People of the Philippines vs. Rudy Peralta y Mabbonag, et al.

A pre-plea amendment of an information from frustrated murder to murder after the victim's death is a formal amendment that ipso facto supersedes the original information without need of an order admitting it, and no rearraignment is required. The death of an accused before final judgment extinguishes criminal liability and warrants dismissal of the criminal case.

Peralta and Liban were among several accused charged in six Informations, including Criminal Case No. 6621, which concerned Virgilio Remigio. The case required application of Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court on amendment or substitution of an information, and of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits imposition of the death penalty. The procedural posture also implicated Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code on extinction of criminal liability by death.

Peralta and Liban, together with Philip Soriano y Pasion, Adviento Soriano y Pasion, Roberto Soriano y Pasion, Ferdinand Soriano y Pasion alias "Mar," and Napoleon Liban, were charged in six Informations pertaining to Criminal Case Nos. 6618, 6619, 6620, 6621, 6622, and 6642, including Criminal Case No. 6621. The Information dated September 30, 1994 accused Rudy Peralta, Cesar Liban, Napoleon "POLI" Liban, Mario Bartolome, Philip Soriano, Roberto Soriano, Adviento Soriano, Mar Soriano, and Lito Acierto y Cumloy of frustrated murder committed on or about June 11, 1994 in Baggao, Cagayan. It alleged that, armed with guns, conspiring together and helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, and treachery, they attacked, assaulted, and shot Virgilio Remigio, inflicting a gunshot wound; that they performed all acts of execution which would have produced murder but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their own will; and that dwelling attended the commission of the offense.

Virgilio died on November 19, 1994. On January 26, 1995, the State filed an Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 6621 for murder in lieu of frustrated murder, alleging that the same attack caused Virgilio's death. Peralta's Certificate of Arraignment indicated that he pleaded not guilty to the crime charged on January 30, 1995, but did not specify the crime. Liban, who had been at large, pleaded not guilty to murder on June 24, 1999.

During trial, Lito Acierto was discharged as a state witness. He testified that in the evening of June 11, 1994, he met with Peralta's group and proceeded to Bitag Pequeño; upon reaching the place, they forcibly opened a house, and Peralta pulled AAA outside and brought her near a guava tree where Peralta, Roberto, and Liban sexually assaulted her. After the sexual assault, Peralta, Liban, and Philip and the group entered Rodrigo dela Cruz's house, then proceeded to Virgilio's house. AAA was ordered to knock and inform Virgilio that policemen were with her; one of the malefactors entered and poked a gun at Virgilio, and one shot Virgilio and his son Jimmy Remigio. Virgilio died from the injuries.

After the prosecution rested and filed its Formal Offer of Evidence dated January 29, 2007, the RTC issued a February 15, 2007 Order setting the initial presentation of defense evidence on March 6, 2007. The defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence dated March 21, 2007, alleging that the charge in Criminal Case No. 6621 was for frustrated murder. The State countered that the charge had already been amended to murder. The defense replied that the RTC never admitted or gave due course to the Amended Information, so only the Information for frustrated murder was given due course. The RTC denied the Demurrer on August 30, 2007 and set anew the initial presentation of defense evidence on January 21, 2008. On September 10, 2007, the RTC issued an Order admitting the Amended Information for murder and setting arraignment on November 7, 2007; the Order noted that the first information was for frustrated murder, that the victim later passed away, that the State filed an amended information for murder, that the certificate of arraignment only mentioned "pleaded not guilty to the crime charged" without specifying the crime, and that the records had no order admitting the Amended Information. The Public Attorney's Office filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds of speedy trial, speedy disposition, and double jeopardy, but the records contained no resolution on it.

The defense presented evidence. Liban testified that on June 11, 1994 at 10 p.m., he was at their house in Bacagan with his wife, Linda Dela Cruz, and child, Arceli Liban; he was 32 years old then, did not know Bitag Pequeño, Baggao, and the private complainants, and knew Peralta as his cousin. Peralta recalled that at about 10 p.m. of June 11, 1994, he was at their house in Bacagan with his wife Nenet and son Frolan; he had been a resident of Bacagan since birth but had not gone to Barangay Bitag Pequeño, and he was weak having vomited blood on June 9, 1994. He denied knowing the Soriano brothers prior to incarceration and the private complainants.

In its August 24, 2010 Judgment, the RTC convicted Peralta, Liban, and Philip of murder in Criminal Case No. 6621 and imposed reclusion perpetua, with orders to pay the heirs of Virgilio PHP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, PHP 50,000.00 as moral damages, and PHP 100,000.00 as actual damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification, ruling that the prosecution proved the elements of murder beyond reasonable doubt; that although only one malefactor shot Virgilio, conspiracy was proven and could be inferred from the accused's concerted actions with the rest arriving together at the scene fully armed; and that the defense of alibi was inherently weak against positive identification by credible witnesses.

• Amendment and Admission of the Amended Information: Accused-appellants argued that the RTC quoted the Information for frustrated murder in its Judgment but convicted them for murder; that the prosecution filed an Amended Information for murder prior to arraignment, but the RTC did not issue an order admitting it; and that they pleaded not guilty in relation to frustrated murder and not murder.
• Double Jeopardy: They posited that the dismissal of the first Information for frustrated murder brought about by the amendment would be a bar to the filing of a subsequent case for murder.
• Sufficiency of Evidence / Proximate Cause: Assuming they were properly arraigned for murder, they argued that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt because it never presented a medical certificate or medico-legal officer to prove that the proximate cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wound allegedly inflicted by them.
• Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition: The Public Attorney's Office moved for reconsideration of the RTC's order admitting the Amended Information on the ground that it violated the accused's constitutional rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of their case, and that rearraignment would result in double jeopardy.
• Alibi: They maintained that on June 11, 1994 they were at their respective houses in Bacagan, Baggao, Cagayan, and did not know the place Bitag Pequeño or the private complainants.

• Proper Conviction: The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that Peralta, Liban, and Philip were properly convicted of murder in Criminal Case No. 6621, among other crimes.
• Amendment Already Effected: In response to the Demurrer to Evidence, the State countered that the charge in Criminal Case No. 6621 had already been amended to murder.

• Validity of the Amended Information Without an Admission Order: Whether the Amended Information for murder validly superseded the original Information for frustrated murder despite the absence of an order admitting it.
• Rearraignment and Double Jeopardy: Whether accused-appellants should have been rearraigned for murder and whether the amendment placed them in double jeopardy.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved murder beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conspiracy and Alibi: Whether conspiracy and the elements of murder were established and whether alibi could overcome positive identification.
• Effect of Peralta's Death: Whether the death of accused-appellant Peralta before final judgment extinguished his criminal liability and required dismissal.
• Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalty and damages imposed were proper.

• Validity of the Amended Information Without an Admission Order: Yes. The pre-plea amendment from frustrated murder to murder was a matter of right, did not downgrade the offense or exclude any accused, and ipso facto superseded the original Information; no order admitting it was required.
• Rearraignment and Double Jeopardy: No. A formal amendment does not require rearraignment, and the amendment did not place accused-appellants in double jeopardy.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The Court found no cogent reason to reverse the CA, which ruled that the prosecution proved the elements of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conspiracy and Alibi: Yes. Conspiracy was inferred from concerted actions, including arriving together at the scene fully armed, and alibi was inherently weak against positive identification by credible witnesses.
• Effect of Peralta's Death: Yes. Peralta's death before final judgment totally extinguished his criminal liability and required dismissal of Criminal Case No. 6621 as to him.
• Penalty and Damages: Affirmed with modification. Liban was sentenced to reclusión perpetua without eligibility for parole, and damages were increased to PHP 100,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, plus PHP 50,000.00 temperate damages, with 6% interest; actual damages were deleted.

• Validity of the Amended Information Without an Admission Order: Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court allows amendment of an information, in form or substance, without leave of court at any time before the accused enters a plea, except when the amendment downgrades the nature of the offense charged or excludes any accused. The amendment from frustrated murder to murder was made before plea and did not downgrade or exclude anyone. Because the amendment was a matter of right, the amended information ipso facto superseded the original information without need for admission or further action by the court. The RTC's 2007 Order admitting the Amended Information was therefore a superfluity and did not have the effect of dismissing the original Information, which had already been superseded in 1995. The Court relied on Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, which held that frustrated murder is necessarily included in murder and that a change from frustrated to consummated murder after the victim's death is a formal amendment; the same material allegations of intent to kill and qualifying circumstances are essential to both, and the supervening fact of death merely supplies the basis for the proper penalty. The amendment could not have surprised accused-appellants, and they never moved to quash the Amended Information. The Court also analogized to civil procedure, where a plaintiff may amend a complaint before a responsive pleading is served without moving for admission; only when filing is not a matter of right is admission sought.

• Rearraignment and Double Jeopardy: Even assuming accused-appellants pleaded only to frustrated murder, no rearraignment was necessary because the amendment was only as to form. Except for the victim's death, the essential elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict for frustrated murder. A second arraignment is not required for a formal amendment; the purpose of arraignment—to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation—had already been attained. The amendment did not charge a new offense or alter the prosecution's theory. Since the original Information was superseded rather than dismissed, and no new offense was charged, double jeopardy did not attach. The Court cited Villarba vs. Court of Appeals and Kummer vs. People.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court found no cogent reason to reverse the CA as to Liban. The CA correctly ruled that the prosecution proved the elements of murder beyond reasonable doubt. Although only one malefactor shot Virgilio, conspiracy was duly proven and may be inferred from accused-appellants' concerted actions with the rest of the accused arriving together at the scene of the crime fully armed. Their defense of alibi was inherently weak and crumbled against positive identification by credible witnesses. Findings of trial courts are accorded the highest respect and are generally not disturbed by the appellate court unless clearly arbitrary or unfounded, or unless some substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the disposition was overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted. The Court cited People vs. Torrefiel and Alicando vs. People.

• Conspiracy and Alibi: Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be inferred from the accused's concerted actions, including arriving together at the scene fully armed. The prosecution established conspiracy despite only one malefactor shooting the victim. Alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses. The trial court's factual findings on these matters were affirmed.

• Effect of Peralta's Death: The Supreme Court's January 22, 2024 Minute Resolution noted the October 27, 2023 Notice of Death from the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, informing the Court that Peralta had died on October 25, 2023. Because his death occurred prior to final judgment, his criminal liability was totally extinguished under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 6621 as to him followed as a matter of course. His civil liability ex delicto was likewise extinguished, but claims for civil liability predicated on other sources of obligation, if any, remained unaffected. The Court cited People vs. Bayotas.

• Penalty and Damages: Murder is punishable by reclusión perpetua to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The presence of an ordinary aggravating circumstance, dwelling, warranted the greater penalty of death, but Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, so the RTC correctly imposed reclusión perpetua. Pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-0-SC, the Court added the phrase "without eligibility for parole" to emphasize that Liban should have been sentenced to death were it not for Republic Act No. 9346. The Court increased civil indemnity and moral damages to PHP 100,000.00 each and awarded PHP 100,000.00 as exemplary damages pursuant to People vs. Jugueta. In lieu of actual damages of PHP 100,000.00, the Court awarded PHP 50,000.00 as temperate damages because no evidence of burial or funeral expenses was presented. All monetary awards earn 6% interest per annum from finality until fully paid.

• Amendment vs. Substitution of Information — Under Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court, an information may be amended in form or substance without leave of court before the accused enters a plea, except when the amendment downgrades the nature of the offense charged or excludes any accused. Substitution, by contrast, involves a substantial change from the original charge, requires leave of court, entails another preliminary investigation, and requires the accused to plead anew. The Court applied this distinction in holding that the change from frustrated murder to murder was an amendment, not a substitution, because frustrated murder is necessarily included in murder.

• Ipso Facto Supersession by an Amended Information — A pre-plea amendment that is a matter of right ipso facto supersedes the original information without need for the trial court to admit the amended information or for the prosecution to move for its admission. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that the RTC's 2007 order admitting the Amended Information was a superfluity because the original Information had already been superseded in 1995.

• No Rearraignment for Formal Amendment — A formal amendment to an information does not require the retaking of the accused's plea. The purpose of arraignment—to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation—is already attained by the first arraignment, and a formal amendment that does not charge a new offense or alter the prosecution's theory cannot surprise the accused. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the claim that rearraignment for murder was necessary.

• Conspiracy May Be Inferred from Concerted Actions — Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof; it may be inferred from the accused's concerted actions, including arriving together at the scene of the crime fully armed. The Court applied this doctrine to sustain the finding of conspiracy even though only one malefactor shot the victim.

• Alibi as an Inherently Weak Defense — Alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the conviction, noting that the trial court's findings on credibility are accorded the highest respect.

• Extinction of Criminal Liability by Death — Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the death of a convict before final judgment totally extinguishes criminal liability. Civil liability ex delicto is likewise extinguished, but claims predicated on other sources of obligation remain unaffected. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss Criminal Case No. 6621 as to Peralta.

• Penalty for Murder and Non-Eligibility for Parole — Murder is punishable by reclusión perpetua to death. When the death penalty is prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty is reclusión perpetua, and under A.M. No. 15-08-0-SC the Court adds "without eligibility for parole" where the accused should have been sentenced to death but for the prohibition. The Court applied this doctrine in modifying Liban's penalty.

• "Prior to the plea of the accused, a formal or substantial amendment of the information ipso facto supersedes the original one without need for the trial court to admit the amended information, except when the amendment downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the information." — This passage states the core rule on pre-plea amendments and explains why the RTC's later admission order was unnecessary.
• "Since the amendment of an information, whether in form or substance, prior to the plea of the accused is a matter of right and does not require leave of court, save for the exception in the second paragraph of Rule 110, Section 14, the amended information ipso facto supersedes the original information without the need to move for its admission and without further action from the court." — This is the ratio decidendi on the validity of the Amended Information and the superfluity of the admission order.
• "Even assuming that accused-appellants pleaded only to the charge of frustrated murder and not murder, as they claim in their appellate brief, it was unnecessary for the trial court to order their rearraignment for the murder charge since the amendment was only as to form." — This passage rejects the rearraignment and double jeopardy argument.
• "Although only one malefactor shot Virgilio, conspiracy was also duly proven by the prosecution and may be inferred from accused-appellants' concerted actions with the rest of the accused arriving together at the scene of the crime fully armed." — This passage states the basis for the conspiracy finding sustaining the murder conviction.

• Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, 283 Phil. 956 (1992) — En Banc ruling followed by the Court; held that frustrated murder is necessarily included in murder, and that an amendment from frustrated to consummated murder after the victim's death is a formal amendment that does not require another preliminary investigation or surprise the accused.
• Villarba vs. Court of Appeals, 874 Phil. 84 (2020) — Cited for the rule that a second arraignment is not required for a formal amendment to an information.
• Kummer vs. People, 717 Phil. 670 (2013) — Cited for the principle that the purpose of arraignment is already attained when the accused is first arraigned, and a formal amendment that does not charge a new offense cannot surprise the accused.
• People vs. Bayotas, 306 Phil. 266 (1994) — En Banc ruling cited for the rule that death before final judgment extinguishes criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, while claims based on other sources of obligation remain unaffected.
• People vs. Torrefiel, 326 Phil. 388 (1996) — Cited for the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from the accused's concerted actions.
• Alicando vs. People, 715 Phil. 638 (2003) — Cited for the rule that findings of trial courts are accorded the highest respect and are generally not disturbed on appeal absent arbitrariness or overlooked substantial facts.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — En Banc ruling cited for the guidelines on civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages in murder cases.

• Rule 110, Section 14, Rules of Court — Governs amendment or substitution of an information. It allows amendment in form or substance without leave of court before plea, except when the amendment downgrades the offense or excludes an accused; after plea, only formal amendments with leave. The Court applied it to hold that the pre-plea amendment from frustrated murder to murder was a matter of right and ipso facto superseded the original Information.
• Article 89(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict before final judgment as to personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties only when death occurs before final judgment. The Court applied it to dismiss the case against Peralta.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines murder and imposes the penalty of reclusión perpetua to death. The Court applied it in affirming Liban's conviction and penalty.
• Republic Act No. 9346 — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. The Court applied it to impose reclusión perpetua instead of death.
• A.M. No. 15-08-0-SC — Provides guidelines on non-eligibility for parole. The Court applied it to add "without eligibility for parole" to Liban's sentence.
• Rule 10, Section 8, Rules of Court — States that an amended pleading supersedes the pleading it amends. The Court cited it by analogy to support the ipso facto supersession of the original Information.
• Rule 15, Section 10 and Rule 11, Section 3, Rules of Court — Cited by analogy on motions for leave and answers to amended complaints, to explain that admission is required only when the filing is not a matter of right.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Hernando, Zalameda, and Marquez, JJ., concur.