People of the Philippines vs. Ruben Lim y Ortiz

Alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused; delay in reporting rape is justified where due to death threats against the victim and/or her family; and a victim’s retraction or pardon must be made prior to the institution of the criminal action to warrant dismissal.

Ruben Lim y Ortiz and Delailah Lim y Garcia were cousins. Delailah’s sister, Karen Saguban, allowed Delailah to stay temporarily in Lim’s house while Lim’s household went to Lucena City for the wake of his brother-in-law, Efren Mansion. The charge arose from events alleged to have occurred during that stay, and the case proceeded under a rape information filed in Quezon City.

Ruben Lim y Ortiz and Delailah Lim y Garcia were cousins. On December 4, 1986, at about 6:00 p.m., Lim went to Delailah’s house at Barrio Palanas, Barangay Vasra, and asked Delailah’s sister, Karen Saguban, to allow Delailah to stay temporarily in his house while his household went to Lucena City for the wake of his brother-in-law, Efren Mansion. Karen agreed, and at about 8:00 p.m. Delailah went to Lim’s house. Lim told her he would leave for Lucena City the following day, instructed her to sleep upstairs while he slept downstairs, and, when Delailah asked to go home upon learning he would not leave that night, told her not to leave because he would leave early in the morning.

At around 9:00 p.m., Delailah went to sleep upstairs. At dawn on December 5, 1986, she felt someone touching her; upon waking, she saw Lim. According to the prosecution, Lim covered her mouth with his left hand, pulled her hair with his right hand, and tried to push her down. When she resisted, he told her not to shout or he would kill her and her family, especially her father who had a heart ailment. He drew a .38 revolver from his right waist and poked it at her neck. There was light from an electric post. Lim continued threatening her, and Delailah believed the threats because she knew he had been charged with frustrated murder in the province and had a string of cases in Manila and was capable of carrying out his threats. When she resisted, he hit her stomach, removed her panty, pressed her thigh, and placed his finger on her private part. He succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her despite her resistance and her plea not to do so because they were cousins. Lim said, “Anong pinsan-pinsan, walang pinsan-pinsan sa akin, kaysa iba pa ang mauna, ako na lang ang uuna.” After the intercourse, he again threatened her not to report the incident or he would kill her and her family, and she believed the threat. Before she left, he showed her an armalite and continued threatening her.

In the morning of December 5, 1986, Delailah was allowed to leave, but she did not reveal what happened for fear of being killed. For several months after the rape, Lim frequently visited her to repeat his threats. During those visits, he learned that Delailah was pregnant with his baby and began insisting that she have an abortion. She refused and informed his wife, who told her to obey Lim’s wishes because he was capable of carrying out his threats. Despite her continued refusal, Lim, with the aid of his sister Virginia Lim, succeeded in bringing Delailah to an abortionist known to her as Aling Maring. On June 21, 1987, Delailah had the abortion. She still could not bring herself to report the case because she remained afraid of Lim. She revealed the rape only when she learned that Lim was detained, but subsequently released, for illegal possession of firearms on October 7, 1987. The following day, accompanied by her sister, she went to the police station to file a complaint for rape, and Lim was held in custody. Delailah executed a written complaint and submitted herself to medical examination by Doctor Moraleda of the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory.

Preliminary investigation was conducted by the Assistant City Fiscal, and Lim submitted his counter-affidavit and rejoinder affidavit. On November 23, 1987, Delailah filed another case against Lim for intentional abortion, with Aling Maring as co-accused. On February 5, 1988, an information was filed in the sala of Judge Velasco with no bail recommended. A warrant of arrest was issued with no bail, but it was returned unserved because Lim remained at large. While eluding arrest, Lim threatened his uncle, Atty. Eldorado Lim, who was suspected of aiding Delailah, warning that he would spray the lawyer’s house with an armalite if he could not convince Delailah to withdraw the cases. Atty. Lim yielded and called Delailah and her sister Karen to execute an affidavit of desistance. With great reservation, Delailah executed on March 1, 1988 an affidavit of desistance in the rape case and on March 8, 1988 a separate affidavit of desistance in the intentional abortion case. As a result, the intentional abortion case was dismissed, and upon arraignment of Lim for rape, bail was granted. On the same date of arraignment, Delailah filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail; the motion was held in abeyance until the prosecution presented evidence. On April 28, 1988, Delailah executed a “Sinumpaang Salaysay” explaining that the affidavit of desistance was involuntary and executed under duress and was meant to hasten the capture of Lim, who would have believed that the case against him would be dropped.

The defense claimed that at the time of the alleged rape on December 5, 1986, Lim was in Lucena City attending the wake of his brother-in-law, Efren Mansion. Lim claimed he stayed in Lucena City from November 29, the start of the week-long vigil, until interment on December 6. The only time he left Lucena City was in the morning of December 5, 1986, to attend a preliminary investigation before Fiscal Silverio in Quezon City set at 2:00 p.m. that afternoon for a theft case he filed against A. Paran and W. Paran. He claimed he was with his wife and children when he left for Quezon City because his wife had to buy things for the wake; his wife returned to Lucena City that same afternoon, while he left Quezon City early in the morning of December 6, 1986, with Jose Bacay, his second-degree cousin, and Atty. Eldorado Lim, his uncle.

The lower court gave full faith and credit to the prosecution’s version and rendered the questioned decision. The trial court found the prosecution’s version credible, and the Supreme Court noted that the records showed Lim to be a violence-prone ex-soldier and that Delailah’s fear was well-founded because Lim owned a .38 caliber gun and an armalite, the former used during the rape and the latter shown to her before she left his house the following morning. The trial court also observed that the affidavit of desistance coincided with the time Lim remained at large after a warrant of arrest was issued with no bail, and that he surrendered on April 22, 1988, several days after the affidavits of desistance were executed. The defense’s witnesses, Lim’s wife Ruth Lim and sister Rosalinda Mansion, testified that Delailah accompanied her sister to Lucena City at about 1:00 p.m. on December 5 and played card games and jumped with joy when she won.

• Overlooked Facts and Insufficient Evidence: Appellant argued that the trial court overlooked facts of substance and value which, if considered, should have resulted in acquittal rather than conviction, and that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
• Alibi: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred in not considering his defense of alibi, claiming it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the alleged crime at the time of its commission because he was in Lucena City attending the wake of his brother-in-law, Efren Mansion, from November 29 until interment on December 6, 1986, and left only in the morning of December 5, 1986, to attend a preliminary investigation before Fiscal Silverio in Quezon City.
• Delay and Tacit Consent: Appellant contended that the lapse of ten months and three days before the filing of charges, if the incident occurred, would lead to the conclusion that there was tacit consent to the act.
• Post-Incident Behavior: Appellant impugned the complainant’s credibility by arguing that her behavior after the alleged rape did not exhibit the fear and exhaustion such an experience should have instilled; she accompanied her sister to Lucena City knowing the accused would be there and, according to the testimonies of his wife and sister, played card games and jumped with joy when she won.
• Affidavit of Desistance: Appellant argued that the affidavit of desistance executed by Delailah Lim stating that the rape case arose from a mere misunderstanding should be considered in his favor.
• Motive and Instigation: Appellant claimed that Delailah filed the case due to instigation by her family after he confronted them regarding his share in the profits from the properties of their deceased grandmother; in his counter-affidavit, he stated a different motive, that she was manipulated by her sister’s deceased boyfriend to force the sharing of death benefits received by his sister.
• Fears Not Well-Founded: Appellant tried to play down Delailah’s alleged fears by establishing that she knew he did not face trial for, nor was ever convicted of, the frustrated murder case imputed to him.
• Consensual Act: Appellant raised matters such as Delailah being at the age of highest sexual desire, the development of intimacy due to her frequent visits to his house, and her having purposely worn a dress that was straight out and open from the neckline down on the date of the alleged rape to show that the act was consensual.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.
• Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in not considering the defense of alibi where it was allegedly physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
• Delay and Tacit Consent: Whether the delay of ten months and three days in filing the rape charge negated the accusation or indicated tacit consent.
• Post-Incident Behavior: Whether the complainant’s behavior after the alleged rape rendered her testimony incredible.
• Affidavit of Desistance: Whether the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant should be considered in favor of the accused.
• Motive and Instigation: Whether the complainant’s alleged ulterior motives or instigation by her family rendered her complaint fabricated.
• Consensual Act and Other Points: Whether matters such as the complainant’s age, alleged intimacy, dress, and voluntary abortion showed consent or affected the charge.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The conviction was affirmed; the prosecution’s evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the trial court’s factual findings were respected absent arbitrariness.
• Alibi: No. Alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification; corroboration by the wife or relatives is extremely weak.
• Delay and Tacit Consent: No. The delay was justified by the appellant’s death threats against the complainant and her family; it did not amount to tacit consent.
• Post-Incident Behavior: No. Different people react differently, and there is no standard behavioral response to a startling or frightful experience; the complainant explained her actions, and the defense witnesses’ testimonies were dubious.
• Affidavit of Desistance: No. The affidavit was executed under duress and after the criminal action was instituted; retraction or pardon must be made prior to institution to warrant dismissal.
• Motive and Instigation: No. The imputed motives were fabricated and inconsistent with the appellant’s own counter-affidavit; the estate dispute was improbable given the length of time since the grandmother’s death.
• Consensual Act and Other Points: No. The matters raised were mere conjectures not established during trial; the abortion matter was impertinent and did not detract from the rape charge.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Review began with the three settled principles in People vs. Yambao: an accusation for rape can be made with facility but is difficult to prove and more difficult to disprove; the complainant’s testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and the prosecution’s evidence must stand or fall on its own merits. No compelling reason appeared to reverse the lower court’s factual findings. Factual findings of trial courts are accorded utmost respect absent arbitrariness because they had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and deportment of witnesses (People vs. Raptus; People vs. Tongson; People vs. Calixtro; People vs. Rafanan). The lower court found the prosecution’s version credible, and the records disclosed nothing to lead to a different conclusion. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt was thus sustained.
• Alibi: Alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification (People vs. Godines; People vs. Dinola; People vs. Robante). Alibi corroborated by the wife or other relatives is extremely weak (People vs. Rio; People vs. Serenio; People vs. Esquillo). Whether alibi is believed depends on its credibility vis-a-vis the prosecution’s version. The lower court found the prosecution credible; the defense’s alibi did not overcome Delailah’s positive identification.
• Delay and Tacit Consent: The ten-month and three-day delay before charges were filed did not indicate tacit consent. The prosecution explained that Delailah testified Lim threatened to kill her and her family if she went to the police. After the rape, Lim made periodic visits to her house, averaging twice a week, to repeat the threats. The records showed Lim was a violence-prone ex-soldier, making the victim’s fear understandable. The affidavit of desistance was itself a product of fear. Delay is justified where due to death threats against the victim and/or her family (People vs. Aquino; People vs. Nunag). The threats were sufficiently effective to deter her from reporting.
• Post-Incident Behavior: The claim that Delailah’s behavior after the rape showed no fear or exhaustion was rejected. People vs. Raptus, citing People vs. Ronquillo, held that different people react differently to a given situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when confronted with a strange or startling frightful experience. Delailah explained she accompanied her sister to Lucena City because her brother-in-law requested it and she could not think of an excuse to refuse without arousing suspicion. The testimonies of Lim’s wife and sister were dubious because their narrations coincided in every respect and detail (People vs. Talla; People vs. Madriaga IV; People vs. Rosario).
• Affidavit of Desistance: The affidavit of desistance was executed on March 1, 1988, while Lim was still at large. He surrendered on April 22, 1988, and on April 28, 1988, Delailah executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay explaining the affidavit was involuntary and under duress and meant to hasten his capture. The trial court observed that the affidavit coincided with the time Lim remained at large after a warrant of arrest was issued with no bail, and he surrendered several days after the affidavits were executed. The duress was supported by motions to withdraw filed on March 4, 1988 by Atty. Eldorado Lim, counsel of the accused in a carnapping case, who stated that Lim threatened him with death due to suspicion that he helped Delailah. It was improbable that Lim would retain Atty. Lim’s services in other cases if they had adverse interests. In any case, to warrant dismissal, the victim’s retraction or pardon must be made prior to the institution of the criminal action (People vs. Soliao). The present case was filed on February 24, 1988, while the affidavit was executed on March 1, 1988.
• Motive and Instigation: The appellant claimed Delailah filed the case due to family instigation over his share in the profits from their deceased grandmother’s properties. But in his counter-affidavit during preliminary investigation, he stated a different motive: that Delailah was manipulated by her sister’s deceased boyfriend to force the sharing of death benefits received by his sister. The imputed motives were fabricated. The lower court correctly pointed out that even conceding the grandmother’s estate was contested by heirs, it was unlikely the partition had not been settled considering Paula Tumlawen died in 1968, almost two decades before the suit.
• Consensual Act and Other Points: It was unnecessary to delve lengthily into other trivial points raised by the appellant—such as Delailah being at the age of highest sexual desire, the development of intimacy due to frequent visits, and her wearing a dress straight out and open from the neckline down on the date of the alleged rape—to show the act was consensual, because these were mere conjectures not established during trial. As to the matter of complainant submitting voluntarily to an abortion, it was impertinent to the case; even assuming arguendo that she submitted to an abortion, it did not detract from the fact that the appellant perpetrated the offense charged.

• Alibi — Alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. Corroboration by the wife or other relatives is extremely weak, and the believability of alibi depends on its credibility vis-a-vis the prosecution’s version. The defense’s alibi and corroborating testimonies failed against Delailah’s positive identification.
• Delay in Reporting Rape — Delay in filing a rape charge is justified where due to death threats against the victim and/or her family and does not amount to tacit consent. The ten-month delay was explained by Lim’s repeated threats, which made the victim’s fear well-founded.
• Behavioral Response to Trauma — There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling frightful experience; different people react differently. Delailah’s post-rape conduct did not destroy her credibility.
• Affidavit of Desistance / Retraction — To warrant dismissal, the victim’s retraction or pardon must be made prior to the institution of the criminal action. An affidavit executed under duress and after filing does not bar prosecution. The affidavit was executed on March 1, 1988, after the present case was filed on February 24, 1988, and was shown to be involuntary.
• Factual Findings of Trial Courts — Factual findings of trial courts are accorded utmost respect absent arbitrariness, especially because trial courts observe the demeanor and deportment of witnesses. The lower court’s credibility findings were sustained.
• Rape Evidence Principles — The Court restated the three settled principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility but is difficult to prove and more difficult to disprove; (2) the complainant’s testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the prosecution’s evidence must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The conviction was affirmed after review under these principles.
• Motive in Criminal Prosecution — Imputed ulterior motive does not overcome positive identification, and inconsistent motives undermine the defense. Lim’s shifting motives were found fabricated.

• "(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense." — The Court restated the guiding principles for appellate review of rape convictions, drawn from People vs. Yambao, before affirming the conviction.
• "It has long been recognized that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused." — The Court rejected the appellant’s alibi defense, emphasizing that positive identification outweighs alibi.
• "The delay in filing the case is justified where such is due to death threats against the victim and/or her family." — The Court explained why the ten-month delay in reporting the rape did not amount to tacit consent.
• "In any case, to warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the victim's retraction or pardon should be made prior to the institution of the criminal action." — The Court rejected the affidavit of desistance as a ground for dismissal because it was executed after the criminal action had been instituted.

• People vs. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571 (1991) — Controlling precedent restating the three settled principles in reviewing rape evidence.
• People vs. Raptus, G.R. Nos. 92169-70, June 19, 1991 — Cited for respect for trial court factual findings and for the rule that people react differently to trauma.
• People vs. Ronquillo, 184 SCRA 236 (1990) — Cited in People vs. Raptus for the rule that there is no standard human behavioral response to a startling or frightful experience.
• People vs. Godines, 196 SCRA 765 (1991); People vs. Dinola, 183 SCRA 493 (1990); People vs. Robante, 178 SCRA 852 (1989) — Alibi is weak and cannot prevail over positive identification.
• People vs. Rio, G.R. No. 90294, September 24, 1991; People vs. Serenio, 179 SCRA 379 (1989); People vs. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 (1989) — Alibi corroborated by the wife or relatives is extremely weak.
• People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 208 (1990); People vs. Nunag, 173 SCRA 274 (1989) — Delay in filing is justified where due to death threats.
• People vs. Talla, 181 SCRA 133 (1990); People vs. Madriaga IV, 171 SCRA 103 (1989); People vs. Rosario, 159 SCRA 192 (1988) — Cited in assessing the dubious testimonies of defense witnesses.
• People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250 (1991) — Retraction or pardon must be prior to the institution of the criminal action.
• People vs. Tongson, 194 SCRA 257 (1991); People vs. Calixtro, 193 SCRA 303 (1991); People vs. Rafanan, 182 SCRA 811 (1990) — Factual findings of trial courts are respected absent arbitrariness.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.