People of the Philippines vs. Rommel Deang, Melvin Espiritu, and Nicson (or Nixon) Catli

The crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide, where the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, warrants the imposition of the death penalty when the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the accused conspired to deprive the victim of liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom and that the victim was killed. The presence of either the ransom demand or the death of the victim already calls for the death penalty; where both circumstances are present, the penalty is mandatory.

The accused-appellants were charged under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, which imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for kidnapping or detention of a minor, with the death penalty mandated where the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom or where the victim is killed. The victim, Arthur "Jay-Jay" Tanhueco, was a second-year high school student at Chevalier School in Angeles City. The case arose from the kidnapping of the minor victim on 5 July 1995 and the subsequent discovery of his body in Laurel, Batangas, which was linked to the kidnapping, leading to the amendment of the information to charge kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

On the morning of 5 July 1995, Arthur "Jay-Jay" Tanhueco, a second-year high school student at Chevalier School in Angeles City, was walking on campus when a man summoned him, talked to him briefly, then suddenly dragged him inside a white Nissan Sentra aided by the driver. Two students, Arnel Mariano and Juliet Somera, witnessed the abduction and identified the man who forced JAY-JAY into the car as ESPIRITU. The car sped away, narrowly missing pedestrian Ranulfo Quizon, who had a good look at the driver and later identified him as DEANG.

JAY-JAY was held against his will as his captors negotiated with his parents, Arturo Tanhueco, Sr. and Shirley Tanhueco, for the payment of a ₱3-million ransom, which was reduced to ₱1.48 million. The pay-off set on the evening of 12 July 1995 at the Game City Amusement Center in Balibago, Angeles City, did not push through. The next day, 13 July, a man who went by the name of "Bian" (ESPIRITU's alias) rang the Tanhuecos and told Shirley to bring the ransom money by herself to Carmenville Subdivision that evening. Once there, two men approached her. One of them, whom she identified as ESPIRITU, quickly occupied the driver's seat, while the other, whom she identified as CATLI, sat behind them and examined the plastic bag containing the money. Shirley was made to sit beside ESPIRITU, blindfolded, and after driving for about an hour, she was instructed to wait for her son. She heard ESPIRITU and CATLI board another car, and after about an hour, an old man removed her blindfold. Her son JAY-JAY, however, was nowhere in sight.

In the course of the investigation, JAY-JAY's father Arturo observed that the telephone calls made by the kidnappers were traced to a house numbered 74-9 along Calachuchi St., Timog Park, Angeles City. On 20 July 1995, he visited said address, where he saw his nephew DEANG talking with a young man, later identified as ESPIRITU, in front of the house owned by a certain Reynaldo Cunanan. Once DEANG was in police custody, the police recovered ₱100,000 from him. He then implicated in his sworn statement ESPIRITU, CATLI, and Benito Catli in the kidnapping for ransom of JAY-JAY.

On 17 July 1995, the dead body of an unidentified boy was found in Sitio Kaynalawit, Barangay Dayap, Laurel, Batangas, along the Tagaytay ridge below a ravine 15 to 30 meters from the road. The post-mortem examination revealed the cause of death as cerebral hemorrhages due to skull fracture over the left temporo parietal area, multiple lacerated wounds, and hematoma over the right eye. When the body was identified to be that of JAY-JAY, the information was amended to charge kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

State witness Benito Catli testified that it was DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI who conceptualized, planned, and executed the abduction. The victim was brought to the ancestral home of Nicson Catli's family at San Juan, San Luis, Pampanga, where Nicson Catli guarded the victim while Melvin Espiritu negotiated for the ransom money and Rommel Deang monitored the movement of the Tanhueco family. Benito also testified that Nicson Catli and Melvin Espiritu met Shirley Tanhueco at Carmenville, and that the three of them brought the victim to Manila at the Longwood Hotel and counted the ransom money. On July 17 or 18, 1995, Nicson Catli gave Benito ₱50,000 and told him that Turo or Jay-Jay Tanhueco was already dead, relating that Nicson, Rommel, and Melvin went to Tagaytay where Rommel shot Jay-Jay with a paltik revolver and thereafter Rommel and Melvin threw him down the cliff.

The Nissan Sentra car used in the forcible taking of JAY-JAY was traced to Bali Cars, which rented it out to ESPIRITU on several occasions in July 1995, coinciding with the dates pertinent to the kidnapping, the delivery of the ransom money, and the taking of JAY-JAY to Longwood Hotel in Manila. The trial court found ESPIRITU's explanations for renting the car incredible.

DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI had a common defense of denial and alibi. DEANG claimed he was watching television at his house on Jesus St., Angeles City. ESPIRITU maintained he accompanied his niece to a Protestant school. CATLI said he never left their family store between 5 and 17 July 1995. The trial court found the prosecution's evidence more credible and disregarded the defense of alibi.

• Insufficient Evidence: DEANG insisted that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of inadequate and insufficient evidence.
• Inadmissible Confession: DEANG argued that his conviction was based on his alleged extrajudicial confession which is inadmissible in evidence, claiming he was not advised of his constitutional rights, that the confession was dictated by PO3 Primo Jamisolamin, that Atty. Mariano Y. Navarro was not his counsel of choice, and that the lawyer did not ascertain whether his confession was freely given.
• Illegal Search and Seizure: DEANG contended that he was convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence, asserting that his arrest and the search of his house were conducted in violation of his constitutional right against warrantless arrests and searches.
• Right to Counsel: DEANG argued that the trial court did not uphold his constitutional right to counsel during his custodial investigation.
• Illegal Arrest: DEANG argued that the trial court did not consider that he was illegally arrested and detained.
• Lack of Evidence and Alibi: ESPIRITU asserted the lack of evidence to convict the three of them and assigned as error the failure of the trial court to appreciate his alibi.
• Preliminary Investigation: CATLI averred that the trial court erred in proceeding with his arraignment without a preliminary investigation.
• Admission of Confession: CATLI argued that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence, giving weight and credence to, and relying chiefly on the alleged extrajudicial confession of accused DEANG in convicting them.
• Discharge of State Witness: CATLI argued that the trial court erred in granting the discharge of Benito Catli when he was the most guilty of the four accused and by giving weight to his testimony.
• Alibi and Motive: CATLI argued that the trial court erred in ignoring his defense of alibi and in convicting him despite a clear lack of motive, as his family was well-off.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The prosecution presented Shirley Tanhueco's testimony proving beyond doubt that JAY-JAY was kidnapped, that she complied with the ransom demands, and that she had sufficient knowledge of the identities of the malefactors because she personally dealt with them.
• State Witness Testimony: The prosecution relied on the pivotal testimony of state witness Benito Catli, who testified that DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI conceptualized, planned, and executed the abduction, and detailed the specific roles of each accused.
• Physical Evidence: The prosecution presented the ₱100,000 recovered from DEANG's possession, which was part of the ransom money, and the Nissan Sentra car traced to Bali Cars, which was rented by ESPIRITU on dates coinciding with the kidnapping.
• Positive Identification: The prosecution presented Ranulfo Quizon, who positively identified DEANG as the driver of the white Nissan Sentra, and students Arnel Mariano and Juliet Somera, who identified ESPIRITU as the man who forced JAY-JAY into the car.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to establish the guilt of DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI for kidnapping for ransom with homicide beyond reasonable doubt.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Whether DEANG's extrajudicial confession was admissible despite his claim that it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
• Legality of Arrest and Search: Whether DEANG's arrest and the search of his house were conducted in violation of his constitutional right against warrantless arrests and searches.
• Right to Preliminary Investigation: Whether CATLI's right to preliminary investigation was violated when the trial court proceeded with his arraignment without one.
• Discharge of State Witness: Whether the trial court erred in granting the discharge of Benito Catli as state witness.
• Defense of Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi interposed by DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI should prevail over the positive identification by prosecution witnesses.
• Imposition of Death Penalty: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The prosecution's evidence, particularly the testimony of state witness Benito Catli and the positive identification by eyewitnesses, established beyond reasonable doubt that DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI committed kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Yes. DEANG's extrajudicial confession was admissible, the record showing that he was informed of his constitutional rights and was represented by counsel of his choice, Atty. Navarro, during the execution of the confession.
• Legality of Arrest and Search: Yes. DEANG was deemed to have waived any defense of illegal arrest by not questioning it before arraignment, and the search of his house was a consented warrantless search, which is an exception to the constitutional proscription.
• Right to Preliminary Investigation: No. CATLI was deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation when he entered his plea during arraignment, and the absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or affect the jurisdiction of the court.
• Discharge of State Witness: No. The discharge of Benito Catli as state witness was within the discretion of the trial judge, and any error in the discharge would not affect his competence as a witness or render his testimony inadmissible.
• Defense of Alibi: No. The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by witnesses, and the accused failed to demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
• Imposition of Death Penalty: Yes. The death penalty was properly imposed, as both the ransom demand and the death of the victim were present, either of which already calls for the death penalty under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court found Shirley Tanhueco's narration of the events convincingly clear, proving beyond doubt that JAY-JAY was kidnapped, that she complied with the ransom demands, and that she had sufficient knowledge of the identities of the malefactors because she personally dealt with them. Minor inconsistencies in her testimony did not affect her credibility, as inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of a witness because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. State witness Benito Catli's testimony was crucial, as he maintained that it was DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI who conceptualized, planned, and executed the abduction, and detailed the specific roles of each accused. The ₱100,000 recovered from DEANG's possession was part of the ransom money, and the Nissan Sentra car was traced to Bali Cars, which rented it out to ESPIRITU on several occasions coinciding with the dates pertinent to the kidnapping.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: The Court found no constitutional and legal infirmity in the signed extrajudicial confession of DEANG. PO3 Jamisolamin testified that DEANG was informed of his constitutional rights and, when asked if he understood them, DEANG replied in the affirmative. When apprised of his right to counsel, DEANG said that he had a lawyer, Atty. Mariano Navarro, who was right in front of DEANG when the latter was giving his confession. SPO2 Mario Nulud corroborated this testimony. The extrajudicial confession itself explicitly showed that DEANG was informed of his constitutional custodial rights and that he was represented by a counsel of his choice. In light of the positive assertions of the police officers, who have not been shown to harbor any ill-motive in testifying against DEANG and are even presumed to have acted regularly, the self-serving and uncorroborated claims of DEANG must fail.

• Legality of Arrest and Search: The Court held that as DEANG did not question the legality of his arrest before he was arraigned, he is deemed to have waived such defense. No proof of the purported illegal arrest was ever presented by the defense. With regard to the alleged illegal search and seizure, SPO2 Mario Nulud testified that DEANG conceded to accompany the police to his house in order to surrender his share of the ransom money, and that DEANG showed and gave to the police officer ₱100,000 in ₱500-peso bills. A consented warrantless search is one of the exceptions to the proscription under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and the consent of the owner of the house to the search effectively removed any badge of illegality.

• Right to Preliminary Investigation: The Court held that CATLI is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation when he entered his plea during arraignment. The Court of Appeals had dismissed CATLI's petition on the ground that only accused Benito Catli filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, and the three other accused did not invoke their right to a preliminary investigation. The Court reiterated that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal information or render it defective, and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information.

• Discharge of State Witness: The Court held that the issue of the discharge of Benito Catli as state witness is well within the discretion of the trial judge. Even assuming arguendo that the trial court did err, the Court has held several times in the past that any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for the discharge of an accused, and of the trial court in granting the petition for discharge, would not deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal specified in Section 10 of Rule 119 and of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, as long as no question of jurisdiction is involved. The improper or mistaken discharge of an accused would not affect his competence as a witness or render inadmissible his testimony.

• Defense of Alibi: The Court held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by witnesses. For alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Chevalier School, where the kidnapping occurred, is in Pampanga, and the residences of DEANG and ESPIRITU, and the store of CATLI's sister, are all located in Angeles City, Pampanga. Each of them miserably failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Chevalier School at the time JAY-JAY was kidnapped.

• Imposition of Death Penalty: The Court applied Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, which provides that the penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. The presence of any of these two circumstances — the ransom demand or the death of the victim — already calls for the imposition of the death penalty. Here, they are both present. The guilt of DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI for the kidnapping for ransom and death of JAY-JAY having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the Court had no other recourse but to agree with the penalty imposed by the trial court.

• Alibi as Weakest Defense — Alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by witnesses. For alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met; it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the alibis of DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI, as they failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Chevalier School at the time JAY-JAY was kidnapped.

• Consented Warrantless Search — A consented warrantless search is one of the exceptions to the proscription under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The consent of the owner of the house to the search effectively removes any badge of illegality. The Court applied this doctrine in upholding the search of DEANG's house, where DEANG conceded to accompany the police to his house in order to surrender his share of the ransom money and voluntarily showed and gave the police officer ₱100,000.

• Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation — The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal information or render it defective, and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information. An accused who enters a plea during arraignment without invoking the right to preliminary investigation is deemed to have waived such right. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting CATLI's contention that his right to preliminary investigation was violated.

• Discharge of Accused as State Witness — The discharge of an accused to become a state witness is within the discretion of the trial judge. Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for the discharge of an accused, and of the trial court in granting the petition for discharge, would not deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal specified in Section 10 of Rule 119 and of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, as long as no question of jurisdiction is involved. The improper or mistaken discharge of an accused would not affect his competence as a witness or render inadmissible his testimony.

• Proof of Motive Not Required — Proof of motive, in general, is not necessary to pin a crime on the accused if the commission of the crime has been proven and the evidence of identification is convincing. The rich and the poor can and do commit crimes; possession of wealth does not make one a saint, and poverty alone does not make one a criminal. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting CATLI's argument that he had no motive to kidnap anybody because his family was well-off.

• Death Penalty for Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide — Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. The presence of any of these two circumstances — the ransom demand or the death of the victim — already calls for the imposition of the death penalty.

• "Alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. For this reason, it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by witnesses." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the alibi doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, stating the general rule that alibi cannot overcome positive identification.

• "For alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission." — This passage defines the strict requisites for the defense of alibi to prosper, requiring proof of physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene.

• "The presence of any of these two circumstances - the ransom demand or the death of the victim - already calls for the imposition for the death penalty. Here, they are both present." — This passage states the controlling rule for the imposition of the death penalty under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, where either ransom demand or death of the victim suffices.

• "In the fist place, the rich and the poor can and do commit crimes. Possession of wealth does not make one a saint, and poverty alone does not make one a criminal. In the second place, proof of motive, in general, is not necessary to pin a crime on the accused if the commission of the crime has been proven and the evidence of identification is convincing." — This passage rejects the argument of lack of motive as a defense, establishing that motive is not an essential element of the crime when the commission of the crime and the identity of the accused are proven.

• People vs. Diaz, 262 SCRA 723 (1996) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of a witness because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
• People vs. De la Cruz, 217 SCRA 283 (1993); People vs. Kenysis, 221 SCRA 628 (1993); People vs. Kyamko, 222 SCRA 183 (1993) — Cited as controlling precedents for the doctrine that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and cannot prevail over positive identification.
• People vs. De la Cruz, 229 SCRA 755 (1994) — Cited as controlling precedent for the strict requirements of time and place for the defense of alibi to prosper.
• Paderanga vs. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86 (1991) — Cited as controlling precedent for the nature of preliminary investigation as inquisitorial and not a trial on the merits.
• People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 (1961); Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 (1996) — Cited as controlling precedents for the rule that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal information or render it defective.
• People vs. Jamero, 133 Phil. 127 (1968); People vs. Torrefranca, 151 SCRA 143 (1987); Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. vs. Son, 209 SCRA 329 (1992); People vs. Armada, 225 SCRA 644 (1993) — Cited as controlling precedents for the rule that any error in the discharge of an accused as state witness would not deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal specified in Section 10 of Rule 119 and of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
• People vs. Alviar, 59 SCRA 136 (1974) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that proof of motive is not necessary to pin a crime on the accused if the commission of the crime has been proven and the evidence of identification is convincing.
• Mustang vs. CA, 257 SCRA 430 (1996) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that a consented warrantless search is one of the exceptions to the proscription under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
• Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 158 (1997) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.
• People vs. Verde, 302 SCRA 690 (1999) — Cited as controlling precedent for the award of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8, Republic Act No. 7659 — The provision defining the crime of kidnapping and detention, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, with the death penalty mandated where the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom or where the victim is killed. The Court applied this provision in affirming the death penalty imposed on the accused-appellants.
• Section 12, Article III, 1987 Constitution — The provision guaranteeing the right of any person under investigation for the commission of an offense to be informed of the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, which rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The Court applied this provision in upholding the admissibility of DEANG's extrajudicial confession.
• Section 2(a), Republic Act No. 7438 — The provision requiring that any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of certain enumerated persons; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence. The Court applied this provision in finding no constitutional and legal infirmity in DEANG's signed extrajudicial confession.
• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — The provision prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, from which a consented warrantless search is an exception. The Court applied this provision in upholding the search of DEANG's house, where DEANG voluntarily surrendered his share of the ransom money.
• Section 10, Rule 119, Rules of Court — The provision specifying the acquittal of a discharged accused as state witness. The Court applied this provision in ruling that any error in the discharge of an accused would not deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal specified therein.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — The provision allowing exemplary damages in criminal cases as part of the civil liability of the malefactors when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this provision in awarding ₱100,000 in exemplary damages.
• Article 2229, Civil Code — The provision defining exemplary damages as imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The Court applied this provision in awarding exemplary damages to the private complainants.
• Article 83, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25, Republic Act No. 7659 — The provision requiring that upon finality of a death penalty decision, the records of the case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power. The Court applied this provision in ordering the forwarding of the records to the Office of the President.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.

• Four Justices (unnamed in the text) — Four Justices of the Court continued to maintain their view that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless, they submitted to the ruling of the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.