People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Delada, Jr.

Self-defense cannot be successfully invoked when the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim has already ceased — where the accused fled from the initial confrontation and returned approximately ten minutes later to fatally stab the victim, the aggression no longer existed, and the killing constituted retaliation, not self-defense. Treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend to directly and specially insure its commission without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make, such as a sudden attack from behind on an unsuspecting victim.

The accused-appellant, Rogelio Delada, Jr., alias "Loloy Piang," was charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, for the killing of Danny Paredes. The victim was a pedicab driver, and the accused was known to him, as the accused's wife was a cousin of the victim's wife. The charge alleged that the killing was attended by treachery and evident premeditation, and that the accused was armed with a knife.

In the morning of July 7, 1997, Danny Paredes, a pedicab driver, parked his vehicle in front of the shoe shop of Loloy Cerna in Cogon, Cagayan De Oro City, and went inside the Cogon market to eat breakfast. When he returned, he discovered that his pedicab was missing. Loloy Cerna told him that appellant Rogelio Delada, Jr., alias "Loloy Piang," took his pedicab.

Later that afternoon, at 4:00 p.m., Paredes saw appellant in the same vicinity aboard the pedicab. He accosted him and said, "Ang, why did you steal my trisikad?" Appellant answered, "Ngano, palag ka?" Irked at the insolent response, Paredes attempted to punch appellant, but the latter was able to dodge the blow and run towards the public market. Thereafter, while Paredes was talking with Loloy Cerna and Antonio Quipanes, they heard somebody say, "Piang is coming back." Quipanes saw appellant approaching towards Paredes' direction holding a kangkong cutter. He tried to warn Paredes of the forthcoming attack by uttering, "Dan, watch out!" However, even before Paredes could fully turn to face his assailant, the latter thrust the knife into the side of his waist. Paredes threw punches at appellant but he collapsed. While he lay injured on the pavement, he requested Quipanes to bring him to the hospital. Quipanes boarded Paredes on a motorela which brought him to the hospital. The entire incident was also witnessed by Paredes' sister, Marlyn P. Yabo, who was standing on the road eight meters away, waiting for her husband, when appellant stabbed her brother.

Paredes sustained a single three-centimeter incised wound on the right flank of his abdomen. The vessel supplying blood to his intestines was lacerated, thereby causing massive bleeding within the abdominal cavity. He lost four liters of blood and, despite immediate medical attention, succumbed to his injuries at dawn the following day. The cause of his death was irreversible hypovolemic shock secondary to massive blood loss. In the meantime, appellant fled the crime scene and re-appeared only after Paredes' body was laid to rest. He voluntarily surrendered to Nilo Java, a barangay captain, who subsequently brought him to Governor Emano.

Appellant interposed self-defense to justify the killing of the victim. He claimed that in the early morning of July 7, 1997, Paredes entrusted the pedicab to him while the former went inside the market to have breakfast. He knew the victim because his wife is a cousin of the latter's wife. He asked for Paredes' permission to use the pedicab, which the latter gave. He was, therefore, surprised when the victim confronted him at 12:00 noon for using the pedicab. He surmised that the latter was intoxicated since he had engaged in a drinking spree with Quipanes. The victim allegedly boxed him for no reason, hitting him on the right side of the face. When he saw Paredes scrambling for an umbrella tube with which to strike him, he then got a knife from inside the shoe repair shop. The victim wrestled with him and kicked him on the back. To defend himself against Paredes, who was a man of robust build, he thrust the knife without even knowing which part of the victim's body was hit. Thereafter, he ran towards the public market.

The prosecution witnesses, Quipanes and Yabo, testified that after his initial confrontation with the victim, appellant returned approximately ten minutes later to kill him. Yabo testified that Paredes was looking for his trisikad which was stolen by Loloy Pi-ang, and that when Paredes confronted him, appellant said "palag ka" or "are you aggrieved." Paredes attempted to box appellant, but appellant ran towards the public market. When appellant came back, he was carrying a kangkong cutter; Quipanes shouted "Dan, watch out," but when Paredes tried to turn his head, he was stabbed by appellant on his right side. Quipanes corroborated this narration, testifying that he and Paredes were talking about the trisikad for about ten minutes, with Paredes' back towards the Cogon market, when he saw appellant stab Paredes. Paredes fell on the pavement on his back and uttered, "Bay, please bring me to the hospital."

• Self-Defense: Appellant insisted that he was able to prove all the elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code. Contrary to the findings of the trial court, it was the victim, Danny Paredes, who initially provoked the altercation by punching and kicking him for no apparent reason. The victim's size and build made the use of a knife reasonable under the circumstances, considering that appellant is much smaller and is suffering from a limp.

• Absence of Treachery: Appellant argued that if he were to be held criminally liable, it should only be for homicide, as the prosecution did not sufficiently establish the presence of treachery to qualify the killing to murder. At no instance was it shown that he deliberately adopted a mode of attack that would deprive the victim of an opportunity to defend himself. Neither could the attack be considered as unexpected on the part of the victim since it was preceded by a quarrel over the trisikad.

• Voluntary Surrender: Appellant argued that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor, as he surrendered to a person in authority three days after the killing.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the arguments of the prosecution-appellee beyond its reliance on the trial court's findings and the testimonies of its witnesses.

• Self-Defense: Whether the trial court gravely erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant despite the existence of evidence that the fatal blow was inflicted in self-defense.

