People of the Philippines vs. Regular and de Lara

A plea of guilty in a capital case is improvidently accepted where the trial court fails to explain fully its meaning and consequences, including the qualifying and aggravating circumstances; and absent proof beyond reasonable doubt of treachery, evident premeditation, and conspiracy, the killing and wounding are homicide and frustrated homicide, not murder and frustrated murder. Quasi-recidivists must be sentenced to the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the new felony, and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty cannot reduce that penalty.

Alfredo Regular and Arturo de Lara were prisoners serving sentences at the New Bilibid Prison and members of the Sigue-sigue Sputnik Gang, while Felipe Ladoy and Emilio Esparza were prisoners affiliated with the rival Batang Cebu and Batang Samar gangs. The charges implicated Revised Penal Code provisions on murder and frustrated murder, with allegations of treachery and evident premeditation, and, because both accused were already serving sentences, Article 160 on quasi-recidivism.

At the time of the incident, Felipe Ladoy and Emilio Esparza were prisoners at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, affiliated with the Batang Cebu and Batang Samar gangs, respectively. Alfredo Regular and Arturo de Lara were also prisoners and members of the rival Sigue-sigue Sputnik Gang. On the day before the stabbing, members of the Sigue-sigue Sputnik Gang were targets of darts thrown by the Visayan group composed of Batang Cebu and Batang Samar gangs. The alleged treacherous attack rankled the Sigue-sigue members, who planned immediate and swift reprisal to avenge their gangmates.

On the eve of November 15, 1970, while de Lara was in his brigade, he heard Rodulfo Patuga say to his gangmates Valeriano and Castro, "Babawi tayo. Abe Castro, Menting ito hindi na malalaman ng mga kasama natin itong pangyayaring ito at hindi natin ipaaalam sa ating mga kasamahan." According to the prosecution, at about 12:30 in the afternoon of November 16, 1970, Ladoy and Esparza were gathering camote tops at the back of Building 4 of the New Bilibid Prison. While they were preoccupied, Regular and de Lara, together with Clemente Valeriano and Reynaldo Castro, all members of the Sigue-sigue Sputnik Gang, suddenly stabbed Ladoy and Esparza. Ladoy died on the spot, while Esparza parried the thrust of his assailant and was immediately brought to the New Bilibid Hospital.

Investigation by prison guards revealed that the assailants surreptitiously went out from Dormitory 4-D after sawing the iron grills at the south end of Building 4. After the stabbing spree, the malefactors returned to their respective dormitories. Later, prisoners Regular, de Lara, and Castro gave up and admitted the killing, executing extrajudicial confessions acknowledging participation in the incident. Esparza was treated by Dr. Argente Alejandro, who found lacerated wounds on his left shoulder, left upper arm, left chest, and other parts of the body. Ladoy's autopsy, conducted by Dr. Ibarrola, proved that his death was caused by massive loss of blood resulting from multiple stab wounds found in his body.

The defense presented a different account. About past 12 o'clock noon, Noli Patuga saw Ladoy and Esparza gathering camote tops at the back of Building 4; the group approached the victims stealthily; Valeriano stabbed Ladoy first; Patuga and Castro followed suit. De Lara thrust his improvised weapon into the body of Ladoy only once, upon the command of Patuga, but he did not know whether he hit the victim. Regular testified that he did not know either Ladoy or Esparza; on November 16, 1970, he was inside his brigade the whole day, and no unusual incident happened inside the prison walls. He stayed in his brigade up to the 18th of that month, when he was called to the investigation section of the New Bilibid Prison and investigated by Ignacio Ferrer. He was made to sign a piece of paper whose contents he had not read, and he denied any participation in the killing and wounding. He claimed that he was maltreated by Ferrer so that he would sign the paper; the room was dark, and he was boxed and beaten with a rubber stick and a big book.

When confronted with the fact that de Lara mentioned him as one of those who killed Ladoy and wounded Esparza, Regular alleged that de Lara implicated him because he bore a grudge against him; when they were still free, de Lara's girlfriend transferred her affection to Regular, which made de Lara angry and vow revenge. The prosecution's evidence did not include any witness who saw how the stabbings were done, and the extrajudicial confessions did not state the means, methods, or manner of execution. De Lara's testimony that he was only invited to join the group immediately before the incident and that he was not included in the plan was unrebutted, while Regular repudiated his confession and claimed it was coerced.

• Treachery and Evident Premeditation (De Lara): Appellant Arturo de Lara argued that the lower court erred in holding that he employed treachery and evident premeditation in killing Ladoy and wounding Esparza.
• Reasonable Doubt (De Lara): Appellant de Lara maintained that the lower court erred in finding him guilty of murder and frustrated murder instead of completely exempting him from criminal liability on the ground of reasonable doubt.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Death Penalty (Regular): Appellant Alfredo Regular contended that the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty based on allegations of treachery, evident premeditation, and recidivism, which were not fully supported by evidence.
• Defense of Gangmates: Both appellants maintained that they were only acting in defense of their gangmates, hence the penalties imposed in both cases were not in accordance with law.

• Plea of Guilty: Whether the trial court improvidently accepted the plea of guilty without fully explaining to the accused its meaning and consequences, including the qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation (De Lara): Whether the lower court erred in holding that Arturo de Lara employed treachery and evident premeditation in killing Felipe Ladoy and wounding Emilio Esparza.
• Criminal Liability (De Lara): Whether Arturo de Lara should be completely exempt from criminal liability on reasonable doubt instead of being found guilty of murder and frustrated murder.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty (Regular): Whether the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty on Alfredo Regular based on treachery, evident premeditation, and recidivism not fully supported by evidence.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was clearly established such that the acts of the other assailants could be considered against de Lara and Regular.
• Defense of Gangmates: Whether the appellants were only acting in defense of their gangmates, making the penalties imposed not in accordance with law.
• Quasi-Recidivism: Whether both accused, as quasi-recidivists under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, must be punished by the maximum period of the penalty for homicide and frustrated homicide, notwithstanding their plea of guilty.

• Plea of Guilty: No. The plea was improvidently laid because the trial judge failed to explain fully its meaning and consequences, including treachery, evident premeditation, and recidivism; the subsequent hearings showed the plea was ambiguous and qualified.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation (De Lara): No. Neither circumstance was proven beyond reasonable doubt; de Lara was only invited to join the group immediately before the incident and was not part of the plan.
• Criminal Liability (De Lara): No. Complete exemption on reasonable doubt was not warranted; de Lara participated in the stabbing, but conspiracy was not clearly established and the crimes were homicide and frustrated homicide.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty (Regular): No. Treachery and evident premeditation were not proven beyond reasonable doubt; the death penalty based on those circumstances cannot stand.
• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not clearly established; if any existed, it was limited to Patuga, Valeriano, and Castro, and joint or simultaneous action alone is insufficient.
• Defense of Gangmates: No. The claim did not exempt them from liability; de Lara was more or less forced but was not acting under uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
• Quasi-Recidivism: Yes. Both accused were quasi-recidivists under Article 160, so the maximum period of the prescribed penalty for homicide and frustrated homicide was mandatory, and the mitigating plea of guilty could not reduce it.

• Plea of Guilty: The trial judge did not adhere to People vs. Apduhan. He failed to explain fully the meaning and far-reaching effect of the plea, including "treachery," "evident premeditation," and "recidivism." He asked whether the accused knew capital punishment could be imposed without explaining why. Under People vs. Solacito, judges must be extra solicitous that an accused pleading guilty understands the meaning of the plea and the import of inevitable conviction. The immediate sentencing and later hearings showed the plea was not an unconditional admission and became ambiguous and qualified.

• Treachery and Evident Premeditation (De Lara): Treachery requires (1) means, methods, or forms of execution tending directly and specially to insure the offender's safety from defensive or retaliatory acts, giving the offended party no opportunity to defend, and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of such means. A sudden and unexpected attack alone does not suffice. De Lara was only invited immediately before the incident, with no time to meditate, calculate, and reflect. He heard the plan the night before but was not part of the group that made it; he was an eavesdropper and knew of his participation only immediately before it took place. Thus, evident premeditation was not proven.

• Criminal Liability (De Lara): De Lara's unrebutted testimony showed he was invited to join the group and hesitantly accepted. The illegal acts of others in the group could not be considered against him because conspiracy had not been clearly established. If any conspiracy existed, it was limited to Patuga, Valeriano, and Castro. While he was not acting under uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, what happened was not entirely his own will and volition; he was more or less forced by his gangmates to participate. He remained criminally liable, but only for homicide and frustrated homicide.

• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty (Regular): Treachery cannot be presumed and must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to prove it: no witnesses saw how the stabbings were done, and the extrajudicial confessions did not state the means, methods, or manner of execution. The circumstances specifying the offense or aggravating the penalty must be proved as conclusively as the act itself; mere presumptions are insufficient. Evident premeditation was also not proven against Regular because he was not with the group when the plan was made, and there was no proof he knew of the plan. The records were scanty on circumstances prior to the event.

• Conspiracy: Evidence of conspiracy must be positive and convincing. Under U.S. vs. Magcomot and People vs. Caballero, neither joint nor simultaneous action per se is a sufficient indicium of conspiracy; a common design must be shown to have motivated the action. De Lara was not included in the plan to retaliate. Regular was also not one of the men who planned the killing; Valeriano, Patuga, and de Castro engineered the stabbing spree. Since Regular was not a co-conspirator, the acts of those three could not prejudice him.

• Defense of Gangmates: The appellants maintained they acted only in defense of their gangmates. This was not accepted as a complete defense. De Lara was not acting under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, but the circumstances showed he was more or less forced by his gangmates to participate. Both accused were still criminally liable for their participation in the stabbing.

• Quasi-Recidivism: Both accused were quasi-recidivists. De Lara was serving sentence for robbery; Regular was serving sentence for robbery and theft. Under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, they must be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the new felonies, homicide and frustrated homicide. Although they entered a voluntary plea of guilty, they were not entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance because the maximum penalty under Article 160 is mandatory. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249; frustrated homicide is one degree lower under Article 50, although Article 250 allows a penalty lower by one degree.

• Plea of guilty in capital cases — A trial judge must be extra solicitous in ensuring that an accused who pleads guilty understands fully the meaning of the plea and the import of an inevitable conviction; the judge must explain the qualifying and aggravating circumstances and their consequences. A plea accepted without such explanation is improvidently laid, and subsequent evidence may show it is ambiguous or qualified. Applied: the trial judge failed to explain treachery, evident premeditation, and recidivism, so the plea did not foreclose the accused's defense.

• Treachery (alevosia) — Treachery requires (1) employment of means, methods, or forms of execution tending directly and specially to insure the offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act by the offended party, leaving no opportunity to defend, and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of such means. A sudden and unexpected attack alone is insufficient. It must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and cannot be presumed. Applied: no witness saw how the stabbings were done and the confessions were silent on the manner of execution, so treachery was not proven against either accused.

• Evident premeditation — Evident premeditation exists only when it is shown beyond reasonable doubt that a period of time long enough for meditation and reflection intervened between the determination and execution, enabling the conscience to overcome the resolution of the will. Applied: de Lara merely overheard the plan and was invited immediately before the incident; Regular was not with the planners and had no proven knowledge of the plan; hence the circumstance was not appreciated.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy must be proven by positive and convincing evidence; neither joint nor simultaneous action per se is a sufficient indicium of conspiracy, and a common design must be shown to have motivated the action. Applied: conspiracy was not clearly established; if any existed, it was limited to Patuga, Valeriano, and Castro, so the acts of those three could not be considered against de Lara and Regular.

• Quasi-recidivism under Article 160, Revised Penal Code — When a person who has been convicted by final judgment for an offense under the Revised Penal Code or special laws commits a felony while serving sentence, the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the new felony must be imposed. The ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty cannot reduce that mandatory maximum. Applied: both accused were serving sentences for robbery and theft, and the new felonies were homicide and frustrated homicide, so each was sentenced to the maximum periods.

• Extrajudicial confession may be accepted in part — The whole confession must ordinarily be put in evidence, and it may be accepted in its entirety or only in part. An exception permits accepting only part and rejecting the rest when the accused makes explanatory statements tending to mitigate his participation and the prosecution fails to rebut them. Applied: de Lara's unrebutted explanatory statements limited his participation; Regular's confession was not disregarded merely because he repudiated it, as it was replete with details only a participant could give.

• "Judges are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction." — This statement, quoted from People vs. Solacito, supplies the standard for accepting a guilty plea and is the basis for holding the plea improvidently laid.

• "There is treachery when the following requisites concur: (1) the culprit employed means, methods or forms of execution which tends directly and specially to insure the offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party which means that no opportunity was given the latter to do so." — This formulation states the requisites of treachery, which the Court found unproven because no witness described the manner of the stabbings and the confessions were silent on it.

• "The evidence to prove the elements of conspiracy must be positive and convincing. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held in U.S. vs. Magcomot and People vs. Caballero that neither joint nor simultaneous action per se is a sufficient indicium of conspiracy; a common design must further be shown to have motivated such action." — This passage states the quantum and nature of proof required for conspiracy, which the Court found lacking as to de Lara and Regular.

• "Both accused are quasi-recidivists. De Lara was serving sentence for robbery while Regular was serving sentence for robbery and theft. In accordance with Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, they shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the new felonies which are homicide and frustrated homicide." — This passage states the quasi-recidivism rule and the mandatory maximum penalty, which controlled the final sentences.

• People vs. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798 — Controlling guideline on plea of guilty; the trial judge failed to adhere to it, rendering the plea improvidently laid.
• People vs. Solacito, L-29209, August 25, 1969, 29 SCRA 61 — Held judges duty-bound to be extra solicitous that an accused pleading guilty understands the plea and inevitable conviction; quoted in the decision.
• People vs. Catalino, 22 SCRA 109 — Held it unsound to disregard a confession simply because the accused repudiates it during trial; applied to Regular's confession.
• U.S. vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386 and People vs. Caballero, 53 Phil. 585 — Held joint or simultaneous action per se is not sufficient indicium of conspiracy; common design must be shown; applied to reject conspiracy.
• People vs. Bautista, et al., 65 SCRA 460 — Held voluntary plea of guilty does not entitle an accused to the mitigating circumstance where Article 160 requires the maximum penalty; applied to both accused.
• People vs. Flores, 43 SCRA 342 — Cited for the rule that a sudden and unexpected attack does not of itself establish alevosia; also cited by the trial court as basis for presenting evidence after the plea.
• People vs. Solano, 6 SCRA 60 — Cited for the rule that the whole confession must be put in evidence, though part may be accepted and part rejected under exceptions.
• U.S. vs. Perdon, 4 Phil. 141 — Held aggravating circumstances must be proved as conclusively as the act itself; mere presumptions are insufficient; applied to treachery.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder; the trial court convicted the accused under this provision, but the Supreme Court reduced the crime because the qualifying circumstances were not proven.
• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty for a frustrated felony is one degree lower than that for the consummated felony; applied to frustrated homicide.
• Article 13, paragraph 7, Revised Penal Code — Voluntary confession of guilt as a mitigating circumstance; the trial court used it to commute death to reclusion perpetua, but the Supreme Court held it could not reduce the mandatory maximum under Article 160.
• Article 160, Revised Penal Code — Defines quasi-recidivism and requires the maximum period of the penalty for the new felony when committed while serving sentence; applied to both accused.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes reclusion temporal for homicide; the penalty for the killing of Ladoy.
• Article 250, Revised Penal Code — Allows the court to impose a penalty lower by one degree than that prescribed by Article 50 for frustrated homicide; noted in the penalty discussion.

Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Abad Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concurred. Teehankee, J., was on leave. Aquino, J., concurred in the result. Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.