People of the Philippines vs. Rodrigo Yorac

A second prosecution for a graver offense is barred by double jeopardy where the more serious injury on which it is based was already in existence at the time of the first prosecution and no new or supervening fact has arisen to alter the character of the crime. The State may not successively prosecute an accused for offenses arising from the same act where the element distinguishing the graver offense was ascertainable, though not ascertained, during the first proceeding.

Rodrigo Yorac was prosecuted by the People of the Philippines, first before the City Court of Bacolod and later before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for injuries inflicted upon Lam Hock. The case is set against the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, a provision whose scope had been shaped by a line of decisions beginning with People vs. Tarok, modified by Melo vs. People, and most recently applied in People vs. Buling.

On April 8, 1968, Lam Hock was confined at the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital for a head injury, as certified by Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, a resident physician of the hospital, in a medical certificate issued April 10, 1968. Rodrigo Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod for having assaulted, attacked, and hit Lam Hock with a piece of wood. On April 16, 1968, Yorac pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten days of arresto menor, and he began serving his sentence forthwith.

Two days later, on April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental charging Yorac with frustrated murder arising from the same act against the same victim. This second information rested on another medical certificate dated April 17, 1968, issued by the same Dr. Zulueta, which stated that Lam Hock's confinement resulted from (a) contusion with lacerated wound four inches in the parieto-occipital region, scalp mid portion, and (b) cerebral concussion, moderately severe, secondary. The certificate also stated that the X-ray finding yielded no radiographic evidence of fracture, and that the healing period, barring complications, was eighteen to twenty-one days.

On June 10, 1968, Yorac filed a motion to quash the frustrated murder information, arguing that having been previously convicted of slight physical injuries by the City Court of Bacolod and having already served the penalty imposed, a prosecution for frustrated murder arising from the same act against the same offended party — slight physical injuries being necessarily included in frustrated murder — would place him in second jeopardy. Judge Nestor B. Alampay granted the motion in a resolution dated June 21, 1968, relying on People vs. Buling, which he considered squarely applicable since nothing in the later medical certificate indicated that a new or supervening fact had developed or arisen since the filing of the original action. The motion for reconsideration was denied, and the People appealed.

• Propriety of the Second Prosecution: The People, as plaintiff-appellant, took the position that the accused, who had already been convicted of slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod and had served sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same person.

• Double Jeopardy: Yorac moved to quash the frustrated murder information on the ground that, having been previously convicted of slight physical injuries by the City Court of Bacolod and having already served the penalty imposed for the very same offense, the prosecution for frustrated murder arising out of the same act against the same offended party — the crime of slight physical injuries being necessarily included in that of frustrated murder — would place him in second jeopardy.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the defendant, who had already been convicted of slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod for injuries inflicted upon Lam Hock and had served sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same person.

• Double Jeopardy: No. The second prosecution for frustrated murder is barred, the offense of slight physical injuries being necessarily included in frustrated murder, and no supervening fact having arisen to alter the character of the crime after the first conviction.

• Double Jeopardy: The constitutional guarantee provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Under Section 9 of Rule 117 (formerly Section 9 of Rule 113), the conviction or acquittal of the defendant, or the dismissal of the case, is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. In People vs. Tarok, the Court held that a prior conviction for serious physical injuries barred a subsequent prosecution for parricide, the former being included in the latter. That ruling was re-examined and set aside in Melo vs. People, which clarified that the rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the accused could not during the first prosecution have been convicted of an offense then inexistent. The Melo exception requires the existence of a new fact supervening for which the defendant is responsible, changing the character of the crime imputed to him and, together with the facts existing previously, constituting a new and distinct offense. Applying People vs. Buling, the Court found that the second medical certificate disclosed no supervening fact. As in Buling, where the fracture later discovered by X-ray must have existed at the time of the first examination and the delay in healing was caused by the superficiality of that examination, the more serious injury certified in the second certificate — the cerebral concussion — was already in existence when Yorac was first prosecuted. The new finding merely lengthened the period of healing and was attributable to the very superficial and inconclusive examination first made. No supervening fact having arisen, the general rule of double jeopardy applies, and the lower court correctly sustained the motion to quash.

• Double Jeopardy — The constitutional guarantee that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense protects an accused from a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction or acquittal, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The guarantee shares features with the rule of finality in civil cases: it assures the accused that the matter is closed, enables him to plan his future, protects him from continued distress, and saves both him and the State from the expenses of redundant litigation. It also helps equalize the adversary capabilities of two grossly mismatched litigants. In this case, the Court applied the guarantee to bar the second prosecution for frustrated murder after Yorac's prior conviction for slight physical injuries.

• Included Offense Rule (Same Offense) — A prior conviction or acquittal bars a subsequent prosecution not only for the offense charged but also for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. Slight physical injuries, being necessarily included in frustrated murder, brought the second prosecution within the bar. The Court reiterated Justice Laurel's admonition in Tarok that the Government cannot begin with the highest offense and then descend step by step, nor begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest, with the same result.

• Supervening Fact Exception (Melo Doctrine) — The rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the accused could not during the first prosecution have been convicted of an offense then inexistent. The exception requires the existence of a new fact supervening for which the defendant is responsible, changing the character of the crime imputed to him and, together with the facts existing previously, constituting a new and distinct offense. The Court found this exception inapplicable because no such supervening fact had arisen.

• Buling Doctrine — Where the graver injury later certified was already in existence at the time of the first examination and was not discovered only because of the superficiality of that examination, there is no supervening fact justifying a second prosecution; the general rule of double jeopardy applies. The Court treated People vs. Buling as the controlling precedent and found its factual circumstances squarely applicable to Yorac's case.

• "This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy." — This passage, drawn from Melo vs. People, states the exception to the rule of identity and defines the supervening-fact requirement that the Court found absent in Yorac's case.

• "Stated differently, if after the first prosecution 'a new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense,' the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." — This formulation supplies the canonical test for the supervening-fact exception, which the Court applied to hold that the second frustrated murder information was barred.

• "As the Government cannot begin with the highest, and then down step by step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither can it begin the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same result." — Quoted from Justice Laurel's opinion in Tarok and reiterated in Melo, this passage articulates the rationale against successive prosecutions for offenses arising from the same act and is frequently cited in double jeopardy jurisprudence.

• "If the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is therefore, no view or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which would justify the application of the ruling enunciated by us in the cases if Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong. . . . We attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was, caused by the very superficial examination then made. As we have stated, we find therefore that no supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong for which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of double jeopardy." — This passage from People vs. Buling is the ratio decidendi on which the Court relied in affirming the quashal, holding that the more serious injury was already in existence at the time of the first examination and that the superficiality of that examination could not supply the supervening fact required to justify a second prosecution.

• People vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712 (1960) — Controlling precedent. The Court found the factual circumstances squarely applicable and relied on it in affirming the quashal, holding that no supervening fact had arisen where the graver injury was already in existence at the time of the first examination and was missed only because of the superficiality of that examination.
• People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260 (1941) — Earlier ruling, cited with approval in People vs. Villasis, holding that a prior conviction for serious physical injuries barred a subsequent prosecution for parricide, the former being included in the latter. Its reasoning on the rule of identity was reiterated in Melo.
• Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950) — Re-examined and set aside the Tarok ruling, establishing the supervening-fact exception: the rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution.
• People vs. Manolong, 85 Phil. 829 (1950) — Followed the Melo doctrine.
• People vs. Petilla, 92 Phil. 395 (1952) — Followed the Melo doctrine.
• People vs. Villasis, 81 Phil. 881 (1948) — Cited the Tarok case with approval.

• Article III, Section 1, paragraph 18, 1935 Constitution — Provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, and that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. This is the constitutional basis for the motion to quash sustained by the lower court and affirmed by the Supreme Court. (The text also cites this guarantee in footnote 8 as Article III, Section 1, paragraph 20.)
• Section 9, Rule 117 (formerly Section 9, Rule 113), Rules of Court — Provides that when a defendant has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant has pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The Court applied this provision in holding that the prior conviction for slight physical injuries barred the subsequent prosecution for frustrated murder.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Barredo, J., took no part.