People of the Philippines vs. Rosemarie de la Cruz

Holding a child by the hand and leading her toward a school gate, without more and where the child had voluntarily accompanied the accused and the act was interrupted before exiting the school, constitutes only attempted kidnapping and serious illegal detention, not consummated kidnapping; intent to deprive liberty must be established by indubitable proof.

Rosemarie de la Cruz y Nieva was charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Whiazel Soriano y Cruz, a seven-year-old Grade 1 pupil at Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School in Malate, Manila. The offense was prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, which then prescribed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The accused was a private individual; no prior relationship between her and the victim appears in the record.

On September 27, 1994, Whiazel Soriano y Cruz, a seven-year-old Grade 1 pupil at Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School in Malate, Manila, was at school. Rosemarie de la Cruz y Nieva, a private individual, was also on the school premises. Cecilia Caparos, a neighbor of Whiazel, was waiting for her own children inside the school compound around 11:30 o’clock in the morning when she saw Whiazel being held by the hand and led away by a woman later identified as de la Cruz. Knowing that Whiazel was enrolled in the afternoon class, Caparos followed them and asked de la Cruz where she was going with the child. De la Cruz answered that she had asked Whiazel to bring her to Rowena Soriano, the child’s mother. Caparos then asked Whiazel why she was with de la Cruz, and the child answered that de la Cruz had requested her to look for the latter’s child. Caparos grew suspicious because of the inconsistent answers, Whiazel’s terrified look, and the scratches on the child’s face. She told de la Cruz that she would bring her to a teacher because she did not trust her; de la Cruz was surprised and reasoned out but agreed to go to a teacher.

Whiazel testified that she voluntarily went with de la Cruz after being asked for help in looking for the school dentist. Whiazel also mentioned that de la Cruz asked for her assistance in looking for de la Cruz’s child in a place far away from school. She was neither threatened nor hurt in any way by de la Cruz. She was not led out of the school; in fact, they never got out of the school compound. When Caparos saw them, Whiazel told de la Cruz that she wanted to go. De la Cruz refused and held Whiazel’s hand. Whiazel did not try to escape. She did not even cry until they went to a teacher.

For the defense, Eufemia Magpantay, guidance teacher at the school, testified that around noontime on the same day, de la Cruz, Whiazel, Whiazel’s teacher Mrs. Rioganes, and Caparos went to her office. The incident was related to her. Asked what she was doing with Whiazel, de la Cruz said she wanted the child’s help in looking for the school dentist. De la Cruz reiterated this before the assistant principal to whom they all later went. Magpantay testified that the school allows patients who are not connected with the school to consult at the clinic. She also mentioned that the students of the public school come mostly from low to average income families.

De la Cruz’s mother-in-law, Gorgonia Nieva, testified that on the day before the incident, de la Cruz had asked her to look for Dr. Luisa Medina, a dentist, because de la Cruz’s daughter was then sick. Her inquiries showed that the dentist no longer had her clinic at her house; instead she may be found at Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School. Thus, the next day, she went with de la Cruz to Manila to look for the dentist. They parted ways when they arrived at the school at around 11 o’clock in the morning. De la Cruz testified that when she got to the school, she asked a guard where the clinic was. The guard gave her directions and told her to pass through the same gate on her way out. When she got to the clinic, no one was there, so she left. On her way out, a girl, later identified as Whiazel, walked with her at arm’s length (nakasabay). She did not hold the child; she did not look at the child; they did not talk; not even smiles were exchanged. Before she could get out of the school, Caparos called her, hurled invectives at her, and accused her of kidnapping Whiazel. De la Cruz got mad but nevertheless offered no resistance when Caparos dragged her and brought her to the office of the guidance counselor. There, Caparos repeated her charges against de la Cruz, which the latter denied. Whiazel was asked by the guidance counselor if de la Cruz was really going to kidnap her, and she answered no. Very much the same things were said later at the principal’s office. At the request of the principal, five policemen later came and brought de la Cruz to Station No. 5 of the Western Police District.

The trial court found that de la Cruz, without legal reason or just cause, took hold of Whiazel by the hand and led her toward the gate of the school compound against her will, evidently to bring her out of the school perimeter; that before they could exit, the child saw Caparos and told de la Cruz she wanted to go to her neighbor; that de la Cruz refused and continued to hold her, so the child was not able to get away; and that although no physical force was employed, de la Cruz exerted sufficient moral intimidation on the child, who at such tender age and immature mind could easily be awed and cowed. The trial court thus convicted de la Cruz of kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor.

• Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellant contended that her guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt and that the entire case was nothing but an overreaction to the situation.
• No Kidnapping: Accused-appellant argued that her act of holding the child by the hand and leading her out of the school premises cannot be considered an act of kidnapping without leaving room for reasonable doubt.
• Victim’s Testimony: Accused-appellant pointed out that Whiazel did not categorically state that accused-appellant tried to kidnap her; on the contrary, the child testified that she voluntarily went with accused-appellant and that she was neither forced nor intimidated into accompanying accused-appellant.
• Valid Reason for Presence: Accused-appellant maintained that her excuse for going to Whiazel’s school to look for Dr. Medina was buttressed by the fact that she had a tooth extracted in jail sometime in November 1994, and that the guidance teacher, Eufemia Magpantay, testified that even persons not connected with the school are allowed to consult Dr. Medina at the school’s dental clinic.
• Conduct After Accusation: Accused-appellant submitted that she had a valid reason for being at the school premises, as she did not run away and instead faced her accuser.
• Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellant argued that all these circumstances constituted reasonable doubt as to her guilt which necessitated her acquittal.

• Deprivation of Liberty: The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that Whiazel was deprived of her liberty, no matter how short a time, the moment accused-appellant, a person unknown to Whiazel, prevented her from going over to her neighbor, Cecilia Caparos.
• Consummation Despite No Force or Threats: The People argued that under the circumstances, considering that the victim is of such tender age, deprivation of liberty was consummated even in the absence of force or threats upon the victim.

• Consummation of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention: Whether accused-appellant’s act of holding the child by the hand and leading her toward the school gate, then refusing to let go when the child asked to go to her neighbor, constituted consummated kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor.
• Intent and Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of liberty.
• Stage of the Felony: Whether the felony, if any, was committed only in the attempted stage.
• Moral Damages: Whether the award of P50,000 moral damages was proper absent evidence of moral suffering.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed was correct given the stage of the felony.

• Consummation of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention: No. The acts of holding the child’s hand and refusing to let go when she asked to go to her neighbor did not sufficiently establish consummated kidnapping; the victim had voluntarily accompanied accused-appellant until that brief moment, and the alleged detention was interrupted before she could exit the school.
• Intent and Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. In a prosecution for kidnapping, intent to deprive the victim of liberty must be established by indubitable proof; the evidence did not show with certainty that the victim was deprived of her liberty.
• Stage of the Felony: Attempted only. Accused-appellant commenced the criminal scheme by taking hold of Whiazel and leading her out of the school premises, but the further progress and completion of the felonious design was thwarted by Cecilia Caparos’s timely intervention.
• Moral Damages: No. The P50,000 award was deleted because moral damages require proof of moral suffering, and the record showed only that the victim cried at the guidance counselor’s office.
• Penalty: Modified. Since the crime was only attempted, the penalty for consummated kidnapping and serious illegal detention was lowered by two degrees, and the indeterminate penalty was set at two years and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum.

• Consummation of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention: The acts held by the trial court and the People as consummating kidnapping were accused-appellant holding the victim’s hand and refusing to let go when the victim asked to go over to her neighbor. This happened for only a very brief span of time; the record showed a good number of people present, a guard stationed at the gate, and at least a teacher nearby; the child could have shouted for help. Up to that brief moment, the victim had gone with accused-appellant voluntarily. Without any further act reinforcing the inference that the victim may have been denied her liberty, even considering her minority, the Court hesitated to find that kidnapping was consummated. Although factual findings of trial courts are generally respected, the Court may substitute its own findings when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, as it perceived here (People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992]).
• Intent and Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter’s liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof (People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The prosecution did not meet this standard. The child testified that she voluntarily went with accused-appellant, was neither threatened nor hurt, and never left the school compound. The inconsistent answers and the child’s frightened appearance did not establish beyond reasonable doubt the intent to deprive liberty.
• Stage of the Felony: The felony committed was kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor in the attempted stage only. Under Article 6, Revised Penal Code, attempted felony exists when the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts and does not perform all acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The overt act must be external and directly connected with the felony; it must be shown that the beginning of execution, if carried to complete termination following its natural course without external obstacles or voluntary desistance, would logically and necessarily ripen to a concrete offense (Padilla. Criminal Law: Revised Penal Code Annotated, vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 141 citing People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil 703). Accused-appellant commenced her criminal scheme by taking hold of Whiazel by the hand and leading her out of the school premises. The Court found attendant circumstances revealing less than noble intentions: the child was led to believe accused-appellant wanted to see the dentist, but it was not clear there really was a Dr. Medina employed by the school; if accused-appellant wanted to see the dentist, why was she on her way out; if she had already gone to the clinic and found no one, what else was she doing with the child; she did not simply ask for directions but wanted the victim to accompany her; and she asked a seven-year-old. The further progress and completion of the felonious design was thwarted by Cecilia Caparos’s timely intervention.
• Moral Damages: The trial court erred in granting P50,000 moral damages despite the absence of any evidence that the victim suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, fright, or similar injury. The record revealed only that the victim cried when they were at the guidance counselor’s office. Moral damages are granted not to enrich but to compensate the victim for the injury suffered (Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16 [1994]); proof of moral suffering must be introduced, failing which such an award is not proper (People vs. Manero, Jr. et. al., 218 SCRA 85 [1993]).
• Penalty: Since the crime was only in its attempted stage, the penalty imposable under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, which is reclusion perpetua to death, had to be lowered by two degrees (Article 51, Revised Penal Code). Two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua to death would be prision mayor, which had to be imposed in its medium period in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance (Article 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty would range from prision correccional as the minimum to prision mayor in its medium period as the maximum. The Court thus imposed two years and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum.

• Intent in Kidnapping Must Be Established by Indubitable Proof — In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of liberty, in any manner, must be established by indubitable proof. The Court applied this standard and found that the evidence did not show with certainty that the victim was deprived of her liberty, especially because she had voluntarily accompanied accused-appellant and was neither threatened nor hurt.
• Attempted Felony — Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony is attempted when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts and does not perform all acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The overt act must be external and directly connected with the felony, and it must appear that the beginning of execution, if carried to complete termination following its natural course without external obstacles or voluntary desistance, would logically and necessarily ripen to a concrete offense. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that accused-appellant commenced the criminal scheme through taking hold of the child and leading her out, but the timely intervention of Cecilia Caparos thwarted completion.
• Moral Damages Require Proof of Moral Suffering — Moral damages are granted not to enrich the victim but to compensate for injury suffered; proof of moral suffering must be introduced, failing which an award is not proper. The Court applied this by deleting the P50,000 award because the record showed only that the victim cried at the guidance counselor’s office, without evidence of sleepless nights, serious anxiety, fright, or similar injury.
• Lowering of Penalty for Attempted Felony and Indeterminate Sentence Law — The penalty for an attempted felony is lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Absent mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law then fixes the minimum and maximum terms. The Court applied these rules by lowering reclusion perpetua to death to prision mayor in its medium period and imposing an indeterminate penalty ranging from prision correccional to prision mayor in its medium period.

• "In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter's liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof (People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993])." — This passage states the evidentiary standard the Court used to reject consummated kidnapping and to require proof of intent beyond reasonable doubt.
• "To our mind, the felony committed is kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor in the attempted stage only." — This is the Court’s core ratio: the crime was not consummated but only attempted.
• "The overt act must be an external one which has direct connection with the felony, it being "necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the offender, will logically and necessarily ripen to a concrete offense" (Padilla. Criminal Law: Revised Penal Code Annotated, vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 141 citing People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil 703)." — This defines the requisites of an attempted felony and explains why the accused’s overt acts had to be assessed for whether they would naturally ripen into the consummated offense.
• "Inasmuch as moral damages are granted not to enrich, but rather to compensate the victim for the injury suffered (Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16 [1994]), proof of moral suffering must be introduced, failing in which, such an award is not proper (People vs. Manero, Jr. et. al., 218 SCRA 85 [1993])." — This states the rule requiring proof of moral suffering and supports the deletion of the P50,000 moral damages award.

• People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993] — Cited for the rule that in a prosecution for kidnapping, intent to deprive the victim of liberty must be established by indubitable proof; the Court relied on this standard in finding the evidence insufficient for consummated kidnapping.
• People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992] — Cited for the exception to the general respect accorded to trial courts’ factual findings when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; the Court used it to substitute its own findings.
• People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil 703 — Cited through Padilla for the requisites of attempted felony, particularly that the overt act must be directly connected with the felony and must logically and necessarily ripen to the concrete offense if not frustrated or desisted from.
• Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16 [1994] — Cited for the principle that moral damages are granted not to enrich but to compensate the victim for injury suffered.
• People vs. Manero, Jr. et. al., 218 SCRA 85 [1993] — Cited for the requirement that proof of moral suffering must be introduced, failing which an award of moral damages is not proper.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 — Penalizes kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court held the crime was only attempted, so this penalty was lowered.
• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines attempted felony as when the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts and does not perform all acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Applied to the overt acts of taking hold of the child and leading her out.
• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty for an attempted felony is lower by two degrees than that for the consummated felony. Applied to lower reclusion perpetua to death to prision mayor.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Governs the imposition of penalties; absent mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the medium period is imposed. Applied to prision mayor in its medium period.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum at prision correccional and the maximum at prision mayor in its medium period.

Narvasa, C.J.; Davide, Jr.; Francisco; and Panganiban, JJ., concur.