People of the Philippines vs. Ramil Balatucan

Evident premeditation may exist even if the offender had not settled upon a definite victim at the time the determination to commit the crime was formed. Where the accused announced his intent to kill "someone" hours before the attack and thereafter clung to that determination, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation attends all crimes committed in execution of that intent, even if the actual victims were not predetermined.

Ramil Balatucan was charged in two separate informations with murder and frustrated murder arising from a single evening of violence on March 18, 1988, in Barangay Umabay Exterior, Municipality of Mobo, Province of Masbate. The charges alleged that appellant, confederating with three John Does, attacked and stabbed Jonnel Labao and Alex Balatucan with a fan knife (batangas), with deliberate intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, superiority of strength, and taking advantage of nighttime. The prosecution's case rested on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Jaime Balatucan, Alex Balatucan, and Arturo Natividad, as well as medical evidence from Dr. Maria Belen Chan and Dr. Artemio Capellan.

On the evening of March 18, 1988, Jaime Balatucan went to a dance held at the BLISS Housing Project in Umabay Exterior, Mobo, Masbate, on the occasion of the barangay fiesta. As Jaime arrived at the scene and before entering the dance hall, he was suddenly boxed by one Rudy Tugbo, who was then in the company of appellant Ramil Balatucan, Arturo Natividad, and one other unidentified person. After striking Jaime, Rudy Tugbo ran away; Jaime pursued him but lost him. Jaime then joined his brother, Alex Balatucan, the deceased Jonnel Labao, and Joey Labao inside the dance hall.

At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Jaime Balatucan and his companions left the dance hall and proceeded to the public highway. On the highway, they were met by appellant, who rushed towards Jonnel Labao and stabbed him with a knife. Jonnel collapsed on the highway with a knife thrust to the heart and died on the spot. As Alex Balatucan tried to help Jonnel up, appellant also stabbed Alex. Jaime grappled with appellant for possession of the knife but failed to disarm him; Jaime managed to grab Ramil by the shirt, but Ramil tore loose, leaving his shirt or part of it in Jaime's hand. Alex Balatucan was brought to the Masbate Provincial Hospital and was confined there for a week.

The prosecution also presented Arturo Natividad, who testified that on the same evening, he was drinking gin with appellant and four other persons in a store in Barangay Cogon, Mobo, Masbate. During the drinking session, appellant informed Arturo that "he (Ramil) will stab" somebody without indicating who the unfortunate person or persons would be. Around 8:30 p.m., the gin drinkers proceeded to the dance hall and stayed there until about 10:30 p.m., when they went out to the highway, which is about 30 meters from the dance hall. They stayed on the shoulder of the highway. In about an hour's time, Jaime Balatucan and his companions emerged from the dance hall and started on the highway. Ramil Balatucan rushed towards the approaching group and stabbed Jonnel Labao and Alex Balatucan.

Dr. Maria Belen Chan testified that the knife wound sustained by Alex Balatucan on his left arm could have been fatal, as it produced profuse bleeding. The medico-legal certificate described the injury as a 1.5-inch-wide stab wound through and through the distal third posterior left arm, directed toward the medial aspect of the middle third left arm. Dr. Artemio Capellan, who conducted a postmortem examination on Jonnel Labao, reported a stab wound affecting the lateral portion of the chest just above the mammary gland, with vital organs and major blood vessels affected; the cause of death was hypovolemic shock due to a single fatal wound.

At trial, appellant pleaded not guilty and asserted the defense of alibi, claiming he had been knocked unconscious during a fight at the dance hall. On appeal, however, appellant impliedly admitted having stabbed both Jonnel Labao and Alex Balatucan, disputing only the legal characterization of his acts. He contended that the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery had not been sufficiently established, arguing that the mode of attack had not been previously considered but was the result of a sudden decision made when the contending groups of high school students accidentally met. Appellant also claimed that Arturo Natividad's testimony about appellant's statement that he would stab "someone" did not prove premeditation, since that statement had been made after appellant had begun drinking hard liquor. Appellant further argued that there was no appreciable interval between the time he decided to stab Alex and the moment he actually did so, and protested that he had no reason to assault either victim, as it was Rudy Tugbo, not appellant, who had an altercation earlier with Jaime Balatucan.

• Treachery in the killing of Jonnel Labao: Appellant contended that treachery should not have been appreciated because the mode of attack had not been previously considered and consciously chosen, but was rather the result of a sudden decision made when the contending groups of high school students accidentally met.
• Treachery in the stabbing of Alex Balatucan: Appellant argued that "the suddenness of attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia (treachery) even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless position is accidental."
• Evident premeditation: Appellant claimed that Arturo Natividad's testimony that appellant had told him he would stab "someone" does not prove premeditation, since that statement had been made after appellant had begun drinking hard liquor.
• Separate premeditation for each crime: Appellant argued that evident premeditation in the stabbing of Alex Balatucan should not have been taken into account, since there was no appreciable interval between the time Ramil decided to stab Alex and the moment he actually did so, requiring separate premeditation for each crime.
• Motive: Appellant protested that he had no reason to assault either victim, as it was Rudy Tugbo, not appellant, who had an altercation earlier in the evening with Jaime Balatucan.
• Proper penalty: Appellant invoked People vs. Intino to argue that with the abolition of the death penalty, the proper imposable penalty for murder is reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.

• Treachery: The Solicitor General argued that both crimes had been attended by treachery, that the attack had not been impulsively done, and that the decision to kill was not a spontaneous on-the-spot decision. The Solicitor General stressed that appellant went out of the dance hall ahead of his intended victims and purposely positioned himself on the highway gutter to avoid notice; as soon as he spotted his prey, he struck without warning and without giving the unarmed and hapless Jonnel and Alex the opportunity to defend themselves, deliberately and consciously adopting that mode of attack to preclude any risk to himself or retaliation from the victims and to insure the execution of the crime.

• Treachery in the killing of Jonnel Labao: Whether treachery attended the killing of Jonnel Labao.
• Treachery in the stabbing of Alex Balatucan: Whether treachery attended the stabbing of Alex Balatucan.
• Evident premeditation: Whether evident premeditation was established as a qualifying circumstance for both crimes.
• Separate premeditation for each crime: Whether separate evident premeditation must precede each of the two crimes committed by appellant.
• Motive: Whether the absence of motive on appellant's part affects his criminal liability.
• Proper penalty for murder: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed for murder given the abolition of the death penalty.
• Proper penalty for frustrated murder: Whether the indeterminate sentence imposed for frustrated murder was properly computed.

• Treachery in the killing of Jonnel Labao: Yes. The deadly attack upon Jonnel Labao was not merely an unplanned attack occurring during an accidental meeting of the two groups; appellant deliberately posted himself on the shoulder of the highway, waited for about an hour until his victim passed by, then suddenly flung himself on the approaching group and thrust his knife at Jonnel's chest, piercing the heart.
• Treachery in the stabbing of Alex Balatucan: Yes. The treachery which attended the killing of Jonnel Labao also infected the attack on Alex Balatucan, as the two acts occurred on the same occasion, the interval between them being measured in seconds; both victims were unarmed and neither could respond to the knife-thrusts delivered by appellant.
• Evident premeditation: Yes. All three requisites for evident premeditation were proven: the determination to stab or kill "someone" was arrived at as early as 6:30 in the evening; appellant repeated his announced threat at least three times; and several hours elapsed between the determination and the attack at about 11:00 o'clock, allowing appellant to reflect on the consequences of his act.
• Separate premeditation for each crime: No. The evident premeditation which qualified the slaying of Jonnel to murder also qualified the frustrated homicide of Alex into frustrated murder; the two crimes need to be considered and characterized in an integrated manner, and evident premeditation may exist even if a definite victim had not been settled upon at the time the offender determined to commit the crime.
• Motive: No. Proof of motive is immaterial when the identity of the appellant has been clearly established, and appellant admitted having slain Jonnel and seriously wounded Alex, disputing only the legal characterization of his acts.
• Proper penalty for murder: Yes. Following People vs. Muñoz, which modified People vs. Intino, the original penalty including death was maintained except that the maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional prohibition; in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty for murder remains reclusion perpetua. Where there are two qualifying aggravating circumstances, only one qualifies the crime to murder while the other is considered a generic aggravating circumstance merely; because of the constitutional prohibition against the death penalty, the penalty properly imposable remains reclusion perpetua.
• Proper penalty for frustrated murder: Modified. The crime of frustrated murder is punishable by prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium; applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term may be fixed within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, while the maximum term shall be the penalty properly imposable. The penalty was increased to an indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum of eight years and one day of prision mayor to a maximum of seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal.

• Treachery in the killing of Jonnel Labao: There is treachery when the offender adopts means, methods, or forms in the execution of the felony which insure its commission without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might take. The evidence showed that appellant had deliberately posted himself on the shoulder or gutter of the highway not far from the dance hall and waited for about an hour until his victim passed by. Appellant then suddenly flung himself on the approaching group and thrust his knife at Jonnel Labao's chest, piercing the heart. This was not an unplanned attack occurring during an accidental meeting of the two groups; the mode of attack was consciously adopted to insure the commission of the crime without risk to appellant.
• Treachery in the stabbing of Alex Balatucan: The treachery which attended the killing of Jonnel Labao also infected the attack on Alex Balatucan. While the act of stabbing Jonnel on the chest was distinguishable from the act of stabbing Alex through his left arm, the two acts occurred on the same occasion, the interval between them being measured in seconds. Jonnel and Alex were together as they walked down the highway; both were unarmed; neither could respond to the knife-thrusts delivered by Ramil. Alex was obviously disabled from defending himself when Ramil thrust his knife through and through Alex's left arm, as Alex was trying to help Jonnel to his feet.
• Evident premeditation: For evident premeditation to be appreciated against an accused, the following requisites must be established: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) the lapse of an interval of time between determination to commit the crime and execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. All three requisites were proven: the determination to stab or kill "someone" was arrived at as early as 6:30 in the evening while appellant was engaged in a drinking session; appellant repeated his announced threat at least three times that evening; and at that time appellant had with him a 10-inch batangas knife, the same knife he would later use. Between the drinking session and the attack at about 11:00 o'clock, appellant had several hours to reflect on the crime and to desist from it if he had wanted to do so. The slaying of Jonnel and the serious stab wound inflicted on Alex demonstrated clearly that appellant had clung to his determination to kill.
• Separate premeditation for each crime: The Court rejected the suggestion that because two separate crimes had been committed, separate premeditation with an adequate interval of time must precede each crime. The evident premeditation which qualified the slaying of Jonnel to murder also qualified the frustrated homicide of Alex into frustrated murder; the two crimes need to be considered and characterized in an integrated manner. Evident premeditation may exist even if at the time the offender determined to commit the crime, a definite victim had not been settled upon, as established in U.S. vs. Manalinde, where the accused acted upon an order to "go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody" and killed the first two persons he encountered. The fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime.
• Motive: Proof of motive is immaterial when the identity of the appellant has been clearly established. Appellant admitted having slain Jonnel and seriously wounded Alex and only disputed the legal characterization of his acts.
• Proper penalty for murder: People vs. Intino held that with the abolition of the death penalty, the proper imposable penalty for murder is reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua with three periods. However, Intino was modified by People vs. Muñoz, which held that the original penalty, including death, was maintained except that the maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional prohibition. Thus, the range of the minimum and medium periods of the imposable penalty remain unchanged, such that in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty for murder would remain reclusion perpetua. In the instant case, there are two aggravating circumstances — evident premeditation and treachery — either of which would qualify the killing to murder. Following People vs. Dueno, where there are two qualifying aggravating circumstances, only one should be considered to qualify the crime to murder, while the other should be considered a generic aggravating circumstance merely. Because of the constitutional prohibition against enforcement of the death penalty, the penalty properly imposable remains reclusion perpetua.
• Proper penalty for frustrated murder: The crime of frustrated murder is punishable by prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term may be fixed within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to the penalty prescribed and properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, while the maximum term shall be the penalty properly imposable under the same Code in view of the attendant circumstances of the offense. The trial court's penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional medium to eight years and one day of prision mayor medium was modified to an indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum of eight years and one day of prision mayor to a maximum of seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — There is treachery when the offender adopts means, methods, or forms in the execution of the felony which insure its commission without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might take. In this case, treachery was found where appellant deliberately posted himself on the highway shoulder, waited for about an hour for his victims to pass, then suddenly attacked without warning, giving the unarmed victims no opportunity to defend themselves.
• Evident Premeditation — Requisites — For evident premeditation to be appreciated against an accused, the following must be established: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) the lapse of an interval of time between determination to commit the crime and execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. All three requisites were proven in this case.
• Evident Premeditation — Indefinite Victim — Evident premeditation may exist even if at the time the offender determined to commit the crime, a definite victim had not been settled upon. The fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime, as the firm and persistent intention of the accused from the moment of determination until the crime was committed is manifestly evident.
• Qualifying and Generic Aggravating Circumstances — Where there are two qualifying aggravating circumstances attending a killing, only one aggravating circumstance should be considered to qualify the crime to murder, while the other should be considered a generic aggravating circumstance merely. Because of the constitutional prohibition against the death penalty, the penalty properly imposable remains reclusion perpetua.
• Motive — Immaterial When Identity is Established — Proof of motive is immaterial when the identity of the appellant has been clearly established. Where the accused admits the acts but disputes only the legal characterization, absence of motive does not affect criminal liability.

• "There is treachery when the offender adopts means, methods or forms in the execution of the felony which insures its commission without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might take." — This passage states the canonical definition of treachery applied by the Court in affirming the qualifying circumstance for both crimes.
• "The Court has consistently held that for evident premeditation to be appreciated against an accused, the following requisites must be established: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) the lapse of an interval of time between determination to commit the crime and execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act." — This passage sets out the three-part test for evident premeditation, which the Court found satisfied on the facts.
• "It is important in this connection to remember that evident premeditation may exist even if at the time the offender determined to commit the crime, a definite victim had not been settled upon." — This passage articulates the rule that premeditation does not require a predetermined victim, a principle the Court applied to reject appellant's argument for separate premeditation for each crime.
• "The fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime." — This passage, quoted from U.S. vs. Manalinde, supports the Court's holding that evident premeditation may attend crimes against victims not specifically identified in advance.

• U.S. vs. Manalinde, 14 Phil. 77 (1909) — Controlling precedent cited for the proposition that evident premeditation may exist even where the victim was not predetermined; the accused acted upon an order to kill somebody and killed the first two persons he encountered, and the Court held that the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not alter the nature of the crime.
• People vs. Intino, 165 SCRA 637 (1988) — Cited by appellant for the proposition that with the abolition of the death penalty, the proper imposable penalty for murder is reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua; subsequently modified by People vs. Muñoz.
• People vs. Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989) — Modified People vs. Intino, holding that the original penalty, including death, was maintained except that the maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional prohibition; thus, in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty for murder remains reclusion perpetua.
• People vs. Dueno, 90 SCRA 23 (1979) — Cited for the rule that where there are two qualifying aggravating circumstances, only one should be considered to qualify the crime to murder, while the other should be considered a generic aggravating circumstance merely.
• People vs. Cuyo, 196 SCRA 447 (1991) — Cited as authority for the definition of treachery.
• People vs. Cafe, 166 SCRA 704 (1988) — Cited as authority for the requisites of evident premeditation.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining murder, under which appellant was convicted; the Court applied the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery to characterize the killing of Jonnel Labao as murder.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in computing the penalty for frustrated murder; the minimum term may be fixed within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to the penalty prescribed and properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, while the maximum term shall be the penalty properly imposable under the same Code in view of the attendant circumstances of the offense.
• Constitutional Provision Abolishing the Death Penalty — Cited as the basis for maintaining the penalty of reclusion perpetua for murder notwithstanding the presence of aggravating circumstances that would otherwise warrant the death penalty.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concurred.