People of the Philippines vs. Rucila Amit y Buena

A plea of guilty and a medically established mild behavior disorder that diminishes the exercise of will-power without depriving the offender of consciousness of her acts are mitigating circumstances; where no aggravating circumstance offsets them, the penalty next lower in degree is imposed under Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code. The claim of insanity or “word deafness” did not warrant a new trial where medical observation found the accused mentally sane at the time of the crime and when she pleaded guilty.

Rucila Amit y Buena was employed as a housegirl by Enrile Esteban y Obando (referred to in the hospital report as Enriqueta Esteban), whose household was at 152 Isarog, Quezon City. The charge was qualified theft under the Revised Penal Code, the information alleging grave abuse of confidence because Rucila, as a housegirl, had free access to the stolen property. The Revised Penal Code provisions on mitigating circumstances, qualified theft, and the law on indeterminate sentence supplied the legal framework for the penalty ultimately imposed.

Rucila Amit y Buena was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with qualified theft under an information alleging that on or about December 21, 1947, in the City of Manila, she wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner, took and carried away clothing and personal items belonging to Enrile Esteban y Obando: twelve dresses valued at P170.00, three chemises at P6.00, one coat at P7.00, seven pants at P15.00, one bathing suit at P8.00, two blouses at P10.00, one kerchief at P2.00, five handkerchiefs at P1.00, and one towel at P1.50, for a total value of P220.50. The information further alleged that she acted with grave abuse of confidence because she was at the time a housegirl of the offended party and had free access to the stolen property.

At her arraignment, assisted by counsel, Rucila pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial court found her guilty and sentenced her to not less than four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional and not more than eight years and one day of prision mayor, and to pay the costs; because the property had been recovered and returned to the owner, no indemnity was pronounced. Her counsel thereafter filed a motion for new trial, stating that from his investigation and observation he was of the opinion that Rucila was suffering from some mental disorder; that she had assured him she was innocent; that she did not know why she entered the plea of guilty; and that if given an opportunity she could establish her innocence. The trial court denied the motion, and the case was brought to the Supreme Court on appeal.

On appeal, counsel renewed the motion for new trial on the same grounds and added that Rucila was suffering from the mental disease technically known as “word deafness.” The Solicitor General objected on the ground that the motion was not supported by any affidavit or certificate of an alienist about her mental disorders, either in the Supreme Court or in the lower court. Because of the seriousness of the offense, the relatively severe penalty, and the plea of guilty, which did not entirely preclude the possibility that the plea and its consequences were not fully realized by one said to be not completely sane, the Supreme Court issued a resolution on November 26, 1948, ordering the chief or Director of the National Psychopathic Hospital, or any competent alienist designated by him, to place Rucila under observation for a reasonable period to verify the alleged mental derangement, particularly “word deafness,” and, if found, to determine how long she had been in that state. Pursuant to that resolution, Rucila was transferred from the Correctional Institution for Women to the National Psychopathic Hospital on December 18, 1948, and was observed by medical experts for about a month.

The hospital report described Rucila, then twenty-six years old, as born of poor parents and having had limited family support and opportunities, but as mentally normal and even above average in intelligence; she had been accelerated one grade and finished the sixth grade. It noted that she was weak in character and morals and somewhat abnormal in behavior, having cohabited without marriage with a chauffeur from 1939 to 1943, then with a soldier by whom she had a child before separating in 1945, and later with her first lover by whom she had another child before he left her; she sometimes stayed with friends instead of remaining at home with her children. Despite this, she was mentally alert, smart, business-minded, and engaged in buying and selling for profit. The report also recounted Enriqueta Esteban's account that Rucila was hired as a housemaid in December 1947 at 152 Isarog, Quezon City; on the night she was hired, around midnight, Esteban was awakened by a police officer accompanying Rucila, who had apparently left the house carrying a box of assorted dresses belonging to Esteban, and at the police station Rucila admitted taking the clothes, which were all accounted for and returned to the owner. The record of arrest showed she was apprehended on the night of December 21, 1947, in front of 390 Blumentritt Street, and admitted having taken assorted clothing valued at P220.50 while the members of the household were asleep, as also stated in a signed statement duly witnessed. The arraignment record in criminal case No. 5270 showed that Rucila, duly represented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty to having stolen, while being a housegirl of Enriqueta Esteban, personal property valued at P220.50 on December 21, 1947; she was sentenced and committed to the Correctional Institution for Women on January 9, 1948. Her behavior at the Correctional Institution from January 1948 to December 1948 was normal, she was assigned to different institutional activities, and she did excellent work.

