People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Pigar y Ambayanan et al.

An ordinary aggravating circumstance, such as dwelling, cannot be appreciated by the courts if it was not alleged in the Information or complaint, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires the specification of qualifying and aggravating circumstances to protect the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Court also held that abuse of superior strength qualifies a killing into murder when there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, and that when abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.

The appellants, along with several co-accused, were charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for the killing of Feliciano S. Garces, Sr. The charge alleged that the accused, conspiring with each other, attacked the victim with bladed weapons and bamboo poles with sharp pointed edges locally known as "bangkaw," with treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and means to weaken the defense. Only three of the accused were arrested, and one of them, Buenaventura "Mokmok" Pigar, died pending trial, resulting in the dismissal of the charge against him.

On August 17, 2009, around 6 o'clock in the evening, Edgardo Garces, son of the victim Feliciano S. Garces, Sr., was on his way home when he saw his co-worker Rogelio Tañala and Roy Pigar quarrelling. Edgardo tried to pacify them, but Roy resented it and threw a stone at Edgardo. Edgardo retaliated with a fist blow, which Roy dodged. A certain Gagante then pacified both Roy and Edgardo. After the incident, Edgardo rushed home to warn his family because he was afraid that Roy, who was drunk, would take revenge.

At that time, Edgardo's sister, Marietta Garces, was tending her kids inside their home, while Feliciano, Sr. was sleeping in his room. When Edgardo arrived, he instructed Marietta and the kids to transfer to their hut just across the street, then left to seek help from their uncle. While Marietta was inside the hut, she saw Roy, with two others, arrive on board a motorcycle. Roy stopped in front of their house and threw stones. Feliciano, Sr. was roused from his sleep, stepped out, and shouted at Roy and his companions. A neighbor witnessed the brewing confrontation and advised Feliciano, Sr. to let it go since Roy and his companions were drunk. Soon, ten men arrived and surrounded the house, including appellants "Jerry" and "Lawlaw." Feliciano, Sr. ran back inside the house, but some of the men ran after him. As they caught up with him inside the house, they hacked him with bolos and a bamboo spear locally known as bangkaw. He ran out of the house only to be met by the other men who repeatedly hacked and poked him with their own bolos and bangkaws. At this point, Edgardo arrived, and a gunshot was heard. Roy then signaled his companions to leave, and everyone heeded.

Feliciano, Sr. was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. At the time of the incident, he was a thin fifty-two-year-old man who moved slowly. Municipal Health Officer Doctor Bibiana O. Cardente examined his body and found seventeen stab wounds, five of which were fatal, including a wound that damaged his brain tissues.

According to the defense, on the same date, Jerry and his companions passed by Feliciano, Sr.'s house, where they saw the latter standing along the road. Feliciano, Sr. suddenly hacked Jerry with a weapon, causing wounds on his right elbow and the right side of his head. Jerry got hold of Feliciano, Sr.'s weapon and used it on him, while his companions helped by hitting Feliciano, Sr. with pieces of wood. Jerry hacked Feliciano, Sr. around seventeen times, killing him. On cross-examination, Jerry admitted that he purposely went to Feliciano, Sr.'s house with the intent of killing Edgardo, who had a misunderstanding with his older brother Roy. Jerry testified that Lawlaw and Mokmok did not perpetrate the incident and were included in the complaint only because Feliciano, Sr.'s family members were angry. Lawlaw corroborated Jerry's claim, reiterating that he had no participation in the killing and was allegedly working in the bakery at the time of the incident.

• Inconsistencies in Testimonies: Appellants faulted the Court of Appeals for affirming their conviction despite alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, specifically on (a) the participation of "Lawlaw" in the killing; (b) how long the incident lasted; and (c) where exactly the attack on Feliciano, Sr. began. It was also purportedly unclear whether Marietta had actually seen the incident from the hut, and it was allegedly contrary to human experience that Marietta, despite seeing her father being stabbed to death, did nothing to help him.
• Absorption of Abuse of Superior Strength: Appellants argued that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating abuse of superior strength in addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, since it is settled that when abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is simply absorbed in the latter.
• Credit for Denial and Alibi: Appellants claimed that denial and alibi are not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when the accused has no other possible defense but denial.

N/A — The decision does not recount the prosecution's specific arguments on appeal beyond its position as plaintiff-appellee seeking affirmance of the conviction.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the appellants' conviction despite the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was established among the appellants and their co-accused in the killing of Feliciano, Sr.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether abuse of superior strength qualified the killing into murder.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing of Feliciano, Sr.
• Dwelling as Aggravating Circumstance: Whether the ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling could be appreciated when it was not alleged in the Information.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The alleged inconsistencies referred to minor details that did not impair the positive identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses, and the trial court's factual findings on credibility, sustained by the Court of Appeals, were entitled to the highest respect.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established, as the appellants and their co-accused acted in concert, with the act of one being the act of all, and the appellants' presence and participation lent moral support to the actual perpetration of the crime.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes. Abuse of superior strength qualified the killing into murder, given the notorious inequality of forces between the frail 52-year-old victim and the nine attackers.
• Treachery: No. Treachery did not attend the killing because the victim was no longer an unsuspecting victim, having been alerted to the attackers' intent to harm him when Roy first tried to hack him.
• Dwelling as Aggravating Circumstance: No. Dwelling could not be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance because it was not alleged in the Information, as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court applied the settled rule that when the issue rests on the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts accord the highest respect to the trial court's assessment because of the trial judge's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. This rule finds even more stringent application where the trial court's findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. The alleged inconsistencies pertaining to how long the incident took place and where exactly the attack began referred to minor details that did not impair or change the fact that the appellants attacked the victim and stabbed him to death. The Court cited People vs. Pulgo for the proposition that inconsistencies on minor details do not impair the credibility of witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant. On Marietta's supposed failure to help her father, the Court stated that there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, or frightful experience, and that the workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.
• Conspiracy: The Court held that it did not matter whether "Lawlaw" actually caused one or more of the fatal wounds sustained by the victim, as the appellants and their co-accused were charged to have conspired with each other in killing Feliciano, Sr. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Citing People vs. Lababo, the Court explained that the overt act of staying in close proximity while another executes the crime serves the purpose of lending moral support by ensuring that no one could interfere and prevent the successful perpetration thereof. One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent as the actual perpetrator, especially if they did nothing to prevent the commission of the crime.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: The Court defined abuse of superior strength as present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The inequality of forces in this case was beyond doubt: the victim was a thin 52-year-old man who was slow moving, and the appellants attacked him with nine persons. The number alone showed the inequality of strength between the victim and the aggressors, and this, coupled with the victim's frailty, supported the finding of abuse of superior strength, which qualified the killing into murder.
• Treachery: The Court found that the appellants were mistaken in claiming that the trial court and the Court of Appeals appreciated treachery over and above abuse of superior strength, as the RTC did not even appreciate treachery as an attendant circumstance. In any event, the Court found that treachery did not attend the victim's killing. Records showed that before Feliciano, Sr. was killed, Roy visited his house first and already tried to hack him but missed. At that time, Feliciano, Sr. was already deemed to have known of Roy's intention to harm him, and it was not remote that Roy would intend to return soon to finish his business with the victim. Citing People vs. Moreno, the Court emphasized that the essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow. Since Feliciano, Sr. was no longer an unsuspecting victim when Roy came back with eight companions, treachery was not present.
• Dwelling as Aggravating Circumstance: The Court cited Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires that the complaint or information state the designation of the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. This provision is in consonance with the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, allowing the accused to fully prepare for his defense and precluding surprises during trial. Even if the prosecution has duly proven the presence of any of these circumstances, the Court cannot appreciate the same if they were not alleged in the Information. Since the killing happened in the victim's dwelling was not alleged in the Information, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not appreciate dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the appellants were criminally responsible for the killing even if it was not shown that each of them actually inflicted the fatal wounds, as their concerted actions in attacking the victim established a common design. Mere presence at the scene of the crime while armed, when it serves to lend moral support to the actual perpetration, can establish conspiracy.
• Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The Court applied this doctrine in qualifying the killing into murder, finding that the inequality of forces between the frail 52-year-old victim and the nine attackers was beyond doubt.
• Treachery — The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that treachery did not attend the killing because the victim was no longer an unsuspecting victim, having been alerted to the attackers' intent to harm him.
• Alibi — For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting "Lawlaw's" alibi, as it was unsubstantiated and it was not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis, especially since the alleged bakery was located in the same barangay as the victim's house.

• "In cases where the issue rests on the credibility of witnesses, as in this case, it is important to emphasize the well-settled rule that 'appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment made by the trial court because of the trial judge's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination.'" — This passage articulates the controlling standard of appellate review in credibility cases, which the Court applied in affirming the conviction.
• "To Our mind, their overt act of staying in close proximity while Benito executes the crime served no other purpose than to lend moral support by ensuring that no one could interfere and prevent the successful perpetration thereof. We are sufficiently convinced that their presence thereat has no doubt, encouraged Benito and increased the odds against the victims, especially since they were all wielding lethal weapons." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Lababo, defines the evidentiary standard for establishing conspiracy through overt acts of moral support, which the Court applied to the appellants' participation in the killing.
• "The provision is in consonance with the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial. Hence, even if the prosecution has duly proven the presence of any of these circumstances, the Court cannot appreciate the same if they were not alleged in the Information." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for the Court's ruling that dwelling could not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because it was not alleged in the Information.

• People vs. Collamat, et al., G.R. No. 218200, August 15, 2018 — Cited for the rule that appellate courts accord the highest respect to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility because of the trial judge's unique opportunity to observe witnesses firsthand.
• People vs. Pulgo, 813 Phil. 205 (2017) — Cited for the rule that inconsistencies on minor details do not impair the credibility of witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant, and that such inconsistencies reinforce rather than weaken credibility.
• People vs. Lababo, G.R. No. 234651, June 06, 2018 — Cited as controlling on the issue of conspiracy, establishing that mere presence at the scene of the crime while armed, when it lends moral support to the actual perpetration, is sufficient to prove conspiracy.
• People vs. Moreno, G.R. No. 217889, March 14, 2018 — Cited for the definition of treachery, emphasizing that its essence is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Cited as controlling for the amounts of monetary awards in crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, setting civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages at P75,000.00 each, and temperate damages at P50,000.00.
• People vs. Sota, et al., G.R. No. 203121, November 29, 2017 — Cited for the rule that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the Information to be appreciated, in consonance with the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines murder and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when committed with any of the attendant circumstances enumerated therein, including treachery and abuse of superior strength. The Court applied this provision in affirming the appellants' conviction for murder.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides the rules for the application of indivisible penalties, stating that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The Court applied this provision in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the "without eligibility for parole" qualification, given the deletion of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.
• Section 8, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court — Requires that the complaint or information state the designation of the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this provision in ruling that dwelling could not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because it was not alleged in the Information.
• Administrative Matter No. 15-08-02-SC — Provides the guidelines for the proper use of the phrase "without eligibility for parole" in indivisible penalties. The Court applied this issuance in ruling that the term "without eligibility for parole" need not be specified in the penalty.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson-First Division), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lopez, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the case text.