People of the Philippines vs. Ricky Alfredo

Alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail absent proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity; it crumbles against positive identification by a truthful witness. A conviction is not invalid merely because the judge who rendered judgment did not hear the witnesses, provided the evidence on record is sufficient and the transcripts are complete. Exemplary damages may be awarded for highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct even without an alleged aggravating circumstance, based on Article 2229 of the Civil Code.

AAA, a 36-year-old woman then six months pregnant, and her 10-year-old son BBB were staying in a rented shack in Cadian, Topdac, Atok, Benguet, where she harvested sayote from a plantation owned by Hover Cotdi. Ricky Alfredo y Norman and his family also worked the nearby sayote plantation. The charges against Alfredo were brought under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code—one count for rape through carnal knowledge under paragraph 1(a) and another for rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2. The victim’s identity and that of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262 and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.

AAA, a 36-year-old woman who was six months pregnant, and her 10-year-old son BBB were staying in a rented shack in Cadian, Topdac, Atok, Benguet, where they had gone to harvest sayote. Ricky Alfredo y Norman and his family also worked in the nearby sayote plantation. On April 27, 2001, AAA and BBB returned to the plantation to harvest sayote; the following day, April 28, 2001, AAA had the harvested sayote transported to Baguio City. That night, she and her son stayed in the shack and retired early to bed.

In the middle of the night, AAA was awakened by a beam of light coming through the gaps in the shack’s walls and illuminating her face. She asked who was there, but no one answered; the light was switched off and then switched on again. A male voice then shouted, “Rumwar kayo ditta no saan kayo nga rumwar paletpeten kayo iti bala!”—meaning that they should come out or be riddled with bullets. AAA remained seated. The voice next said, “Lukatam daytoy no saan mo nga lukatan bilangan ka, maysa, duwa...”—meaning that she should open the door or he would count one, two. AAA woke BBB. The voice then said, “Pabitaken kayo iti bala”—meaning that he would explode the bullet. AAA cried out of fear. Anxious that the person outside would kill her and her son, she lit the gas lamp on the table and opened the door while her son stood beside it. As the door opened, she saw accused-appellant directly in front of her holding a flashlight. She did not immediately recognize him because his long hair covered his face. She invited him inside, but he immediately held her hair and ordered her to walk uphill. Helpless and terrified, AAA obeyed, with accused-appellant behind her.

Upon reaching a sloping ground, accused-appellant ordered AAA to stop. He placed the lit flashlight in his pocket and ordered her to remove her clothes. When she refused, he boxed her left eye and removed her clothes. When she tried to stop him, he angrily slapped her face. Completely naked, AAA was again ordered to walk uphill. Upon reaching a grassy portion with a stump about one foot high, accused-appellant ordered her to stop and lie on top of the stump after boxing her thighs. He bent down and spread open her legs. After directing the beam of the flashlight on her naked body, he removed his pants, lowered his brief to his knees, went on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. He threatened to box her if she moved. He also held her breast and other parts of her body, shifted the flashlight from one hand to another, and moved his buttocks up and down. AAA cried as she felt severe pain in her lower abdomen. Accused-appellant stood up and directed the beam of the flashlight on her after he was satisfied. Ten minutes later, he went on top of AAA again, inserted his penis into her vagina, and moved his buttocks up and down. After being satisfied, he stood up and lit a cigarette. Afterwards, he went on top of AAA again and tried to insert his penis into her vagina, but his penis had already softened. Frustrated, he knelt and inserted his fingers into her vagina. After removing his fingers, he held a twig about 10 inches long and the size of a small finger in diameter and used it to pierce her vagina. Dissatisfied, he removed the twig and inserted the flashlight into her vagina. After removing the flashlight, he went on top of her again, pressing his elbows on her upper breasts and boxing her shoulders and thighs. He then stood up and warned her not to report the incident to the authorities. Immediately after, he left her at the scene.

Since she was too weak to walk, AAA rested for about 15 minutes before she got up and returned to the shack, where she immediately woke her son. They proceeded to the highway and boarded a jeep to Camp 30, Atok, Benguet. The following day, she went to Sayangan, Atok, Benguet to report the incident to the police. Dr. Alma Ged-ang found that AAA had a subconjunctival hemorrhage on the right eye and multiple head injuries, which may have been caused by force such as a blow, a punch, or a hard object hitting the eye. There was also tenderness on the upper part of the back of AAA, as well as on her left infraclavicular area below the left clavicle, left flank area or at the left side of the waist, and medial aspect on the inner part of the thigh. There were also multiple linear abrasions, or minor straight open wounds on the skin of her forearms and legs, caused by sharp objects with rough surface. On internal examination, Dr. Ged-ang found a confluent abrasion on the left and medial aspects of AAA’s labia minora about five centimeters long and a confluent circular abrasion caused by a blunt, rough object that had been forcibly introduced into the genitalia.

According to accused-appellant, in the morning of April 28, 2001, he was working in the sayote plantation near his house. At noontime, he went home to eat lunch. After lunch, his mother told him to bring the pile of sayote she had harvested to the edge of the road. When he reached the place, he saw AAA gathering the sayote harvested by his mother and placing them in a sack. He shouted at her, prompting AAA to run away with her son and leave the sack. He then started placing the harvested sayote in the sack and filled eight sacks. Remembering that his mother had told him he would be able to fill 10 sacks, he went to AAA’s shack after bringing the eight sacks near the road, suspecting that she and her son had taken the two missing sacks. When he arrived, he saw them packing sayote and saw a sack of sayote with his father’s name printed on it. He got mad and told AAA to go away and leave because what they were doing was wrong. AAA replied that she would wait for Hover Cotdi, the owner of the sayote plantation and the shack, to ask permission to leave. Accused-appellant claimed that he spoke in an angry but non-threatening voice. While he was confronting AAA, her son ran into the shack and stayed there. Before leaving, accused-appellant told AAA that the sacks of sayote belonged to his family, although he decided not to take them back anymore. He left after five o’clock in the afternoon and arrived at their house at around seven o’clock in the evening. All his family members were watching television on Channel 3; he joined them in watching a Tagalog movie, then went to bed at 10 o’clock in the evening, while his parents continued to watch television until 11 o’clock in the evening. The following morning, April 29, 2001, he woke between six and seven o’clock, had breakfast, and helped his mother clean the sayote farm. At around eight o’clock, he saw AAA by the road waiting for a ride with baggage placed in a carton box. His mother went down the road and talked to AAA, leaving accused-appellant behind. He claimed to pity AAA upon seeing her but could not do anything.

The trial court credited the prosecution’s version over the defense’s account. It relied on AAA’s detailed testimony, the medical findings of Dr. Ged-ang, the recovery of AAA’s red t-shirt and blue shorts at the place where accused-appellant was said to have removed her clothes, and the testimony of BBB, who described how accused-appellant threatened them on the night of April 28, 2001, how he identified accused-appellant as the perpetrator, and what his mother looked like when she returned home in the early morning of April 29, 2001. According to BBB, his mother was naked except for a dirty white jacket she was wearing, and he noticed that she had wounds and blood all over her body. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

• Alibi: Accused-appellant contended that, by the nature of the offense in the two Informations, he had no other plausible defense except alibi; although denial and alibi are the weakest defenses in criminal cases, they should not be brushed aside if there are material inconsistencies in the claims of the prosecution witnesses, especially because rape normally involves only two persons.
• Material Inconsistencies: Accused-appellant argued that there were material inconsistencies between the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies and their affidavits, specifically (1) whether his penis was erect or not, and (2) whether AAA recognized him while they were already on the mountain or while they were still in the shack.
• Judge Who Did Not Hear Witnesses: Accused-appellant contended that the judge who penned the appealed decision was different from the judge who heard the witnesses’ testimonies and was therefore in no position to render judgment, as he did not observe firsthand their demeanor during trial.
• Conduct of Accused: Accused-appellant argued that his then and there conduct was unlikely to yield a guilty verdict.

• Alibi: Whether accused-appellant’s alibi should be given weight notwithstanding the alleged material inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ claims.
• Material Inconsistencies: Whether the alleged inconsistencies between the prosecution witnesses’ affidavits and open-court testimonies impaired their credibility.
• Judge Who Did Not Hear Witnesses: Whether the conviction is invalid because the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses’ testimonies during trial.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the evidence established accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite his claim that his conduct was unlikely to yield a guilty verdict.

• Alibi: No. Alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail unless the accused proves that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity; positive identification by AAA defeated it.
• Material Inconsistencies: No. The alleged inconsistencies were not material; affidavits are generally inferior to open-court testimony, and AAA’s testimony and affidavit were reconcilable.
• Judge Who Did Not Hear Witnesses: No. The fact that the deciding judge did not hear the witnesses does not invalidate the conviction where the evidence on record is sufficient and the transcripts are complete.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The prosecution established all elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraphs 1(a) and 2, beyond reasonable doubt through AAA’s detailed testimony, medical findings, and corroborating evidence.

• Alibi: For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed; he must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Accused-appellant failed to present convincing evidence that he did not leave his house, which was only about 150 meters away from AAA’s shack, on the evening of April 28, 2001. It was not physically impossible for him to be present on the mountain where he allegedly raped AAA. Alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses; it is negative and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. No strong and credible evidence was adduced to overcome AAA’s testimony. Even if corroborated by his mother Remina and sister Margaret, the alibi was unworthy of belief because accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA and because alibi established mainly by the accused himself and his relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms is not credible.

• Material Inconsistencies: Accused-appellant pointed to two alleged inconsistencies: whether his penis was erect or not, and whether AAA recognized him while they were already on the mountain or while they were still in the shack. AAA testified in open court that accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina several times but was unable to do so because his penis had already softened. In her affidavit, she stated that the suspect tried to insert his penis into her vagina but it did not erect. There was no inconsistency; the only difference was that she failed to state in her affidavit that before the unsuccessful attempt, accused-appellant had already succeeded twice in penetrating her private organ. As to recognition, there was likewise no incompatibility between AAA’s affidavit stating that she came to know accused-appellant as the culprit when they were on the mountain and his flashlight illuminated his face as he lay on top of her, and her testimony that while they were still in the shack she was “not then sure” but already suspected that her rapist was accused-appellant “because of his hair.” She became positively certain only when the flashlight illuminated his face while they were on the mountain. Discrepancies do not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, for affidavits, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer or due to partial suggestions, and are generally considered inferior to testimony given in open court.

• Judge Who Did Not Hear Witnesses: The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion. As held in People vs. Competente, the circumstance that the judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. A perusal of the Decision showed that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and was carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions from the Court carefully passed upon. The transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were extant and complete, so there was no impediment for the judge to decide the case.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: In reviewing evidence in rape cases, the Court considers that: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the complainant’s testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the prosecution’s evidence must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can testify to the fact of forced coitus. Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape—one under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and the other under paragraph 2. The elements of rape under paragraph 1(a) are: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) the act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. The elements under paragraph 2 are: (1) the offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2) the act is committed by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and (3) the act is accomplished by using force or intimidation, among others. The prosecution sufficiently established these elements. AAA gave a detailed narration of the incident and categorically asserted that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her and sexually assaulted her against her will with force, threat, or intimidation. She testified that accused-appellant threatened to riddle her and her son with bullets if they did not open the door, forcibly pulled her hair and dragged her to the mountains, boxed her every time she did not yield, boxed her thighs forcing her to sit, and threatened to box her if she moved while he carried out his bestial desires. After satisfying his lust, he sexually assaulted her by inserting his fingers into her vagina, trying to pierce it with a twig, and inserting a flashlight into her vagina. She was too weak to stop him, had struggled from the shack to the mountains, and was six months pregnant, frightened, and hopeless. The medical findings of Dr. Ged-ang corroborated her testimony. While a medical examination is not indispensable in a rape prosecution, the medical certificate is a veritable corroborative piece of evidence. The police found AAA’s red t-shirt and blue shorts at the place where accused-appellant was said to have removed her clothes. BBB testified as to how accused-appellant threatened them, how he identified accused-appellant as the perpetrator, and what his mother looked like when she returned home—naked except for a dirty white jacket, with wounds and blood all over her body. All these were consistent with AAA’s testimony. The conviction was accordingly sustained.

• Alibi — Alibi is a defense that the accused was elsewhere when the crime was committed. For it to prosper, it is not enough to prove presence in another place; the accused must also prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. It is inherently weak, negative, and self-serving, and crumbles against positive identification by truthful witnesses. In this case, accused-appellant failed to prove physical impossibility because his house was only about 150 meters from AAA’s shack and it was not impossible for him to be on the mountain where the rape occurred. His alibi, corroborated only by relatives, did not overcome AAA’s positive identification.

• Credibility of Affidavits vs. Open-Court Testimony — Affidavits taken ex parte are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer or due to partial suggestions, and are generally inferior to testimony given in open court. Discrepancies between an affidavit and open-court testimony do not necessarily impair the witness’s credibility. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that AAA’s alleged inconsistencies—whether accused-appellant’s penis was erect and when she recognized him—were reconcilable and did not diminish her credibility.

• Validity of Judgment by a Judge Who Did Not Hear the Witnesses — A judgment of conviction is not rendered erroneous merely because the judge who rendered it was not the one who heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor during trial, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support the conclusion and the transcripts of stenographic notes are extant and complete. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting accused-appellant’s claim that the deciding judge was in no position to render judgment.

• Elements of Rape under Article 266-A — Under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) the act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. Under paragraph 2, the elements are: (1) the offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2) the act is committed by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and (3) the act is accomplished by using force or intimidation, among others. The Court found both sets of elements established by AAA’s testimony, medical evidence, and corroborating testimony.

• Exemplary Damages for Outrageous Conduct — Exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of rights, and as punishment for outrageous conduct. They may be awarded not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance but also where the circumstances show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender, based on Article 2229 of the Civil Code. The Court applied this doctrine by awarding PhP30,000 exemplary damages for each count of rape, citing the moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness shown by sexually assaulting a pregnant woman.

• Catubig Principle on Exemplary Damages — Under People vs. Catubig, courts may still award exemplary damages based on Article 2230 of the Civil Code even if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which remained pending thereafter. The retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party. The Court discussed this principle in People vs. Dalisay and ultimately relied on Article 2229 as the basis for exemplary damages in this case.

• “It should be noted that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.” — This passage states the controlling requisites for the defense of alibi, which the Court used to reject accused-appellant’s defense because he failed to prove physical impossibility.
• “The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.” — This passage defines the rule on the validity of a judgment rendered by a judge who did not hear the witnesses, a key procedural holding in the case.
• “Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.” — This passage articulates the basis for awarding exemplary damages under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, which the Court applied to increase the damages awarded.
• “In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be made: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.” — This passage sets out the standard of review for rape convictions, which the Court used before sustaining the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Cited as the basis for transferring the case from the RTC to the Court of Appeals because the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, modifying the rules on direct appeals.
• People vs. Competente, G.R. No. 96697, March 26, 1992, 207 SCRA 591 — Cited for the rule that the circumstance that the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses does not detract from the validity of the conviction.
• People vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996, 252 SCRA 507 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages for sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, on account of the accused’s moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness.
• People vs. Dalisay, G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807 — Cited for the discussion of the dichotomy in awarding exemplary damages under the Revised Rules and the Catubig principle, and for the rule that exemplary damages may be based on Article 2229.
• People vs. Catubig — Cited in People vs. Dalisay for the principle that courts may still award exemplary damages based on Article 2230 even if the aggravating circumstance was not alleged, so long as it was proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules and pending thereafter.
• People vs. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, August 9, 2010 — Cited for the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages awarded in rape cases.
• People vs. San Diego, G.R. No. 129297, March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 477 — Cited for the considerations in reviewing evidence in rape cases, including the caution required in scrutinizing the complainant’s testimony.
• People vs. Resurreccion, G.R. No. 185389, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 269 — Cited for the rule that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or secrecy, so the victim is often the only witness to the forced coitus.
• People vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. 142662, August 14, 2001, 362 SCRA 778 — Cited for the rule that while medical examination is not indispensable in a rape prosecution, the medical certificate is a veritable corroborative piece of evidence.
• People vs. Guerrero, G.R. No. 170360, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 666 — Cited for the requisites of alibi, particularly that the accused must prove physical impossibility of being at the crime scene.
• People vs. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 78 — Cited for the rule that alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses.
• People vs. Manzano, G.R. No. 108293, September 15, 1995, 248 SCRA 239 — Cited for the rule that alibi becomes more unworthy of merit when established mainly by the accused himself and his relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms.
• People vs. Sara, G.R. No. 140618, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 431 — Cited for the rule that the validity of a conviction is not adversely affected by the fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses.
• People vs. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419 — Cited as authority for withholding the real names of the victim and her immediate family members to protect their identity and privacy.

• Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a), Revised Penal Code — Defines rape through carnal knowledge: the offender is a man, had carnal knowledge of a woman, and the act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. Applied to the first count in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213.
• Article 266-A, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Defines rape through sexual assault: the offender commits an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person, accomplished by force or intimidation, among others. Applied to the second count in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214, involving the insertion of a flashlight into AAA’s vagina.
• Article 2229, Civil Code — Provides the main basis for exemplary damages, allowing their award where the circumstances show highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct. The Court used this provision to justify the award of PhP30,000 exemplary damages for each count of rape.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Allows exemplary damages when an aggravating circumstance has been proven. The Court discussed this provision in relation to the Revised Rules and the Catubig principle but ultimately relied on Article 2229 as the basis for exemplary damages.
• Section 44, Republic Act No. 9262 — Cited as authority for withholding the real names of the victim and her immediate family members to protect their identity and privacy.
• Section 40, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC — Cited together with Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262 for the same purpose of protecting the victim’s identity and privacy.

Corona, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.