On admission to the National Psychopathic Hospital, Rucila was well behaved, cooperative, coherent, relevant in speech, and well oriented in all spheres, with no hallucinations or delusions elicited. During the one-month observation, she showed good behavior, was cooperative and observant of ward activities, adjusted to the noise of patients at night, was respectful to personnel, attended to her needs, spoke coherently and relevantly, had a fairly stable mood and adequate emotional reactions, and exhibited no hallucinations, delusions, bizarre trends, or compulsive or impulsive phenomena. She remained well oriented to date, place, and person, in contact with the environment, with accurate and well-preserved memory; she remembered all incidents in her past life, admitted having been a housemaid to Enriqueta Esteban for a day and leaving the house that same night, December 20 or 21, 1947, with a bundle of assorted dresses worth more than P200, being apprehended by a policeman, admitting to him that she took the clothing, being brought to Bilibid Prison, and signing a written confession; she remembered being kept at Bilibid until arraignment before Judge Peña and being taken to the Correctional Institution for Women on January 9, 1948. She had a good grasp of current events, alertness in mathematical operations, and good insight and judgment; she said she deserved punishment for her crime although she thought it too long, stated she was not insane, preferred to finish her term in prison rather than stay at the National Psychopathic Hospital, and would not act insane as she was counselled to do because she was not crazy and did not want injections and treatments. Physical and neurological examination showed weakness of the external rectus of the right eye resulting in convergent strabismus, with no other abnormal findings, and laboratory examinations were essentially negative.

The National Psychopathic Hospital concluded that Rucila was not psychotic and was not suffering from “word deafness”; that she was not psychotic and did not suffer from “word deafness” during the commission of the crime on December 21, 1947; and that she was not psychotic and did not suffer from “word deafness” when she pleaded guilty upon arraignment on January 9, 1948. It nevertheless found that she was suffering from a mild behavior disorder as a consequence of an illness in early life, most probably encephalitis, as evidenced by the development of squinting of the right eye and somewhat truant behavior. The diagnosis was “Without psychosis” and “Behavior disorder, mild, post-encephalitic.” The report thus established that she was in her right senses and mentally sane when she committed the crime and when she entered her plea of guilty, while also documenting the mild behavior disorder that the Court later considered in mitigation.

• Mental Disorder and New Trial: Appellant Rucila Amit y Buena, through counsel, moved for new trial on the ground that she was suffering from some mental disorder; she had assured counsel she was innocent, did not know why she entered the plea of guilty, and could establish her innocence if given an opportunity.
• Word Deafness: On appeal, counsel renewed the motion and added that appellant was suffering from the mental disease technically known as “word deafness.”
• Mental State at Plea: The sole ground of appeal was the failure and refusal of the trial court to grant the motion for new trial founded on appellant's mental state at the time she pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
• Transfer for Treatment: Appellant's counsel petitioned that she be transferred to the National Psychopathic Hospital for necessary and proper treatment.

• Lack of Medical Evidence: The Solicitor General objected to the motion for new trial because it was not supported by any affidavit or certificate of any alienist about appellant's mental disorders, either in the Supreme Court or in the lower court.
• Conditional No Objection to Transfer: In answer to the petition to transfer appellant to the National Psychopathic Hospital for treatment, the Solicitor General stated he had no objection provided that the fact of appellant's mental alienation be ascertained by proper medical authority.
• Recommendation for Mitigating Circumstance: After the hospital report, the Solicitor General recommended that appellant be accorded the benefits of Article 13, paragraph 9, of the Revised Penal Code.

• Mental Disorder/Word Deafness: Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial based on appellant's alleged mental disorder and “word deafness.”
• Mental State at Time of Crime and Plea: Whether appellant was mentally sane at the time she committed the qualified theft and when she pleaded guilty.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether appellant's mild behavior disorder and plea of guilty may be considered mitigating circumstances under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed should be reduced to the penalty next lower in degree under Article 64, paragraph 5, and fixed under the law on indeterminate sentence.

• Mental Disorder/Word Deafness: No. The medical observation found appellant not psychotic and not suffering from “word deafness” at the time of the crime or at arraignment; the denial of the motion for new trial was sustained.
• Mental State at Time of Crime and Plea: No. The report concluded that she was in her right senses and mentally sane when she committed the crime and when she pleaded guilty.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Yes. The mild behavior disorder was treated as an illness diminishing will-power without depriving consciousness under Article 13(9); together with the plea of guilty, it constituted two mitigating circumstances.
• Penalty: Yes. With no aggravating circumstance, Article 64(5) required the penalty next lower in degree; applying the law on indeterminate sentence, the penalty was fixed at not less than one year and one day and not more than four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional.

• Mental Disorder/Word Deafness: The motion for new trial rested on counsel's opinion and appellant's alleged mental disorder, later specified as “word deafness.” The Solicitor General correctly noted the absence of any affidavit or certificate from an alienist. To resolve the claim, the Supreme Court ordered observation at the National Psychopathic Hospital. The hospital's report, signed by Dr. Cristeta V. Fulgencio and Dr. Toribio Joson, was comprehensive and adequate. It found no psychosis and no “word deafness” at the time of the crime on December 21, 1947, or when she pleaded guilty on January 9, 1948. The report also noted she was mentally alert, coherent, oriented, with good memory, insight, and judgment, and she herself asserted her sanity and responsibility. Therefore, the factual premise for a new trial—mental derangement preventing a valid plea—was absent.
• Mental State at Time of Crime and Plea: The report's mental status examination showed no hallucinations, delusions, bizarre trends, or impulsive phenomena; she was well oriented and in contact with reality; she remembered the incidents, admitted the taking, and understood her situation. Physical and neurological findings showed only convergent strabismus of the right eye; laboratory examinations were negative. The diagnosis was “Without psychosis” and “Behavior disorder, mild, post-encephalitic.” On these findings, the Court concluded she was in her right senses and mentally sane when she committed the crime and when she entered her plea of guilty. The plea of guilty, made with assistance of counsel, was therefore valid.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Although appellant was not insane, the report found a mild behavior disorder as a consequence of an early illness, most probably encephalitis. The Court considered this within Article 13, paragraph 9, of the Revised Penal Code, which treats as mitigating such illness as would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving the offender of consciousness of her acts, or under paragraph 10 as an analogous circumstance. The Solicitor General likewise recommended Article 13(9). Together with the plea of guilty, appellant had two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance. Under Article 64, paragraph 5, the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law was imposed.
• Penalty: Qualified theft involving more than P200 is penalized under Article 309, paragraph 3, in relation to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 120, with prision mayor in its medium and maximum degrees. The penalty next lower is prision correccional in its maximum degree to prision mayor in its minimum degree. Applying the law on indeterminate sentence, the Court sentenced appellant to not less than one year and one day and not more than four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional, with the accessories of the law, and credited any preventive imprisonment already suffered. The decision appealed from was affirmed with this modification.

• Illness diminishing will-power as a mitigating circumstance — Under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, an illness of the offender that diminishes the exercise of will-power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts is mitigating. In this case, the mild post-encephalitic behavior disorder, though not amounting to insanity or exempting her from liability, was credited as diminishing will-power and considered in reducing the penalty. The Court also referred to Article 13(10) as covering analogous circumstances.
• Plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance — A plea of guilty, entered with assistance of counsel, was counted in appellant's favor as a mitigating circumstance. Together with the illness-based mitigating circumstance, it produced two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance.
• Penalty next lower in degree when two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance — Under Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code, when two or more mitigating circumstances are present and no aggravating circumstance offsets them, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law is imposed. The Court applied this rule to reduce the penalty for qualified theft.
• Qualified theft by abuse of confidence — The information charged qualified theft because appellant, as a housegirl of the offended party, had free access to the stolen property, which constituted grave abuse of confidence. For qualified theft involving property valued at more than P200, the prescribed penalty is prision mayor in its medium and maximum degrees under Article 309(3) in relation to Article 310, as amended by Republic Act No. 120.
• Law on indeterminate sentence — The Court applied the law on indeterminate sentence in fixing the minimum and maximum terms of the modified penalty, imposing not less than one year and one day and not more than four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional.

• “From the above studies and findings the undersigned and members of the staff of the National Psychopathic Hospital are of the opinion that Rucila Amit y Buena is not psychotic and not suffering from "word deafness" that she was not psychotic, and did not suffer from "word deafness" during the commission of the crime on December 21, 1947, that she was not psychotic and did not suffer from word deafness when she pleaded guilty upon arraignment on January 9, 1948.” — This is the hospital's conclusion that defeated the mental disorder and “word deafness” claim and supported the validity of the plea.
• “From the foregoing it is safe to conclude that when the appellants committed the crime of qualified theft and when she entered a plea of guilt to the charge during the trial she was in her right senses and mentally sane.” — This states the Court's own conclusion on sanity at the time of the crime and plea.
• “Together with the plea of guilty, appellant has two mitigating circumstances in her favor without aggravating circumstances to off-set them and under article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we hereby impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law.” — This states the ratio for the reduced penalty.
• “According to the report far from claiming insanity or mental derangement she positively asserted her sanity and responsibility Although she is mentally sane, we however, are inclined to extend our sympathy to the appellant because of her misfortunes and her weak character.” — This explains why the Court, while finding no insanity, still considered the mild behavior disorder in mitigation.

• Article 13, paragraph 9, Revised Penal Code — Defines as mitigating such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts. The Court applied it to appellant's mild post-encephalitic behavior disorder.
• Article 13, paragraph 10, Revised Penal Code — Covers any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those enumerated. The Court referred to this paragraph as an alternative basis for the same mitigating circumstance.
• Article 64, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. The Court applied it after finding the plea of guilty and the behavior disorder as mitigating.
• Article 309, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Fixes the penalty for qualified theft involving property valued at more than P200 at prision mayor in its medium and maximum degrees. The Court used it to determine the base penalty.
• Article 310, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 120 — Defines qualified theft and is read in relation to Article 309. The Court cited it in computing the penalty for the qualified theft.
• Law on indeterminate sentence — Governs the imposition of a minimum and maximum term. The Court applied it to sentence appellant to not less than one year and one day and not more than four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfect, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ.