People of the Philippines vs. Rodencio Narca y Gagarin, et al.

The conviction for murder was affirmed where the prosecution established treachery and conspiracy through positive identification, dying declarations, and circumstantial evidence, and where the accused failed to prove self-defense or alibi. The penalty of life imprisonment was modified to reclusion perpetua because life imprisonment is not a penalty under the Revised Penal Code and is not equivalent to reclusion perpetua.

The four appellants — Rodencio, Benjamin, and Rogelio Narca, and their brother-in-law Jaime Baldelamar — were charged with murder for the death of Mauro Reglos, Jr. The victim and his wife Elizabeth were returning home from visiting the victim's sick father when the attack occurred. The case arose from a criminal information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, alleging that the appellants, conspiring together and taking advantage of nighttime, treachery, and evident premeditation, hacked the victim with bolos.

On March 10, 1990, between 7:00 and 8:00 in the evening, spouses Mauro Reglos, Jr. and Elizabeth Reglos were returning home to Sta. Ana, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, after visiting the victim's sick father at Barangay Cavite Plum, Guimba. As they walked, appellant Benjamin Narca suddenly hacked Mauro at the back portion of his head with a long bolo known as a "panabas." When Mauro was about to fall backward, Jaime Baldelamar, Rogelio Narca, and Rodencio "Rudy" Narca suddenly appeared and took turns hacking Mauro with bolos.

Elizabeth screamed for help, and Arturo Reglos and Dante Reglos responded, arriving at the scene to find Benjamin, Rodencio, and Rogelio Narca, and Jaime Baldelamar, all armed with bolos, guarding Mauro, who was lying face downward, soaked with blood but still alive. Arturo and Dante could not approach the victim because the appellants threatened them. Two minutes after Arturo and Dante arrived, all the accused left, but Rogelio Narca returned and hacked Mauro once more at his back. When Arturo approached the victim, Mauro told him that he was hacked and attacked by the appellants, asking why they did this to him when he had no fault.

The victim's wife Elizabeth testified during the bail hearings on September 19, 1990. Defense counsel requested that cross-examination be conducted on the next hearing, October 4, 1990. That cross-examination never took place because Elizabeth and her son were bludgeoned to death on September 28, 1990.

On appeal, appellant Benjamin admitted killing the victim but invoked self-defense, while the other appellants claimed alibi, stating they were not at the scene of the crime. Appellants Rogelio and Rodencio claimed they were irrigating their farm until 9:00 P.M. on the fatal night. The distance of the appellants' houses to the crime scene ranged from as near as 3 meters to as far as 1,500 meters, and their field was about 800 meters away, or a mere 15-minute walk. The trial court found the testimonies of the accused self-serving, improbable, and not in accordance with common knowledge and experience, while the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Elizabeth, Arturo, and Dante Reglos were revealing, straight to the point, probable, and consistent.

• Invalid Preliminary Investigation: Appellants assailed the validity of the preliminary investigation because they were not represented by counsel therein and were thereby deprived of due process.
• Inadmissibility of Testimony: Appellants argued that the testimony of Elizabeth Reglos during the bail hearings should not be given credence since she was not cross-examined, and that such testimony, having been taken during bail hearings, could not be used against them at trial.
• Self-Defense: Appellant Benjamin admitted killing the victim but invoked self-defense, claiming he assumed full and sole responsibility for the victim's death.
• Alibi: The other appellants claimed they were not at the scene of the crime, with Rogelio and Rodencio contending they were irrigating their farm until 9:00 P.M. on the fatal night.

• Positive Identification: The prosecution presented witnesses who positively identified the appellants as being present at the scene of the crime, armed with bolos and a "panabas," and who saw them guarding the victim's prostrate body.
• Dying Declaration: The victim's statement to Arturo Reglos identifying the appellants as his assailants was admissible as a dying declaration, all elements for its admissibility being present.
• Circumstantial Evidence: The combination of undisputed facts — presence at the scene, possession of sharp instruments, coordination among the appellants, prevention of rescue, and the medical examination showing wounds caused by sharp instruments — produced a logical conclusion pointing to the appellants' culpability.

• Validity of Preliminary Investigation: Whether the preliminary investigation was invalid for lack of counsel, thereby depriving the appellants of due process.
• Admissibility of Deceased Witness's Testimony: Whether the testimony of Elizabeth Reglos taken during bail hearings, without cross-examination due to her death, was admissible against the appellants.
• Self-Defense: Whether appellant Benjamin Narca validly invoked self-defense.
• Alibi: Whether the other appellants' defense of alibi was sufficient to overcome the prosecution's evidence.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy among the appellants was established.
• Evident Premeditation and Nighttime: Whether the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and nighttime were proven.
• Penalty: Whether the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment.

• Validity of Preliminary Investigation: No. There is nothing in the Rules that renders invalid a preliminary investigation held without the defendant's counsel; preliminary investigation is not part of the due process clause but a right merely created by law, and its invalidity or absence does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
• Admissibility of Deceased Witness's Testimony: Yes, admissible. The right to cross-examination is a personal right that may be waived expressly or impliedly; the defense's failure to cross-examine Elizabeth, having sought deferment, constituted an implied waiver, and her testimony was admissible under Section 1(f) of Rule 115 and Section 8 of Rule 114, as amended.
• Self-Defense: No. The foremost element of unlawful aggression was absent; the victim was walking with his wife when he was suddenly attacked without warning, and the location and severity of the wounds belied the claim of self-defense.
• Alibi: No. The defense of alibi crumbled in the face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses and the victim's dying declaration; the appellants failed to show it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene at the covered time.
• Treachery: Yes. The attack was perpetrated suddenly and without warning, satisfying the two conditions of treachery: employment of means of execution giving the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself, and deliberate and conscious adoption of such means.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was inferred from the coordinated acts and movements of the co-conspirators — the victim was first hacked by Benjamin and then almost simultaneously by the others, and the appellants were seen talking together and left the crime scene together.
• Evident Premeditation and Nighttime: No. The records were bereft of direct evidence of a plan or preparation to kill, and the mere fact that the crime was committed at 6:30–7:00 p.m. did not prove that the appellants used darkness to facilitate their design; nighttime was absorbed in treachery.
• Penalty: The penalty of life imprisonment was erroneous; the proper penalty was reclusion perpetua, the medium period of reclusion temporal maximum to death under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code where there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.

• Validity of Preliminary Investigation: Preliminary investigation is not a part of the due process clause but a right merely created by law; it is not the venue for the full exercise of the rights of the parties and is merely preparatory to trial. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is only to determine a well-grounded belief that a crime was probably committed by the accused. Moreover, the invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor impair the validity of the information.

• Admissibility of Deceased Witness's Testimony: The defense's failure to cross-examine Elizabeth was occasioned by her supervening death, but lack of cross-examination due to the death of the witness does not necessarily render the deceased's previous testimony expungible. Mere opportunity, not actual cross-examination, is the essence of the right to cross-examine. The appellants lost such opportunity when they sought deferment of cross-examination, and they only have themselves to blame. The right to cross-examination is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right. Under Section 1(f) of Rule 115, either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased given in another case or proceeding, and under Section 8 of Rule 114, as amended by Circular 12-94, evidence presented during bail hearings is considered automatically reproduced at trial.

• Self-Defense: One who claims self-defense must prove: (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person; mere shouting, intimidating, or threatening attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression. The evidence showed the victim was only walking with his wife when he was suddenly attacked with a "panabas" and bolos, hit at the back of his head, chopping off a part of his skull and exposing his brain. Once alevosia was established, any claim of self-defense cannot prosper for being inconsistent with treachery. The location and severity of the fatal wounds indicated a determined effort to kill. Appellant Benjamin failed to discharge his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the exculpatory cause he invoked.

• Alibi: The defense of alibi, aside from being inherently weak and easy to fabricate, crumbles in the face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses and the victim's dying declaration. The appellants failed to strictly comply with the requirements of time and place by failing to show they were somewhere else when the crime occurred and that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene at the covered time. The distance of their houses to the crime scene ranged from 3 meters to 1,500 meters, and their field was about 800 meters away or a mere 15-minute walk.

• Treachery: Where the attack is perpetrated suddenly and without warning, there is treachery. The two conditions of treachery are: (a) employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) that said means of execution be deliberately and consciously adopted. Due to the appellants' treacherous acts, the outnumbered victim was caught by surprise and had no chance to defend himself.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof; it may be inferred from the coordinated acts and movements of the co-conspirators. The appellants' actions implicitly showed unity of purpose — a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. Having established conspiracy, all the appellants are answerable as co-principals regardless of their degree of participation, and it becomes unnecessary to determine who inflicted the fatal wounds.

• Evident Premeditation and Nighttime: To appreciate evident premeditation, three elements must be established: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow reflection. The records were bereft of direct evidence of a plan. As to nighttime, the mere fact that the crime was committed at 6:30–7:00 p.m. does not prove that the appellants used darkness to facilitate their design; the record was silent whether they took advantage of nocturnity. However, nighttime is absorbed in treachery.

• Penalty: Life imprisonment is nowhere in the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, nor is it a penalty similar to reclusion perpetua. Prior to the Heinous Crimes Law (R.A. 7659), the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death. In accordance with the graduation of penalties in Article 63, when there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty is the medium period, which is reclusion perpetua.

• Right to Cross-Examination as Waivable — The right to cross-examination is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right. Where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right, and the testimony given on direct examination will be received or allowed to remain in the record. The common basic principle underlying implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.

• Admissibility of Testimony of Deceased Witness — Under Section 1(f) of Rule 115, either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased given in another case or proceeding. Under Section 8 of Rule 114, as amended by Circular 12-94, evidence presented during bail hearings is considered automatically reproduced at trial, subject only to the possible recall of the witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.

• Self-Defense Requisites — One who claims self-defense must prove: (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person; mere shouting, intimidating, or threatening attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression. Once alevosia is established, any claim of self-defense cannot prosper for being inconsistent with treachery.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery exists where the attack is perpetrated suddenly and without warning, satisfying two conditions: (a) employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) that said means of execution be deliberately and consciously adopted.

• Conspiracy by Inference — Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof; it may be inferred from the coordinated acts and movements of the co-conspirators. So long as the acts of the conspirators are characterized by unity of purpose, intent, and design to effect a common unlawful objective, conspiracy exists. Having established conspiracy, all the appellants are answerable as co-principals regardless of their degree of participation.

• Dying Declaration — The elements for admissibility of a dying declaration are: (a) the declaration must concern the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it was made at a time when the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he survived; (d) the declaration is offered in any case in which the decedent is the victim. The rules do not require that the declarant must first state explicitly his perception of the inevitability of his death so long as the circumstances would justify a conclusion that he is conscious of his condition.

• Evident Premeditation Requisites — To appreciate evident premeditation, three elements must be established: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof, to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

• Life Imprisonment vs. Reclusion Perpetua — Life imprisonment is nowhere in the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, nor is it a penalty similar to reclusion perpetua. No trial judge should mistake one for the other. Supreme Court Administrative Circular 6-A-92 enjoins trial judges to strictly observe the distinction between life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua.

• "The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the procedural impasse because it prejudiced the party whose only fault was to die before he could be cross-examined. The prudent alternative should have been to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of cross-examination could have been shown to be not in that instance a material loss." — This passage, quoted from Republic vs. Sandiganbayan citing Fulgado vs. CA, articulates the rule that a deceased witness's direct testimony need not be expunged where the loss of cross-examination was not a material loss and the adverse party was afforded a reasonable chance to cross-examine but failed through his own fault.

• "Besides, mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine." — This statement defines the nature of the right to cross-examination, supporting the Court's finding that the appellants' request for deferment constituted an implied waiver of the right.

• "Where the attack is perpetrated suddenly and without warning, there is treachery." — This concise formulation of the treachery doctrine was applied to the facts, where the victim was walking with his wife when he was suddenly attacked with a "panabas" and bolos, satisfying the two conditions of treachery.

• "Life imprisonment is nowhere in the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code nor is it a penalty similar to reclusion perpetua." — This statement corrects the trial court's erroneous imposition of life imprisonment, emphasizing the distinction between the two penalties and the requirement that trial judges strictly observe the distinction.

• Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438 (1996) — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that the direct testimony of a deceased witness should be admitted where the loss of cross-examination was not a material loss and the adverse party was afforded a reasonable chance to cross-examine but failed through his own fault.
• Fulgado vs. CA, 182 SCRA 81 (1990) — Followed for the proposition that death preventing cross-examination under circumstances where no responsibility can be ascribed to the plaintiff or witness should not result in striking out the direct examination.
• People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459 (1991) — Cited for the reiteration that reclusion perpetua is not the same as life imprisonment and that no trial judge should mistake one for the other.
• People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 (1992) — Cited for the ruling that life imprisonment is not a penalty under the Revised Penal Code and is not similar to reclusion perpetua.
• People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil 58 — Cited as the 1948 case that first made clear that reclusion perpetua is not the same as life imprisonment.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing murder; prior to the Heinous Crimes Law (R.A. 7659), the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — The provision on the graduation of penalties; where there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty is the medium period, which in this case was reclusion perpetua.
• Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — The provision on self-defense, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
• Article 14(13), Revised Penal Code — The provision on evident premeditation, requiring the time of determination, an act manifesting clinging to the determination, and a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution.
• Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court — The provision defining the purpose of a preliminary investigation as determining a well-grounded belief that a crime was probably committed by the accused.
• Section 1(f), Rule 115, Rules of Court — The provision allowing either party to utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased given in another case or proceeding.
• Section 8, Rule 114, Rules of Court, as amended by Circular 12-94 — The provision providing that evidence presented during bail hearings is considered automatically reproduced at trial, subject to the possible recall of the witness unless the witness is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.
• Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court — The provision allowing conviction on circumstantial evidence where: there is more than one circumstance; the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred.