Alleged: The Solicitor General noted that the information did not allege conspiracy and, in fact, charged accused-appellant with having inflicted all the wounds.

• Murder Conviction Based on Non-Fatal Wound: Whether the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder where the only eyewitness account attributed to him a single non-fatal blow to the back of the head and the fatal stab wound was not shown to have been inflicted by him.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Whether circumstantial evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant inflicted the fatal stab wound.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy could be appreciated to hold accused-appellant liable for the fatal wound despite the information not alleging conspiracy.
• Alibi: Whether accused-appellant’s defense of alibi warranted acquittal.
• Criminal Liability and Qualifying Circumstance: Whether accused-appellant was liable only for attempted murder and whether treachery qualified the crime.

• Murder Conviction Based on Non-Fatal Wound: No. The conviction for murder cannot stand because the prosecution failed to prove that the non-fatal blow caused death; the evidence supported only attempted murder if intent to kill and treachery were shown.
• Circumstantial Evidence: No. The circumstantial evidence did not form an unbroken chain pointing to accused-appellant as the author of the fatal stab wound to the exclusion of all others.
• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was neither alleged in the information nor proven beyond reasonable doubt; no prior agreement or concerted action to kill was shown.
• Alibi: No. Alibi was not credited because accused-appellant failed to prove physical impossibility of being at the scene; his own account showed he could return from his home four kilometers away.
• Criminal Liability and Qualifying Circumstance: Yes, only attempted murder. The sudden attack from behind without provocation showed intent to kill and treachery, but the wound was not fatal and not all acts of execution were performed.

• Murder Conviction Based on Non-Fatal Wound: Conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, not on the weakness or absence of defense evidence. The only prosecution eyewitness, Vicente Calidguid, testified that accused-appellant struck Gilbert Cadiente once with a cane knife, hitting him on the nape. The doctor identified this as Wound No. 3 and testified that it was not fatal, that there was no skull fracture, and that brain damage was possible but quite remote. The Solicitor General’s theory that the wound could have caused brain injury and contributed to death rested on a remote possibility. The prosecution therefore failed to establish that accused-appellant’s act produced the injury constituting murder. Dr. Baldado found Injury No. 1, the stab wound on the left chest, to be penetrating and most probably fatal because it injured the blood vessels of the heart. No eyewitness account established who inflicted that fatal wound.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Because there was no eyewitness to the fatal wound, circumstantial evidence had to satisfy Rule 133, §4: there must be more than one circumstance; the facts from which inferences are derived must be proven; and the combination of all circumstances must produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must form an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The circumstances here were that accused-appellant attacked and wounded Gilbert on the head, that the fatal wound was caused by a pointed instrument, and that accused-appellant’s cane knife was pointed. These did not suffice. The fact that accused-appellant wounded Gilbert did not mean he inflicted all the wounds; Calidguid testified that accused-appellant hit Gilbert only once and then ran away with his cane knife. The possibility that accused-appellant later ran after the victim and stabbed him was conjecture. Another person could have inflicted the fatal stab, and the trial court itself suspected at least another person was responsible. Several persons at the dance had cane knives, including Casido and Diada. The medical certificate described the fatal wound as 1 cm long; it was doubtful whether a cane knife with a maximum width of five inches, though pointed, could leave such a minuscule surface wound if it penetrated to the heart, and an icepick was a more probable weapon. The means and opportunity to inflict the fatal wound were not accused-appellant’s alone. Speculation and probabilities cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot sway judgment.
• Conspiracy: The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of murder because of his treacherous participation in inflicting injuries. That would be correct if conspiracy existed, but the information did not allege conspiracy and charged accused-appellant with having inflicted all the wounds. Conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. No evidence of prior agreement was presented, and there was no showing of concerted action taken to kill Gilbert Cadiente. Accused-appellant could not therefore be held liable for the fatal wound on a conspiracy theory.
• Alibi: For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was not present at the scene of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been present there at the time the offense was committed. Accused-appellant failed to do so. By his own account, he left the dance at around 10:00 p.m. to go to his home four kilometers away and arrived home at past 11:00 p.m.; it was possible for him to return to the dance and be present when the altercation occurred past midnight. There were also contradictions in his alibi: he testified that Casido was no longer at the dance when he left, but Devila said Casido left with Vicente Calidguid two minutes after accused-appellant and Diada left; and accused-appellant claimed everybody at home was asleep, while Diada said his wife and children were still awake because his youngest child was abnormal and premature. The affidavits pointing to Casido did not help: Devila retracted his affidavit; the trial court excluded the affidavits for lack of identification; Alberto Cadiente was not presented, making his affidavit hearsay; and Rudy Cadiente was not confronted with his affidavit. Calidguid’s eyewitness account that accused-appellant assaulted Gilbert from behind stood unrebutted.
• Criminal Liability and Qualifying Circumstance: The weapon used and the location of the wound at the back of the head, a vital part of the body, unmistakably showed an intent to kill. However, for some reason other than his own desistance, accused-appellant was not able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to consummate the killing because the wound he inflicted was not fatal. He ran away after delivering the blow. Since all acts of execution necessary to produce the felony were not done, the crime for which he could be held liable was only attempted murder. The attack was sudden and without provocation; because it was made from behind, the victim was unable to defend himself, and this circumstance constituted treachery, qualifying the crime to attempted murder. Under Art. 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the principal of an attempted crime is lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 7659, Art. 248 punished murder with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Under Art. 61(3), the penalty two degrees lower was prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. With no modifying circumstance, the medium period, prision mayor minimum, was imposed as the maximum. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant was entitled to a minimum penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period as the penalty next lower than that for attempted murder.

