People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Castro

Treachery cannot qualify a killing when the accused acted on the impulse of the moment and did not deliberately or consciously adopt the means, method, or manner of execution to make it impossible or difficult for the victim to defend himself or retaliate; the killing is then homicide, not murder, and mitigating circumstances such as lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and passion and obfuscation may be appreciated.

Romeo Castro was the barrio captain of San Juan, Pili, Camarines Sur, and the father of four-year-old Ely Castro. Ferdinand Recoco was a nine-year-old boy. The text supplies no further statutory, regulatory, or historical backdrop beyond the criminal charge and the appeal.

At about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 17, 1971, Leonor Gata, aunt of the deceased, was looking out of the window of her house when she saw Romeo Castro, then barrio captain of San Juan, Pili, Camarines Sur, running toward Ferdinand Recoco, who was in the middle of the street. Upon reaching Ferdinand, Castro boxed him with his left fist, hitting him on the right eye, followed by another fist blow on the left temple and a "karate chop" below the right ear. Ferdinand fell on the asphalt road, face downward. Leonor went down and asked Castro why he boxed Ferdinand; Castro replied that he was angered when he saw Ferdinand box his four-year-old son, Ely. The deceased admitted having boxed Ely because the latter took a potshot at him with a water pistol.

That evening, Ferdinand developed a fever; the following morning, Dr. Mateo Dalisay treated him for fever and inflammation of the right eye. After four days of treatment without improvement, Dr. Dalisay advised the family to take the boy to an eye specialist. On November 25, 1971, Ferdinand was brought to the provincial hospital in Pili, Camarines Sur, where Dr. Jesus Miraflores treated him. On December 5, 1971, thirteen days after the incident, he died. Dr. Zenaida S. Decena conducted a post-mortem examination on December 8, 1971 and reported external findings of a superficial abrasion two inches in length on the temporal side of the right eye, hematoma of the upper and lower lids, bluish discoloration of the entire anterior abdominal wall, and gangrenous intestines with the inferior surface of the liver greenish in color; internal findings of purulent exudate surrounding the tissues of the right eye and clotted blood over cerebral blood vessels with slight purulent material in the frontal lobe. The cause of death was septicemia secondary to pan-opthalmitis due to trauma.

Castro's version was that at about 4:00 in the afternoon of the same day, while he was in the public market of Pili, Camarines Sur, helping his wife sell fish, his four-year-old son Ely arrived and asked for money for merienda. Castro bought biscuits for him and told him to go home. As the boy was walking home, Ferdinand Recoco approached Ely and boxed him. Castro immediately ran toward the place where the boys were and, upon seeing that Ely was being boxed by Ferdinand for the second time, he hit Ferdinand on the face and pushed him aside. Ferdinand ran away. Castro vehemently denied having delivered several fist blows and a "karate chop" on Ferdinand, claiming that he hit him only once on the face and then pushed him.

Teofilo Casero, a porter at the PNR station at Pili, Camarines Sur, corroborated Castro's version. He testified that he was about twelve meters distant when he saw Ferdinand box Ely Castro; that when Ferdinand was about to box Ely for the second time, barrio captain Romeo Castro arrived and struck Ferdinand on the face with his fist. Casero denied having seen Castro deliver several fist blows and a "karate chop" on the deceased.

The trial court, in pronouncing Castro guilty of murder, reasoned that in giving successive boxing and karate blows on a child of tender years, any possibility of danger resulting to the accused from the child was nil, and that treachery therefore attended the killing. The physical evidence, however, included the testimonies of Dr. Dalisay and Dr. Miraflores that aside from fever and inflammation of the right eye, they could not find any other lesion, abrasion, or contusion on the body of the deceased; Dr. Dalisay diagnosed conjunctivitis or sore eye. Cresencia Recoco, mother of the deceased, testified that Castro committed the offense because he was "carried away by the impetus of the moment"; that, as proof of remorse, he accompanied her to the hospital and volunteered to give his share of the medical and hospital expenses; and that when the eye specialist gave a prescription for Ferdinand's medication, Castro voluntarily bought the medicine.

• Murder Conviction and Penalty: Appellant contended that his conviction for murder and the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon him were not warranted by the circumstances established by the evidence.
• Defense of Son and Lack of Intent: He assigned as error the failure of the trial court to appreciate the extenuating circumstances of defense of his son and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
• Proper Conviction: He prayed that he be declared guilty only of simple homicide, with the foregoing circumstances considered in his favor to mitigate the penalty.
• Denial of Successive Blows: He denied having delivered several fist blows and a "karate chop" on Ferdinand, claiming that he hit him only once on the face and then pushed him.

• Treachery: Whether the killing of Ferdinand Recoco was qualified by treachery, where appellant acted upon seeing his son being boxed.
• Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong: Whether the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong should be appreciated in appellant's favor.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation should be appreciated in appellant's favor.
• Criminal Liability and Penalty: Whether appellant should be convicted only of homicide, with mitigating circumstances, rather than murder with reclusion perpetua.

• Treachery: No. Treachery requires that the means, method, or manner of execution be deliberately and consciously adopted to make it impossible or difficult for the victim to defend himself or retaliate; appellant acted on the impulse of the moment and did not consciously choose the method of attack.
• Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong: Yes. The circumstances and the marked disproportion between the means employed and the ultimate consequence supported the claim that appellant merely intended to chastise Ferdinand, not to kill him.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Yes. Appellant acted from natural paternal instinct upon seeing his four-year-old son boxed by a bigger boy, and was momentarily blinded by anger.
• Criminal Liability and Penalty: Homicide, not murder. Appellant was guilty only of homicide, mitigated by lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and passion and obfuscation; the Indeterminate Sentence Law was applied.

• Treachery: For treachery to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, it must be established that the means, method, or manner of execution of the offense was deliberately and consciously adopted in order to make it impossible or difficult for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. In this case, appellant had neither the opportunity nor the reason to plan or deliberate on the mode of execution because he acted at the impulse of the moment; he instinctively lifted a hand when he saw his four-year-old son being boxed by a bigger boy. The method of attack was not consciously chosen to facilitate the execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was therefore ruled out. The lower court's conclusion that appellant dealt successive blows also found no basis in the physical evidence: Dr. Dalisay testified that aside from fever and inflammation of the right eye, he could not find any other lesion, abrasion, or contusion on the body of the deceased, and diagnosed conjunctivitis or sore eye; Dr. Miraflores likewise declared that there was no other lesion aside from fever and the inflamed right eye. These testimonies corroborated the defense version that appellant merely gave one fist blow. Even conceding additional blows, the findings sustained the conclusion that they were not sufficiently forceful to produce even the slightest contusion in the areas allegedly hit. The Court cited People vs. Capiling, 74 SCRA 285, and People vs. Latorre, 74 SCRA 106, for the treachery rule.
• Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong: Taking into consideration the circumstances under which the act was executed and the marked disproportion between the means employed and the ultimate consequence, appellant's claim that he merely intended to chastise Ferdinand, and not to do away with him, deserved the fullest credence. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong should be appreciated in his favor. Although appellant did not seek acquittal and did not justify his act, the Court considered the cause or motive that impelled him to act, not to justify the offense but to demonstrate the lesser degree of depravity in his act. Cresencia Recoco, mother of the deceased, testified that appellant was "carried away by the impetus of the moment"; that he accompanied her to the hospital and volunteered to give his share of the medical and hospital expenses; and that he voluntarily bought the medicine prescribed by the eye specialist.
• Passion and Obfuscation: The trial court brushed aside appellant's claim of passion and obfuscation, opining that Ferdinand's act of boxing appellant's four-year-old son was too trivial and insignificant to produce the passion or obfuscation contemplated by law. The Court disagreed: while the cause would indeed seem trivial and slight, appellant's actuation arose from a natural instinct that impels a father to rush to the rescue of a beleaguered son, regardless of whether the latter be right or wrong. When appellant saw his son Ely being boxed by Ferdinand, a much bigger boy, and that the latter was in the act of delivering another blow, appellant, momentarily blinded by anger, lost sight of the fact that his son's adversary was but a nine-year-old boy. When appellant hit the deceased, he did so on the impulse of passion and obfuscation.
• Criminal Liability and Penalty: Under the circumstances, appellant was guilty only of the crime of homicide, mitigated by two mitigating circumstances: (1) lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong; and (2) passion and obfuscation. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court imposed a term of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordered indemnity of P12,000.00 and costs.

• Treachery (alevosia) — For treachery to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, it must be established that the means, method, or manner of execution of the offense was deliberately and consciously adopted in order to make it impossible or difficult for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The Court applied this rule and ruled out treachery because appellant acted on the impulse of the moment and did not consciously choose the method of attack.
• Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong — This mitigating circumstance is appreciated where the circumstances of the act and the marked disproportion between the means employed and the ultimate consequence show that the accused did not intend to commit so grave a wrong. The Court applied it because appellant merely intended to chastise Ferdinand, not to kill him.
• Passion and obfuscation — This mitigating circumstance is appreciated where the accused acted under the impulse of passion and obfuscation. The Court applied it because appellant, impelled by natural paternal instinct upon seeing his four-year-old son boxed by a bigger boy, was momentarily blinded by anger and lost sight of the fact that the victim was only nine years old.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — The law was applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment after appellant was convicted of homicide with two mitigating circumstances. The Court imposed four years and two months of prision correccional as minimum and eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum.
• Defense of son as motive, not justification — Although appellant invoked defense of his son, he did not seek acquittal or justify his act. The Court considered the paternal instinct only to explain the passion and obfuscation and the lesser degree of depravity, not as a justifying circumstance.

• "For treachery to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, it must be established that the means, method or manner of execution of the offense was deliberately and consciously adopted in order to make it impossible or difficult for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate." — States the controlling standard for treachery applied to rule out murder.
• "In the case at bar, appellant had neither the opportunity nor the reason to plan or deliberate on the mode of execution of the crime because he undoubtedly acted at the impulse of the moment." — Applies the treachery standard to the facts and explains why the qualifying circumstance was absent.
• "Taking into consideration the circumstances under which the appellant's act was executed, as well as the marked disproportion between the means employed and the ultimate consequence thereof, the appellant's claim that he merely intended to chastise Ferdinand, and not to do away with him, deserves the fullest credence." — Basis for appreciating lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
• "Under the circumstances aforementioned, We hold that appellant is guilty only of the crime of homicide, mitigated by two mitigating circumstances, to wit: (1) lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong; and (2) passion and obfuscation." — States the ratio and conclusion reducing the conviction from murder to homicide.

• People vs. Capiling, 74 SCRA 285 — Cited by the Court as jurisprudential support for the rule that treachery requires deliberate and conscious adoption of the means, method, or manner of execution to make defense or retaliation impossible or difficult.
• People vs. Latorre, 74 SCRA 106 — Cited together with People vs. Capiling for the same treachery standard applied to rule out the qualifying circumstance.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in the dispositive portion to impose a minimum term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional and a maximum term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor after the conviction was reduced to homicide with two mitigating circumstances.

Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.