People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Hernandez

Conspiracy and collective responsibility arise when, at the time of the aggression, the accused act in concert, each doing his part to fulfill a common design to kill, so that the act of the one who actually stabbed the victim is deemed the act of all. Abuse of superior strength qualifies a killing as murder where three armed men encircle and pinion a defenseless and unsuspecting victim while one stabs him repeatedly, employing means that assure execution of the crime without risk to themselves.

Romeo Hernandez, a tricycle driver, was a neighbor and second cousin of Leonardo Hernandez, the birthday celebrant. The victim, Arturo Ilagan, was also a tricycle driver and a guest at the celebration. The offense charged was murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes the unlawful killing of a person with qualifying circumstances. The information alleged conspiracy and abuse of superior strength.

On November 6, 1981, Sergeant Leonardo Hernandez held a birthday celebration in Barangay Galamay-Amo, San Jose, Batangas, to which several persons, mostly tricycle drivers, were invited. A group was already drinking when, at around 6:30 in the evening, another group of five tricycle drivers, including Arturo Ilagan, joined them. After a short while, Ilagan left the house to answer a call of nature. While he was occupied, three men, one armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly encircled him and pinned him closely (“dikit-dikit”) to the center. Two men held his hands while a third stabbed him repeatedly in different parts of his body. They left him prostrate and moaning in pain, with blood oozing from twelve stab wounds. He was rushed to a hospital but expired at 4:00 the next day; the cause of death was diagnosed as “hypogelemic shock” due to multiple stab wounds on the waist, abdomen, and extremities.

The stabbing was immediately reported to the San Jose, Batangas police by Leonardo Hernandez, who identified the three assailants as Romeo Hernandez, Vivencio Remo, and Victorino Remo, all tricycle drivers who had attended his birthday party. On November 10, 1981, Abelardo Joyag executed a statement before the police naming the same persons as the murderers of Arturo Ilagan. On September 20, 1982, the Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Batangas City filed an information for murder against Romeo Hernandez, Vivencio Remo, and Victorino Remo. The information alleged that on or about November 6, 1981, at about 6:30 in the evening, in Barangay Galamay Amo, San Jose, Batangas, the accused, armed with bladed weapons, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping each other, with abuse of superior strength, attacked, assaulted, and stabbed Arturo Ilagan y Gonzales, inflicting multiple wounds that directly caused his death.

Only Romeo Hernandez and Vivencio Remo were arrested and arraigned; both pleaded not guilty, while Victorino Remo remained at-large. During the early stages of the trial, Vivencio Remo died, and the case against him was dismissed on July 9, 1985. The trial proceeded against the remaining accused, Romeo Hernandez. The prosecution presented six witnesses, including Joyag. Joyag testified that at about 6:30 in the evening of November 6, 1981, he arrived at Leonardo Hernandez’s house in the company of Gregorio Perez, Artemio Austria, Leonardo Mapalad, and Arturo Ilagan as an invited guest. He saw Vivencio Remo, Victorino Remo (whom he had not met before), and Romeo Hernandez in the sala drinking “liliw,” a native wine. Vivencio Remo introduced him to his companions. After a while, Arturo Ilagan left the group and went out of the house, telling Joyag that he was going to answer the call of nature. Vivencio and Victorino Remo, accompanied by Romeo Hernandez, followed Arturo.

Feeling the urge to relieve himself also, Joyag left the sala to urinate outside. Before he could do so, he saw at a distance of some eight meters away Victorino, Vivencio, and Romeo encircle Arturo. It was beginning to get dark (“takipsilim”), but he had an unobstructed view of the trio as they ganged up against Arturo. He saw two of the group hold Arturo’s hands, and although he failed to actually see the weapon, he saw Victorino’s hand moving from different directions, stabbing the victim’s breast and other parts of his body. He also saw Arturo’s head move in different directions in an effort to evade the knife thrusts. Joyag rushed inside Leonardo’s house shouting for his companions to come out because Arturo was being attacked. Upon reaching the place, they found Arturo lying on his back, moaning and bleeding; his assailants were nowhere in sight. With the aid of Gregorio Perez and Leonardo Mapalad, Joyag rushed Arturo to the hospital. Joyag’s testimony was corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.

Notwithstanding his previous identification of Ilagan’s assailants to the police, Leonardo Hernandez underwent a change of heart. He and his wife testified in favor of their neighbor and second cousin, Romeo Hernandez. They alleged that they had requested Romeo Hernandez to buy cigarettes from the store of Leonora Pintor, which is 600 meters away from their house, and that Romeo was still doing his errand when the stabbing incident occurred. They allegedly saw Romeo Hernandez again the following day, even though he was prevented by his parents from leaving their house because of the incident. When Romeo Hernandez himself took the witness stand, he affirmed that he was in Leonora Pintor’s store buying cigarettes during the stabbing of Ilagan.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals credited Joyag’s positive identification of Romeo Hernandez, Vivencio Remo, and Victorino Remo as the assailants. Both courts rejected Romeo Hernandez’s alibi and the Hernandez spouses’ testimonies, the latter because Leonardo Hernandez had initially reported the crime and named the three accused before changing his account. Joyag’s four-day delay in giving a statement was not considered sufficient to discredit him, as he came forward after recovering from the shock of his friend’s death.

• Credibility of Abelardo Joyag: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimony of Abelardo Joyag, and capitalized on Joyag’s four-day delay in giving his statement to the police.
• Guilt by Indispensable Cooperation: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding him guilty by indispensable cooperation of the crime charged.
• Alibi: Appellant maintained that he was in Leonora Pintor’s store buying cigarettes during the stabbing of Ilagan.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Whether the courts erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimony of Abelardo Joyag despite his four-day delay in giving a statement to the police.
• Conspiracy and Guilt by Indispensable Cooperation: Whether Romeo Hernandez was correctly found guilty as a co-conspirator or principal by indispensable cooperation in the murder of Arturo Ilagan.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether abuse of superior strength qualified the killing as murder.
• Penalty: Whether reclusion perpetua was the correct penalty absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: No. The appellate court correctly gave full credit to Joyag’s positive and unequivocal identification; his four-day delay did not discredit him because he came forward voluntarily after recovering from shock.
• Conspiracy and Guilt by Indispensable Cooperation: Yes. Collective responsibility was established because at the time of the aggression all acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill a common design to kill; the act of the one who stabbed is deemed the act of all.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes. Three armed men encircled and pinioned a defenseless and unsuspecting victim while one stabbed him repeatedly, employing means that assured execution of the crime without risk to themselves.
• Penalty: Yes. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death; absent modifying circumstances, the medium period is reclusion perpetua.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: The appellate court, after a thorough examination of the evidence, gave full credit to Joyag because appellant admitted he met Joyag only on the day he testified and knew no reason for false testimony. Joyag’s positive and unequivocal identification prevailed over alibi, which crumbled like a house of sand. The four-day delay in giving his statement did not discredit him; he came forward of his own free will as soon as he recovered from shock over the death of his friend. The Hernandez spouses’ testimonies were rejected because they were covering up for their cousin and because Leonardo Hernandez, immediately after the stabbing and before extraneous considerations set in, reported the crime and named the three accused. Joyag’s testimony was corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
• Conspiracy and Guilt by Indispensable Cooperation: For collective responsibility among the accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all of them acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design to kill their victim. Although only one may have actually stabbed Ilagan, the act of that one is deemed the act of all. The Court cited People vs. Napoleon Montealegre, 161 SCRA 700, and People vs. Dominador Roca, 162 SCRA 696. The appellate court and trial court found appellant guilty as a co-conspirator in the murder.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: The crime committed was murder with treachery by taking advantage of superior strength with the aid of armed men or by employing means to weaken the defense. Three men, armed with a knife, crept up in the dark against a defenseless and unsuspecting victim answering a call of nature. When two attackers pinioned Ilagan’s arms so that their companion could stab him repeatedly and with impunity, they employed means which assured the execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from the defense the victim might make. This qualified the killing as murder.
• Penalty: Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code punishes murder with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. In the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the medium period is imposable. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the penalty is reclusion perpetua in accordance with People vs. Munoz, G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, which held that Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 except only insofar as it prohibits the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua; the range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged. Because only the Supreme Court can impose reclusion perpetua under Article VIII, Section 5(2)(d) of the 1987 Constitution, the Court of Appeals certified and elevated the entire record to the Supreme Court for review under Section 34, Republic Act No. 296, as amended, and paragraph 3, Section 13, Rule 124, Revised Rules of Court, as amended. The Supreme Court affirmed.

• Conspiracy and Collective Criminal Responsibility — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. For collective responsibility among the accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all of them acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design to kill their victim; although only one may have actually stabbed the victim, the act of that one is deemed the act of all. The Court applied this doctrine to hold Romeo Hernandez liable as a co-conspirator even though only one of the three assailants actually stabbed Arturo Ilagan.
• Abuse of Superior Strength as a Qualifying Circumstance — Abuse of superior strength qualifies a killing to murder when the aggressors deliberately use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim. The Court found this circumstance present where three men, one armed with a knife, encircled a defenseless and unsuspecting victim, two pinioned his arms, and the third stabbed him repeatedly, thereby employing means that assured the execution of the crime without risk to themselves.
• Credibility of Witness and Delay in Reporting — Delay in reporting a crime does not necessarily discredit a witness if explained by shock or other reasonable cause; positive identification prevails over alibi. The Court upheld the appellate court’s crediting of Joyag’s testimony despite his four-day delay in giving a statement, because he came forward voluntarily after recovering from shock over his friend’s death.
• Penalty for Murder After Prohibition of the Death Penalty — Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. With the death penalty prohibited by the 1987 Constitution, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua; absent generic aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the medium period is still reclusion perpetua. The Court applied this rule in affirming the penalty imposed on Romeo Hernandez.

• "For a collective responsibility among the accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all of them acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design to kill their victim. Although only one of them may have actually stabbed Ilagan, the act of that one is deemed to be the act of all (People vs. Napoleon Montealegre, 161 SCRA 700; People vs. Dominador Roca, 162 SCRA 696)." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on conspiracy and collective criminal responsibility, explaining why Romeo Hernandez was liable although only one assailant actually stabbed the victim.
• "Three men, armed with a knife, crept up in the dark against a defenseless and unsuspecting victim who was answering a call of nature. When two of Ilagan's attackers pinioned his arms so that their companion could stab him repeatedly and with impunity, they thereby employed means which assured the execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from the defense that their victim might make." — This passage defines the factual basis for abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance in murder.
• "While appellant capitalized Joyag's four-day delay in giving his statement to the police, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that it was not enough to discredit him for he came forward of his own free will as soon as he had recovered from his shock over the death of his friend." — This passage explains why the delay in reporting did not impair the eyewitness’s credibility.
• "there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua." — This passage states the controlling rule on the penalty for murder after the prohibition of the death penalty.

• People vs. Napoleon Montealegre, 161 SCRA 700 — Cited to support the rule on collective responsibility in conspiracy: although only one accused may have actually stabbed the victim, the act of that one is deemed the act of all.
• People vs. Dominador Roca, 162 SCRA 696 — Cited together with Montealegre for the same conspiracy doctrine and collective criminal responsibility.
• People vs. Munoz, G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989 — Cited for the penalty rule: Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution does not change the periods of the penalty under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except to prohibit the death penalty and reduce it to reclusion perpetua; absent modifying circumstances, the medium period remains reclusion perpetua.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. The Court applied it to hold that the killing was murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, and that the penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, reduced to reclusion perpetua under the 1987 Constitution.
• Article 29, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Cited by the trial court in crediting the accused with one-half of the period of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence.
• Article III, Section 19(1), 1987 Constitution — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The Court applied this provision in determining the penalty for murder.
• Article VIII, Section 5(2)(d), 1987 Constitution — Provides that only the Supreme Court may impose reclusion perpetua. This was the basis for the Court of Appeals’ certification and elevation of the case to the Supreme Court.
• Section 34, Republic Act No. 296, as amended — Requires the Court of Appeals to certify and elevate the entire record to the Supreme Court for review when the judgment involves a penalty beyond its competence to impose.
• Paragraph 3, Section 13, Rule 124, Revised Rules of Court, as amended — Cited together with Section 34, Republic Act No. 296, as the procedural basis for elevating the case to the Supreme Court.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.