People of the Philippines vs. Robert Poculan

In rape, the force or intimidation employed need only be sufficient to enable the accused to consummate his purpose; it need not be so great or of such character as could not be resisted, and intimidation may be addressed to the mind. The conviction for three separate rapes was affirmed, with the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position.

Robert Poculan was the Municipal Mayor of Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, and Conchita B. Rone was a clerk in his office. The charge arose under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines rape and treats use of a deadly weapon as a qualifying circumstance. The cases were initially investigated by military authorities pursuant to PD No. 39, as amended, in relation to PD 911, before being transferred to the civil courts upon Poculan’s written request.

Conchita B. Rone, a commerce graduate then 28 years old and single, had worked as a clerk since November 1, 1977 in the Office of Mayor Robert Poculan in Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte. She was boarding in the house of her aunt Sofronias B. Eroy in the poblacion of Rizal. On the morning of March 22, 1980, a Saturday, Vice Mayor Julieta Pila asked Conchita to accompany her in looking for a Ford Fiera to be hired by the teacher members of the election committees going to Dipolog City on March 23, 1980, where a recounting of ballots at the Pilot Demonstration School was scheduled. After hiring the vehicle, Conchita went with Vice Mayor Pila to the municipal building to prepare and sort documents, then returned to her boarding house at noon. At 2:00 p.m., Servolo Herodias told her that Poculan wanted her at his house. She went there, arranged documents, complied with instructions, and typewrote something. At 6:30 p.m., after asking permission to leave, Poculan told her to take the motorcab parked nearby. After she sat inside, Poculan followed and said he was also taking the motorcab to the adjoining barangay of Mapang and would just drop her at her boarding house along the way. An elderly woman she did not recognize was already inside, and Pat. Benhur Cabiara also rode in the motorcab driven by Felipe Fuerzas.

After traveling about one and a half kilometers toward Mapang, the elderly woman alighted about a hundred meters from the house of the Pamatongs. At the intersection of the barangay road leading to Nasipang, Pat. Cabiara also alighted. Only Conchita and Poculan remained. The motorcab did not proceed toward her boarding house; it ran very fast downgrade toward Nilabo, Rizal. Conchita became apprehensive, touched the driver, and asked where the motorcab was bound, but the driver did not answer. When she wanted to get out, Poculan held her hand and said, “Do not move or else I will kill you now.” Upon reaching the small creek of Nilabo, the motorcab stopped because it could not go farther beyond the creek, which was followed by a hill. Poculan alighted and pulled Conchita, who resisted by holding on to the driver’s shirt. He abruptly pulled her hand, forcing her out of the motorcab and even to kneel. She embraced his legs, pleaded, and asked why they were there. He answered that there was a coronation in Nilabo and that they would be the ones to crown. She cried and pleaded to be allowed to go home. Poculan pulled her uphill; she resisted but was easily overcome. He brought her to a hut, pushed her, and told her to enter. She stumbled near the stairs. Inside, he pushed her again, making her lie flat on the floor. He laid himself on top of her, forcibly pulled up her T-shirt, and removed her pants and panty. She resisted and pushed him, saying “Do not! Do not!” He told her, “Do not move.” He pointed a pistol at her and threatened to kill her, bit her chin, squeezed her breast, and sucked her nipples. Despite her resistance and the wiggling of her body, he succeeded in penetrating her private part, causing her to shout in pain. Thereafter, he lay down on the floor while she squatted in the corner. She looked for her clothes in the dark, but when he saw her moving, he pulled her toward him. She stumbled but returned to the corner. Approximately two hours later, he again forced and succeeded in having sexual congress with her despite her resistance and the moving of her body. He then lay down again, and she resumed searching for her clothes and found them.

At about midnight of March 22, 1980, Poculan told Conchita, “Come on, let’s go further to that place,” which she later discovered was a house about 150 meters away. Upon reaching the house, Poculan called the owner and told him to pick young coconuts. After drinking the coconut water, he told the owner to cook food. While Poculan was eating his very late supper, Conchita was crying because he would not allow her to leave. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 23, 1980, Poculan requested one of the occupants to ascertain if his wagon had arrived. After being informed that it was there, he told Conchita, “All right, go ahead.” They walked toward the waiting wagon and boarded it. The wagon was driven by Orlando Capili and accompanied by Pat. Benhur Cabiara. It proceeded toward the poblacion of Rizal. On the way back, at about 4:00 or 4:30 a.m., a little farther from the poblacion, the wagon stopped. Capili and Pat. Cabiara alighted and stayed elsewhere. Poculan then told Conchita that if she would not succumb to his wish to have sexual intercourse, the two men, driver Capili and policeman Cabiara, would have sexual intercourse with her and would take turns. Intimidated, the third carnal assault was consummated. Conchita fixed her clothes, and Capili and Pat. Cabiara boarded the wagon. The wagon then took a shortcut along a barangay road passing her boarding house.

Upon arrival at her boarding house, Conchita knocked at the door, which was opened by a domestic helper of her aunt Sofronias Eroy. She went inside, cried bitterly, collapsed, and could not talk. She was very weak, with swollen eyes and bruises on her arms, chin, and face. When her aunt Eroy came out and asked where she came from, Conchita said, “Manay, the Mayor brought me to Nilabo and there he forced me.” She requested her aunt not to reveal what had happened because she had been warned that if the incident were revealed, even the Eroy family would be killed. The whole day of March 23, 1980, Conchita secluded herself. On March 24, 1980, accompanied by her cousin, she left her boarding house and walked toward her native barrio of Balubohan, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, about 10 kilometers away. Upon arriving home, she cried and told her brother Virgilio Rone, “I was brought by the Mayor to Nilabo and there he forced me.” In the afternoon of March 26, 1980, Pat. Cabiara, accompanied by Filemon Sagaray, the husband of the barangay captain of Balubohan, came to see Conchita and told her that Poculan wished to meet her at a neighbor’s house. She refused. On March 27, 1980, Pat. Cabiara, together with Filemon Sagaray and his wife Barangay Captain Manoleta Sagaray, again informed her of Poculan’s wish to talk to her. She bluntly answered that she would not go. Before departing, Barangay Captain Manoleta Sagaray told her that she would just tell the Mayor to see her in her house, and Conchita replied, “It is up to you.” When Poculan arrived at her house on March 27, 1980, he muttered, “Oh, the Mayor is under you because it is the Mayor who is now coming to you.” He asked whether she had complained to the Philippine Constabulary. After she replied that she had not, he said, “Yes, I have confidence in you.” He praised her and told her that she was religious and educated. He offered her any work and anything she would like—a house, a coconut plantation, or even further studies. Conchita answered that she did not need them and was not interested. He looked at her house and asked if she would like him to remodel it; she did not answer. On April 1, 1980, Poculan again went to Conchita’s house and reiterated his offer to send her for further studies. He wanted her to report to the office because people were wondering why she was no longer seen there. After she remained silent, Poculan left, saying, “You watch out. If you go out from your place I will kill you.”

On April 4, 1980, Conchita secretly left her house, walked toward barangay Sebaca, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, and sought the advice of her aunt Marcelina Bartolome. After she disclosed her experience with Poculan, her aunt advised her to proceed to Dipolog City and get the assistance of a lawyer. Instead of going directly to Dipolog City, she took a pumpboat to the island barangay of Sinipay, Sibutad, Zamboanga del Norte, where she slept in the house of her married sister Nicareta Colaljo. In the morning of April 5, 1980, she took a pumpboat to barangay Panganoran, then hiked about six kilometers toward barangay Talisay, Dapitan City, where her aunt Agueda Bartolome resided. After she narrated her experience, her aunt advised her to proceed to Dipolog City and see Rev. Father Paulo Briones, who was also a lawyer. On April 9, 1980, accompanied by her cousin Antonio Bartolome, she left for Dipolog City. She met Father Briones and narrated everything. Father Briones accompanied her to the NBI Sub-Office for medical examination, but they were advised to go to the NBI in Manila instead. Upon recommendation of Father Briones, she was allowed to stay in the convent of the Religious of the Virgin Mary until April 20, 1980. On April 20, 1980, accompanied by Father Briones and Atty. Ana C. Aguilar, she took a flight for Manila. On April 21, 1980, she submitted herself for medicolegal examination at the central office of the National Bureau of Investigation. The Medico-Legal Division issued Living Case Report No. MG-80-295, which noted no sign of extragenital physical injuries and concluded that the genital findings were compatible with sexual intercourse with a man on or about the alleged date of commission; the hymen was wide and thick with recently healed lacerations, deep at 9:00 o’clock and complete at 5:00 o’clock, and the hymenal orifice admitted a tube 2.8 cm in diameter. On May 7, 1980, accompanied by Father Paulo Briones, Conchita sought the help of Minister Juan Ponce Enrile at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, who sent them to the office of Col. Soriano. On the same day, she subscribed and swore to her affidavit before 1st Lt. Camilo A. Catalan and later re-subscribed it before Major Aniano A. Desierto on July 23, 1980. Also on May 7, 1980, an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order was issued against Poculan, and on May 17, 1980, he was arrested and detained at the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, Taguig, Metro Manila. Two charge sheets were prepared by the Chief Prosecution Division, Military Tribunals, the first on July 25, 1980 and the second on September 16, 1980. Upon Poculan’s written request, the then President transferred the cases to the civil courts on October 15, 1980.

The defense refrained from giving its own statement of facts, but Poculan’s exculpatory circumstances appear in his question-and-answer sworn statement before the trial judge on November 8, 1984, considered as his direct testimony. He maintained that Conchita had filed an application for leave of absence on March 20, 1980; that she did not report for work on March 20, 21, and 22 because she was already on leave; and that she left for Balubohan early in the morning of March 22, 1980. He claimed it was physically impossible for him to be riding in a motorcab at that time because he was suffering from physical injuries in his left and right legs caused by bullet wounds, his left leg could not be flexed, and he could not ride in a motorcab. He denied ordering Pat. Cabiara to get a motorcab that evening. He also claimed that a motorcab could not reach Nilabo, that he did not have a resthouse in Nilabo but only a copra dryer, that he could not climb a hill or steep creek because he walked with crutches, that the copra dryer had no stairs, rooms, or walls, that he could not take off his pants without help, and that it was impossible for him to lie down on the floor. He asked why he would rape Conchita when she was his querida, and said that if he had wanted sexual intercourse with her that evening he could have prevented her from going home that morning and told her to accompany him to Dipolog City. Considering his age and osteoarthritis lumbar vertebrae since 1943, he claimed he could perform the sexual act only once per sexual session. He asserted that the multiple rape charge was politically motivated and maliciously fabricated by his political enemies using Conchita as a willing tool, and that his political opponents caused the fabricated case to expose him to public shame and contempt and to detain him in Bicutan for his ultimate political downfall. Defense witnesses Julieta T. Pila, Leonilo Tacal, Anastacio Baid, and Manolita Sagaray corroborated his declaration that Conchita was his paramour. Julieta Pila, Vice Mayor of Rizal, said she used to see them fondling each other in the office. Leonilo Tacal, a janitor in the Mayor’s office, added that they used to meet in his house and that his children noticed how scandalously they acted. Anastacio Baid, Orlando Capili, Leonilo Tacal, and Manolita Sagaray echoed Poculan’s declaration that he had been using crutches after he was ambushed in 1978. Mrs. Pila further denied that she had passed by Conchita’s boarding house in the morning of March 22, 1980. Aniceto Baid, son of Anastacio and a high school teacher at Sebaca, stated that he was at Conchita’s boarding house in the early morning of March 23, 1980 but did not see her there. Orlando Capili, who used to drive Poculan’s wagon off and on, retracted his sworn statement on May 20, 1980 and denied Conchita’s story that he had driven Poculan’s wagon or that he was in Nilabo on March 23, 1980, claiming he was in Dipolog City then. Felipe Fuerzas, the motorcab driver and an employee of the Municipal Waterworks Cooperative, also denied Conchita’s story that he had driven the motorcab, stating that he was in Cotabato at that time and that a motorcab cannot reach Nilabo because of the stony road; Gil Alumbro corroborated this latter statement. Manolita Sagaray, Barangay Captain of Balubohan, denied having gone to see Conchita at her home at Poculan’s behest on March 27 and contended that she saw Conchita at her hometown in Balubohan from March 22 to Good Friday on April 6, 1980. After evaluating the conflicting versions, the trial court found Conchita’s testimony credible and the defense witnesses unworthy of credence because of their personal and political attachment to Poculan and his moral ascendancy over them; it also found that Conchita suffered bruises on her arms, chin, and face, although the medical examination took place about a month after the incidents.

• Variance Between Complaints and Informations: Appellant argued that the trial court fatally erred in proceeding with trial and rendering convictions upon informations that charged offenses different from Conchita Rone’s sworn complaints, because the complaints alleged he was “armed with a revolver” while the informations did not; he maintained that all proceedings from arraignment to conviction were illegal, null, and void ab initio.
• Preliminary Investigation: Appellant maintained that there had been no preliminary investigation of the complaints and that the trial court erred in proceeding without one; he argued that the rejection of his request to go to Rizal under escort to secure affidavits denied him the opportunity to present controverting evidence and violated due process.
• Force and Intimidation: Appellant argued that neither force nor intimidation had been proven; external evidence did not show rape, the NBI doctor found no extragenital physical injuries and testified that Conchita said she was not physically maltreated, no torn panties or bra were presented, the genital examination indicated ten or more sexual intercourses, and no pistol was proven; he also argued there was no rape in the wagon because the only threat was that two other men would rape her if she did not yield.
• Credibility of Complainant: Appellant argued that Conchita’s testimony was characterized by more than forty inconsistencies, contradictions, omissions, and incredible assertions, and that her motives were dismissal from employment, a P10,000 consideration, and political vendetta.
• Impeached Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not discarding completely the testimonies and affidavits of Pat. Benhur Cabiara and Virgilio Rone, because they had been impeached.
• Defense Evidence: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not giving due weight and credit to his testimony and that of his witnesses.
• Ocular Inspection and Inferences: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in relying on pure inferences and deductions and on baseless imagination of facts, and in denying the defense motion for ocular inspection on the excuse that the judge was physically weak.
• Fabricated Charges: Appellant argued that the false charges of rape were filed because of the order separating Conchita from her employment in the municipal government, a monetary consideration of P10,000 given to her, and the influence and vendetta of his long-time political enemies, with Conchita as a willing instrument.
• Evaluation of Rape Evidence: Appellant argued that the trial court failed to observe the fundamental rules of jurisprudence in appreciating the testimony of a complaining witness in rape cases, namely, scrutinizing it carefully to determine if it could stand on its own weight and not relying on the weakness of the defense evidence.
• Acquittal: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in rendering judgments of conviction in the three cases instead of acquitting him.

• Complaints vs. Informations: Respondent countered that there was nothing mystifying in the respective texts of the complaints and informations; Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code qualifies rape by the use of a deadly weapon, not by merely being armed, and the investigating fiscal had discretion to assess the evidence and charge what he believed was the proper offense.
• Preliminary Investigation: Respondent argued that the purpose of a preliminary investigation had been satisfied because the accused was given all opportunity to submit countervailing evidence; the rejection of his request to leave detention to secure affidavits did not bar him or his lawyers from presenting counterbalancing evidence, and his motion for reinvestigation was denied and the denial sustained by the Minister of Justice.
• Force and Intimidation: Respondent argued that the force employed in rape need not be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it need only be sufficient to enable the accused to consummate his purpose, and the medical findings did not negate rape because the examination was conducted about a month later and the absence of torn clothing did not connote absence of resistance.
• Credibility of Complainant: Respondent argued that Conchita’s testimony was credible, that her inconsistencies were not on substantial or pivotal matters, and that her delay in reporting was explained by threats to her life and that of her family and by her search for assistance from relatives.
• Impeached Prosecution Witnesses: Respondent pointed out that the trial court used the affidavits of Pat. Cabiara and Virgilio Rone only as to their tenor; Cabiara’s affidavit was offered to impeach him when he turned hostile, and Rone’s affidavit was offered as part of his testimony that he immediately retracted the statement prepared by Poculan as an advance defense.
• Defense Witnesses: Respondent argued that the defense witnesses were not credible because they were subject to varied forms of personal and political attachment to Poculan, who exercised moral ascendancy over them, and their testimonies were replete with unnaturalness.
• Ocular Inspection: Respondent argued that the failure of the trial judge to conduct an ocular inspection did not detract from the credibility of the prosecution evidence, because the inspection would have occurred three to four years after the incident and conditions would not have been the same; a witness also testified that the road to Nilabo was sand and gravel and accessible by motorcab, truck, or pick-up.
• Motive and Fabrication: Respondent argued that the alleged monetary consideration of P10,000 remained unsubstantiated and that the delay in initiating the prosecution could not be equated with untruthfulness or vacillation.
• Overall Evidence: Respondent argued that the prosecution evidence considered by itself was adequate to sustain the judgment appealed from and was not dependent on the weakness of the defense evidence.

• Variance Between Complaints and Informations: Whether the trial court erred in proceeding on informations that did not allege the accused was “armed with a revolver” as stated in the sworn complaints, thereby charging offenses different from the complaints.
• Preliminary Investigation: Whether the accused was denied preliminary investigation and due process when the military preliminary investigation rejected his request to leave detention to secure affidavits and when his motion for reinvestigation was denied.
• Force and Intimidation: Whether the prosecution proved force or intimidation in the three rapes despite the absence of external injuries, torn underwear, or proof of pistol use, and despite medical findings of prior sexual intercourse.
• Credibility of Complainant: Whether the trial court erred in crediting Conchita Rone’s testimony despite alleged inconsistencies, contradictions, omissions, and motives of dismissal, monetary consideration, and political vendetta.
• Impeached Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in not discarding the testimonies and affidavits of Pat. Benhur Cabiara and Virgilio Rone as impeached.
• Defense Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in not giving due weight and credit to the testimonies of the appellant and his witnesses.
• Ocular Inspection and Inferences: Whether the trial court erred in relying on inferences and deductions and in denying the defense motion for ocular inspection.
• Fabricated Charges: Whether the rape charges were false and filed because of Conchita’s separation from employment, a P10,000 monetary consideration, and political vendetta.
• Evaluation of Rape Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in evaluating the evidence and should have acquitted the appellant.

• Variance Between Complaints and Informations: No. The prosecuting fiscal has discretion to charge the proper offense; “armed with a revolver” is not synonymous with use of a deadly weapon, and rape is qualified by the use, not mere possession, of a deadly weapon under Article 335.
• Preliminary Investigation: No. The purpose of preliminary investigation was satisfied; the accused was given opportunity to submit countervailing evidence, and the denial of his request to leave detention did not bar him from presenting evidence.
• Force and Intimidation: No. The force employed need only be sufficient to consummate the purpose; intimidation may be addressed to the mind, and the absence of external injuries or torn clothing did not negate rape.
• Credibility of Complainant: No. The inconsistencies were not on substantial or pivotal matters; Conchita remained resolute, and the alleged motives were baseless.
• Impeached Prosecution Witnesses: No. The trial court used the affidavits only as to their tenor or for impeachment; their retraction did not destroy the prosecution’s case.
• Defense Evidence: No. The trial court properly found the defense witnesses unworthy of credence due to personal and political attachment to the appellant and his moral ascendancy over them.
• Ocular Inspection and Inferences: No. The failure to conduct an ocular inspection did not detract from the prosecution evidence, and the road’s accessibility was established by another witness.
• Fabricated Charges: No. The claims of dismissal, P10,000 consideration, and political vendetta were unsubstantiated and belied by Conchita’s immediate reports and conduct.
• Evaluation of Rape Evidence: No. The trial court’s credibility findings are entitled to the highest degree of respect, and the prosecution evidence was adequate to sustain conviction.

• Variance Between Complaints and Informations: The Court explained that the complaints alleged Poculan was “armed with a revolver,” while the informations did not. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code qualifies rape by the use of a deadly weapon, not by the mere fact of being armed. The investigating fiscal was vested with discretion to assess the evidence and charge what he believed was the proper offense. The complainant in private crimes merely initiates the prosecution; she does not control the fiscal’s charging decision. Thus, no fatal variance existed.
• Preliminary Investigation: The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution and to protect the accused from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, as stated in Sausi vs. Querubin. The records showed that Poculan was given all opportunity to submit countervailing evidence. He was furnished copies of the charge sheet and documentary evidence, required to file a counter-affidavit, and granted an extension. The denial of his request to go to Rizal under escort to secure affidavits did not bar him or his lawyers from presenting counterbalancing evidence. The preliminary investigation was completed, and his motion for reinvestigation was denied by Fiscal Mata and the denial sustained by the Minister of Justice. His petition in G.R. No. 60953-55 was dismissed for lack of merit. Due process was not denied.
• Force and Intimidation: The Court applied the rule that the force employed in rape need not be so great nor of such character as could not be resisted; it is only that the force used by the accused be sufficient to enable him to consummate his purpose, as held in People vs. Gan, People vs. Olden, and People vs. Equac. Not all women are of the same mettle. The trial court found the force sufficient. The examining physician’s finding of no external injuries was understandable because the examination was conducted on April 21, 1980, approximately a month after the incidents; the bruises on Conchita’s arms, chin, and face could have healed by then. Her statement to the doctor that she was not physically maltreated was not incompatible with her testimony that she was pulled, pushed, or threatened, because the force used was insufficient to inflict serious physical injuries but sufficient to overcome her resistance. The absence of torn panties or bra did not negate resistance. In the wagon, no physical maltreatment accompanied the rape, but Poculan’s threat that Capili and Cabiara would take turns raping her was sufficient intimidation; intimidation can be addressed to the mind. The medical finding of more than three sexual intercourses did not negate rape, and unchaste character is no defense under People vs. Lamberte. If Conchita had been Poculan’s querida, there would have been no need for the ruse, the isolated hut, or the motorcab with two passengers.
• Credibility of Complainant: The Court reviewed the almost thousand-page transcript and found that while there were inconsistencies and inaccuracies, such as the name of the motorcab driver and her date of birth, they were not on substantial matters or pivotal issues. Throughout eleven session days of probing, occasionally insulting and bullying cross-examination, punctuated by outpourings of emotion, Conchita remained resolute and uncowed. The Court discerned no intent to weave a fanciful story. The alleged motives—dismissal from employment, a P10,000 consideration, and political vendetta—were baseless. The leave application was doubtful because the original was in the Mayor’s hands, had no official entries, and no official custodian testified as to its veracity. The P10,000 consideration remained unsubstantiated. The delay in initiating prosecution was explained by Poculan’s threats and Conchita’s search for assistance from relatives; she feared for her life and even received security when she returned to Dipolog City. Her failure to bring the apparel she wore did not destroy her credibility, because the absence of torn dresses and underwear does not negative the truth of a rape complaint under People vs. Balbuena. Poculan’s claim that he could not walk without crutches was contradicted by photographs showing him standing erect and delivering a speech without crutches, and his denial of carrying a firearm was belied by photographs showing him with a sidearm.
• Impeached Prosecution Witnesses: Pat. Cabiara’s first affidavit, taken on May 14, 1980, substantially corroborated Conchita’s version, but he later executed an affidavit of retraction on January 21, 1981. Virgilio Rone’s first affidavit stated that Conchita arrived at Balubohan on March 22, 1980 looking healthy and well, but he later subscribed to another affidavit stating that he signed the first affidavit out of fear after Poculan requested him and his father to do so. The trial court used the affidavits only as to their tenor. The prosecution offered Cabiara’s affidavit to impeach him when he turned hostile, and Rone’s affidavit was offered as part of his testimony that he immediately retracted the statement prepared by Poculan as an advance defense. Thus, the trial court did not err in not discarding them completely.
• Defense Evidence: The trial court observed that the defense witnesses were subject to varied forms of personal and political attachment to Poculan, who exercised moral ascendancy over them, and could not be expected to tell the whole truth. Their testimonies were replete with unnaturalness. The totality of the evidence revealed a criminal design well contrived: Conchita was made to report to Poculan’s house; a motorcab was waiting; an elderly woman and Pat. Cabiara were placed inside to deflect suspicion; they alighted; the driver turned toward Nilabo without orders; Pat. Cabiara and the wagon were on hand at dawn; and the wagon stopped while Capili and Cabiara alighted, leaving Poculan to ravish Conchita a third time. Conchita immediately told her aunt and later her brother. Poculan’s post-incident acts—tracking her, sending emissaries, offering benefits, and threatening her—enhanced his culpability. The retractions were unworthy of credence.
• Ocular Inspection and Inferences: The failure of the trial judge to conduct an ocular inspection because of his advanced age did not detract from the credibility of the prosecution evidence. The inspection would have taken place approximately three to four years after the incident, and conditions would not have been the same. Democrito Cadungog, a farmer of Mapang, Rizal, testified that the road to Nilabo was sand and gravel and accessible by motorcab, truck, or pick-up, and that they used to campaign there in 1980. Thus, the trial court did not err in relying on the evidence presented.
• Fabricated Charges: The alleged monetary consideration of P10,000 remained unsubstantiated. The Court found no intent on Conchita’s part to weave a fanciful story impelled by dismissal from employment, monetary consideration, or political vendetta. The delay in initiating the prosecution was explained by her fear and her search for assistance. Poculan’s efforts to quash the charges through appeals to the President and letters from Assemblyman Hussein Loong and Governor Alberto Q. Ubay did not negate the prima facie evidence found by both military and civilian prosecuting officers.
• Evaluation of Rape Evidence: The findings of the trial court on credibility are generally given the highest degree of respect. The Court’s independent review confirmed those findings, and it was not shown that the trial court overlooked facts of weight and importance that might change the result. The consistent ruling is that when a woman testifies that she had been raped, she says all that is needed to signify that the crime has been committed, provided her testimony meets the test of credibility, as stated in People vs. Soterol. Conchita met that test. The prosecution evidence considered by itself was adequate to sustain the judgment and was not dependent on the weakness of the defense evidence. Poculan’s culpability for three separate crimes of rape, with the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his public position and without any mitigating circumstance, was established beyond doubt.

• Force in Rape — The force employed in rape need not be so great nor of such character as could not be resisted. It is only that the force used by the accused be sufficient to enable him to consummate his purpose. The Court applied this rule to affirm the trial court’s finding that the force used by Poculan was sufficient.
• Intimidation in Rape — Intimidation may be addressed to the mind. A threat that other men would take turns raping the victim if she did not submit was sufficient to cow her into submission, even without physical force. The Court applied this to the rape in the wagon.
• Absence of External Injuries or Torn Clothing — The absence of external physical injuries or torn underwear does not negate rape. The medical examination was conducted about a month after the incidents, and the bruises could have healed; the absence of torn clothing does not connote absence of resistance. The Court relied on this in rejecting Poculan’s arguments.
• Unchaste Character Not a Defense — The fact that an offended party may have been of unchaste character constitutes no defense in a charge of rape. The Court applied this in holding that the medical finding of prior sexual intercourse did not negate the rape charge.
• Prosecuting Officer’s Discretion and Variance — In private crimes, the complainant merely initiates the prosecution. The prosecuting officer is vested with discretion to charge what he believes is the proper offense. Being “armed with a revolver” is not synonymous with the use of a deadly weapon, which is what qualifies rape under Article 335. The Court applied this to reject the claimed fatal variance.
• Purpose of Preliminary Investigation — The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution and to protect the accused from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial. The purpose is satisfied when the accused is given the opportunity to submit countervailing evidence. The Court found this purpose satisfied.
• Credibility Findings of the Trial Court — Findings of the trial court on credibility are generally given the highest degree of respect. The Court independently reviewed the record and confirmed the trial court’s findings.
• Testimony of a Rape Victim — When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says all that is needed to signify that the crime has been committed, provided her testimony meets the test of credibility. The Court found Conchita’s testimony credible and sufficient.
• Moral Ascendancy and Defense Witness Credibility — Witnesses subject to personal and political attachment to the accused, over whom the accused exercises moral ascendancy, cannot be expected to tell the whole truth. The Court upheld the trial court’s rejection of the defense witnesses’ testimonies on this ground.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Taking Advantage of Public Position — The Court affirmed the conviction for three separate crimes of rape with the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position, as found by the trial court and denominated as abuse of power in the informations.

• "It is an accepted rule that the force employed in rape need not be so great nor of such character as could not be resisted. It is only that the force used by the accused be sufficient to enable him to consummate his purpose." — This states the controlling standard for force in rape, which the Court applied to affirm the conviction despite the absence of serious external injuries.
• "Intimidation can be addressed to the mind as well, as exemplified by the rape of Complainant in the wagon." — This defines the scope of intimidation in rape and supports the finding that the threat in the wagon was sufficient even without physical force.
• "The fact that an offended party may have been of unchaste character constitutes no defense in a charge of Rape (People vs. Lamberte, L-65153, July 11, 1986,142 SCRA 685)." — This rejects the defense theory that the medical finding of prior sexual intercourse or the alleged querida relationship negated rape.
• "The consistent ruling of this Court has also been that when a woman testifies that she had been raped, she says all that is needed to signify that the crime has been committed (People vs. Soterol, L-53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400), provided her testimony meets the test of credibility." — This articulates the evidentiary weight accorded to a credible rape victim’s testimony and was used to sustain the conviction.

• People vs. Gan — Cited for the rule that the force employed in rape need not be so great nor of such character as could not be resisted; only sufficient force to consummate the purpose is required.
• People vs. Olden — Cited as reiterating the same view on force and resistance in rape.
• People vs. Equac, 80 SCRA 665, 671 [1977] — Quoted for the proposition that not all women are of the same mettle and that a victim need not resist to the jeopardy of life or limb.
• People vs. Lamberte, L-65153, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 685 — Held that unchaste character is no defense in a charge of rape; applied to reject the defense’s reliance on the medical finding of prior sexual intercourse.
• People vs. Balbuena, L-44859-60, April 27, 1984, 129 SCRA 10 — Held that the absence of torn dresses and underwear does not negative the truth of a rape complaint and the credibility of the victim’s testimony.
• People vs. Soterol, L-53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400 — Held that when a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says all that is needed to signify that the crime has been committed, provided her testimony meets the test of credibility.
• Sausi vs. Querubin, L-24122, January 29, 1975, 62 SCRA 155 — Cited for the purpose of a preliminary investigation: to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution and to protect the accused from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial.
• People vs. Antonio Arizila y Flores, G.R. No. 59713, March 15, 1982 — Cited by the trial court in imposing three penalties of reclusion perpetua for the three separate crimes of rape.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code — Defines rape and qualifies it by the use of a deadly weapon. The Court explained that the allegation “armed with a revolver” in the complaints did not necessarily mean the firearm was used, and the informations could charge simple rape.
• PD No. 39, as amended, in relation to PD 911 — Basis for the preliminary investigation conducted by the military authorities. The Court found that the preliminary investigation satisfied its purpose and did not deny the accused due process.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur.