People of the Philippines vs. Roel Punzalan, et al.

A conspirator is liable for the robbery with homicide committed by his co-conspirators even if he did not physically participate in the killing, and his mere failure to flee after the crime does not amount to withdrawal or disavowal sufficient to extinguish liability; withdrawal requires an overt act to prevent the commission of the related felony or to abandon or dissociate from the conspiracy before its consummation.

Marieta Mendoza, married to Domingo Mendoza, was employed as a househelp by the Fule family and attended to Lourdes Fule, then 66 years old and hypertensive. Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida were also houseboys in the Fule household. The charge was robbery with homicide under the Revised Penal Code, and the 1987 Constitution's prohibition on the death penalty governed the penalty that could be imposed.

The information charged that on or about July 11, 1986, at Poblacion, Alaminos, Laguna, Marieta Mendoza, in conspiracy with her husband Domingo Mendoza and Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida alias "Jose Vecido," all employed as domestic helpers in the house of Judge Conrado Fule and Mrs. Lourdes Fule, forcibly entered Mrs. Lourdes Fule's bedroom, attacked and stabbed her with bladed weapons, causing her instantaneous death, and on the same occasion took P10,000.00 in cash and assorted jewelry worth P1,636,000.00, for a total of P1,646,000.00. The trial court's findings narrate the operative events on July 9 to 11, 1985. Marieta was married to Domingo Mendoza. She had been employed off and on with the Fule family for two years before the incident and became a permanent househelp. Her primary duty was to attend to Mrs. Lourdes Fule, then 66 years old and hypertensive. She slept immediately outside the door of her mistress so that medicines could be given as needed. Roel Punzalan had been a houseboy for about four to five months, while Jose Besida was hired two months before at the instance of Domingo Mendoza.

A week before the incident, all the accused plotted to rob Mrs. Fule, who had a collection of jewelry and cash. On July 9, 1985, Domingo Mendoza arrived at 9:00 a.m. and stayed at the servants' quarters of the Fule compound at the corner of Del Pilar and Rizal Avenue, Alaminos, Laguna. He was seen in a close huddle with the other accused and spent the night until July 10, 1985. After Judge Conrado Fule left for Manila at about 4:00 p.m., all the accused were seen in secret and close conversation. Domingo Mendoza was heard to utter "Ituloy na natin wala si Judge Fule." He left at 6:30 p.m. that day. At about 7:30 p.m., Gregorio Fule had supper at his mother's house, served by Nieves Garcia Santos and Marieta. After eating, mother and son talked about their health while the son fixed the betamax unit. After fixing the betamax, Gregorio Fule left his mother watching a betamax tape together with Marieta, Roel Punzalan, Jose Besida, a child of Marieta, and Nieves Garcia Santos.

At about 11:30 p.m. on July 10, 1985, Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida went out of the house to the servants' quarters while the victim and Marieta locked all the doors. At 12:30 a.m. on July 11, 1985, Marieta was seen at the door of the servants' quarters calling for Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida, after which the three went up to the house. Marieta knocked on the victim's door and woke her on some pretext. When the victim opened the door, Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida rushed in and inflicted injuries and stab wounds on her. They placed cloth on her mouth to prevent her from making an outcry. While the victim lay bleeding on her bed, Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida ransacked her drawers and took jewelry and cash. Domingo Mendoza was waiting in a parked jeep outside the Fule compound. Marieta did nothing to help the victim or prevent the killing. After the crime, Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida told Marieta that they would meet at Del Remedio, and changed their bloodied clothes at the staircase and under the oliva tree on the Fule compound.

At 6:00 a.m. on July 11, 1985, Marieta woke June Murillo, another houseboy, and Nieves Garcia Santos without telling them anything unusual. Murillo cleaned the Fule compound until he noticed that the front iron gate was open. He reported this to Marieta and Nieves Garcia Santos, and the three went up to the adjoining house of Gregorio Fule. Marieta informed Gregorio Fule that "Napasukan tayo ng magnanakaw." Murillo was instructed to fetch the police. Gregorio Fule saw bloodstained clothing near the oliva tree and personal items on the stairs leading to his mother's room. When he went up, he saw Marieta's sleeping mat, pillow, and blanket immediately outside his mother's door; inside, his mother was covered with blood, the room was bloody, and the drawer where valuables were kept was open and emptied of $5,000.00, P70,000.00 in cash, and P1.5 million worth of assorted jewelry. He confronted Marieta, who responded that she knew nothing because "Tulog na tulog po ako." The police arrived and an investigation was conducted. Marieta was initially treated as a possible witness until she was later suspected of involvement in the crime.

Marieta testified to a different version. She said she had worked as a housemaid of Mrs. Lourdes Fule for five years at the time of the incident, although not continuously; there were times when she was borrowed by Mrs. Fule's daughter, Marilou. In the first week of July 1985 she was with Marilou, and in the second week she was with Mrs. Fule. On the night of July 10, 1985, after all the members of the household had taken supper and after fixing the kitchen, she joined Mrs. Fule in watching television with two children, one of whom was her son. Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida also joined them. After a while, she noticed Jose Besida go to the kitchen and inside her room. She did not notice Roel Punzalan leave. The doors were all open, including the door to Mrs. Fule's room and the door to her own room. They finished watching television at around 11:00 p.m., after which Mrs. Fule and she locked all the doors. She put up the mosquito net on Mrs. Fule's bed and did not notice anybody inside the room. She slept with her son outside Mrs. Fule's room, about three meters from the door, outside the white mark shown in Exhibit "F-1." The cabinet in her room was at her right side, as was the way to the comfort room; at her left was the aparador and the room where rice and ironed clothes were kept. Mrs. Fule's door had a lock both inside and outside. Until she slept, she did not notice Besida go out. Mrs. Fule took medicine after each meal, so Marieta did not have to wake her.

Around 2:00 a.m. on July 11, 1985, Marieta was awakened by sounds of moaning from Mrs. Fule. When she stood up, Roel Punzalan blocked her and told her to lie down or she would be killed, at the same time poking something at her back which she presumed to be a bladed instrument because it pierced her skin. Because of the threat, she lay down facing the cabinet. After about three minutes, Punzalan went out, but she did not notice whether he was carrying something or whether his shirt had bloodstain. After three minutes, another person passed; because of fear for her life, she lay sidewise with her back against the passage from Mrs. Fule's door to the other door. At about 2:15 to 2:30 a.m., these two persons went out of Mrs. Fule's room and her room. Mrs. Fule's door was slightly open; she saw scattered things but did not see Mrs. Fule. From the time she was ordered to lie down, she did not sleep. She wanted to inform the other occupants of the house but feared that Punzalan might still be in the house, so she waited until around 6:00 a.m. She crawled to Nieves Santos and inquired about Roel Punzalan, whom she saw in Mrs. Fule's room. She told Nieves that she heard Mrs. Fule moaning and saw Roel Punzalan in the room around 2:00 a.m. Upon knowing that Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida were not there, she and Nieves, with Jun Murillo, went to Gregorio Fule. When they told Gregorio that Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida were no longer there, Gregorio told them to call the police and went directly to his mother's room. Until then, she had no knowledge of what actually happened to Mrs. Fule. Marieta further testified that Domingo visited her days before the incident; they talked about the children and his drinking and nothing else. When Judge Fule left for Manila on July 10, 1985, Domingo was no longer there, having left at around 4:00 p.m. She did not notice her husband talk with Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida. She knew nothing of their plans and did not know of the presence of the jewelry and money inside Mrs. Fule's room. She was investigated several times. The first statement was in her own handwriting, dictated by Ma Ading, Nieves Santos' nickname, and Francisco Fule, with a threat to kill every member of her family if she made a mistake. Another statement was typewritten and prepared by the police when she was interrogated at the police station on July 11, 1985, marked as Exhibit "H." She did not fully understand every question asked by the police officer. She signed it because she was told that there was nothing wrong in signing it. On July 15, 1985, another statement was prepared at the police station of Alaminos, Laguna, with her signature, marked as Exhibit "C."

The trial court found these circumstances sufficient to establish conspiracy. It found that Marieta was aware that Mrs. Fule was moaning that night and had glimpsed scattered things inside the victim's room, but did nothing to assist her or prevent her killing. It found that she did not relate what she witnessed to Nieves Garcia Santos and Gregorio Fule, and that her claim that Roel Punzalan prevented her from entering the room was unbelievable because she could have rushed out and summoned help. It found that she stayed on her sleeping mat for four hours while the victim was dead or bleeding to death, and that her suppression of information was intended to feign innocence. It also found that the victim's room could not be entered without passing through Marieta; that the door could only be opened from the inside; and that the victim would not have opened the door for the relatively newly hired househelpers but would have opened it for Marieta.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant Marieta Mendoza argued that the trial court gravely erred in giving much weight and credence to the prosecution evidence and in disregarding the defense. She maintained that because the judge who observed witnesses Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez was not the judge who wrote the decision, the Supreme Court was not bound by the latter judge's findings on their credibility. She also contended that Santos and Hernandez were employees of the victim's husband and that their sworn statements incriminating her were submitted to the Fiscal's Office only three months after the crime, suggesting that Judge Fule exercised considerable influence over them.
• Conspiracy: Appellant argued that the prosecution failed to establish that she was a conspirator in the robbery or the slaying. She claimed that she was unaware of any plan to rob the victim, knew nothing of the jewelry and money, and did not notice her husband talking with Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida.
• Failure to Flee: Appellant insisted that her failure to flee with her co-accused showed that she had not joined the conspiracy.
• Threat and Coercion: Appellant claimed that her life was threatened by Roel Punzalan, who poked what she believed was a sharp instrument into her back when she discovered the robbery and assault, effectively preventing her from doing anything to forestall or prevent the crime.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in appreciating nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of rank, age or sex, dwelling, and evident premeditation.
• Specific Witness Testimonies: Appellant impugned the testimony of Nieves Santos as improbable because she allegedly overheard only incriminating remarks, saw Marieta summon Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida without finding it unusual, and did not volunteer to help; she impugned Pepito Hernandez's testimony that he saw Domingo Mendoza in front of Fule's house at 4:30 a.m.; and she impugned Gregorio Fule's testimony for failing to mention jewelry found near Marieta's pillow until three months later and for alleged contradiction about placing jewelry in a bank vault.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the prosecution evidence and disregarding the defense, particularly where the judge who observed witnesses Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez was not the judge who wrote the decision.
• Conspiracy: Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that Marieta Mendoza was a conspirator in the robbery and the killing.
• Withdrawal or Disavowal: Whether Marieta Mendoza's failure to flee with her co-accused negated her participation in the conspiracy or extinguished her criminal liability.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether Marieta Mendoza was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide as charged.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of rank, age or sex, dwelling, and evident premeditation.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. Findings on credibility are generally accorded great weight; the fact that the judge who observed two witnesses did not write the decision does not by itself render reliance erroneous, especially where the writing judge presided over the latter half of the trial.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Circumstantial evidence established that Marieta Mendoza acted in concert with Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida at least in the robbery; where conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all.
• Withdrawal or Disavowal: No. Failure to flee after the robbery and killing was consummated did not amount to withdrawal; the locus penitentiae had passed, and an overt act to prevent the related felony or abandon the conspiracy was required before or during consummation.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. The prosecution established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt for robbery with homicide, as she conspired in the robbery during which the homicide occurred.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Partly. Evident premeditation, nocturnity, and abuse of superior strength were correctly appreciated; disregard of age, rank, or sex was absorbed in abuse of superior strength and is relevant only in crimes against persons, while dwelling was disregarded because the accused resided in the servants' quarter assimilated to the victim's house.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The general rule is that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and will not lightly be disturbed by an appellate court, because the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying. Appellant's contention had merit only in the sense that the Court could not rely solely on that rule with respect to Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez, since the judge who observed them was not the judge who wrote the decision; the Court thus made its own evaluation of their testimony. However, that circumstance alone did not render the trial court's reliance erroneous. The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by interruptions in the service of the judge or judges presiding over it, and the judge who wrote the decision had presided over the latter half of the trial. The delay in submitting the witnesses' sworn statements three months after the crime did not impair their credibility; an obvious explanation was their natural reluctance to become involved in the investigation of a brutal crime and to testify while co-accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida were still at large. It may have been true that Judge Fule asked and persuaded Santos and Hernandez to testify for the prosecution, but there was no basis to believe that he led them to testify falsely. Pepito Hernandez's statement that he saw Domingo Mendoza in front of Fule's house at 4:30 a.m. was not directly relevant to Marieta's culpability. Nieves Santos's testimony was not improbable: conspirators need not broadcast their intentions, she could have overheard only fragments of their discussion, the summons by Marieta did not alarm her because she thought the houseboys had been called by the victim, and she was a cook rather than a house-girl. The acts and words she testified to became significant only after the discovery of the killing and robbery. Gregorio Fule's testimony was also not significantly affected: an ordinary person suddenly confronted with his mother's bloody corpse would be shocked and disoriented, the delay in mentioning the stray pieces of jewelry did not necessarily imply fabrication, the bank vault issue had no necessary bearing on the truth of his statement, and Marieta may have been unable to think of a more secure hiding place on the spur of the moment. Judge Jaramillo, who wrote the decision, had observed Gregorio Fule and found his testimony worthy of credence.

• Conspiracy: There was no direct evidence that Marieta actually participated in the physical assault and stabbing of the victim, so her conviction rested on the conclusion that she participated in a conspiracy to commit the robbery in the course of which the homicide occurred. The factors leading to that conclusion were: (1) she participated in the discussion among her husband Domingo Mendoza, Roel Punzalan, and Jose Besida in the afternoon before the robbery and killing, when Domingo Mendoza declared that the time to carry out their plan had arrived with Judge Fule gone; (2) she unlocked doors and summoned Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida from the servants' quarters and brought them inside Judge Fule's house an hour or so before the robbery and killing; (3) by her own testimony, she saw Jose Besida enter her room leading to Mrs. Fule's room while Mrs. Fule and others were watching a video film, but failed to report that fact to Mrs. Fule or anyone else; (4) after hearing Mrs. Fule's moaning through the open bedroom door and after she was aware that Roel Punzalan and another person had left Mrs. Fule's room in the corridor where Marieta slept, she stayed on the floor for four hours without attempting to find out what had happened to Mrs. Fule and without attempting to awaken Nieves Santos or anyone else and raise the alarm; and (5) she was not harmed in any way by Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida although she obviously recognized them, and they did not even tie or gag her to prevent her from raising an alarm. These multiple factors, considered together, led to the conclusion, constituting moral certainty, that Marieta had acted in concert with Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida at least in respect of the robbery. It was possible that the conspiracy did not originally extend to the killing of Mrs. Fule and that the killing was resorted to on the spur of the moment to counter unexpected resistance or prevent an outcry. The general rule, however, is that where conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all, and the extent of the specific participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary, each being held liable for the criminal deeds executed by another or others.

• Withdrawal or Disavowal: Appellant insisted that she was unaware of any plan to rob the victim and that her failure to flee with her co-accused showed she had not joined the conspiracy. The simple refusal or failure to flee with her co-accused did not, by itself, necessarily imply that she had never conspired to rob the victim. Taking the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to her, her failure to flee could be considered an indication that she had been shocked that what began as a plan to rob Mrs. Fule culminated in her brutal slaying, and that Marieta sought to disavow the conspiracy to rob which she had initially joined. The ultimate issue was whether her disavowal or disengagement through failure or refusal to flee was sufficient to extinguish or negate criminal liability for the robbery and the killing. Such disavowal was not sufficient. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and merges his will into the common felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have cast his lot with his fellow conspirators and to have taken his chances that things may go awry and that the offended party may resist or third persons may get killed in the course of implementing the basic criminal design. To free himself from such criminal liability, the law requires some overt act on the part of the conspirator to seek to prevent commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy to commit the initial felony. In this case, while the failure to flee may perhaps be regarded as a negative overt act, such disavowal came too late, having manifested itself after, and not before or during, the consummation of the robbery and the slaying. In legal contemplation, there was no longer a conspiracy to be repudiated nor an unlawful killing which could have been prevented, since the conspiracy and the killing had already materialized. The locus penitentiae had already passed. Appellant's claim that her life was threatened by Roel Punzalan was supported only by her own word, and that word, taken in the context of all the other circumstances, especially her failure to raise the alarm long after the doers of the crime had left, was insufficient to nullify the prosecution's case. The trial judge, who was presiding when the defense presented its case and who wrote the decision with the benefit of observing her demeanor, did not believe her claim that she had been coerced into silence, and there was no basis in the record for setting aside that conclusion.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Because conspiracy was established and the robbery with homicide was proven, Marieta was liable as a co-conspirator. The act of one conspirator being the act of all, she was properly held liable for the robbery and the homicide committed by Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida, even though she did not physically participate in the stabbing. The trial court's judgment of conviction was therefore affirmed.

• Aggravating Circumstances: Evident premeditation was correctly appreciated. The record showed not only the time when the accused determined or at least last conferred on the commission of the crime, but also acts which manifestly indicated that the appellant and her co-accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime. An interval of seven or eight hours had taken place between the meeting of the co-accused and Marieta's summoning of Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida into the Fule house, an interval sufficient to allow appellant and her co-conspirators to reflect upon the consequences of their acts. Nocturnity was correctly appreciated because it was purposely sought by the conspirators to afford impunity and to facilitate both the execution of the crime and their escape; they timed the robbery to coincide with the absence of Judge Fule and chose to strike late at night to ensure that the victim would be alone in her bedroom and unable to resist or flee. Abuse of superior strength was similarly correctly appreciated because of the great variance in the relative physical condition of the assailants and the victim: two adult males against an old lady suffering from hypertension; the assailants were armed with bladed and blunt instruments while the victim was alone, unarmed, and in no position to defend herself; and the great violence inflicted upon the victim, as indicated by the number and location of her wounds, indicated abuse of superior strength. Disregard of age, rank, or sex was incorrectly appreciated because it was absorbed in abuse of superior strength; moreover, it is relevant only in crimes against persons, while robbery with homicide is a felony classified as a crime against property, with the homicide regarded as incidental to the robbery. Dwelling should also have been disregarded because the accused, except Domingo Mendoza, all resided in the servants' quarter of Mrs. Fule's residence, and the servants' quarter may be assimilated to the victim's house as an appendage or attachment to it. Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of persons shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when, by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. Article 63, paragraph 2, of the same Code provides that when there is at least one aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is death. Since death is not an enforceable penalty under the Constitution, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua.

• Conspiracy; act of one is act of all — When conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all, and the extent of each conspirator's specific participation becomes secondary; each is held liable for the criminal deeds executed by another or others. The Court applied this to hold Marieta Mendoza liable for the robbery with homicide even though there was no direct evidence that she physically stabbed the victim, because circumstantial evidence established her concert in the robbery.
• Withdrawal or disavowal from conspiracy; locus penitentiae — One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of the co-conspirators and merges his will into the common felonious intent. To escape liability, the law requires an overt act to prevent the commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or dissociate from the conspiracy to commit the initial felony. A mere failure to flee after consummation is not sufficient; the locus penitentiae has passed.
• Credibility of witnesses; interrupted trial judge — Findings of the trial court on credibility are accorded great weight because the trial judge observed the witnesses' demeanor. Where the judge who observed certain witnesses is not the judge who wrote the decision, the appellate court may make its own evaluation, but that circumstance alone does not render the trial court's reliance erroneous; the continuity of the court and efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by interruptions in the service of the presiding judge.
• Circumstantial evidence of conspiracy — Conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence. Multiple circumstances, considered together, may lead to moral certainty that the accused acted in concert, including participation in planning, unlocking doors and summoning co-accused, failure to report suspicious acts, failure to aid the victim or raise alarm, and absence of harm or restraint by the co-accused.
• Aggravating circumstances in robbery with homicide — In robbery with homicide, evident premeditation, nocturnity, and abuse of superior strength may be appreciated. Disregard of age, rank, or sex is absorbed in abuse of superior strength and is relevant only in crimes against persons; robbery with homicide is a crime against property, with homicide incidental. Dwelling is disregarded where the accused resided in the servants' quarter, which is assimilated to the victim's house.
• Penalty for robbery with homicide with aggravating circumstance — Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death when homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery. Under Article 63, paragraph 2, the presence of at least one aggravating circumstance makes death the imposable penalty, but because death is not enforceable under the 1987 Constitution, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua.

• "The general rule, however, is that where conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all and that the extent of the specific participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary, each being held liable for the criminal deed(s) executed by another or others." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on conspiracy liability, explaining why Marieta Mendoza was liable for the homicide despite the absence of direct evidence that she participated in the stabbing.
• "One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators; he merges his will into the common felonious intent." — This defines the doctrinal basis for holding a conspirator liable for the acts of his co-conspirators and is central to the Court's rejection of Marieta's claim that she was unaware of the plan.
• "To free himself from such criminal liability, the law requires some overt act on the part of the conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy to commit the initial felony." — This sets out the requisites for withdrawal or disavowal from a conspiracy, which the Court applied to hold that Marieta's failure to flee was insufficient.
• "The locus penitentiae, i.e., appellant's opportunity to purge herself of criminal liability, had already passed." — This passage explains why Marieta's failure to flee after the robbery and killing could not negate her liability; the opportunity to withdraw had already lapsed.

• People vs. Aldeguer, 184 SCRA 1, 6 (1990) — Cited for the general rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and will not lightly be disturbed by an appellate court.
• People vs. Callado, G.R. No. 88631, 30 April 1991 — Cited on the continuity of a court and the efficacy of its proceedings not being affected by interruptions in the service of the judge or judges presiding over it.
• Ayco vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 84770, 18 March 1991 — Cited in connection with the trial judge who wrote the decision having presided over the latter half of the trial.
• People vs. Montante, 192 SCRA 483, 487-488 (1990) — Cited in the discussion of the trial judge's observation of witnesses and the deference owed to credibility findings.
• People vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 92658, 30 April 1991; People vs. Nunag, G.R. No. 92570, 29 April 1991; People vs. Bartulay, 192 SCRA 621, 629 (1990); People vs. Gupo, 190 SCRA 7, 18 (1990); People vs. Veronas, 179 SCRA 423, 427 (1989) — Cited to support the rule that where conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all and each conspirator is liable for the criminal deeds executed by another.
• People vs. Salvador, 163 SCRA 574, 580-582 (1988); People vs. Bazar, 162 SCRA 609, 617 (1988); People vs. Escober, 157 SCRA 541, 567 (1988); People vs. Pelagio, 20 SCRA 153, 159-160 (1967) — Cited to support the requirement of an overt act to prevent the related felony or abandon the conspiracy in order to escape liability.
• People vs. Ga, G.R. No. 49831, 27 June 1990 — Cited on the appreciation of nocturnity and also in the discussion of aggravating circumstances.
• People vs. Pagcol, 79 SCRA 570-577 (1978); People vs. Nabduna, 142 SCRA 446, 458 (1986) — Cited in the discussion of disregard of age, rank, or sex and dwelling as aggravating circumstances.
• Lozano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90870, 5 February 1991 — Cited in support of increasing the civil indemnity for the victim's death to P50,000.00.

• Article 294, Revised Penal Code — Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death when, by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, homicide is committed. Applied to classify Marieta Mendoza's crime and authorize the penalty.
• Article 63, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — When at least one aggravating circumstance attends the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is death. Applied because at least one aggravating circumstance was present, but the death penalty could not be imposed.
• Article III, Section 19(1), 1987 Philippine Constitution — The death penalty is not an enforceable penalty. Applied to reduce the imposable death penalty to reclusion perpetua; the trial court had reduced it to life imprisonment, while the Supreme Court fixed the appropriate penalty as reclusion perpetua.

Narvasa, CJ., Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.