• Treachery: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder despite the insufficiency of evidence to prove that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender on the part of the accused-appellant.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established because the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim had ceased when appellant ran away, and the victim was casually conversing with Quipanes when appellant returned ten minutes later to stab him. When the unlawful aggression which had begun no longer exists, the one purportedly making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed.

• Treachery: Yes, treachery attended the killing. The victim had his back towards the public market from where appellant commenced the assault, had no inkling of the impending attack, and the location and severity of the lone stab wound practically foreclosed any opportunity for Paredes to resist the attack. The trial court thus correctly appreciated treachery as having attended the killing.

• Voluntary Surrender: Yes, voluntary surrender should be considered in appellant's favor, as he surrendered to a person in authority three days after the killing, a fact which the prosecution did not contest. However, its presence will not affect the penalty imposed, as under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the crime is attended by a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be applied.

• Self-Defense: By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect admitted that he killed Paredes, thereby shifting the burden of proving all the elements of this justifying circumstance to him. These elements are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Of these requisites, unlawful aggression, or the sudden and unprovoked attack on the person defending himself, is indispensable. Without this element, no claim of self-defense can prosper. In the case at bar, while it would seem that it was the victim who initiated the attack at the outset, the aggression ceased as soon as appellant ran away. Paredes did not pursue the assault and was in fact casually conversing with Quipanes when appellant returned ten minutes later. It was then that appellant suddenly and fatally stabbed Paredes from behind. When the unlawful aggression which had begun no longer exists, the one purportedly making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed. Accordingly, when appellant stabbed Paredes, there was no longer any immediate threat to his person that would justify his unlawful act. Hence, appellant cannot successfully invoke self-defense to avoid criminal liability and his conviction must necessarily follow.

• Treachery: There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially insure the execution of the crime, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. In the instant case, it was indubitably established that Paredes had his back towards the public market from where appellant commenced the assault. He had no inkling of the impending attack as shown by his casual behavior while talking to Quipanes. Although it is true that he had a previous altercation with appellant over the pedicab, he already had his guard down at the time of the fatal stabbing since he had given up on the pursuit of appellant ten minutes earlier. These all too clearly indicate that Paredes could not have foreseen the deadly assault. Moreover, the injury inflicted on Paredes rendered him defenseless and without recourse against his assailant. The location and severity of the lone stab wound practically foreclosed any opportunity for Paredes to resist the attack. The knife pierced through a vulnerable part of the body and the manner by which the same was inflicted ensured the commission of the criminal act without any risk of defense from the victim. The trial court thus correctly appreciated treachery as having attended the killing. On the other hand, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation did not attend the killing, as the prosecution was not able to show: (a) the time when accused-appellant decided to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused-appellant had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and its execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act.

• Voluntary Surrender: The evidence reveals that appellant indeed surrendered to a person in authority three days after the killing, a fact which the prosecution did not contest. Notwithstanding this, the presence of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance will not affect the penalty to be imposed upon appellant. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the same code states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties and the crime is attended by a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Consequently, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court.

• Self-Defense; Unlawful Aggression as Indispensable Requisite — The elements of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression, or the sudden and unprovoked attack on the person defending himself, is indispensable; without this element, no claim of self-defense can prosper. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the victim's aggression ceased when appellant ran away, and the victim did not pursue the assault; when appellant returned ten minutes later and stabbed the victim, there was no longer any immediate threat to his person, making the killing retaliation rather than self-defense.

• Treachery — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially insure the execution of the crime, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the victim had his back towards the market from which appellant approached, had no inkling of the attack, and the lone stab wound to a vulnerable part of the body foreclosed any opportunity to resist.

• Evident Premeditation — The prosecution must show: (a) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and its execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that evident premeditation did not attend the killing because the prosecution failed to establish these elements.

• Voluntary Surrender — Voluntary surrender is a mitigating circumstance that may be appreciated in favor of the accused when he surrenders to a person in authority. The Court applied this doctrine in crediting appellant's surrender to a barangay captain three days after the killing, but noted that under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the penalty consists of two indivisible penalties and the crime is attended by a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.

• "When the unlawful aggression which had begun no longer exists, the one purportedly making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the self-defense issue: the cessation of unlawful aggression defeats a claim of self-defense, converting the killing into retaliation.

• "The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor." — This passage defines the canonical formulation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance for murder.

• "In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: x x x 3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied." — This quotation from Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code explains why the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender did not reduce the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

• People vs. Teston, G.R. No. 134938, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 404 — Cited for the rule that the highest degree of respect is accorded to the trial court's findings on witness credibility, subject only to a clear showing of overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts of weight and substance.

• People vs. Cotas, G.R. No. 132043, May 13, 2000, 332 SCRA 627 — Cited for the elements of self-defense and the indispensability of unlawful aggression.

• People vs. Magno, 379 Phil. 531 (2000) — Cited for the definition of treachery as the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim.

• People vs. Verde, 362 Phil. 305 (1999) — Cited for the prevailing judicial policy reducing civil indemnity to ₱50,000.00.

• People vs. Cabote, G.R. No. 136143, November 15, 2001 — Cited for the award of moral damages to the victim's heirs even without proof of emotional suffering, based on the assumption that violent death invariably brings emotional pain and anguish.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6, Republic Act No. 7659 — The provision defining murder and prescribing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when committed with treachery, among other attendant circumstances. The Court applied this provision in affirming the conviction for murder.

• Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — The provision defining the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The Court applied this provision in ruling that appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of self-defense.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — The provision prescribing the rules for the application of indivisible penalties. The Court applied this provision in ruling that when the crime is attended by a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinion is noted in the provided case text.