People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Cruz

Conspiracy must be proved as sufficiently as the crime itself, by clear and convincing evidence amounting to proof beyond reasonable doubt, and an equivocal remark such as "andiyan na" cannot supply the conspiratorial agreement or convert its speaker into a principal by inducement. Inducement exists only where the command or advice is of such a nature that, without its concurrence, the crime would not have materialized; accomplice liability, in turn, requires assistance knowingly or intentionally given, which is not possible without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose.

Rolando Cruz, alias Tikboy, and Rading (Radito) Sason were cousins, and Sason remained at large throughout the proceedings. The victim, Jesus Baang, was married to Leonila Gullen, a first cousin of Cruz, while Laura — the sister of Sason whose wedding figured in the prosecution's theory of motive — was Cruz's niece. The two accused were charged with murder, Cruz being imputed the role of principal by inducement in a killing allegedly carried out by Sason.

In the afternoon of November 25, 1983, Jesus Baang, a married fisherman of thirty-six years, was shot dead on M. Sioson Street in Dampalit, Malabon, Metro Manila. The gunman was identified by eyewitnesses as Rading (Radito) Sason, while Rolando Cruz, alias Tikboy, was implicated as a co-conspirator and principal by inducement. Cruz and Sason were cousins, and the victim was married to Leonila Gullen, a first cousin of Cruz.

Danilo Soriano, a twenty-one-year-old laborer, was at the store of Lola Ida in Dampalit when he saw Baang walking along M. Sioson Street followed by Sason. Sason suddenly shot Baang from behind; after the first gunshot Baang turned to face his assailant, who shot him a second time. Baang tried to escape but fell to the ground, at which point the gunman delivered the coup de grace and fatally shot him on the head. Sason then walked away from the scene. Soriano did not see Cruz during the actual shooting; it was only afterwards, during the ensuing commotion, that he noticed Cruz standing at the alley leading to the street, watching the crowd milling around the body. Renato Ramirez, twenty-three years old, was standing at the corner of Don Basilio Boulevard and M. Sioson Street on his way home when he saw Sason walking a few paces behind Baang, heard two shots, and saw Baang fall; Sason approached the fallen man and shot him again before leaving. Standing about one and one-half electric posts away, Ramirez asked the gunman, "Pare, bakit?", to which Sason replied, "Pare, wala kang nakita." Ramirez corroborated Soriano's testimony that Cruz was nowhere near the scene during the actual attack. The witnesses' narrations closely coincided with the findings of Dr. Ricardo Ibarrola, the NBI medico-legal officer who autopsied the cadaver at nine o'clock in the evening of November 25, 1983; his report disclosed that Baang had been shot at the back, chest, and head with a .45 caliber pistol, sustaining three wounds, two of them fatal.

The motive for the killing was apparently traceable to the victim himself. One day before the wedding of Laura, a sister of Rading Sason, a former girlfriend named Tiray of the prospective groom arrived from Palawan. Baang allowed her to sleep in his house and brought her to the church the following morning. The woman created a scene, and as a result the wedding was celebrated at the side altar instead of the main altar. The incident caused embarrassment and humiliation to the bride's family, particularly Rading Sason.

The prosecution sought to establish the conspiracy through the eyewitness account of Ismael Doro Rivera, a twenty-two-year-old laborer and a cousin of the two accused. Rivera testified that at around two o'clock in the afternoon of November 25, 1983, he was in the house of Aling Jusing, drinking with Rading Sason, Danilo Soriano, and Renato Ramirez. After a while Soriano left, followed by Ramirez, who said he was going to have a haircut; then Sason followed suit and headed in the direction of the church. Rivera saw Rolando Cruz come out of his house and talk with Sason, and he recalled Cruz telling Sason, "andiyan na." The two then left, and Rivera heard shots.

Cruz maintained his innocence. He claimed that at the time Baang was gunned down he was at the back of his mother's house near the fishpond, three electric posts away from the scene of the crime, spreading and laying fishnet. Ismael Rivera then called out to him and told him of the violent incident at the labasan; he quickly went outside and saw many people looking at the sprawled body of the victim. On that same day, November 25, 1983, Cruz was arrested by the police and brought to the police headquarters for investigation.

The trial court relied on Rivera's declarations to conclude that Cruz was a principal party in the killing, reasoning that his utterance of the words "andiyan na" to Sason could not be given any meaning except that he was a party to the commission of the crime, and that there was moral certainty that conspiracy existed, making Cruz as guilty as the principal by induction. On the defense side, Rivera himself testified that he never heard any plan between Cruz and Sason to kill Baang, confirming only that he heard Cruz tell Sason "andiyan na." The trial court also invoked the ill-feelings reportedly existing between Cruz and the victim as a result of the wedding scandal and the various threats on Baang's life which Cruz purportedly made.

• Lone Assignment of Error — Conspiracy: Accused-appellant Rolando Cruz contended that the trial court erred in finding him guilty as a conspirator in the crime of murder, the prosecution's evidence linking him to the felonious acts of Sason being weak, inconclusive, and utterly insufficient to establish his guilt.
• Equivocal Utterance: The defense assailed the trial court for giving undue weight to the words "nandiyan na" reportedly uttered by Cruz and inferring therefrom a conspiracy to kill Baang, pointing out that Rivera himself testified that he did not hear Sason and Cruz planning to kill the victim.
• Insufficient Motive: The defense argued that attributing anger and humiliation to Cruz sufficient to move him to kill a close relation, merely because of a wedding embarrassment that did not even affect him personally, rested on conjecture, and that the threats he purportedly made were of impaired gravity or seriousness because they were made while he was drunk or in a state of stupor.

• Conspiracy and Principal by Inducement: Whether the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant Rolando Cruz guilty as a conspirator in the crime of murder.
• Accomplice Liability: Whether Cruz could instead be held liable as an accomplice on the theory that he cooperated in the execution of the offense by signalling the arrival of the deceased.

• Conspiracy and Principal by Inducement: No. Conspiracy must be proved as sufficiently as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence amounting to proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the equivocal phrase "andiyan na" could not establish the conspiratorial agreement or make Cruz a principal by inducement.
• Accomplice Liability: No. The cooperation the law punishes is that which is knowingly or intentionally given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose, and no conclusive proof of a prior plan or agreement between Cruz and Sason appears on the record.

• Conspiracy and Principal by Inducement: Conspiracy, like any other ingredient of an offense, must be proved as sufficiently as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not by mere conjectures; proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish a finding of criminal conspiracy. While the prosecution's evidence against Sason appeared overwhelming, its evidence linking Cruz to Sason's felonious acts was weak, inconclusive, and utterly insufficient. The phrase "andiyan na" reportedly uttered by Cruz minutes before the actual shooting might lend some semblance of conspiracy, but semblance cannot take the place of facts; the expression has equivocal meanings, as when one recognizes a passerby and remarks "andiyan na si mayabang," "andiyan na yung kaibigan mo," or other derivative forms, not to mention the unadorned "andiyan na" itself, and these phrases carry no conclusive conspiratorial meaning. The supposedly damning utterance was thus susceptible of varied interpretations, and the trial court's sweeping conclusion that it was intended to goad the gunwielder into killing Baang could not be sustained. Inducement exists only if the command or advice is of such a nature that, without its concurrence, the crime would not have materialized; it taxed the imagination how the controversial phrase could have become the moving cause without which Sason would not have shot the victim in cold blood. The trial court's reliance on ill-feelings arising from the wedding scandal likewise failed, since the bride was Cruz's niece but the victim Baang was married to Leonila Gullen, Cruz's first cousin, and to attribute to Cruz anger and humiliation enough to want to kill a close relation over a wedding embarrassment that did not affect him personally was to indulge in another conjecture. The threats on Baang's life purportedly made by Cruz were of greatly impaired gravity or seriousness because they were made while he was drunk or in a state of stupor. Murder being a serious charge, the slightest doubt had to be resolved in favor of innocence.
• Accomplice Liability: The cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance which is knowingly or intentionally given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose. In this case there was an absence of conclusive proof indicating a prior plan or agreement between Cruz and Sason to kill the victim, and that essential element could not be automatically deduced from the fact that the two accused had harbored a grudge against Baang. All told, Cruz's criminal complicity, whether as a principal by inducement or as an accomplice, was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

• Proof of Conspiracy Beyond Reasonable Doubt — Conspiracy, like any other ingredient of an offense, must be proved as sufficiently as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not by mere conjectures; proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish a finding of criminal conspiracy. The Court applied this standard to reject the inference of conspiracy drawn from Cruz's alleged remark, holding the prosecution's evidence against him weak and inconclusive notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against the actual gunman.
• Equivocal Utterances Cannot Establish Conspiracy — A statement susceptible of innocent or varied meanings does not supply the agreement that conspiracy requires. The phrase "andiyan na," which may simply announce the arrival or presence of a person, was held to carry no conclusive conspiratorial meaning and could not be construed as an instruction or signal to kill.
• Principal by Inducement — Requisite — Inducement exists if the command or advice is of such a nature that, without its concurrence, the crime would not have materialized. The Court found it impossible to conclude that the phrase imputed to Cruz was the moving cause without which Sason would not have shot the victim.
• Accomplice Liability — Requisite — The cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance which is knowingly or intentionally given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose. Absent conclusive proof of a prior plan or agreement, and absent any showing that Cruz acted with knowledge of a criminal purpose, liability as an accomplice cannot attach; a shared grudge does not automatically supply that element.
• Motive and Threats as Substitutes for Proof — Motive, however strong, and threats allegedly made while the accused was drunk or in a state of stupor, cannot take the place of the proof beyond reasonable doubt required to establish criminal complicity. The Court held that attributing a homicidal motive to Cruz based on a wedding embarrassment that did not personally affect him was mere conjecture, and that the gravity of the purported threats was greatly impaired by his intoxicated state.

• "Conspiracy, like any other ingredient of an offense, must be proved as sufficiently as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not by mere conjectures." — This is the ratio decidendi of the acquittal: it fixes the quantum of proof for conspiracy and supplies the standard against which the "andiyan na" utterance was measured and found wanting.
• "The phrase andiyan na has equivocal meanings. When a person recognizes someone who passes by, it is not uncommon to hear from the former, andiyan na si mayabang, andiyan na yung kaibigan mo, or other derivative forms of the expression andiyan na, not to mention the unadorned andiyan na itself. These phrases have no conclusive conspiratorial meaning." — This passage defines why the lone piece of evidence against Cruz could not bear the weight the trial court placed on it, and is the Court's canonical treatment of ambiguous utterances in conspiracy cases.
• "Inducement exists if the command or advice is of such a nature that, without its concurrence, the crime would not have materialized." — The Court's formulation of the inducement requisite, applied to hold that the imputed phrase could not have been the moving cause of the killing.
• "It must be explained that the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance which is knowingly or intentionally given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose." — This states the controlling rule on accomplice liability, which the Court applied to foreclose the alternative theory that Cruz was liable as an accomplice for signalling the victim's arrival.

• Castaneda vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 61243, March 16, 1989, 171 SCRA 263 — Cited as authority for the rule that conspiracy must be proved as sufficiently as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence and not by mere conjectures, and that proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish criminal conspiracy.
• People vs. Elizaga, G.R. No. 78794, November 21, 1988, 167 SCRA 516 — Cited within Castaneda vs. Sandiganbayan as the source of the same rule on the quantum of proof required for conspiracy.
• People vs. Adil Hernandez, 29 Phil. 109 — Cited in connection with the discussion of inducement as a mode of criminal participation.
• People vs. Bello, 11 Phil. 526 — Cited as authority for the rule that the cooperation punished by law is assistance knowingly or intentionally given and not possible without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose.
• People vs. Ortiz and Zausa, 55 Phil. 993 — Cited alongside People vs. Bello for the same rule governing accomplice liability.

• Article 17, Revised Penal Code — Cited by the Court in connection with the theory that Cruz was a principal by inducement, the participation the trial court found and the Court rejected. The provision was applied through the Court's ruling that inducement requires a command or advice of such a nature that, without its concurrence, the crime would not have materialized — a causal threshold the equivocal phrase "andiyan na" did not meet.

Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., was on leave.