People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Baguio y Tampos

A victim's statement identifying his assailants, made immediately after a sudden and unexpected attack and while he was being carried to the hospital, is admissible both as a dying declaration — the declarant's consciousness of impending death being inferable from the statement itself and the serious nature of his wounds — and, independently, as part of the res gestae as a spontaneous statement made under the exciting influence of a startling occurrence. Corollarily, the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for murder is reclusion perpetua in its medium period, and reclusion perpetua is not the same as, and must not be equated with, "life imprisonment."

Alfredo Paulino y Austria, thirty-three years old, was a businessman who also served as Barangay Tanod and Pook Leader of his barangay, and was survived by his widow Lidovina Vallefas and their five children. He had earlier had unpleasant dealings with Rodolfo Baguio y Tampos, alias "Bebot," whom he suspected, together with a certain Frankie, of thievery in the neighborhood; when a Dr. Narciso lost his watch, it was found in Bebot's possession and Bebot was constrained to return it. Baguio was charged as a co-conspirator in the killing together with several unnamed John Does, while one identified assailant, Francisco Pinili, was separately indicted before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on account of his minority at the time of the offense.

Alfredo Paulino y Austria, thirty-three years old, was a businessman who also served as Barangay Tanod and Pook Leader of Barangay Gulod, Quezon City, where he lived with his wife Lidovina Vallefas and their five children. He had earlier had unpleasant dealings with Rodolfo Baguio y Tampos, alias "Bebot," whom he suspected, along with another person known to his wife as Frankie, of thievery in the neighborhood; when a certain Dr. Narciso lost his watch, it was found in Bebot's possession and Bebot was constrained to return it.

At about ten o'clock in the evening of March 31, 1981, Lidovina and her husband were conversing with a certain Benny in front of their house when a group of about nine or ten people passed by. Among the group she recognized Bebot. As these persons were passing, Lidovina went inside her house to get money to buy cigarettes. While inside, she heard her husband cry out, "Aray ko po!" She rushed out and saw her husband sprawled on the ground while Bebot and his companions were stabbing him with pointed weapons. She saw Bebot himself thrust his weapon at her husband twice. The assailants then fled.

Lidovina went to her husband and helped him to his feet. In a weak voice, with blood soaking his clothing, he said several times, "Kung ako ay bibigyan pa ng Diyos ng pangalawang buhay, hindi maaaring hindi mananagot si Bebot at Frankie." Two neighbors, Ismael Milan and a Mr. Sinucuban, helped her bring Alfredo to the hospital. He died in the surgery room at about noon of the following day, April 1, 1981. The autopsy disclosed twenty-three stab wounds on his person, eleven of which had in all probability been inflicted by a pointed instrument or instruments such as an ice pick, and twelve by partially pointed, single-bladed weapons.

Lidovina gave a written statement to the police on April 1, 1981. In the middle of August 1981, she was called to the police headquarters where, from among five persons made to line up before her, she picked out Rodolfo Baguio. An information charging Baguio, together with several John Does whose true names and whereabouts had not yet been ascertained, as co-conspirators in the crime of murder with treachery and abuse of superior strength, was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-17059. One of the identified assailants, Francisco Pinili, was indicted for the same crime before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City on account of his minority at the time of the offense. Only Baguio was arraigned and tried; his co-conspirators were never arrested.

Apart from the testimony of the victim's wife and of the NBI medico-legal officer who performed the post-mortem examination, the prosecution presented Pat. Restituto de Leon, the police officer who investigated the case. He declared that it was he who took down the written statements of the widow and of Baguio, the latter's statement being marked as Exhibit "C," and that prior to questioning Baguio he had advised him, in Tagalog, of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to have the assistance of counsel, and that his statement may be used for or against him.

The defense of alibi was put forth by Baguio. He testified that at the time of the killing he was at work as a house painter at an apartment on Mauban Street, Bonifacio, Balintawak, and that he worked overtime on that day until midnight; that he was informed of the killing by his wife when he reached home after work but did not mind it much, although the victim was a friend whom he saw quite often, because stabbings were an ordinary occurrence in their neighborhood; and that he thereafter continued reporting for work as usual. He denied having had a hand in the slaying of Alfredo Paulino, or having signed Exhibit "C," alleging that while it was true that he had been interrogated by the police on August 9, 1981 and had furnished the information appearing in that exhibit, the investigation was for a case of "robbery-snatching" and not for the killing of Alfredo Paulino. He also denied having any enemies in the locality, and offered the testimony of his helper, Rodolfo Pabica, in an attempt to substantiate his alibi. Pabica deposed that he was a helper of Baguio and the latter's father; that he started to work with them in March 1981; that they left their place of work at midnight of March 31, 1981 because they worked overtime; and that, contradicting Baguio's testimony that he had continued working as usual after March 31, 1981, Baguio had not reported for work any more since April 1, 1981 because, according to his father, he was a suspect in a criminal case.

The trial court rejected Baguio's alibi and declared the evidence of the prosecution to have established beyond reasonable doubt the commission by Baguio of the crime of murder qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstances of premeditation and abuse of superior strength. It found itself morally certain that Rodolfo Baguio was one of those who killed Alfredo Paulino in conspiracy with his co-accused who were still at large, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Alfredo Paulino in the amount of P12,000.00, with costs.

• Dying Declaration: The accused-appellant argued that the ante-mortem statements of the victim, Alfredo Paulino, do not qualify as a dying declaration; he contended that the utterance could not have been made, much less repeated, in view of the number and gravity of the decedent's wounds, and expressed doubt as to whether Paulino was "under the consciousness of impending death" at the time he uttered the statement, that being one of the requisites for admission of the statement as an exception to the hearsay rule.
• Rejection of Defense Witness: The accused-appellant argued that the trial court disregarded the testimony of Rodolfo Pabica on the basis of his delayed appearance as a witness.
• Inadmissible Police Statement: The accused-appellant argued that the trial court used against him his written statement taken under police investigation, Exhibit "C," in violation of his rights under the Constitution.

• Dying Declaration: Whether the ante-mortem statements made by the victim, Alfredo Paulino, shortly after receiving his wounds are admissible as a dying declaration.
• Rejection of Defense Witness: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the testimony of defense witness Rodolfo Pabica on the ground of his delayed appearance as a witness.
• Inadmissible Police Statement: Whether the trial court erred in using against the accused his written statement taken during police investigation, in violation of his constitutional rights.

• Dying Declaration: Yes. The statement was properly admitted as a dying declaration, the declarant's consciousness of impending death being inferable from the statement itself and the serious nature of his wounds; in any event, it was admissible as part of the res gestae as a spontaneous statement made under the exciting influence of a startling occurrence.
• Rejection of Defense Witness: No. The trial court rejected Pabica's evidence not so much because he was tardily presented but chiefly because he did not impress the court as a credible witness.
• Inadmissible Police Statement: No ruling is necessary. Even without taking account of Exhibit "C," the conviction can stand upon the other proofs on record and must perforce be affirmed.

• Dying Declaration: The appellant's argument that the utterance could not have been made, much less repeated, given the number and gravity of the decedent's wounds was mere conjecture and could not be sustained in the face of the positive evidence that despite the fatal character of his injuries the deceased was still alive while being brought to the hospital and in truth died only at about eleven o'clock in the morning of the following day, and the equally positive testimony that the statement was indeed made, not once, but several times. On the requisite of consciousness of impending death, the statement itself was the best proof of the fact: it opened with the hope that God might somehow give the declarant a second life, and that wish for a second life could not but indicate his awareness that his first life was draining away with the blood flowing from his many and grievous wounds. The other requisites of a dying declaration being present — the statement concerned the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; the declarant was otherwise competent as a witness; and the declaration was offered in a criminal case the subject of which was the declarant's killing — the admission and appreciation of the statement by the trial court could hardly be faulted. In any case, even if the declaration were refused admission as a dying declaration, there could be no question about its admissibility as part of the res gestae, another equally well-known exception to the hearsay rule, as a statement made while a startling occurrence is taking place, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, descriptive of the occurrence itself and admissible in proof of that occurrence. It was difficult to imagine an occurrence more startling than a sudden attack by several armed men and the infliction by them of numerous stab wounds on the declarant; it was therefore reasonable to assume that statements made by the victim immediately after the unexpected attack and in relation thereto must have been drawn from him almost involuntarily, under the exciting influence of the shocking event, with neither time nor opportunity to deliberate thereon. In such a situation, it is the event speaking through the declarant, not the declarant speaking of the event, his statements being the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action, and pure emanations of the occurrence itself.

• Rejection of Defense Witness: The trial court rejected Pabica's evidence not so much because he was tardily presented but chiefly because he did not impress the court as a credible witness. It was exceedingly strange that after Baguio had been charged with the murder of Alfredo Paulino and Pabica had been informed of it, Pabica never got in touch with Baguio to offer to tell the authorities about their whereabouts at the time of the offense, nor did Baguio ever seek Pabica out to substantiate his alibi. It could not have escaped Baguio that his co-workers, his own father and Pabica, were the best witnesses to prove his absence from the scene of the crime at the time of its perpetration, yet Baguio never presented his father to testify in support of his alibi, and Pabica's becoming a witness was pure and simple happenstance about three years after the murder, when he chanced upon Baguio's mother at a basketball court and was then, and only then, asked to testify in Baguio's behalf. The trial court was therefore correct in refusing to accord credence to his testimony. The defense of alibi was likewise properly rejected: aside from its inherent weakness on account of the ease with which it may be fabricated, it is unavailing where, as here, there is affirmative evidence of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, if not indeed his positive identification as the actual perpetrator by an eyewitness who has not been demonstrated to be other than truthful or possessed of any ill motive against the appellant, as well as by the ante-mortem statements of the victim received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae.

• Inadmissible Police Statement: There was no need to discuss the third assigned error, which dealt with the appellant's admissions in Exhibit "C," because even without taking account of that exhibit, Baguio's conviction could stand upon the other proofs on record and must perforce be affirmed.

• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances, and Penalty: The facts demonstrated a deliberate, sudden and unexpected attack on the victim, without any warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault, so that treachery qualified the killing as murder. Abuse of superior strength, however, could not be independently appreciated as an aggravating circumstance since it is absorbed in treachery. Similarly, evident premeditation could not be considered against the appellant and his co-accused; for although they all took part in the slaying and cooperated with each other in such a manner as to show a community of purpose and oneness of criminal intent, there was no adequate evidence that they had planned the crime and had sufficient time and opportunity to reflect thereon before actually carrying it into effect. The penalty prescribed for murder by the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal maximum to death; there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, reclusion perpetua, which was in fact the penalty meted out by the trial court. As regards the indemnity payable to the heirs of Alfredo Paulino, the same should be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00, conformably with current doctrine. Finally, the trial court's judgment, in sentencing Baguio "to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" as if these penalties were one and the same, was incorrect: murder is defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code, and within the range of the penalty prescribed therefor is the penalty of reclusion perpetua; the Code does not prescribe the penalty of "life imprisonment" for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, and carries with it accessory penalties such as perpetual special disqualification; it is not the same as "life imprisonment," which does not carry any accessory penalty and does not appear to have any definite extent or duration. The felony committed by Baguio being one punished under the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is that prescribed by the same Code, reclusion perpetua, not "life imprisonment."

• Dying Declaration — A declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. The requisites are: (a) the statement concerns the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) the declarant was otherwise competent as a witness; (c) the declaration was offered in a criminal case the subject of which was the declarant's killing; and (d) it was made under a consciousness of impending death. The Court held that although the declarant did not categorically state that he believed his death to be inevitable, the serious nature of his wounds justified the conclusion that he was conscious of his impending death; the statement itself — a wish that God might give him a second life — was the best proof of his awareness that his first life was draining away.
• Res Gestae (Spontaneous Statements) — Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. The Court held that the victim's statement, made immediately after a sudden attack by several armed men and the infliction of numerous stab wounds, was drawn from him almost involuntarily under the exciting influence of the shocking event, with neither time nor opportunity to deliberate; it is the event speaking through the declarant, not the declarant speaking of the event, the statements being the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action, and pure emanations of the occurrence itself.
• Alibi — Alibi is inherently weak on account of the ease with which it may be fabricated, and is unavailing where there is affirmative evidence of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, if not indeed his positive identification as the actual perpetrator by an eyewitness who has not been shown to be untruthful or possessed of any ill motive against the accused, as well as by the ante-mortem statements of the victim received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae.
• Treachery — Treachery qualifies a killing as murder where the facts demonstrate a deliberate, sudden and unexpected attack on the victim, without any warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault.
• Abuse of Superior Strength Absorbed in Treachery — Abuse of superior strength may not be independently appreciated as an aggravating circumstance where it is absorbed in treachery.
• Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation may not be considered against the accused where, although they all took part in the slaying and cooperated with each other in such a manner as to show a community of purpose and oneness of criminal intent, there is no adequate evidence that they had planned the crime and had sufficient time and opportunity to reflect thereon before actually carrying it into effect.
• Reclusion Perpetua Distinguished from Life Imprisonment — Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, and carries with it accessory penalties such as perpetual special disqualification. It is not the same as "life imprisonment," which does not carry any accessory penalty and does not appear to have any definite extent or duration. The Revised Penal Code does not prescribe "life imprisonment" for any of the felonies therein defined; that penalty is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Code but by special laws.
• Civil Indemnity — The indemnity payable to the heirs of the victim should be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00, conformably with current doctrine.

• "The statement itself would appear to be the best proof of this fact. It opens with the hope that God might somehow give him a second life. But surely, that wish for a second life expressed by the deceased cannot but indicate his awareness that his first life was draining away with the blood flowing from his many and grievous wounds." — This passage supplies the Court's ratio for finding the requisite consciousness of impending death despite the absence of an express declaration by the victim that he believed his death to be inevitable; it is the frequently cited formulation for inferring that requisite from the statement itself and the gravity of the wounds.
• "In such a situation, as has very often been said with no little accuracy, it is the event speaking through the declarant, not the declarant speaking of the event, his statements being 'the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action, . . . pure emanations of the occurrence itself.'" — This is the Court's canonical articulation of the res gestae or spontaneous-statement exception to the hearsay rule, invoked as an independent ground for admitting the victim's ante-mortem statement even if it were not received as a dying declaration.
• "Abuse of superior strength may not however be independently appreciated as an aggravating circumstance since it is absorbed in treachery." — A concise statement of the rule on the relationship between treachery and abuse of superior strength, applied to strike down one of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court.
• "Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely; perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as 'life imprisonment' which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration." — This passage defines the distinction between the Code penalty of reclusion perpetua and the special-law penalty of life imprisonment, and is the basis for correcting the trial court's alternative reference to "life imprisonment."

• People vs. Dinglasa, G.R. No. 75619, April 3, 1990 — Cited as authority that although the declarant did not categorically state that he believed his death to be inevitable, the serious nature of his wounds justifies the conclusion that he was conscious of his impending death.
• People vs. Nabor, G.R. Nos. 77822-23, May 21, 1990 — Cited for the same proposition on consciousness of impending death, and again as authority on the requisites of a dying declaration.
• People vs. Laredo, G.R. Nos. 81249-51, May 14, 1990 — Cited as authority on the admissibility of the ante-mortem statement as part of the res gestae.
• People vs. Ramillo, 147 SCRA 109 (1987) and People vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113 (1987) — Cited together as authority on the spontaneous-statement rule and the rationale that statements made under the exciting influence of a startling occurrence are drawn from the declarant almost involuntarily.
• People vs. Centeno, 172 SCRA 607 and People vs. Manzanares, 177 SCRA 427 — Cited as authority that abuse of superior strength may not be independently appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because it is absorbed in treachery.
• U.S. vs. Lasada, 21 Phil. 287 — Cited, through Aquino's commentary, as authority on evident premeditation and the requirement of proof of planning and opportunity to reflect.
• People vs. Mobe, 81 SCRA 58, People vs. Phones, 84 SCRA 167, and People vs. Sumadic, 113 SCRA 689 — Cited as authority distinguishing reclusion perpetua from life imprisonment and confirming that the former is the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Jusep, 151 SCRA 248 (1987) and People vs. Perante, Jr., 143 SCRA 56 — Cited, among a line of cases, on the inherent weakness of alibi and its unavailability in the face of positive identification by an eyewitness.
• People vs. Sagario, 14 SCRA 468 and People vs. Saliling, L-27974, February 27, 1976 — Cited, through Moran's Comments on the Rules, as authority on the requisites of a dying declaration.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes the crime of murder, for which the prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal maximum to death. The Court applied the article in holding that the felony committed by Baguio is punished under the Revised Penal Code, so that the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua — the medium period, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance — and not "life imprisonment," which the Code does not prescribe for any felony.
• Section 31, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Provides that the declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. The Court applied this provision in sustaining the admission of the victim's ante-mortem statement as a dying declaration.
• Section 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. The Court applied this provision as an independent basis for admitting the victim's statement even assuming it were not admissible as a dying declaration.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ.