People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Nell

Self-defense cannot be sustained where the accused, having admitted the killing, fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed; and absent proof of any qualifying circumstance, the killing is homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, not murder.

Romeo Nell alias "Omeng" was a tricycle driver in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, while Reynaldo Laureano y Nuque was a resident of the same locality. The Revised Penal Code governs the justifying circumstance of self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1, and distinguishes homicide under Article 249 from murder when qualifying circumstances attend a killing. The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from a conviction for murder.

On March 24, 1990, at about 10:00 p.m., in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Reynaldo Laureano y Nuque was stabbed and died. Romeo Nell alias "Omeng," a tricycle driver, was charged with murder together with Danny Angeles alias "Danny Fake" and John Doe. The prosecution presented two versions of the incident: one by Rosini Espejo-Cenon and another by Benjamin Laureano, the victim's brother. Both pointed to Nell as the assailant but differed on the participation of the other accused and the events leading to the stabbing.

According to Rosini, she was washing clothes in front of their house at about 10:00 p.m. when, from across the street about six meters away, she saw Nell stab Reynaldo. Nell was with Danilo Angeles alias "Danny Fake." The victim was resting while sitting in front of an already closed store. Nell made a thrust with a "panaksak," but Reynaldo ran away; Nell chased him. Some liquor drinkers noticed the chase and threw bottles at Nell, hitting him at the nape and causing him to stumble. Danny Fake tried to help Nell. Before Nell could stand, Danny Fake pulled Reynaldo and immersed him in a canal. Nell then stabbed Reynaldo upon Danny Fake's orders, hitting him on the chest and repeatedly moving the bladed weapon inside the body to and fro. After Reynaldo was no longer moving, Danny Fake kicked Nell and told him to escape. Nell ran away with another man who was half-naked from the waist up. Danny Fake shouted at those who had thrown bottles and then left while holding a viente nueve knife. Someone helped Reynaldo, who was brought to the hospital but died. Rosini saw the incident because of light from stores that were still open.

Benjamin Laureano gave a different account. At about 10:30 p.m., he was fetching water at Abalos Street, about twenty meters from their residence, when he was told of trouble at the corner of Abalos and Concepcion Streets. He went there with Boyet Manansala and saw his brother Reynaldo and Nell quarreling. He knew Nell because Nell used to borrow tools from their neighbors. He saw Nell and Reynaldo struggle, after which Nell ran toward the market; Reynaldo chased him. Benjamin asked Reynaldo to go home because Reynaldo could not run far or catch Nell, and they went home. Reynaldo later went down and drank beer in a store in front of their house with Junior Cenon. Nell arrived. Benjamin, who was then lifting a container of water, saw Nell chase Reynaldo with a bladed weapon. When Nell caught up with Reynaldo, they struggled first; Reynaldo was hit and knelt in the canal, and Nell stabbed and kicked him. Reynaldo was hit on the chest once. Nell ran away. Benjamin saw this from about eight meters away. He went upstairs to ask for help, but when they went down Nell was gone. They brought Reynaldo out of the canal to Santisimo Rosario Hospital, where he was dead on arrival. Benjamin gave a statement to the police (Exh. B, B-1). On cross-examination, he testified that he could not go near when his brother was being stabbed because Nell had a companion and a lookout.

Dr. Prospero Cabanayan conducted the autopsy and testified that the victim died of severe hemorrhage due to an eleven-inch stab wound below the right collarbone, penetrating the big blood vessels directly to the heart, and two puncture wounds located at the chest almost near the armpit. The stab wound could have been caused by a sharp, single-bladed instrument, while the puncture wounds could have been caused by a pointed instrument. From the location of the wounds, he opined that it was possible the victim was lying down, facing the assailant who was standing. The prosecution also presented Francisca Sagnip, the victim's sister, as a rebuttal witness. She testified that on March 26, 1990, at about 8:00 a.m., she was at the police station to present a kitchen knife she had found at the canal at Abalos Street, Marulas, Valenzuela, at about 7:30 a.m. that same day; she identified the kitchen knife (Exh. H). On cross-examination, she said she was not present when her brother was stabbed, that the police went to the scene after the report and found no kitchen knife, and that she was alone when she found the knife. She believed it was the one used against her brother.

Nell invoked self-defense. He testified that on March 24, 1990, while plying his tricycle at about 5:00 to 6:00 p.m., he saw Reynaldo Laureano. He let his two passengers alight. Reynaldo approached him for beer money, and he told him he would give it later. Reynaldo got angry, saying "hindi puede," and told him he needed to drink and that if Nell did not give money, something bad would happen to him. Reynaldo also said, "Ako ang may hawak ng Abalos St.," and boxed Nell. Nell fought back. While they were boxing, Reynaldo's brother Benjamin and a certain Junior arrived. Nell ran because Benjamin had a knife. The three gave chase but failed to catch him. Nell went home, leaving his tricycle on the road. After one hour, he tried to retrieve it but did not pass Abalos Street; he was able to retrieve the tricycle and went home. He rested for four hours before plying his tricycle again. At about 10:00 p.m., he met Reynaldo a second time when he passed by Abalos Street. He saw Benjamin, Junior, and Reynaldo drinking beer, seated on a bench on the side of the street near Reynaldo's house. On his return trip, the three blocked his way, forcing him to stop. They again asked for money, particularly Reynaldo, while the two stood by. Nell requested that he be allowed not to give because his trip was destroyed and he had a family to feed. Reynaldo approached him to box him. Nell jumped toward his tricycle to get his screwdriver to defend himself because one of them had already pulled out a knife while Junior held a bottle of beer and hit him on the head. Junior is the brother-in-law of Rosini Espejo. After Nell was hit with the bottle, his vision became dark and he started stabbing Reynaldo. Benjamin and Junior ran away when they saw Reynaldo was hit. Nell boarded his tricycle and went home. He stabbed Reynaldo even though it was Junior who hit him with the bottle because Reynaldo was poised to box him. He did not tell the police because he was afraid he would be incarcerated and was thinking of his children, as his wife was abroad. He was arrested on April 27, 1992. He did not hide but continued plying his tricycle; Reynaldo's father, brother, and sister were often his passengers. He said they did not cause his arrest because people there knew the deceased was a troublemaker and a "salot" in their place. He claimed Rosini's testimony that he had a companion was untrue and that she testified that way because her brother-in-law was involved. He had a screwdriver because he used it as a tool for adjustment of the contract point of his tricycle.

The trial court rejected the self-defense claim, finding the prosecution evidence more credible than Nell's. It accepted Benjamin Laureano's testimony over Rosini Cenon's because Benjamin gave his statement to the police immediately after the stabbing, at ten minutes past one o'clock in the early morning of March 25, 1990, while Rosini's statement was executed two days later, on March 27, 1990, after her brother-in-law Junior Cenon was implicated in the stabbing by Nell. Nell's version was uncorroborated and incredible. The trial court also found that even if the victim was a drug user and a troublemaker, Nell's actions were not justified. It held that the killing was qualified by evident premeditation, finding that Nell and the victim had a quarrel that ended when Nell ran away, and that Nell later returned and stabbed the victim.

• Self-Defense: Appellant Romeo Nell argued that the trial court erred in not acquitting him on the ground of self-defense under paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. He maintained that the victim and his companions extorted beer money from him, that the victim boxed him, that Benjamin had a knife, that Junior Cenon hit him on the head with a bottle of beer, and that he stabbed the victim because the victim was poised to box him.
• Murder vs. Homicide: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in categorizing the crime committed as murder instead of homicide.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Appellant maintained that Rosini Espejo-Cenon's testimony giving a different version, including that he had a companion, was not true and was given because her brother-in-law was involved in the case.

• Credibility: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting appellant's uncorroborated testimony and accepting the prosecution's evidence.
• Self-Defense: Whether appellant established all the requisites of self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation qualified the killing to murder.
• Treachery and Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether treachery and abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder.
• Crime and Penalty: Whether appellant should be convicted of murder or homicide and what penalty should be imposed.

• Credibility: No. The trial court's assessment of credibility is entitled to great weight and is conclusive absent arbitrariness or oversight; the records support its rejection of appellant's uncorroborated version.
• Self-Defense: No. Appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed, so the justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot be sustained.
• Evident Premeditation: No. Mere return to the scene four hours after an earlier quarrel does not establish the elements of evident premeditation; no planning or preparation to kill was shown.
• Treachery and Abuse of Superior Strength: No. The prosecution failed to show a sudden attack without warning or the deliberate employment of excessive force out of proportion to the victim's means of defense.
• Crime and Penalty: Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, not murder. Appellant was sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, with P50,000.00 indemnity and costs affirmed.

• Credibility: The trial court's assessment of a witness's credibility is entitled to great weight, even conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Credibility peculiarly falls within the trial court's province because it had the opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses. The records supported the trial court's rejection of Nell's uncorroborated testimony. Five points were noted: (1) Nell claimed he used a six-inch screwdriver, but the medico-legal officer described the wounds as possibly caused by a sharp, single-bladed instrument and a pointed instrument; a screwdriver with a blunt end and rounded side fit neither description, and Nell did not present it in evidence; (2) Nell's implication that Benjamin, the victim's brother, fatally stabbed Reynaldo was illogical and contrary to the established fact that the quarrel was between the victim and Nell, with no plausible reason for Benjamin to kill his own brother; (3) Nell's choice of victim was questionable because it was Junior Cenon who allegedly hit him with a beer bottle, making Junior the more imminent threat, not the unarmed victim; (4) Nell admitted fleeing the scene in his tricycle, and flight is a strong indication of guilt, while his intentional failure to report the incident negated self-defense; and (5) the defense failed to raise the extortion theory and Benjamin's alleged complicity during Benjamin's testimony, creating serious doubt about the veracity of Nell's present allegations. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from a credible witness but must be credible in itself.
• Self-Defense: By interposing self-defense, appellant shifted the burden of proof and obligated himself to show that his act was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability. He had to establish clearly and convincingly all the requisites of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the accused's life in actual peril; it must put the life or personal safety of the person defending himself in real danger and cannot be merely an imagined threat or a threatening or intimidating attitude. Here, unlawful aggression was not established. Appellant merely proved that the victim, Benjamin, and Junior Cenon were extorting beer money from him, but the manner of extortion described did not show how his life or limb was placed in peril. Even if a threat could have been imminent because Benjamin held a knife, appellant did not state that Benjamin threatened him with the deadly weapon; Benjamin did not threaten him at all. Appellant admitted that after his head was hit with a bottle of beer, his vision dimmed and he started stabbing the victim, who was allegedly approaching and about to box him. No peril to appellant's life or limb justified the killing. As to reasonable necessity, the Court considers whether the aggressor was armed, the nature and quality of the weapon used, and the physical conditions and sizes of both aggressor and defender. Appellant was armed, while his alleged assailants were not competently shown to have been armed; his claim that Benjamin had a knife and that Junior and the victim held bottles of beer remained mere allegation, not evidence. Thus, the reasonable necessity of the means employed was not proven.
• Evident Premeditation: The trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation based solely on the fact that appellant returned to the crime scene four hours after his first quarrel with the victim. Evident premeditation indicates a stubborn adherence to a decision to commit a felony and requires: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) overt act(s) manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. Returning to the scene of an earlier fight about four hours later does not establish these elements. Mere lapse of time is not equivalent to evident premeditation. The Court has consistently held that evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder absent evidence not only of sufficient lapse of time but also of the planning and preparation to kill when the plan was conceived. The prosecution evidence simply showed that after the fight was broken up, appellant returned to kill the victim; from these circumstances, it could not be deduced with certainty that appellant clung to a decision to kill the victim.
• Treachery and Abuse of Superior Strength: Treachery and abuse of superior strength were not discussed in the trial court's Decision. Since they were alleged in the Information, the Supreme Court examined the records for evidentiary support. Treachery was not appreciated from the prosecution's narration. Benjamin was bringing several containers of water into their house when the incident occurred, so his attention was focused elsewhere prior to his brother's stabbing and he was not in a position to say that appellant attacked his brother suddenly and without warning. He did see, however, that appellant chased his brother with a bladed weapon and that they struggled with each other first before appellant stabbed his brother. In effect, he admitted that when appellant attacked the victim, the latter was not without a chance to defend himself. The prosecution failed to establish that appellant employed means, methods, or forms which tended directly and specially to insure the commission of the killing without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. The record was also bereft of proof that appellant and his companions took advantage of their collective strength to overwhelm their victim. Superior strength is not appreciated by the mere fact of superiority in the number of malefactors, but rather by the deliberate employment of excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The victim was also not alone.
• Crime and Penalty: Appellant's testimony suffered seriously from want of credibility. Even if credibility were ascribed to it, his plea of self-defense still could not be accepted because he failed to prove all its requisites. While appellant failed to prove self-defense, the prosecution likewise failed to show any qualifying circumstance. Accordingly, appellant should be convicted only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, without any generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance. The penalty imposed was eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The trial court's disposition requiring indemnity of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Reynaldo Laureano and payment of costs was affirmed.

• Self-defense — burden and quantum of proof — Once an accused openly admits the killing and invokes self-defense, the burden shifts to him to prove all the elements of self-defense clearly and convincingly. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's, because even if the prosecution's evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the admission of the killing. In this case, Nell admitted stabbing Reynaldo, so he bore the burden of proving self-defense.
• Requisites of self-defense — Self-defense requires: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. All three must concur. The Court found that Nell failed to prove unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity.
• Unlawful aggression — Unlawful aggression is an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the accused's life in actual peril. It must put the life or personal safety of the person defending himself in real danger and cannot be merely an imagined threat or a threatening or intimidating attitude. The alleged extortion of beer money and the victim's poised boxing stance did not place Nell's life or limb in peril.
• Reasonable necessity of the means employed — In assessing reasonable necessity, the Court considers (1) whether the aggressor was armed, (2) the nature and quality of the weapon used, and (3) the physical conditions and sizes of both the aggressor and the person defending himself. Nell was armed, while his alleged assailants were not competently shown to have been armed; his claims about their weapons remained allegations, not evidence.
• Credibility of witnesses — A trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, even conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Credibility is peculiarly within the trial court's province because it had the opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses. The Court upheld the trial court's rejection of Nell's uncorroborated testimony.
• Flight — Flight in jurisprudence is a strong indication of guilt, although its converse does not necessarily imply innocence. Nell admitted fleeing the scene in his tricycle and intentionally failed to report the incident to the police, which negated his claim of self-defense.
• Evident premeditation — Evident premeditation indicates a stubborn adherence to a decision to commit a felony. It requires: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) overt act(s) manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. Mere lapse of time is not equivalent to evident premeditation; there must also be evidence of planning and preparation to kill when the plan was conceived. Nell's return to the scene four hours after the quarrel did not establish evident premeditation.
• Treachery — Treachery requires the employment of means, methods, or forms which tend directly and specially to insure the commission of the killing without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It was not established because the victim had a chance to defend himself; appellant chased him with a bladed weapon and they struggled first before the stabbing.
• Abuse of superior strength — Abuse of superior strength is not appreciated by the mere fact of superiority in the number of malefactors, but rather by the deliberate employment of excessive force which is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The record lacked proof that appellant and his companions took advantage of collective strength to overwhelm the victim, and the victim was not alone.
• Homicide vs. murder — Absent proof of any qualifying circumstance, a killing is homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, not murder. Because evident premeditation, treachery, and abuse of superior strength were not established, Nell was convicted only of homicide.

• "After an accused has openly admitted the killing, the gravamen of the prosecution's case cannot be disbelieved anymore. Thus, the accused must prove all the elements of self-defense clearly and convincingly. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's." — States the burden and quantum of proof once self-defense is invoked after an admission of killing.
• "Unlawful aggression is an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner which places the accused's life in actual peril. It must be such that it puts in real danger the life or personal safety of the person defending himself. It cannot be merely an imagined threat or a threatening or intimidating attitude." — Defines the first requisite of self-defense and explains why the alleged extortion and boxing stance did not suffice.
• "Evident premeditation indicates a stubborn adherence to a decision to commit a felony. It requires a showing of: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) overt act(s) manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts." — Sets out the elements of evident premeditation and supports the ruling that mere return to the scene after four hours was insufficient.
• "Superior strength is not appreciated by the mere fact of superiority in the number of malefactors, but rather by the deliberate employment of excessive force which is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked." — Defines abuse of superior strength and explains why it was not appreciated despite the alleged presence of companions.

• People vs. Obzunar, G.R. No. 92153, December 16, 1996 — Cited for the rule that self-defense shifts the burden of proof to the accused.
• People vs. So, 247 SCRA 708, 718, August 28, 1995 — Cited with Obzunar on the burden of proving self-defense.
• People vs. Nuestro, 240 SCRA 221, 227, January 18, 1995 — Cited for the requisites of self-defense and the factors in assessing reasonable necessity of the means employed.
• People vs. Ombrog, G.R. No. 104666, February 12, 1997 — Cited for the rule that a trial court's credibility assessment is entitled to great weight.
• People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709, 716, February 24, 1995 — Cited on credibility and the trial court's opportunity to observe witnesses.
• People vs. Asoy, 251 SCRA 682, 688, December 29, 1995 — Cited for the doctrine that flight is a strong indication of guilt.
• People vs. Desalisa, 229 SCRA 35, 47, January 4, 1994 — Cited for the qualification that the converse of flight does not necessarily imply innocence.
• People vs. Caras, 234 SCRA 199, 210, July 18, 1994 — Cited for the rule that failure to report the incident negates self-defense.
• People vs. Gerolaga, G.R. No. 89075, October 15, 1996 — Cited for the requisites of self-defense.
• De Luna vs. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 758, 763, June 2, 1995 — Cited for the rule that self-defense requires unlawful aggression initiated by the victim.
• People vs. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653, 667, January 27, 1993 — Cited for the rule that unlawful aggression cannot be merely an imagined threat or threatening attitude.
• People vs. Layno, G.R. No. 110833, November 21, 1996 — Cited for the elements of evident premeditation.
• People vs. De la Cruz, 242 SCRA 129, 142, March 2, 1995 — Cited for the rule that mere lapse of time is not equivalent to evident premeditation.
• People vs. Waggay, 218 SCRA 742, 755, February 9, 1993 — Cited for the rule on abuse of superior strength.
• People vs. Empacis, 222 SCRA 59, 69, May 14, 1993 — Cited for the rule that superior strength requires deliberate employment of excessive force.
• People vs. Camahalan, 241 SCRA 558, 569, February 22, 1995 — Cited on treachery and abuse of superior strength.

• Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The Court applied it by requiring appellant to prove unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation; because he failed, self-defense was rejected.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide. The Court convicted appellant of homicide, not murder, because no qualifying circumstance was proven.
• Article 14, no. 16, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the discussion of abuse of superior strength. The Court found that superior strength was not established, as there was no deliberate employment of excessive force out of proportion to the victim's means of defense.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concurred. Davide, Jr., J., took no part.