People of the Philippines vs. Roger Llabres

A plea of self-defense transfers the burden of proof to the accused, who, having admitted the offense imputed to him, must show that his acts were justified under the law by establishing the concurrence of (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel such unlawful aggression, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself; the number and location of the wounds inflicted may by themselves demonstrate the absence of the second requisite.

Roger Llabres y Advincula was employed as a security guard at the Egg and Eye Restaurant in Quezon City, and the persons he was charged with killing and wounding were among a group of customers who went to the establishment on August 23, 1984. The case turns on the first paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, which excuses from criminal liability one who acts in defense of his person, and on Articles 50, 51, 64, 248, and 249 of the same Code, together with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which govern the penalties imposable for murder, frustrated homicide, and attempted homicide.

Roger Llabres y Advincula was employed as a security guard at the Egg and Eye Restaurant in Quezon City. On August 23, 1984, a group consisting of Roland Yap, Enrique Paras, Santos Origenes, Victor Lim, Generoso Tumulac, Jr., and Dominador Sobroso went to the restaurant. The prosecution placed the incident at about eleven o'clock in the morning of that date, while the appellant testified that the events began in the evening of August 23, 1984 and that Yap and Paras were leaving the establishment at one o'clock in the morning.

According to the prosecution, Llabres did not allow the group to enter because the restaurant was already closed. Yap asked to be let in anyway as he was a regular customer, but Llabres refused, and a heated argument followed, leading to a near-fist fight that was defused when Paras intervened and persuaded Yap to leave with the others. The group then proceeded to a waiting shed about ten meters away to wait for a taxi, and Llabres entered the restaurant. After about five minutes, the group heard somebody behind them shout, "Putang ina ninyo!" Without looking back, Yap retorted, "Putang ina n'yo rin!" Llabres suddenly attacked Yap with a bolo; Yap fell, but Llabres continued hacking him even when he was already on the ground. When Paras sought to wrest the bolo, Llabres turned on him, wounding him in the forehead and his left wrist. Llabres next attacked Origenes, hitting the latter's left arm, right armpit, and right thigh. Lim moved to help his companions but was hit in the mouth when some seven or eight men armed with bolos came out of the restaurant and started throwing bottles at them, prompting the group to flee and leave the fallen Yap behind.

The appellant gave a different account. He testified that Yap and Paras went to the Egg and Eye Restaurant where he was working as a security guard, and that as they were leaving at one o'clock in the morning, one of the waitresses asked him to detain them because they had not yet paid their bill; the bill was finally settled with the restaurant manager. Yap, still resentful, coldly told the waitress to "eat the change." Yap and Paras came back after thirty minutes with five other men, all armed with bolos. Yap told him to call the manager immediately or he himself would be killed. Llabres ran to the waiting shed as he was not carrying his gun, but the group followed and surrounded him. Yap made a stab at him with his bolo, but Llabres was able to parry the thrust and wrest the weapon. Yap stepped back and pulled a kitchen knife, but before he could use it, Llabres fell upon him with the bolo and continued hacking him. He also defended himself from Paras and Origenes when they tried to help Yap.

Llabres later surrendered to the police and admitted hacking the three victims, turning over the bolo he had used in attacking them. Investigators found no kitchen knife at the scene of the crime.

Yap died as a result of shock and massive hemorrhage. The autopsy revealed that he had sustained twenty-one wounds in all: ten hack wounds and two incised wounds at the back, and eight hack wounds and one incised wound in the front of his body. Paras suffered three hack wounds on the forehead, left cheek, and left forearm, and a fracture on the forehead; he was hospitalized for three days, and Dr. Ernesto Brion, who treated him, testified that Paras could have died from his wounds without timely medical attention. Origenes had hack wounds on the back, knee, right thigh, and palms, but Dr. Brion was not sure the wounds would have been fatal if not treated immediately. Lim's injury was a laceration in his upper lip.

The trial court disbelieved the appellant's testimony and chose to give credence to Victor Lim and Enrique Paras, the eyewitnesses for the prosecution, who gave a different report of the incident.

• Self-Defense: The accused-appellant maintained that he acted in self-defense, claiming that Yap and his companions, all armed with bolos, attacked and surrounded him, that Yap stabbed at him with a bolo which he parried and wrested, that Yap then drew a kitchen knife, and that he hacked Yap and defended himself against Paras and Origenes only to repel the unlawful aggression against him.
• Non-Presentation of Origenes: The defense faulted the prosecution for not presenting Santos Origenes as a witness and deduced sinister motives from the omission, arguing that the failure to present him weakened the prosecution's case.

• Self-Defense: Whether the accused-appellant's plea of self-defense was established by proof of the concurrence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
• Credibility: Whether the trial court erred in disbelieving the accused-appellant's testimony and in giving credence to the prosecution eyewitnesses.
• Non-Presentation of Origenes: Whether the prosecution's failure to present Santos Origenes as a witness weakened its case against the accused-appellant.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing of Roland Yap to murder.
• Cruelty: Whether the aggravating circumstance of cruelty attended the commission of the murder.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether voluntary surrender should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in all three criminal cases.
• Penalties: Whether the penalties imposed by the trial court were in accordance with Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Self-Defense: No. The plea of self-defense failed, only the accused having testified to unlawful aggression and the twenty-one wounds inflicted on Yap negating any reasonable necessity in the means employed.
• Credibility: No. The trial court did not err; the question on appeal being one of credibility, the finding in favor of the prosecution was adopted, the appellant's version being an improbable tale uncorroborated by any witness.
• Non-Presentation of Origenes: No. It is the prerogative of each party to choose its own witnesses in accordance with its own assessment of the evidence, and the non-presentation of Origenes did not weaken the prosecution.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was correctly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, Yap having been suddenly attacked from behind and sustaining eleven hack wounds in the back.
• Cruelty: No. Cruelty under Article 14(21) of the Revised Penal Code was not shown, the repeated blows indicating an intent to kill Yap as soon as possible rather than a deliberate prolongation of his suffering.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in all three cases.
• Penalties: Modified. Under Article 64(2) of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty is imposed in its minimum period where only a mitigating circumstance is present, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies.

• Self-Defense: Under the first paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, a plea of self-defense prospers only when it is shown that there was (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel such unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, and these circumstances must concur. A plea of self-defense transfers the burden of proof to the accused, who, having admitted the offense imputed to him, must show that his acts were justified under the law. Only Llabres testified that it was Yap who began the aggression, and there was no corroboration of his claim that he offered no provocation; his testimony was disbelieved by the trial court, which gave credence to prosecution eyewitnesses Victor Lim and Enrique Paras. Even assuming unlawful aggression on the part of Yap, the Court could not accept that there was reasonable necessity for the means employed, since Yap was struck twenty-one times, with twelve wounds in the back and nine in the front, and by Llabres's own admission he kept hacking at Yap even when his victim was already helpless on the ground. The number of wounds alone, let alone their nature, showed that Llabres was not merely defending himself but needlessly striking at an already dying person. The appellant's account — that he, unarmed at first, repulsed eight armed men determined to kill him, each carrying a bolo, and killed one, nearly killed another, and wounded two others while hardly being touched himself — was an improbable tale, and no one corroborated him; investigators also found no kitchen knife at the scene of the crime.
• Credibility: The question on appeal was one of credibility, and the Court decided it as the trial court did, in favor of the prosecution. The trial court's assessment of the witnesses was adopted, the appellant's version having been rejected as an improbable tale and the eyewitnesses for the prosecution having given a different and credible report of the incident.
• Non-Presentation of Origenes: It is the prerogative of each party to choose its own witnesses in accordance with its own assessment of the evidence it needs to prove its case. The non-presentation of Origenes did not weaken the prosecution, and if the defense felt that Origenes could support its own cause, there was nothing to prevent it from calling him as its own witness.
• Treachery: The trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the murder of Yap, who was suddenly attacked from behind and sustained eleven hack wounds in the back. Even if Yap did hear Llabres shout, "Putang ina ninyo!", the expletive was not sufficient warning that his life was in danger and that he would be suddenly attacked with a bolo. The trial court was also correct in rejecting the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, since by the prosecution's own account only five minutes elapsed from the time Llabres entered the restaurant until he reappeared to attack Yap and his companions.
• Cruelty: It was not correct to consider against the appellant the aggravating circumstance of cruelty. Under Article 14(21) of the Revised Penal Code, there is cruelty when the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing another wrong which is not necessary for its commission. This was not shown, since Llabres did not deliberately prolong the physical suffering of his victim; on the contrary, his repeated blows showed that he intended to kill Yap as soon as he could.
• Voluntary Surrender: Llabres is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in all the three cases. Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, the court shall impose the penalty in its minimum period. The trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in Criminal Case No. Q-35261 and Criminal Case No. Q-35262.
• Penalties: The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. In Criminal Case No. Q-35263, in view of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of any aggravating circumstance, the appropriate penalty is the indeterminate sentence of from ten (10) years and six (6) months of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. There being no aggravating circumstance in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-35261 and Q-35262, and applying Article 64 in connection with Articles 50 and 51 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (RA 4103, as amended), the Court imposed on the appellant in Criminal Case No. Q-35261 the indeterminate sentence of from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and in Criminal Case No. Q-35262, the indeterminate sentence of from two (2) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. The awards in Criminal Case No. Q-35263 were reduced to P50,000.00 in keeping with the present policy of the Court.

• Self-Defense — Requisites and Burden of Proof — Under the first paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, a plea of self-defense will prosper only when it is shown that there was: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel such unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. These circumstances must concur. A plea of self-defense transfers the burden of proof to the accused, who, having admitted the offense imputed to him, must show that his acts were justified under the law. In this case, only the appellant testified that Yap began the aggression, and there was no corroboration of his claim that he offered no provocation; the trial court disbelieved him and credited the prosecution eyewitnesses.
• Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed — The second requisite of self-defense requires that the means employed be reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. The number and location of the wounds inflicted may by themselves demonstrate the absence of this requisite. Here, Yap was struck twenty-one times, with twelve wounds in the back and nine in the front, and by the appellant's own admission he kept hacking at Yap even when the victim was already helpless on the ground. The number of wounds alone, let alone their nature, showed all too clearly that Llabres was not merely defending himself but needlessly striking at an already dying person.
• Treachery as a Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery qualifies a killing to murder where the attack is sudden and unexpected, depriving the victim of any opportunity to defend himself. In this case, Yap was suddenly attacked from behind and sustained eleven hack wounds in the back. Even if Yap heard the appellant shout an expletive, the utterance was not sufficient warning that his life was in danger and that he would be suddenly attacked with a bolo.
• Cruelty under Article 14(21), Revised Penal Code — There is cruelty when the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing another wrong which is not necessary for its commission. The circumstance was not shown in this case because the appellant did not deliberately prolong the physical suffering of his victim; on the contrary, his repeated blows showed that he intended to kill Yap as soon as he could.
• Voluntary Surrender as a Mitigating Circumstance — Voluntary surrender, having been established in all three cases, was appreciated in favor of the appellant. The mitigating circumstance operates to lower the penalty imposable under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code and to fix the penalty within the range prescribed by the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Article 64(2), Revised Penal Code — Penalty in the Minimum Period — When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, the court shall impose the penalty in its minimum period. This rule was applied in all three cases, the aggravating circumstance of cruelty having been rejected and no other aggravating circumstance having attended the commission of the offenses.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (RA 4103, as amended), the court imposes an indeterminate sentence with a minimum and a maximum term, the minimum being taken from the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code and the maximum from the penalty prescribed by the Code, taking into account the attending circumstances. The Court applied the law in fixing the indeterminate penalties in all three cases.
• Prerogative to Choose Witnesses — It is the prerogative of each party to choose its own witnesses in accordance with its own assessment of the evidence it needs to prove its case. The prosecution's non-presentation of Santos Origenes did not weaken its case, and the defense could have called him as its own witness had it believed he would support its cause.

• "A plea of self-defense transfers the burden of proof to the accused. Having admitted the offense imputed to him, he must show that his acts were justified under the law. The appellant in the case at bar failed to do this." — This passage states the foundational rule on the burden of proof in self-defense, the ratio on which the affirmance of all three convictions rests.
• "Under the first paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, a plea of self-defense will prosper only when it is shown that there was: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel such unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. These circumstances must concur." — This is the canonical formulation of the three requisites of self-defense applied by the Court in rejecting the appellant's plea.
• "The number of wounds alone, let alone their nature, shows all too clearly that Llabres was not merely defending himself but needlessly striking at an already dying person." — This passage supplies the Court's test for the second requisite of self-defense, treating the number and nature of wounds as sufficient to negate reasonable necessity in the means employed.
• "According to Article 14 (21) of the Revised Penal Code, there in cruelty when the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing another wrong which is not necessary for its commission. This has not been shown in the case at bar." — This passage defines the aggravating circumstance of cruelty and explains why it was rejected, the appellant's repeated blows having shown an intent to kill as soon as possible rather than a deliberate prolongation of suffering.

• People vs. Nomat, Sr., 211 SCRA 14 (1992) — Cited in the ponencia in support of the rule that a plea of self-defense transfers the burden of proof to the accused, who must show that his acts were justified under the law.

• Article 11, first paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a person who acts in defense of his person is exempt from criminal liability, provided the requisites of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself concur. The Court applied this provision in rejecting the appellant's plea of self-defense, the requisites not having concurred.
• Article 14(21), Revised Penal Code — Defines cruelty as an aggravating circumstance where the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission. The Court held that this circumstance was not shown, the appellant's repeated blows having indicated an intent to kill as soon as possible rather than a deliberate prolongation of the victim's suffering.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Establishes the rules for the application of penalties containing three periods. Paragraph 2 thereof provides that when only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period. The Court applied this rule in all three cases after rejecting cruelty as an aggravating circumstance and crediting voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. The Court referred to this provision in fixing the penalty for the killing of Roland Yap, noting that the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
• Article 249, in relation to Articles 50 and 51, Revised Penal Code — Article 249 defines and penalizes homicide; Article 50 governs the penalty for frustrated felonies and Article 51 the penalty for attempted felonies. These provisions were applied in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-35261 and Q-35262, respectively, in determining the penalties for frustrated homicide and attempted homicide.
• Section 1, Indeterminate Sentence Law (RA 4103, as amended) — Governs the imposition of indeterminate sentences consisting of a minimum and a maximum term. The Court applied this provision, together with Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, in imposing the modified indeterminate penalties in all three criminal cases.

Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ.