People of the Philippines vs. Roger Montilla, Carlito dela Rosa and Ricaredo dela Rosa

The qualifying circumstance of "taking advantage of superior strength" under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is not established where the victim was first rendered helpless by stoning, making the appellants' numerical superiority unnecessary for the killing. An accused who interposes self-defense must prove every element of that defense beyond reasonable doubt, and the defense of alibi is unavailing where there is affirmative evidence of the accused's presence at the scene of the crime and positive identification as the perpetrator.

The case arose from a criminal information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch XLIV, charging Roger Montilla, Carlito dela Rosa, and Ricaredo dela Rosa with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The information alleged that the three accused, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, and superiority of strength, attacked, assaulted, hacked, and stabbed Eusebio Rosero y Alamag with a bolo, inflicting wounds that caused his instantaneous death. The antecedent dispute stemmed from an incident wherein Eusebio Rosero, Jr. allegedly took and butchered the dog of Roger Montilla, which fueled the hostility between the parties.

In the afternoon of June 21, 1988, the victim Eusebio Rosero, Sr., together with Dino Altitche and Juanito Zaragoza, was resting at the seashore of Sitio Asinan, Barangay Madancalan, Baleno, Masbate, when accused Ricaredo dela Rosa arrived. During their conversation, the victim stabbed Ricaredo dela Rosa. After this incident, both ran away, and Dino Altitche tried to pacify them. Ricaredo dela Rosa went to the house of Juanito Zaragoza, while Eusebio Rosero, Sr. ran to the house of Dino Altitche and closed the door. Appellants Roger Montilla and Carlito dela Rosa, armed with bolos, went to the house of Dino Altitche and waited for the victim to come out. As the victim was coming out, appellants threw stones at him. When the victim was hit, he lost his hold of the door, enabling appellants to close in on him. Appellants then stabbed and hacked the victim to death.

The wife of the victim, Veronica Rosero, testified that she was in their house at Asinan, Madancalan, Baleno, Masbate, and saw the three accused help one another in hacking her husband. According to her, Ricaredo dela Rosa hit her husband on the breast, Carlito dela Rosa on the armpit, while Roger Montilla hacked and stoned her husband, all finding their mark, causing Eusebio Rosero, Sr. to fall inside the house of Dino Altitche. She stated she was only four meters away, though when asked by the court, she said the distance was 15 meters. While Eusebio Rosero, Sr. was able to barricade himself inside the house of Dino Altitche, the accused were able to pass through the window of said house, enter, and gang up upon the victim.

Pat. dela Rosa, a cousin of all the accused, was informed of the quarrel by Dino Altitche and proceeded to the place. On arrival, he saw Roger Montilla holding the bolo and shouting that he was the one who killed Eusebio Rosero, Sr., and Montilla peacefully surrendered to him. When asked why he hacked the victim, Montilla said he was angry at what the victim did to his dog, as it was brought out during trial that Eusebio Rosero, Jr. got the dog of Roger Montilla and butchered it. The doctor testified that the victim suffered five wounds in all, with wound No. 3 being the most fatal, caused by a sharp bladed instrument that penetrated the heart and lungs.

The defense presented a different version. Ricaredo dela Rosa testified that there was a quarrel between Roger Montilla and Eusebio Rosero, Sr. caused by the dog taken by Eusebio Rosero, Jr. but not returned. During the quarrel, Roger Montilla slapped Eusebio Rosero, Jr., who ran towards their house and returned with a bolo challenging Montilla to a fight. While Ricaredo dela Rosa was standing, Eusebio Rosero, Sr. appeared with a bolo and immediately hacked Ricaredo dela Rosa, hitting him on the left shoulder. Ricaredo dela Rosa ran away to his house, closed his door and windows, and did not know what happened next. Carlito dela Rosa claimed he was not present during the incident, being at Magdalena, Baleno, Masbate, and only learned later that his brother was hacked. Roger Montilla testified that he was at his house when Eusebio Rosero, Jr. came to him; he confronted him about the dog, slapped him, and later went out to go to the house of Ricaredo dela Rosa, but was met on the way by Eusebio Rosero, Sr. who hacked him, slightly wounding him on the right eyebrow. Montilla claimed he scooped up sand and threw it at the victim's face, temporarily blinding him, and then a scuffle ensued over the bolo, during which he did not know whether the victim was hit by the point of the bolo.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellants assigned as error that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses notwithstanding their alleged glaring inconsistencies, thereby committing gross and serious misapprehension of the facts involved in the case.
• Lack of Legal Basis: Appellants argued that the decision of the trial court was without any legal basis, in fact and in law.
• Self-Defense (Montilla): Appellant Montilla, after admitting killing the victim, anchored his defense on alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses rather than proving the elements of self-defense.
• Alibi (Carlito dela Rosa): Appellant Carlito dela Rosa claimed that he was not at the scene of the crime in Sitio Asinan, Barrio Madancalan, Baleno, Masbate when the victim was hacked to death, alleging he was in Barrio Magdalena in the same town.

• Positive Identification: The prosecution presented the positive and clear testimony of prosecution witness Veronica Rosero, who identified Ricaredo dela Rosa, Carlito dela Rosa, and Roger Montilla as the ones who killed her husband, stating that they helped one another in killing him.
• Ante-Mortem Statement: The prosecution presented evidence that the victim, in his ante-mortem statement heard by prosecution witnesses Dino Altitche and Veronica Rosero, answered "Carlito de la Rosa and his companions" when asked who stabbed him.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite their alleged inconsistencies.
• Self-Defense: Whether appellant Montilla validly interposed the defense of self-defense to absolve himself from criminal liability.
• Alibi: Whether appellant Carlito dela Rosa's defense of alibi should be sustained given the positive identification by prosecution witnesses and the victim's ante-mortem statement.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Superior Strength: Whether the killing of the victim was qualified to murder by the circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court did not commit any error in extending superior credit to the evidence adduced by the prosecution, as the alleged inconsistencies referred to trivial and collateral matters and not to the vital fact that appellants hacked and stabbed the victim after cornering him in the house of Dino Altitche.
• Self-Defense: No. An accused who interposes self-defense must prove every element of this defense beyond reasonable doubt to avoid criminal liability, and Montilla failed to do so, instead merely pointing out alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution's testimonies.
• Alibi: No. The defense of alibi is unavailing where there is affirmative evidence of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, if not his positive identification as the perpetrator, as well as where there is an ante-mortem statement of the victim received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Superior Strength: No. The superior strength of appellants was not necessary for the killing of the victim because the stoning of the victim had rendered him somewhat helpless, thus making it easy for appellants to stab him; therefore, Montilla should be convicted only of homicide.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The resolution of the issues raised by the appellants hinges on the credibility of the testimony of the prosecution and defense witnesses. It is firmly settled that the findings of the trial court are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court and may be disregarded only where substantial errors have been committed or determinative facts have been overlooked which otherwise would have dictated a different conclusion or verdict. The Court found no such error in the instant case. The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer to mere collateral matters and do not discredit their credibility. The Court recognized that persons witnessing an unfolding crime may not recall the sequence of incidents in exactly the same way, as persons react differently to a similar situation; what is important is that these persons corroborate each other on material facts, although not on trivial or collateral matters.

• Self-Defense: The settled rule is that an accused who interposes self-defense must prove every element of this defense in order to avoid criminal liability for the killing or injury of the victim, and must prove self-defense beyond reasonable doubt. Instead of proving self-defense with his own evidence, appellant Montilla simply chipped away at the evidence of the prosecution by pointing out alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Despite his effort, the fact still stands out that he inflicted injuries on the victim without any justification, causing his death. His conviction must therefore stand.

• Alibi: The defense of alibi is certainly unavailing where there is affirmative evidence of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission, if not his positive identification as the perpetrator of the offense, as well as where there is an ante-mortem statement of the victim received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae. The pretense of appellant Carlito dela Rosa was belied by the positive and clear testimony of prosecution witness Veronica Rosero, who was inside her house which is near the house of Altitche, and who identified Carlito dela Rosa as one of those who inflicted injuries on the victim. An ante-mortem statement is an evidence of the highest order; at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled, and the utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be considered as pure emanations of the stabbing and hacking incident or the incident speaking through the victim.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Superior Strength: Among the circumstances that can qualify an act of killing another as murder is "taking advantage of superior strength" under paragraph 1, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. For numerical superiority to constitute superior strength, it must be shown that the culprits took advantage of their superior number in killing the victim. In this case, the victim was first stoned at the doorway of the house of Dino Altitche. When he was hit, he lost his hold on the doorknob, enabling appellants to close in on him and stab him with their bolos. Under these circumstances, the superior strength of appellants was not necessary for the killing of the victim; the stoning of the victim had rendered him somewhat helpless, thus making it easy for appellants to stab him. Since Montilla and Carlito dela Rosa hacked and stabbed the victim under the same circumstances, their guilt must necessarily be of the same character.

• Self-Defense — An accused who interposes self-defense must prove every element of this defense beyond reasonable doubt in order to avoid criminal liability for the killing or injury of the victim. The Court applied this doctrine to reject Montilla's defense, as he merely pointed out alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution's testimonies instead of proving the elements of self-defense with his own evidence.

• Alibi — The defense of alibi is unavailing where there is affirmative evidence of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, if not his positive identification as the perpetrator of the offense, as well as where there is an ante-mortem statement of the victim received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae. The Court applied this doctrine to reject Carlito dela Rosa's alibi, as he was positively identified by prosecution witness Veronica Rosero and named in the victim's ante-mortem statement.

• Ante-Mortem Statement — An ante-mortem statement is an evidence of the highest order. At the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled; the utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be considered as pure emanations of the stabbing and hacking incident or the incident speaking through the victim. The Court relied on this doctrine to establish the guilt of Carlito dela Rosa.

• Superior Strength as Qualifying Circumstance — For numerical superiority to constitute superior strength under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, it must be shown that the culprits took advantage of their superior number in killing the victim. The Court applied this doctrine to reduce Montilla's conviction from murder to homicide, holding that the stoning of the victim had rendered him helpless, making the appellants' superior strength unnecessary for the killing.

• "The settled rule is that an accused who interposes self-defense must prove every element of this defense in order to avoid criminal liability for the killing or injury of the victim (People v. Rey, 172 SCRA 149). He must prove self-defense beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Urbiztondo, 132 SCRA 268)." — This passage articulates the burden of proof on an accused invoking self-defense, which the Court applied to reject Montilla's defense.

• "As this Court has articulated, the defense of alibi is certainly unavailing where there is affirmative evidence of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission, if not his positive identification as the perpetrator of the offense, as well as where there is an ante mortem statement of the victim received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae (People v. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459)." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the rule on alibi, which the Court applied to reject Carlito dela Rosa's defense.

• "An ante mortem statement is an evidence of the highest order (People v. Almeda, 124 SCRA 491). At the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled. The utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be considered so-to-speak as pure emanations of the stabbing and hacking incident or the incident speaking through the victim." — This passage defines the evidentiary weight of ante-mortem statements, which the Court relied upon to establish Carlito dela Rosa's guilt.

• "For numerical superiority to constitute superior strength, it must be shown that the culprits took advantage of their superior number in killing the victims. In this case, the victim was first stoned at the doorway of the house of Dino Altitche. When he was hit, he lost his hold on the doorknob, enabling appellants to close in on him and stab him with their bolos. Under these circumstances, the superior strength of appellants was not necessary for the killing of the victim." — This passage states the controlling rule on superior strength as a qualifying circumstance and its application to the facts, forming the basis for reducing Montilla's conviction from murder to homicide.

• People vs. Caraig, G.R. No. 91162, October 3, 1991 — Cited for the settled rule that the findings of the trial court are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court and may be disregarded only where substantial errors have been committed or determinative facts have been overlooked.

• People vs. Rey, 172 SCRA 149 — Cited for the rule that an accused who interposes self-defense must prove every element of this defense in order to avoid criminal liability.

• People vs. Urbiztondo, 132 SCRA 268 — Cited for the rule that self-defense must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

• People vs. Plandez, 132 SCRA 69 — Cited to support the conclusion that Montilla's conviction must stand despite his failure to prove self-defense.

• People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459 — Cited for the rule that the defense of alibi is unavailing where there is affirmative evidence of the accused's presence at the scene of the crime and positive identification as the perpetrator.

• People vs. Almeda, 124 SCRA 491 — Cited for the doctrine that an ante-mortem statement is an evidence of the highest order.

• People vs. Damian, 127 SCRA 507 — Cited for the recognition that persons witnessing an unfolding crime may not recall the sequence of incidents in exactly the same way, and that what matters is corroboration on material facts.

• People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643 — Cited as the basis for increasing the civil indemnity from ₱30,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 in accordance with existing jurisprudence.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining murder and enumerating the qualifying circumstances, including "taking advantage of superior strength" under paragraph 1. The Court applied this provision to determine whether the killing of the victim was qualified to murder, ultimately holding that superior strength was not established because the stoning of the victim had rendered him helpless, making the appellants' numerical superiority unnecessary.

Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon concurred.