People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Pansensoy

Self-defense requires clear and convincing proof of unlawful aggression by the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation; where the accused is the aggressor, the plea fails. Passion and obfuscation, once established, cannot co-exist with treachery or evident premeditation, reducing the killing to homicide.

Roberto Pansensoy was a security guard and the legitimate husband of Analie Pansensoy. Analie had been living with Hilario Reyes since February 1994, and the relationship among the three supplied the context for the killing and the evidentiary questions on appeal. The governing legal backdrop included the Revised Penal Code provisions on homicide and murder, the requisites of self-defense and mitigating circumstances, and the marital disqualification rule in the Revised Rules on Evidence.

Analie Pansensoy, twenty-eight years old, was the legitimate wife of appellant Roberto Pansensoy, a twenty-eight-year-old security guard, with whom she had three children. Since February 1994, however, Analie had been living with Hilario Reyes in a rented house at Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal. On May 8, 1994, Hilario was lying down inside the house while Analie was there. Analie heard a knocking on the door and stood up to open it; she saw appellant holding a gun. She embraced appellant and tried to wrest the gun away from him but failed. Hilario went out of the house and sat on a bench. Appellant approached Hilario and asked whether he really loved appellant’s wife; Hilario answered in the affirmative. Appellant next asked whether Hilario was still single; Hilario answered yes. Appellant counted one to three and, at the count of three, shot Hilario on the forehead. Hilario sprawled on the ground.

Dr. Emmanuel Aranas conducted the autopsy on the victim at the St. James Funeral Parlor at past midnight on May 9, 1994. He found a single gunshot wound on the forehead as the cause of death, with smudging indicating that Hilario was shot at close range, possibly less than three inches, and that the shooter and Hilario were facing each other. SPO1 Reynaldo Anclote investigated the shooting and took the statements of Gregoria Reyes and Analie at the police station a day after the incident; he did not conduct an ocular inspection at the scene. Gregoria Reyes, Hilario’s mother, learned of her son’s death through a neighbor, Roger, and saw the gunshot wound on his forehead. She incurred P10,000.00 for the funeral and P30,000.00 for the burial. At the time of his death, Hilario was managing two passenger jeepneys, one of which he also drove, and was earning P800.00 a day. Rogelio Fullente, fifty-six years old and a co-driver of Hilario on the Antipolo-Marikina route, lived about ten meters away from where Hilario was staying, separated by a driveway. He heard several knocks and opened his door; he saw a man knocking on Hilario’s door and ordering him to come out. The first time he saw the man, the man was not carrying anything. After hearing a gunshot, Rogelio opened the door again and saw the man carrying something before leaving. He narrated that the man asked Hilario if he loved his wife, Hilario answered yes, and the man fired a shot; Hilario’s head bent forward before he fell. On cross-examination, Rogelio testified that Hilario opened the door, sat on the bench by the door, and that when Hilario answered yes, appellant immediately fired; Rogelio watched appellant fire and then left to report the incident to Hilario’s parents.

Appellant invoked self-defense. He testified that Analie was his wife and that they had three children, and that their relationship as husband and wife was normal. On May 8, 1994, at about 6:30 p.m., a certain Amadong Bisaya told him that he saw his wife with their youngest child and “Tisoy,” referring to Hilario, board a jeep on their way to Lumang Bayan. Appellant had met Bisaya before, when Bisaya told him sometime in April 1994 that he always saw appellant’s wife with another man. Appellant asked Bisaya to accompany him to Lumang Bayan, where Bisaya pointed to the room where his wife and “Tisoy” entered. Appellant kicked the door of the room and found his wife and “Tisoy” lying beside each other, clad only in their underwear. He dragged his wife out of the room by her hair; while doing so, he saw “Tisoy” pull a gun from a table covered with clothes. He let go of his wife and jumped on “Tisoy” to grab the gun. While they struggled for possession of the gun, he hit “Tisoy’s” testicles with his knees. “Tisoy” fell on his knees but was still holding the gun. Still grappling for possession, appellant held the back portion of the gun and part of the trigger, while his other hand held Hilario’s hand, which was holding the butt of the gun. When Hilario knelt down, appellant was able to twist Hilario’s hand and point the barrel of the gun toward him. The gun suddenly went off; at that moment, “Tisoy” was holding the trigger. “Tisoy” was shot on the head and fell. “Tisoy” was still holding the gun when he fell to the floor. Appellant confronted his wife, pulled her hair, and slapped her. He asked her where their child was; before she could answer, their child entered and embraced her mother tightly. He tried to pull their daughter away, but Analie did not let go. He told Analie that he would kill her too if she did not release the child and started to count “one, two,” which made his wife release their daughter. He left the room with the child and proceeded to their house. “Tisoy” was still sprawled on the ground face down when he left.

The trial court accorded full faith and credence to Analie’s testimony and rejected appellant’s version that he acted in self-defense. It found Analie credible and observed that she remained unperturbed during cross-examination. The trial court noted that appellant, then a security guard, was charged by his employer with qualified theft for the loss of a .38 caliber revolver, allegedly committed on May 8, 1994, the same day as the shooting; the gun used in the shooting was not found at the scene, but the slug recovered was that of a .38 caliber revolver. Although appellant was subsequently acquitted of the theft charge, the trial court considered this as evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime. The trial court further noted that appellant went into hiding from the time of the shooting until the case was filed in court on August 24, 1994.

• Self-Defense: Appellant insisted that he acted in self-defense; he claimed that the victim was the unlawful aggressor, that Hilario pulled a gun from the table, and that the gun fired during their struggle while Hilario was holding the trigger.
• Credibility of Analie: Appellant questioned the trial court’s assessment of Analie’s credibility, arguing that her testimony was flawed because she claimed she and appellant had been separated for more than three years despite their youngest daughter being barely a year old, and that his version—that he dragged his wife by the hair—was more believable and in accord with human behavior than Analie’s account that he interrogated the victim before shooting him.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Appellant argued for the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, maintaining that upon confirming with his own eyes that his wife was cheating on him, he lost self-control and acted from a natural instinct to protect his wounded feelings.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Appellant assigned as error the trial court’s conviction for murder despite the prosecution’s failure to prove any of the qualifying circumstances.

• Evident Premeditation: The Office of the Solicitor General submitted that evident premeditation qualified the killing to murder; according to the OSG, premeditation was apparent from appellant’s act of going to the scene already carrying the gun, and although appellant was a security guard, he had no legal justification for bringing the gun to the victim’s residence, which indicated a preconceived plan to kill his wife’s lover.

• Self-Defense: Whether appellant acted in self-defense, satisfying the requisites of unlawful aggression by the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation.
• Credibility and Sufficiency: Whether the trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to Analie’s eyewitness testimony and in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
• Marital Disqualification: Whether Analie’s testimony was admissible despite the marital disqualification rule.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation should be appreciated in appellant’s favor.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Whether treachery and evident premeditation qualified the killing to murder.
• Damages and Penalty: Whether the penalty and damages imposed were proper.

• Self-Defense: No. The first requisite of unlawful aggression was absent; the evidence showed appellant was the aggressor, not the victim, so self-defense cannot prosper.
• Credibility and Sufficiency: No. The trial court’s assessment of Analie’s credibility is entitled to great weight, and her credible and positive eyewitness testimony is sufficient to convict; the alleged flaws concerned minor or incidental matters.
• Marital Disqualification: Yes, admissible. The marital disqualification rule did not bar Analie’s testimony because appellant failed to make a timely objection, and the incompetency was waived.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Yes. The elements concurred: an unlawful act sufficient to produce obfuscation, and no considerable time between the act and the killing.
• Qualifying Circumstances: No. Treachery and evident premeditation cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation; the records did not show a preconceived plan or sufficient lapse of time.
• Damages and Penalty: Modified. The crime is homicide under Article 249, RPC, with passion and obfuscation; the indeterminate penalty is 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum. Actual damages are deleted; moral damages are P50,000; loss of earning capacity is P3,379,200; civil indemnity of P50,000 is sustained.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense as a justifying circumstance requires (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified rests on the accused, who must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s. Appellant claimed Hilario pulled a gun and that the gun fired during their struggle, but the trial court credited Analie’s testimony that appellant arrived holding a gun, embraced him to wrest it away, and then shot Hilario after asking whether he loved appellant’s wife. Because the unlawful aggression came from appellant, not the victim, the first requisite was absent and the plea of self-defense failed. The trial court’s credibility assessment was entitled to great weight absent arbitrariness; the alleged inconsistencies in Analie’s testimony concerned minor or incidental matters and did not impair her credibility. Rogelio’s confusing corroboration did not matter because a lone eyewitness’s credible and positive testimony is sufficient to convict. Appellant’s flight after the incident and failure to report to authorities further negated self-defense. The qualified theft charge was not considered corroborative because the slug evidence rested on shaky ground, but it was superfluous in light of Analie’s account.

• Credibility and Sufficiency: The trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is entitled to great weight, even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Analie testified in a candid and straightforward manner, remained consistent on cross-examination, and her alleged flaws—separation for three years despite a one-year-old child, and appellant’s interrogation of the victim—did not pertain to the act of killing but to minor or incidental matters. A lone eyewitness’s credible and positive testimony is sufficient to convict an accused. Thus, the conviction was supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the killing.

• Marital Disqualification: Under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, during marriage neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants. Analie, as appellant’s legitimate wife, would have been disqualified had appellant timely objected. However, objections to the competency of a spouse may be waived like other witnesses, and the objection must be made when the spouse is first offered as a witness. Appellant failed to make a timely objection, so the incompetency was waived and Analie’s testimony was admissible.

• Passion and Obfuscation: To be entitled to passion and obfuscation, two elements must concur: (1) an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce the condition of mind; and (2) the act producing the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time during which the perpetrator might recover normal equanimity. Appellant met Bisaya, learned his wife and child had boarded a jeep with Hilario, followed them, and found his wife and Hilario together; under either version, jealousy and the brazen admission by Hilario that he loved appellant’s wife could produce passion and obfuscation. Only a few minutes elapsed between discovery and killing, so appellant had no opportunity to regain equanimity. The mitigating circumstance was therefore credited.

• Qualifying Circumstances: The Information alleged treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation because passion involves loss of control while treachery requires conscious adoption of means. Evident premeditation likewise cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation because premeditation requires calm thought and reflection. The OSG argued that appellant’s carrying a gun showed a preconceived plan, but the records did not show how and when he hatched the plan or how much time elapsed. The mere carrying of a gun, especially by a security guard on his way home, did not necessarily indicate a preconceived plan; People vs. Diokno held that customary carrying of arms does not prove intent to kill. Thus, neither qualifying circumstance was appreciated, and the killing was homicide, not murder.

• Damages and Penalty: Since the crime proven was homicide under Article 249, RPC, the penalty is reclusion temporal. With the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, Article 64, second paragraph, RPC, required imposition of reclusion temporal in its minimum period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law allowed an indeterminate sentence with minimum within the penalty next lower and maximum within the prescribed penalty after modifying circumstances; the Court imposed 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum. As to damages, the P50,000 civil indemnity was sustained because it is awarded without proof other than the commission of the crime and death. The P40,000 actual damages were deleted because actual loss must be proved with reasonable certainty through competent proof and best evidence; no receipts were presented. Moral damages were raised from P20,000 to P50,000 in line with current jurisprudence for the pain caused by Hilario’s death. Loss of earning capacity was awarded despite absence of documentary evidence because Gregoria testified without objection that Hilario earned P800 daily as manager and driver of two passenger jeepneys and was 36 at death; using the formula, net earning capacity was P3,379,200. An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, so the Court corrected the damages even if not assigned as error.

• Self-Defense — A justifying circumstance that exempts an accused from criminal liability when three requisites concur: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The burden of proving self-defense by clear and convincing evidence rests on the accused, who must rely on the strength of his own evidence. In this case, the first requisite was absent because the evidence showed appellant was the aggressor.

• Credibility of Witnesses — A trial court’s assessment of a witness’s credibility is entitled to great weight, even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of a material fact. A lone eyewitness’s credible and positive testimony is sufficient to convict. The Court upheld the trial court’s credence to Analie and found her alleged inconsistencies to concern minor or incidental matters.

• Marital Disqualification Rule — Under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, during marriage neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants. The disqualification is waivable, and the objection must be made when the spouse is first offered as a witness. Appellant’s failure to timely object waived the disqualification.

• Passion and Obfuscation — A mitigating circumstance requiring: (1) an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce the condition of mind; and (2) the act producing the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time during which the perpetrator might recover normal equanimity. The Court credited it because appellant discovered his wife with Hilario and Hilario admitted loving her, and only a few minutes elapsed before the killing.

• Incompatibility of Passion and Obfuscation with Treachery and Evident Premeditation — Treachery cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation because passion involves loss of control while treachery requires conscious adoption of means. Evident premeditation likewise cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation because premeditation requires calm thought and reflection. Thus, the killing was homicide, not murder.

• Evident Premeditation — Its elements are: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection. The mere carrying of a gun, especially if customary, does not by itself indicate a preconceived plan to kill.

• Actual Damages — To recover actual damages, the actual amount of loss must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable. Absent receipts, the award of P40,000 actual damages was deleted.

• Loss of Earning Capacity — The absence of documentary evidence does not preclude recovery where the victim’s income is established by testimony not objected to. The Court used the formula: net earning capacity = life expectancy x gross annual income minus living expenses (50% of GAI), with life expectancy = 2/3(80 - age at death), and awarded P3,379,200.

• Civil Indemnity — Civil indemnity for death is awarded without need of proof other than the commission of the crime and the consequent death of the victim. The P50,000 award was sustained.

• Appellate Review in Criminal Cases — An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether or not made the subject of an assignment of error. This allowed the Court to delete actual damages and award loss of earning capacity.

• "Self-defense as a justifying circumstance may exempt an accused from criminal liability when the following requisites are met, namely: (1) there has been an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression are reasonably necessary; and (3) the person defending himself has not provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression." — States the requisites of self-defense, the first issue on appeal; the Court found the first requisite absent because appellant was the aggressor.
• "Treachery cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation." — The ratio for rejecting treachery as a qualifying circumstance after crediting passion and obfuscation, reducing the killing from murder to homicide.
• "The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by calm thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a composed judgment." — Defines evident premeditation and supports the Court’s holding that it cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation.
• "To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable." — States the evidentiary standard for actual damages; the Court deleted the P40,000 award because no receipts were presented.

• People vs. Dorado, 303 SCRA 61 (1999) — Cited for the requisites of self-defense as a justifying circumstance.
• People vs. Tadeje, 310 SCRA 426 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the burden of proving self-defense by clear and convincing evidence is on the accused.
• People vs. Mendoza, 284 SCRA 705 (1998) — Cited for the principle that an accused invoking self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution’s.
• People vs. Reduca, 301 SCRA 516 (1998) and People vs. Jimenez, 302 SCRA 607 (1998) — Cited for the great weight accorded to a trial court’s assessment of witness credibility.
• People vs. Ferras, 289 SCRA 94 (1998) — Cited for the rule that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.
• People vs. Javier, 311 SCRA 576 (1999) — Cited for the elements of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
• People vs. Germina, 290 SCRA 146 (1998) — Cited for the rule that treachery cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation.
• People vs. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570 (1977) — Cited for the rule that evident premeditation cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation.
• People vs. Caisip, 290 SCRA 451 (1998) — Cited for the elements of evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance.
• People vs. Diokno, 63 Phil. 601 (1936) — Cited for the principle that the customary carrying of arms does not by itself indicate an intent to kill.
• People vs. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68 (1999) — Cited for the increased moral damages and the formula for loss of earning capacity.
• People vs. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158 (1998) — Cited for the requirement that actual damages be proved with competent proof and the best evidence obtainable.
• People vs. Barellano, 319 SCRA 567 (1999) — Cited for the rule that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be considered by the court.
• People vs. Adoc, 330 SCRA 626 (2000) and People vs. Solis, 291 SCRA 529 (1998) — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity is awarded without need of proof other than the commission of the crime and the victim’s death.
• People vs. Juachon, 319 SCRA 761 (1999) — Cited for the rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding opens the whole case for review.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines homicide as the killing of another without any of the circumstances enumerated in the preceding article and penalizes it with reclusion temporal. Applied because the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were not appreciated.
• Article 64, second paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when only a mitigating circumstance is present and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period. Applied to impose reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Allows the imposition of an indeterminate sentence with the minimum period within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law and the maximum period within the range of the latter after appreciating modifying circumstances. Applied to sentence appellant to 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum.
• Section 22, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence — The marital disqualification rule, providing that during marriage neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants. Applied to hold that the disqualification was waived by appellant’s failure to timely object.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman); Vitug; and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.