People of the Philippines vs. Rodrigo Balleno y Pernetes

The crime of rape is committed by carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation, and the mere touching of the labia of the woman consummates the crime of rape. A qualifying circumstance that increases the penalty to death must be accurately alleged in the Information, and the failure to do so bars conviction in its qualified form, resulting in conviction for simple rape only.

The appellant, Rodrigo Balleno y Pernetes, was the live-in partner of Lorna, the mother of thirteen-year-old complainant Jacquelyn Balandra y Alzate. Lorna was lawfully married to Charlie Balandra, the victim's father, and appellant and Lorna were not married to each other. The case was prosecuted under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."

At 12:15 p.m. of March 18, 2000, thirteen-year-old Jacquelyn Balandra was with her step-sisters, Titin and Crismarie, inside the room of their home located at Old Air Academy, ATO, Don Carlos Village, Pasay City. Appellant Rodrigo Balleno, the live-in partner of Jacquelyn's mother, Lorna, entered the room and ordered Titin and Crismarie to go out. When they were alone, appellant sat at the side of the bed where Jacquelyn was lying down. He touched her thighs, placed her hands on her back, and covered her mouth. He then removed Jacquelyn's shorts and panties, lay on top of her, and kissed her lips. He took off his shorts and inserted his penis into Jacquelyn's vagina, while she tried to push him away.

Jacquelyn went to her friends, Toochie, Nanette, and Mylene, and related to them what happened. They accompanied her to the local barangay where she reported the incident. On the same day, barangay officials Luis Alintana, Efren Bais, and Rogelio Basagre arrested appellant. Jacquelyn executed her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" and submitted herself to a medical examination. Dr. Estela Guerrero Manalo, a physician assigned at the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, Manila, conducted a physical and genital examination on Jacquelyn on March 20, 2000. Her examination showed that the victim's external genitalia and hymen were normal, and there was no evidence of spermatozoa. She, however, claimed that it was possible that the victim was sexually abused even if the result of the examination showed a normal genital.

In his defense, appellant denied the charge against him and claimed that on March 18, 2000, he had a drinking spree at home with his cousin Lito Balleno and Sammy Alzate, uncle of Jacquelyn, from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m., consuming three bottles of gin. He admitted that he kissed Jacquelyn because the latter took care of his youngest child. Thereafter, Jacquelyn pushed him away and left. He fell asleep and was awakened by the barangay officials who arrested him. Appellant further alleged that the crime was imputed to him because Jacquelyn wanted her real father, Charlie, to be reunited with her mother.

The trial court found appellant guilty of simple rape, noting that the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying circumstance of stepparent relationship because appellant and the victim's mother were not married to each other. The court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 and moral damages of ₱50,000.00.

• Guilt Not Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the fact that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, pointing to the inconsistency between the victim's testimony and her sworn statement regarding penile penetration.

• Credibility of the Victim: The prosecution established that the victim's testimony was clear, candid, straightforward, and consistent, and that she had positively identified appellant as her malefactor with no ulterior motive to concoct a story charging him with rape.

• Credibility of the Victim: Whether the trial court erred in giving weight to the victim's testimony despite the alleged inconsistency between her sworn statement and her open court testimony regarding penile penetration.
• Sufficiency of Force and Intimidation: Whether the absence of physical injuries and torn clothing negates the element of force and intimidation in rape.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Stepparent Relationship: Whether the failure to accurately allege the relationship between appellant and the victim in the Information bars conviction of rape in its qualified form.
• Award of Damages: Whether the civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 should be reduced to ₱50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Credibility of the Victim: No. The alleged inconsistency between the victim's sworn statement and her open court testimony did not impair her credibility, as open court declarations take precedence over written affidavits, and the mere touching of the labia consummates the crime of rape.
• Sufficiency of Force and Intimidation: No. The absence of external signs of physical injuries does not prove that rape was not committed, as the force employed need not be irresistible so long as it is present and brings the desired result.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Stepparent Relationship: Yes. The failure to accurately allege the relationship between appellant and the victim in the Information bars his conviction of rape in its qualified form, because the filiation or kinship with the accused must be alleged as part of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
• Award of Damages: Yes. The civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 was reduced to ₱50,000.00, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, while the award of ₱50,000.00 in moral damages was affirmed.

• Credibility of the Victim: Some discrepancies between an affidavit and the testimony of a witness in open court do not necessarily impair credibility, for affidavits are generally taken ex parte and are often incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. An affidavit is not a complete reproduction of what the declarant has in mind because it is generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs it after it has been read to him. Open court declarations take precedence over written affidavits in the hierarchy of evidence. Even assuming there was no penile penetration because the victim's legs were not spread apart, the mere touching of the labia of the woman consummates the crime of rape. The fact that no laceration and no ruptured hymen were found does not necessarily negate rape, for a broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. A medical examination is not essential in the prosecution of a rape case; it is merely corroborative in character. The absence of spermatozoa does not disprove rape, as the victim may have washed or urinated prior to examination. When a woman, more so if a minor, states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed, for no woman would weave a tale of sexual assault and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape.

• Sufficiency of Force and Intimidation: The argument that appellant could not have raped Jacquelyn in a thickly populated squatter's area deserves scant consideration, for lust is no respecter of time and place. Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along roadsides, in school premises, in a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other family members are sleeping. The testimony of Jacquelyn established that, through force and intimidation, appellant pinned her hands at her back, covered her mouth, and succeeded in abusing her. The force employed in rape need not be irresistible so long as it is present and brings the desired result; all that is necessary is that the force be sufficient to fulfill its evil end. The degree of force or intimidation required is relative and must be viewed in light of the complainant's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the offense.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Stepparent Relationship: The word "step," when used as a prefix in conjunction with a degree of kinship, is repugnant to blood relationship and is indicative of a relationship by affinity. Since appellant and the victim's mother were not married, no such relationship by affinity existed between appellant and the victim. A stepfather-stepdaughter relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship, i.e., the appellant should have been legally married to the victim's mother. A stepfather is the husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. Citing People vs. Fraga, the Court held that although the rape of a person under eighteen years of age by the common-law spouse of the victim's mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed because the relationship was not what was alleged in the information. The filiation or kinship with the accused must be alleged in the information as part of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Therefore, the failure to accurately allege the relationship bars conviction of rape in its qualified form, and appellant was correctly convicted of simple rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, punishable by reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B.

• Award of Damages: In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be reduced to ₱50,000.00. Civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of moral damages, which is automatically granted in rape cases. Moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 are additionally awarded without need of pleading or proof of the basis thereof, because it is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odiousness of the crime to warrant per se the award of moral damages.

• Touching of the labia consummates rape — The mere touching of the labia of the woman consummates the crime of rape, even without full penile penetration. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that even assuming there was no penile penetration because the victim's legs were not spread apart, the crime of rape was still consummated.

• Open court declarations take precedence over written affidavits — In the hierarchy of evidence, open court declarations take precedence over written affidavits because affidavits are generally taken ex parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. The Court applied this doctrine to reject appellant's argument based on the inconsistency between the victim's sworn statement and her testimony.

• Filiation or kinship must be alleged in the Information — The filiation or kinship with the accused must be alleged in the information as part of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the failure to accurately allege the stepparent relationship barred conviction of rape in its qualified form.

• Force need not be irresistible — The force employed in rape need not be irresistible so long as it is present and brings the desired result; all that is necessary is that the force be sufficient to fulfill its evil end. The degree of force or intimidation required is relative and must be viewed in light of the complainant's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the offense.

• "It has been consistently ruled that the mere touching of the labia of the woman consummates the crime of rape." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on what constitutes consummated rape, applied to reject appellant's argument that there was no penile penetration.

• "The filiation or kinship with the accused must be alleged in the information as part of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for why the failure to accurately allege the stepparent relationship barred conviction of rape in its qualified form.

• "When a woman, more so if a minor, states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed." — This passage articulates the principle governing the credibility of rape victims, particularly minors, and why their testimony alone can sustain a conviction.

• People vs. Fraga, G.R. Nos. 134130-33, 12 April 2000, 330 SCRA 669 — Controlling precedent holding that although the rape of a person under eighteen years of age by the common-law spouse of the victim's mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed when the relationship alleged in the information was that of stepfather, not common-law spouse of the mother.
• People vs. Sabredo, G.R. No. 126114, 11 May 2000, 331 SCRA 663 — Cited for the rule that discrepancies between an affidavit and open court testimony do not necessarily impair credibility.
• People vs. Tagaylo, G.R. Nos. 137108-09, 20 November 2000, 345 SCRA 284 — Cited for the doctrine that the mere touching of the labia consummates the crime of rape.
• People vs. Tolentino, 367 Phil. 755 (1999) — Cited for the definition of a stepfather as the husband of one's mother by virtue of a subsequent marriage.
• People vs. Villaraza, G.R. Nos. 131848-50, 5 September 2000, 339 SCRA 666 — Cited for the definition of a stepdaughter and for the rule that failure to accurately allege the relationship bars conviction in the qualified form.
• People vs. Rafales, 379 Phil. 980 (2000) — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity for rape should be ₱50,000.00.

• Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 — Defines rape as carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation. The Court applied this provision to sustain the conviction for simple rape.
• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 — Provides that rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. The Court applied this provision to affirm the penalty imposed by the trial court.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.