People of the Philippines vs. Ronald Paradero Aporado

An attack that is sudden and unexpected does not automatically constitute treachery; the subjective element—deliberate adoption of the mode of attack to ensure the killing without risk—must also be proved. Without that element, the killing is homicide, not murder.

Ronald Paradero Aporado was charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code for the stabbing death of Amado B. Halasan. The Revised Penal Code also defines homicide under Article 249 and governs the mitigating circumstances invoked by the accused. The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the Regional Trial Court's conviction.

On January 28, 2017, Ronald Paradero Aporado, also known as "Tunay," Jay Amoy, Amado B. Halasan, and Fritz Montalba were having a drinking spree outside the house of Jomar Amoy in Sitio San Roque, Barangay Mabuhay, Bansalan, Davao del Sur. During the session, the group teased Ronald that he looked like a killer and told him that he was ugly; Amado challenged him whether he knew how to kill a person. According to the prosecution, Ronald was enraged by the mockery and took it as a degradation of his person, although the group was unaware of his reaction. After a while, Ronald's sister called and asked him to go home because he was already drunk, and he complied.

When Ronald returned, Jay offered him a drink. Ronald suddenly tried to punch Amado, but Jay held his hand. Jay then noticed that Ronald had a knife, so he let go and ran toward Jomar's house, followed by Fritz. From inside, Jay saw Ronald stab Amado several times in the breast area; at that time, Amado was asleep and seated with his head bowed. After the stabbing, Ronald went to the house of Rey Amoy, came back with a backpack, and again stabbed Amado while shouting, "do you think that I do not know how to kill a person. I have killed many times." He left with a warning that he would kill them all. Amado was brought to Centeno Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Ronald was apprehended by barangay tanod Janilo Espinosa along the road going to New Visayas. Janilo bodily frisked him and saw a knife in his backpack, then brought him to the barangay hall. When asked why he stabbed Amado, Ronald answered that he just liked to kill ("natripingan lang niya").

For the defense, Ronald admitted that he stabbed Amado in the breast five times. He testified that Amado mocked him, that he got mad, and that he went home to get a knife, which he used to stab Amado. He denied returning to stab Amado a second time. He claimed that he walked to Matanao, where he was a resident, to surrender because he did not know the location of the municipal hall of Bansalan; while on his way, he flagged down a vehicle not knowing that it was owned by Barangay Mabuhay.

The RTC found that Ronald repeatedly stabbed Amado while the latter was asleep, and the CA affirmed that finding.

• Treachery: Ronald, accused-appellant, argued that the prosecution failed to prove treachery beyond reasonable doubt; there was no evidence that Amado was asleep or had no opportunity to defend himself, and the mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to support a finding of treachery.
• Sufficient Provocation: Ronald maintained that he was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation, claiming that the mockery and humiliation by Amado and the others provoked his reaction.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Ronald argued that he was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation arising from the mockery and humiliation.
• Voluntary Surrender: Ronald claimed that he was entitled to voluntary surrender, asserting that he walked to Matanao to surrender because he did not know the location of the Bansalan municipal hall.
• Intoxication: Ronald argued that he was entitled to intoxication as a mitigating circumstance, claiming that he had been intoxicated for about twelve hours, from 9:00 in the morning until the incident at 9:00 in the evening.

• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing to murder, or whether both the objective and subjective elements of alevosia were proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Sufficient Provocation: Whether the mockery and humiliation Ronald received constituted sufficient provocation under Article 13(4) of the Revised Penal Code to mitigate his criminal liability.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Whether passion and obfuscation can be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in Ronald's favor.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether Ronald voluntarily surrendered to the authorities within the meaning of the mitigating circumstance.
• Intoxication: Whether Ronald's alleged intoxication may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
• Penalty and Damages: Whether, absent treachery, Ronald is guilty of homicide and what penalty and damages should be imposed.

• Treachery: No. Treachery did not attend the killing; the subjective element was absent because the sudden attack was an impulsive reaction to provocation, not a deliberately chosen mode of attack to ensure execution without risk. The killing is therefore homicide, not murder.
• Sufficient Provocation: No. The mockery and humiliation were not sufficient provocation and did not immediately precede the act; a lapse of time negated the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(4) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Passion and Obfuscation: No. The requisites were lacking; the teasing was not an unlawful and sufficient act, and the interval before the stabbing showed the act arose from wounded ego or revenge, not lawful passion.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. Ronald was arrested by barangay tanod Janilo after being chased; there was no spontaneous and unconditional surrender to a person in authority.
• Intoxication: No. No clear evidence established the degree of Ronald's intoxication or that it blurred his reason and affected his mental faculties; the mere claim was insufficient.
• Penalty and Damages: Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, with indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum; civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages of PHP 50,000.00 each, with 6% legal interest per annum from finality.

• Treachery: Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code requires two conditions: (1) the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act by the offended party, who thus has no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation—the objective element; and (2) the deliberate choice of such means, methods, or manner of execution—the subjective element. Mere suddenness and unexpectedness of an attack do not suffice. In People vs. Magbuhos, the Court explained that treachery cannot be appreciated from the mere fact that the attack was sudden and unexpected; it must appear that the aggressor consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the killing without risk to himself. The totality of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies showed that Ronald was teased during a drinking spree, became offended, went home, returned with a knife, and stabbed Amado without warning. That attack was an impulsive reaction to provocation, not a deliberately chosen method to ensure the killing without risk. People vs. Sabanal and Cirera vs. People likewise held that a sudden attack may be an impulse or reaction to provocation, which negates treachery. Thus, the subjective element was absent and treachery did not qualify the killing.

• Sufficient Provocation: Under Article 13(4) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is mitigated if sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. Sufficient provocation refers to any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is proportionate in gravity; it must be sufficient and must immediately precede the act. In People vs. Nabora, the Court defined sufficiency as adequate to excite the person to commit the wrong and proportionate to its gravity, and held that pointing a finger and uttering a question were not sufficient. The test is whether the accused's retaliatory act was a proportionate response to the provocation or threat. The mockery that Ronald "looks like a killer" or is "ugly" may have been annoying or unreasonable, but it was not sufficiently provocative to merit the extreme retaliatory act of homicide. Moreover, the provocation did not immediately precede the act: the teasing occurred during a drinking spree that started in the morning; Ronald endured it, went home upon his sister's call, got a knife, returned, drank the liquor Jay offered, tried to punch Amado, and only then stabbed him. This lapse of time negated sufficient provocation, consistent with People vs. Tan and People vs. Benito.

• Passion and Obfuscation: For passion and obfuscation to be appreciated, two elements must concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of the mind; and (2) the act that produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time during which the perpetrator might have recovered normal equanimity. Both requisites were lacking. The teasing or challenge about knowing how to kill might have been an attack on Ronald's ego, but it was not by itself an unlawful act, nor was it sufficient to produce obfuscation that would lead him to crime. Ronald did not immediately attack Amado; he endured the teasing, went home, got a knife, returned, and drank more liquor before stabbing Amado. Passion and obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings, not from the excitement inherent in quarrels, the spirit of revenge, or a wounded ego. People vs. Rabanillo was similar: the accused and victim were in a drinking party, the victim reprimanded the accused, they fought, and the accused later hacked the victim; passion and obfuscation were not appreciated because the accused acted out of revenge or anger and resentment for being publicly berated.

• Voluntary Surrender: The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender requires: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrendered to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. In Roca vs. CA, the Court stressed that there must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges guilt or wishes to spare them the trouble and expense of capture. Here, Janilo chased Ronald and traversed the road to New Visayas; they spotted him, and he flagged down their multicab. Janilo then met and arrested him. There was no voluntary surrender.

• Intoxication: Intoxication as a mitigating circumstance requires that it should not be habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. The accused must establish the state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the crime and prove that he took such a quantity of alcohol as would blur his reason. No clear evidence showed the degree of Ronald's intoxication or that it affected his reasoning and intelligence. His claim that he had been intoxicated for about twelve hours, from 9:00 in the morning until the incident at 9:00 in the evening, was insufficient; there must be convincing proof of the nature and effect of the intoxication. A medical certificate stating that the accused's breath smelled of alcohol, paired with testimony that he had imbibed alcohol, has been held insufficient. The law presumes every person to be of sound mind unless proven otherwise; absent satisfactory proof that intoxication clouded one's sense and reason, it is presumed that one was sober. People vs. Inggo stressed that the test is whether the intoxication sufficed to affect mental faculties, blur reason, and deprive self-control.

• Penalty and Damages: Without alevosia to qualify the crime, Ronald is guilty of homicide and not murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Without any modifying circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor, with a range of six years and one day to 12 years. Thus, Ronald shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Applying People vs. Jugueta, the damages awarded were modified to civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages of PHP 50,000.00 each, earning legal interest at 6% per annum from finality until full payment.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Two-Element Test — Treachery under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code requires: (1) the employment of means, methods, or forms that tend directly and especially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to the offender arising from any defense the offended party might make (objective element); and (2) the deliberate choice of such means, methods, or manner of execution (subjective element). A sudden and unexpected attack is not automatically treacherous; the prosecution must prove that the accused consciously adopted the mode of attack to facilitate the killing without risk. In this case, the killing was an impulsive reaction to provocation during a drinking spree, so the subjective element was absent and treachery did not qualify the killing to murder.

• Sufficient Provocation as a Mitigating Circumstance — Under Article 13(4) of the Revised Penal Code, sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party must immediately precede the act. The provocation must be unjust or improper, adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong, and proportionate in gravity to the retaliatory act. It must also immediately precede the act; a lapse of time allows the accused to regain reason and self-control. Here, the mockery that Ronald looked like a killer or was ugly was not sufficient, and the interval between the teasing and the stabbing negated the mitigating circumstance.

• Passion and Obfuscation — Passion and obfuscation require: (1) an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act that produced the obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time during which the perpetrator might have recovered normal equanimity. The passion must originate from lawful feelings, not from revenge, wounded ego, or the excitement inherent in quarrels. The Court found both requisites lacking because the teasing was not unlawful or sufficient and Ronald had time to regain self-control before stabbing Amado.

• Voluntary Surrender — Voluntary surrender requires: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrendered to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. There must be spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. Ronald was chased and arrested by barangay tanod Janilo after he flagged down the barangay multicab; no voluntary surrender occurred.

• Intoxication as a Mitigating Circumstance — Intoxication, to mitigate liability, must not be habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. The accused must establish the state of intoxication at the time of the crime and prove that the quantity of alcohol taken blurred reason. Mere claim of intoxication is insufficient; there must be convincing proof of its nature and effect. The law presumes sobriety and sound mind absent satisfactory proof. Ronald's claim of twelve hours of drinking did not establish that his mental faculties were affected.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law in Homicide — Without treachery, the crime is homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable by reclusion temporal. With no modifying circumstance, the penalty is imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum is taken from the penalty next lower in degree, prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal. The Court imposed eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

• Damages in Homicide under People vs. Jugueta — In homicide, the damages may be fixed at PHP 50,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages, with legal interest at 6% per annum from finality until full payment. The Court applied this in modifying the RTC's award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages.

• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods, or forms that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party might make." — This is the Court's canonical statement of the definition of treachery under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code, which anchors the two-element analysis.
• "Treachery cannot be appreciated from the mere fact that the attack was sudden and unexpected. The Court has held that the circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected on the person assaulted did not constitute the element of alevosia necessary to raise homicide to murder, where it did not appear that the aggressor consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself." — Quoted from People vs. Magbuhos, this passage states the controlling rule that suddenness alone does not establish treachery; the subjective element must be proved.
• "Therefore, an attack done impulsively during a casual meeting—however sudden and unexpected—is not done with treachery." — This is the ratio of the Court's treachery ruling, applying the two-element test to the facts of the drinking spree.
• "To mitigate a criminal act, the provocation must be proportionate in gravity to the wrong done in response." — This passage states the sufficiency requirement for the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation under Article 13(4) of the Revised Penal Code.

• People vs. Magbuhos, 842 Phil. 1145 (2018) — Cited for the rule that treachery cannot be appreciated from the mere fact that the attack was sudden and unexpected; the aggressor must consciously adopt the mode of attack to facilitate the killing without risk to himself.
• People vs. Sabanal, 254 Phil. 433 (1989) — Cited for the principle that it does not always follow that a sudden and unexpected attack is tainted with treachery; it could have been done on impulse as a reaction to actual or imagined provocation.
• Cirera vs. People, 739 Phil. 25 (2014) — Cited for the rule that provocation on the part of the victim negates treachery because the attack may be an impulsive reaction rather than a premeditated mode of attack.
• People vs. Nabora, 73 Phil. 434 (1943) — Cited for the definition and test of sufficient provocation under Article 13(4); pointing a finger and uttering a question were not sufficient provocation.
• People vs. Rabanillo, 367 Phil. 114 (1999) — Cited as analogous precedent rejecting passion and obfuscation where the accused acted out of revenge or anger and resentment after being publicly berated during a drinking party.
• Roca vs. CA, 403 Phil. 326 (2001) — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender and the requirement of spontaneity and intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities.
• People vs. Inggo, 452 Phil. 678 (2003) — Cited for the test of intoxication as a mitigating circumstance: the intoxication must have sufficed to affect mental faculties, blur reason, and deprive self-control.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Cited for the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages in homicide, which the Court applied in modifying the damages.
• Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Cited for the imposition of legal interest at 6% per annum on monetary awards from finality until full payment.
• People vs. Hubilla, Jr., 322 Phil. 520 (1996) — Cited for the doctrine that where the accused admits responsibility for the killing, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to prove justification or lack of liability by clear and convincing evidence.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. Ronald was originally charged under this provision, but the Court held that treachery was not proven, so the killing could not be qualified as murder.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide. Because treachery was absent, the Court held Ronald guilty of homicide under this article and imposed the corresponding penalty.
• Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery (alevosia) as a qualifying circumstance. The Court applied its two-element test and found the subjective element absent.
• Article 13(4), Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act. The Court held the mockery was not sufficient and did not immediately precede the stabbing.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in fixing the indeterminate penalty for homicide: the minimum was taken from prision mayor, the penalty next lower in degree, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal.

Justice Leonen (Chairperson), Justice Lazaro-Javier, Justice Lopez, and Justice Kho, Jr. concurred.