People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Villa, Jr. y Delgado

The exempting circumstance of insanity requires complete deprivation of intelligence or freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the offense, and mere abnormality of mental faculties is not sufficient. The defense of insanity must be proven with clear and convincing evidence, and the accused bears the burden of overcoming the legal presumption of sound mind.

Rodolfo Villa, Jr. was a member of the CAFGU (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit) and a neighbor of the Fernandez family in New Cabalan, Olongapo City. The case involves the exempting circumstance of insanity under the Revised Penal Code, which requires a showing of complete deprivation of reason or discernment at the time of the commission of the crime. The accused was charged with four counts of Murder qualified by treachery.

In the early morning of June 22, 1991, Dionito Fernandez was cutting grass in his yard in New Cabalan, Olongapo City. Accused Rodolfo Villa, Jr., a member of the CAFGU and neighbor of Dionito, suddenly came out of his house with his M-1 Garand rifle and shot Dionito from behind, killing him instantly. Ronald Fernandez and Sheila Fernandez, children of Dionito, rushed to their father's rescue after hearing the gunshot, but the accused also fired at them, fatally hitting Ronald who was embracing his father, and mortally wounding Sheila on the thigh and stomach. Samuel Eclevia, another neighbor, attempted to wrestle the rifle from the accused, but Samuel too was gunned down.

After his rampage, Rodolfo Villa Jr. surrendered to a certain Captain Dolino of S2 OMDC (Olongapo Metropolitan District Command). Rodolfo was charged with multiple murder. When arraigned on October 3, 1991, he entered a plea of not guilty. Later, his counsel manifested in open court that the accused was desirous of changing his plea to guilty. Thereafter, the accused invoked self-defense insofar as Dionito Fernandez was concerned, as the latter tried to stab him with a bolo. The trial court proceeded to propound searching questions on the accused to determine whether he understood the nature and consequences of his change of plea, and upon being satisfied with the answers given by the accused who was assisted by counsel, the court allowed the change of plea.

On July 16, 1992, the trial court issued an order appointing Atty. Romeo Alinea as counsel de oficio for the accused, as his counsel de parte Atty. Cipriano Dumpit was unavailable due to his ongoing medical treatment. Before the defense could present its evidence, counsel de oficio Alinea manifested his inability to confer with the accused but moved that a psychiatric examination of the accused be made at the National Center for Mental Health to determine his mental condition. The motion was granted, and the accused was examined at the Olongapo City General Hospital to ascertain whether he was suffering from mental illness before, during, and after the commission of the crimes.

Dr. Romeo Enriquez, the examining psychiatrist at the Olongapo City General Hospital, recommended that the accused be confined at the National Center for Mental Health, Forensic Pavilion, where an evaluation process for the possibility of insanity could be made. On November 4, 1994, the accused was confined and treated at the National Center for Mental Health under the direct supervision of Dr. Celeste A. C. Peña and Dr. Isagani S. Gonzales. On December 21, 1994, after more than a month of psychiatric evaluation, the attending physicians submitted a psychiatric evaluation report stating that the patient was suffering from Insanity or Psychosis classified as Schizophrenia, characterized by deterioration in social and occupational functioning, auditory hallucination, delusion, thought disturbances, and poor judgment, and that he was at that time incompetent to stand trial.

Six months later, on June 5, 1995, a follow-up report on the patient's psychiatric status was made by Dr. Cheryl Zalsos, with remarks that the patient's status had improved enough for him to withstand the rigors of the trial. Adoracion Manuit, Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Section, National Center for Mental Health, filed a Petition for Release praying that the accused be discharged and returned to jail for the speedy disposition of his case, and further recommending that he be allowed to undergo periodic check-up to sustain his improved mental state as well as to prevent a relapse of his illness. In its Order of June 21, 1995, the trial court granted the petition, and the trial resumed with the accused now raising insanity as a defense.

On April 3, 1997, the trial court disregarded the defense of insanity and convicted the accused of the crimes charged. The trial court found that the evaluation reports did not state in unequivocal terms that the accused was suffering from insanity of schizophrenic type before or during the killing, and that the accused failed to prove complete deprivation of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court.

• Insanity as Exempting Circumstance: Accused-appellant argued that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crimes, relying on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Peña and Dr. Gonzales and the testimony of Dr. Zalsos, which stated that he was suffering from insanity or psychosis classified as schizophrenia.
• Sufficiency of Psychiatric Evidence: The defense maintained that the psychiatrists at the National Center for Mental Health arrived at their conclusion after a series of medical and psychological examinations on accused-appellant during his confinement at the center, which should be sufficient to establish his insanity.

• Presumption of Sound Mind: The prosecution relied on the legal presumption that every person is of sound mind, and that the accused bears the burden of proving the exempting circumstance of insanity with clear and convincing evidence.
• Acts Consistent with Sanity: The prosecution pointed to the accused's conduct immediately after the killings—his surrender to authorities, his remorse, and his ability to give a detailed sworn statement—as evidence that he was sane at the time of the commission of the crimes.

• Insanity Defense: Whether accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the crimes as would exempt him from criminal liability.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Public Position: Whether the aggravating circumstance of "taking advantage of his public position" as a CAFGU member should be considered against accused-appellant.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Plea of Guilty: Whether the trial court properly credited the mitigating circumstance of "plea of guilty" in favor of accused-appellant.

• Insanity Defense: No. The defense of insanity was not proven with clear and convincing evidence. The psychiatric evaluation reports did not establish that accused-appellant suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence or freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crimes.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Public Position: No. The mere fact that accused-appellant was a member of the CAFGU and was issued an M-1 Garand rifle is not sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission of the crimes.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Plea of Guilty: Yes. The trial court properly credited the mitigating circumstance of "plea of guilty" in favor of accused-appellant.

• Insanity Defense: The Court defined insanity as existing when there is complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason, acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. The Court found that the following circumstances negated a complete absence of intelligence on the part of accused-appellant: (a) immediately after he killed the victims he thought of surrendering to the PC Detachment in Olongapo City; (b) he showed remorse during his confinement at the Mental Hospital; and (c) he was able to give a Sworn Statement before the Prosecutor's Office in Olongapo City immediately after the commission of the crimes narrating his version of the incident. The Court found it incredible for a supposedly deranged person to remember vividly and give such a lucid and detailed account of the carnage, from the moment he shot his first victim up to the time he surrendered to the authorities. The Court also noted that the psychiatrists relied mainly on the data supplied by accused-appellant and his police escort, without conducting an independent interview of any of accused-appellant's family members, relatives, or persons who could provide information on his state of mind before or during the commission of the offenses. The Court stated that it could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the center, but in all probability, such insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. The inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Public Position: The Court held that the mere fact that accused-appellant was a member of the CAFGU and was issued an M-1 Garand rifle is not sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission of the crimes.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Plea of Guilty: The Court affirmed the trial court's appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. Following Art. 64, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code, there being one mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty on accused-appellant should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period for each crime of murder, it being the minimum imposable penalty after appreciating one mitigating circumstance in his favor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be meted an indeterminate sentence within the range of prision mayor maximum as minimum to reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.

• Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance — Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason, acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the accused's acts—surrendering to authorities, showing remorse, and giving a detailed sworn statement—negated a complete absence of intelligence.
• Burden of Proof in Insanity Defense — The law presumes every man to be of sound mind, and a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Insanity is a defense by way of confession and avoidance. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the accused miserably failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the crimes freely, knowingly, and intelligently.
• Relevance of Mental State at Time of Commission — An inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability. The Court applied this doctrine in noting that the accused's insanity, if any, may have been contracted during his detention pending trial.

• "Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts." — This passage defines the controlling doctrine of insanity as an exempting circumstance and is the canonical formulation applied by the Court in this case.
• "The fact that immediately after the incident (accused) thought of surrendering to the law-enforcement authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it." — This quotation from People vs. Ambal, cited by the Court, establishes that the act of surrendering immediately after the crime is evidence of sanity and consciousness of guilt.
• "We find it incredible for a supposedly deranged person to remember vividly and give such a lucid and detailed account of the carnage, from the moment he shot his first victim up to the time he surrendered to the authorities." — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning for rejecting the insanity defense based on the accused's detailed sworn statement.
• "It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the center. But, in all probability, such insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending trial." — This passage illustrates the Court's application of the doctrine that the relevant inquiry is the accused's mental state at the time of the commission of the crime, not during trial.

• People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851 — Cited for the doctrine that for insanity to be considered an exempting circumstance, it must be shown to exist just before or during the commission of the offense.
• People vs. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275 — Cited for the doctrine that to exempt the accused from criminal liability, it must be shown beyond cavil of doubt that there was complete deprivation of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime.
• People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, 17 October 1980, 100 SCRA 325 — Cited for the proposition that the fact that immediately after the incident the accused thought of surrendering to the law-enforcement authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.
• People vs. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991, 199 SCRA 860 — Cited for the definition of insanity as complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act.
• People vs. So, G.R. No. 104664, 28 August 1995, 247 SCRA 708 — Cited for the doctrine that the law presumes every man to be of sound mind, and a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it.
• People vs. Pantoja, No. L-18793, 11 October 1968, 25 SCRA 468 — Cited for the proposition that the mere fact of being a member of the CAFGU and being issued a rifle is not sufficient to establish misuse of public position.

• Article 64, paragraph (2), Revised Penal Code — Applied to determine the imposable penalty when there is one mitigating circumstance, resulting in the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period for each crime of murder.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the range of the indeterminate sentence, resulting in prision mayor maximum as minimum to reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.