• Attempted Murder; Intent to Kill and Treachery — When the accused inflicts a non-fatal wound with intent to kill and treachery but does not perform all acts of execution necessary to consummate the killing, the crime is attempted murder, not murder. The Court applied this where accused-appellant struck the victim from behind on the back of the head, a vital part, with a cane knife; the wound was not fatal, and he ran away after the blow.
• Circumstantial Evidence — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction only if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must form an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The Court held that the circumstances did not exclude others as authors of the fatal stab wound.
• Conspiracy — Conspiracy must be alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt; it cannot be presumed. There must be evidence of prior agreement or concerted action to commit the crime. The Court found neither, and the information did not allege conspiracy.
• Alibi — Alibi requires proof not only that the accused was absent from the scene but also that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the time of the offense. The Court rejected the alibi because accused-appellant’s home was only four kilometers away and he could have returned to the dance.
• Treachery — Treachery is present when the attack is sudden and without provocation and is made from behind, rendering the victim unable to defend himself. The Court applied it to qualify the killing to attempted murder.
• Penalty for Attempted Felony — Under Art. 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the principal of an attempted crime is lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony. The Court used this rule, together with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to impose the indeterminate penalty.

• "The Court cannot convict accused-appellant of murder on this “remote” possibility that Injury No. 3 could have caused accused-appellant’s death. Indeed, the prosecution’s evidence in this regard, consisting of Dr. Baldado, Jr.’s testimony, fails to establish that the act of the accused-appellant produced the injury constituting the penal offense for which he stands convicted, i.e., murder." — This passage states the ratio for rejecting the murder conviction: the prosecution did not prove that the non-fatal head wound caused death or constituted the penal offense charged.
• "In sum, the circumstantial evidence in this case does not point with certainty to accused-appellant as responsible for the fatal wound suffered by Gilbert Cadiente. In this, as in all criminal cases, speculation and probabilities cannot take the place of proof required to establish guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of the circumstantial-evidence standard applied to the fatal stab wound.
• "Accused-appellant’s attack was sudden and done without any provocation. Because it was made from behind, the victim was unable to defend himself. This circumstance constitutes treachery which qualifies the crime to attempted murder." — This passage defines the treachery that qualified the crime to attempted murder.
• "For alibi to prosper, he must prove not only that he was not present at the scene of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been present there at the time the offense was committed." — This passage states the controlling requisites for the defense of alibi, which the Court found unfulfilled.

• People vs. Paguntalan, 242 SCRA 753 (1995) — Cited for the rule that conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness or absence of evidence of the defense.
• People vs. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 (1988) — Cited in support of the holding that the prosecution must establish that the act of the accused produced the injury constituting the penal offense.
• People vs. Dela Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718 (1995) — Cited for the requirement that circumstantial evidence must form an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
• People vs. Jumao-an, 230 SCRA 70 (1994) — Cited for the rule that speculation and probabilities cannot take the place of proof required to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• People vs. Clores, 125 SCRA 67 (1988) — Cited for the principle that suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot sway judgment.
• People vs. Halili, 245 SCRA 340 (1995) and People vs. Laurel, 200 SCRA 465 (1991) — Cited for the rule that conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• People vs. Bracamonte, 257 SCRA 380 (1996); People vs. Evangelista, 256 SCRA 611 (1996); People vs. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 745 (1994); People vs. Dalanon, 237 SCRA 607 (1993) — Cited for the requirement that alibi must be supported by proof of physical impossibility of presence at the scene.
• People vs. Maguikay, 237 SCRA 587 (1994) and People vs. Tiu, 216 SCRA 140 (1992) — Cited in connection with the liability for attempted murder.
• Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 430 (1996) and People vs. Soldao, 243 SCRA 119 (1995) — Cited for treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
• People vs. Arsenio Letigio, et al., G.R. No. 112968, February 13, 1997; People vs. Rosario, 246 SCRA 658 (1995); People vs. Abo, 230 SCRA 612 (1994); People vs. Javier, 229 SCRA 638 (1994); People vs. Calope, 229 SCRA 413 (1994) — Cited for the rule that an eyewitness account stands unrebutted where affidavits are not properly identified or the affiant is not confronted.

• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty to be imposed upon the principal of an attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Applied to reduce the penalty for attempted murder.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (prior to amendment by R.A. No. 7659) — Provided that murder shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Used as the baseline for computing the penalty for attempted murder.
• Article 61(3), Revised Penal Code — Used to determine the penalty two degrees lower than that for murder, which was prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to impose a minimum penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, as the penalty next lower than that for attempted murder.
• Rule 133, Section 4, Revised Rules of Court — Sets the requisites for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence: more than one circumstance, proven facts from which inferences are derived, and a combination producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Applied to reject the circumstantial evidence against accused-appellant.
• Section 33, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence — Requires a translation in an official language; the trial court excluded Exh. 1 for non-compliance.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Referred to as the amendment to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code; the Court noted that the penalty provision prior to its amendment applied.

Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Puno, JJ., concurred. Torres, Jr., J., was on leave.