People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Saul and Elmer Avenue

Self-defense cannot be successfully invoked where the alleged unlawful aggression has already ceased and the accused initiated the attack; conspiracy is not established by the mere handing of a weapon absent proof of a preconceived plan and common criminal design; and voluntary surrender may mitigate liability even if the accused does not surrender at the first opportunity.

On October 5, 1992, Sipil Delotavo hosted a drinking spree at his house in Barangay Sinikway, Iloilo City, to celebrate his birthday. Among the guests were appellants Roberto Saul and Elmer Avenue and brothers Rodrigo and John Serojo. According to the prosecution, at about 10:00 p.m., while the celebration was ongoing, Rodrigo took a nap on a long bench. In jest, Roberto, also known as “Ganzon,” slapped Rodrigo on the face. Rodrigo awoke and threw an empty whiskey bottle at Roberto; the bottle was parried by a companion but hit a boy named Danny. Irked, Roberto and Elmer left the house. Moments later, Rodrigo told John they were going home. Accompanied by Sidney Sindin, the brothers left. Just outside the gate, the trio saw Roberto and Elmer standing a few meters away. As they approached, Sidney saw Elmer hand a knife to Roberto, who suddenly stabbed John. John fell and asked Sidney to take him to the hospital. While Sidney was bent over John, he saw Roberto stabbing Rodrigo. Sidney ran to the Serojos’ house and informed their mother, then returned with a pedicab. The brothers were no longer at the scene. A sister asked Sidney to look for Rodrigo; he found Rodrigo wounded on the pavement at the plaza and brought him to the hospital. On the way, they caught up with the jeep carrying John, and the brothers were taken together to St. Paul’s Hospital in Iloilo City. John was pronounced dead on arrival; Rodrigo survived.

According to the defense, at around 11:00 p.m., Sipil Delotavo played a joke on Rodrigo, who was asleep on a wooden bench. Sipil threw a fishhead at Rodrigo’s face. Rodrigo awoke, mumbled a warning, and went back to sleep. Sipil threw another fishhead. Rodrigo retaliated by throwing an empty whiskey bottle at Roberto, hitting and wounding Roberto on the head. Roberto covered his bleeding wound with his left hand, but John suddenly ran toward him and punched him in the stomach. Roberto leaned against the wall. Elmer intervened and separated them, then told Roberto to run. Roberto ran, but John chased him. Elmer followed and, at the gate of the compound, saw John delivering fist blows at Roberto. Elmer also noticed Nestor Eufan standing nearby. Elmer placed himself between John and Roberto and tried to stop John, but John brushed him aside. At that moment, Elmer saw Rodrigo break an empty long-neck whiskey bottle. Elmer handed Roberto a knife, which he claimed he had picked from a table in Sipil’s house. Roberto took the knife and tried to run, but John, armed with a knife drawn from his hip, chased him; Rodrigo, holding the broken bottle, also ran after them. Elmer and Nestor left the scene. A few meters away, John caught up with Roberto, grabbed his jacket, and lunged at him with a knife. Roberto parried the knife with his hand, sustaining a wound between the ring and middle fingers of his left hand. Cornered, Roberto stabbed John in the stomach. Roberto then saw Rodrigo about to strike him with the broken whiskey bottle, so he also stabbed Rodrigo. Roberto ran home. The following morning, at about 9:00 a.m., Roberto had his wound treated and later that afternoon surrendered to the police.

The trial court observed that the use of a knife against an unarmed attacker was not reasonable or proper. The Court of Appeals found that Roberto’s surrender was not voluntary because he surrendered only in the afternoon of the day following the crime and after presenting himself to the NBI that same morning.

• Unlawful Aggression: Appellants argued that Rodrigo and John Serojo were the unlawful aggressors because they chased Roberto, with the obvious intention of hurting him further, forcing Roberto to act in self-defense.
• Self-Defense: Appellants maintained that Roberto acted in self-defense when he stabbed Rodrigo and John, claiming the victims attacked him despite knowing he had no hand in the prank.
• Conspiracy / Accomplice Liability: Appellant Elmer Avenue denied conspiracy, insisting he instinctively handed the knife to Roberto so the latter could defend himself; if any offense was committed, his participation was only as an accomplice.
• Voluntary Surrender: Appellants argued that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be credited to Roberto Saul because he surrendered to police authorities.

• Unlawful Aggression: The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that Roberto Saul was the unlawful aggressor because he purposely waited for the Serojo brothers to come out and inflict harm upon them after the bottle-throwing incident. The OSG contended that when the Serojo brothers left the party, they had no intention of inflicting harm and did not expect to see appellants waiting by the gate, as Roberto had already left ahead of them.

• Self-Defense: Whether the justifying circumstance of self-defense is present.
• Conspiracy: Whether there was conspiracy between the appellants.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of appellant Roberto Saul.

• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression, the essential and primary element of self-defense, was absent because any aggression by the victims had ceased when appellants waited outside the gate; the use of a knife against an unarmed attacker was not reasonably necessary, and appellants failed to prove the requisites under Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code.
• Conspiracy: No. The mere handing of the knife by Elmer to Roberto did not establish conspiracy absent proof of a preconceived plan and common criminal design; Elmer was liable only as an accomplice.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. Roberto’s surrender to the NBI and police without arrest or force was voluntary; the law does not require surrender at the first opportunity, so the mitigating circumstance should be credited.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the essential and primary element and a condition sine qua non; it must be positively shown that a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack placed the defendant’s life in danger and forced him to use more or less reasonable means to resist. Here, appellants waited for the Serojo brothers outside the gate of Sipil Delotavo’s house. Any hostility shown by Rodrigo inside the house had ceased, and Roberto was no longer in danger. Even if only two minutes had elapsed since the bottle-throwing incident, the alleged aggression by the victims had already ceased when appellants stepped out. There is no unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb or right is neither actual nor imminent; aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. If the person attacked allowed time to lapse after the injury, the act is revenge, not self-defense. The second requisite also presupposes unlawful aggression and depends on the nature and extent of the aggression; the trial court observed that using a knife against an unarmed attacker was not reasonable or proper. Because no unlawful aggression came from the victims and appellants initiated the attack, there was no provocation from the victims. One who invokes self-defense admits authorship of the killing, and the burden shifts to him to establish the justifying circumstance with clear and convincing evidence; he must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution. Appellants failed to discharge this burden.
• Conspiracy: For conspiracy to exist, the participants must agree to the commission of the felony and decide to commit it; the agreement may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts pointing to joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. Conspiracy must be shown as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. In cases where the Court held that persons who provided the weapon used in the crime were co-conspirators, the other contemporaneous acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission showed that they acted in unison for a common purpose. Here, although the knife used by Roberto belonged to Elmer, Elmer’s handing of the knife to Roberto was not by itself an act of conspiracy. Nothing in the records showed a preconceived plan to commit the crime. The fray started because of a practical joke on Rodrigo, and there was no proof that Elmer was motivated by the same criminal design as Roberto. In case of doubt, the milder form of responsibility should be attributed to the accused; thus, Elmer’s participation was only that of an accomplice.
• Voluntary Surrender: For voluntary surrender to mitigate liability, the following elements must be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. A surrender is voluntary if it is spontaneous, meaning there is an intent to submit oneself to the authorities either because the offender acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses of capturing him. It is not required that the accused surrender at the first opportunity; as long as the requisites are met, voluntary surrender may be appreciated. Roberto presented himself to the NBI in the morning and, in the afternoon of the same day, gave himself up. He was not apprehended or forced to surrender. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that his surrender was not voluntary merely because he surrendered in the afternoon of the day following the crime and after presenting himself to the NBI that same morning. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should count in his favor.

• Self-defense — Under Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, self-defense requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the essential and primary element and a condition sine qua non; it must be actual or imminent. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting appellants’ claim because any aggression by the Serojo brothers had ceased when appellants waited outside the gate, and the use of a knife against an unarmed attacker was not reasonably necessary.
• Burden of proof in self-defense — One who invokes self-defense admits authorship of the killing, and the burden shifts to him to establish the justifying circumstance with clear and convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution. Appellants failed to discharge this burden.
• Conspiracy — Conspiracy requires an agreement to commit the felony and a decision to commit it; the agreement may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts pointing to joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. It must be proven as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. The mere handing of a weapon does not establish conspiracy absent proof of a preconceived plan and common criminal design. The Court applied this to hold that Elmer Avenue was not a co-conspirator.
• Accomplice liability — In case of doubt, the milder form of responsibility should be attributed to the accused. Where there is no conspiracy but the accused participated in the commission of the offense, he may be held liable as an accomplice. Elmer Avenue was thus liable only as an accomplice for handing the knife to Roberto.
• Voluntary surrender — For voluntary surrender to mitigate liability, the offender must not have been actually arrested, must have surrendered himself to a person in authority, and the surrender must be voluntary. The surrender must be spontaneous, with intent to submit to authorities either because the offender acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and expenses of capturing him. It is not required that the accused surrender at the first opportunity. The Court applied this to credit Roberto Saul with voluntary surrender.
• Civil indemnity and actual damages — Civil indemnity for death may be awarded without proof other than the fact of the victim’s death. Actual damages must be duly proven or admitted. The Court awarded P50,000 as civil indemnity for John Serojo, P48,512.66 as actual damages for John Serojo’s medical and funeral expenses, and P34,448.40 as actual damages for Rodrigo Serojo’s medical expenses.

• "Unlawful aggression is the essential and primary element of self-defense. Its presence is a condition sine qua non if it is to be successfully invoked. It must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the defendant's life in danger and forced him to inflict more or less reasonable means to resist the said attack." — This passage states the Court’s canonical formulation of unlawful aggression as the indispensable element of self-defense.
• "There is no unlawful aggression when the peril to one's life, limb or right is neither actual nor imminent." — This passage supplies the test for when aggression may justify self-defense and was applied to reject the claim because the alleged aggression had already ceased.
• "For conspiracy to exist, the participants must agree to the commission of the felony and decide to commit it, which agreement may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from the acts that point to joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of intent." — This passage defines conspiracy and explains how it may be proved, which the Court used to hold that Elmer Avenue was not a co-conspirator.
• "A surrender, to be voluntary must be spontaneous, i.e. there must be an intent to submit oneself to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses in capturing him." — This passage defines voluntary surrender and supports the Court’s ruling crediting the mitigating circumstance to Roberto Saul.

• People vs. Malazzab, G.R. No. L-39136, 160 SCRA 123 (1988) — Cited for the requisites of self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Sarense, G.R. No. 97433, 214 SCRA 780 (1992) — Cited for the rule that unlawful aggression is essential and must be a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack.
• People vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-38180, 108 SCRA 288 (1981) — Cited for the rule that there is no unlawful aggression when the peril is neither actual nor imminent.
• People vs. Macariola, G.R. No. L-40757, 120 SCRA 92 (1983) — Cited for the rule that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.
• U.S. vs. Banzuela, G.R. No. 10172, 31 Phil. 564 (1915) — Cited for the rule that if the person attacked allowed time to lapse, the act is revenge, not self-defense.
• Salcedo vs. People, G.R. No. 137143, December 8, 2000 — Cited for the rule that one who invokes self-defense admits authorship and bears the burden of proof.
• People vs. Abagon, G.R. No. 68940, 161 SCRA 255 (1988) — Cited for the rule that the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not the weakness of the prosecution.
• People vs. Baltar, G.R. No. 125306, December 11, 2000 — Cited for the rule that handing a weapon is not by itself conspiracy absent a preconceived plan.
• People vs. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 132123, November 23, 2000 — Cited for the rule that conspiracy must be shown as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself.
• People vs. Dela Cerna, G.R. No. L-20911, 21 SCRA 569 (1967) — Cited as an example where a provider of a weapon was held a co-conspirator because contemporaneous acts showed common purpose.
• People vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. L-29419, 40 SCRA 514 (1971) — Cited for the rule that in doubt, the milder form of responsibility should be attributed to the accused.
• People vs. Tambis, G.R. No. 124452, 311 SCRA 430 (1999) — Cited for the elements of voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Sakam, G.R. No. 41566, 61 Phil. 27 (1934) — Cited for the rule that voluntary surrender must be spontaneous.
• People vs. Cayabyab, G.R. No. 123073, 274 SCRA 387 (1997) — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity for death may be awarded without proof other than the fact of death.
• People vs. Verde, G.R. No. 119077, 302 SCRA 690 (1999) — Cited for the same rule on civil indemnity for death.

• Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines self-defense as a justifying circumstance and sets out its requisites. The Court applied it and found the requisites absent because there was no unlawful aggression, the means used were not reasonably necessary, and appellants lacked sufficient provocation.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide. The Court found Roberto Saul guilty as principal in the crime of homicide for the wrongful death of John Serojo under this article.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in imposing the indeterminate penalties on both appellants for homicide and frustrated homicide. The Court used it to fix the minimum and maximum terms in the dispositive portion.

Justices Bellosillo, Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr. concurred. Justice Buena was on official leave.