People of the Philippines vs. Raganas and Daleon

Circumstantial evidence may sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide even without direct testimony that the accused inflicted the fatal wounds, provided the requisites of circumstantial evidence are satisfied and the combined circumstances produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt; likewise, reclusion perpetua remains an indivisible penalty despite Republic Act No. 7659’s fixing of its duration.

Apolinar Raganas and Ruel Daleon were co-accused in Criminal Case No. 90-850 before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18. They had been co-workers in a rubber plantation in Logitas, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and had bunked together until Daleon left in 1987. The governing statutes include Article 293 in relation to Article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which penalizes robbery with homicide and prescribes its penalty, and Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, which governs the application of indivisible penalties. Republic Act No. 7659 also amended Article 27 to fix the duration of reclusion perpetua.

On June 18, 1990, at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening at Barangay Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental, two men wearing identical clothes alighted from a passenger jeepney. They were later identified as Apolinar Raganas and Ruel Daleon. On their way to the Yasay Compound, they passed Isidra Daayata and Delia Caracho, who were standing on the left side of the national highway on the same side as the two men. The area was illuminated by a lamp post near the guardhouse of the Yasay Compound, where Mamerto Lucion was the guard on duty. Isidra testified that she and Delia were seated along the national highway when a passenger jeepney coming from the east and going west stopped in front of them; two men alighted, crossed the highway, headed toward the Yasay Compound, proceeded to a mango tree near the barangay social hall about forty meters away, then returned to the compound and headed to a caimito tree where they disappeared from view.

At around 9:30 p.m. (DST), prosecution witness Roque Obsioma heard a commotion in the direction of the guardhouse in the Yasay Compound. He and his cousin Edwin Obsioma rushed toward the guardhouse and saw Mamerto Lucion grappling with two persons inside. After a while, the small gate beside the guardhouse opened and the head of a man emerged; the gate reopened and another head emerged. Apparently noticing Roque and Edwin, the man slammed the gate closed. A little later, a man with a cassette recorder tucked under his armpit was seen coming out of the small gate. Roque chased him but gave up the chase, and later identified the man as Apolinar Raganas. During the chase, the cassette recorder fell and Roque retrieved it; he brought the recorder, which belonged to Joseph Denosta, a resident of the Yasay Compound, back to the guardhouse.

Isidra also testified that at about 9:30 that evening she and Delia saw Roque and Edwin standing along the highway about ten meters in front of the Yasay Compound, looking toward the guardhouse. Their curiosity aroused, Isidra and Delia went to a gasoline station from where the Yasay Compound was visible. Isidra then saw a man with something tucked under his armpit come out of the small gate, passing in front of Roque and Edwin; Roque chased the man but failed to catch him. While the pursuit was ongoing, a man jumped from the wall of the Yasay Compound and dropped something under his armpit as he fled; Roque picked the object up and returned to the guardhouse. Isidra and Delia then went to the guardhouse with Ricardo Caracho, his wife, and other curious neighbors. Upon entering the small gate, they came upon the dead Mamerto Lucion inside the guardhouse, kneeling with his inert right hand extended forward, bloodied from several fresh wounds; there were bloodstains on the wall and floor, and the guardhouse was in disarray. During trial, Isidra pointed to Apolinar Raganas and Ruel Daleon as the two men she saw emerging from the Yasay Compound that day.

Joseph Denosta, the owner of the cassette recorder, testified that he had lent the recorder to Mamerto Lucion. He described the Yasay Compound and the guardhouse where Mamerto was found dead, and stated that he lost no time in rushing to the guardhouse, where he saw the lifeless Mamerto kneeling, slumped on a chair, bloodied, and wounded on several parts of his body. Roland J. Ebonia, a photographer fetched by the Opol Police, testified that he took about sixteen photographs of the incident, marked as Exhibits A, A-1 to A-15. These photographs showed the exterior of the guardhouse, the view through its door including the adjacent gate of the compound, the cassette recorder (Exhibit F in Exhibit A-2), the bloodied body of Mamerto, the intercom system, the disarrayed guardhouse, bloodstains on the floor, walls, and chair inside the guardhouse, and different angle shots of the dead Mamerto in a blood-stained, striped, long-sleeved shirt.

Reinerio Baba testified that he was resting in his house in Barra, Opol, Misamis Oriental, with his wife and family when, at about 10:50 p.m. on June 18, 1990, he was awakened by rapping at his door. A man was calling, “Sir, sir, open the door. I’m a good man.” Baba peered through the windows and saw a man with bloodstains on his hands, pants, and shirt. When Baba asked who he was, the man replied, “Sir, I am a good man,” and handed over his wallet containing his identification card. Despite his wife’s restraint, Baba opened the door. The man raised his hands and said, “I’ll not resist.” The man then told Baba that they had “hit” somebody and asked to stay for the night, but Baba refused. Fearful that something might happen, Baba brought the man to Atty. Amado Mabulay, the barangay captain of Barra. That same night, Mabulay, accompanied by Baba and several other residents, brought the man to the police station. Baba identified the man as Apolinar Raganas.

Raganas’s defense was denial. He denied having inflicted any injury on Mamerto Lucion. According to him, he and Ruel Daleon had known each other since 1986-87 as co-workers in a rubber plantation in Logitas, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and had bunked together as rubber tappers, but had separated in 1987 when Daleon left ahead to continue schooling. He admitted going with Daleon to the Yasay Compound at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental, at about 9:30 p.m. on June 18, 1990, to see security guard Mamerto Lucion, whom he had previously known through a certain Paeng Reyes, to inquire about the latter, who had lost his job and whom he wanted to help find another. His purpose fell through because Daleon suddenly boxed Mamerto Lucion and later assaulted and wounded him despite Raganas’s efforts to separate them during the struggle inside the guardhouse. When he sensed that Mamerto had been wounded, he got scared and rushed out through the small gate of the Yasay Compound, went to a chapel nearby, and ran and walked part of the way toward Barra, Opol, passing along the highway in the general direction of Cagayan de Oro. At Barra he decided to seek help; he could not enter a house because of snarling sentry dogs, and instead found his way into the house of a man who turned out to be Reinerio Baba, to whom he identified himself as a “good man.” He informed Baba that somebody had been “hit” (gibirahan), a colloquial term for assaulting or attacking somebody, referring to the wounding of Mamerto at the guardhouse. Baba asked why he was splotched with blood; Raganas did not explain why because he thought it was merely fistcuffs between Lucion and Daleon, whom he tried to separate by holding back Daleon. Baba brought him to barangay captain Amado Mabulay, to whom he was turned over, and later that same night he was brought in a truck by Mabulay to the Opol municipal hall and turned over to the Opol police. Raganas refused to identify Ruel Daleon by name despite inquiries from Baba and Mabulay. All the while he denied killing Mamerto Lucion, but implicated as the culprit his companion, whom he did not name, because he feared for his life and reprisal from that man, the assailant. He also denied carrying and taking away the cassette recorder, half emerging from the small gate three times, or being chased after he left the compound. He revealed Daleon’s name only a few days later to his employer Vicente Cabrera, who visited him at the Opol municipal jail. Raganas admitted that he and his companion had come by passenger jeepney from Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City, by error of taking the ride first to Bulun, then to Barra, and finally to Igpit, Opol; that they alighted along the highway in the vicinity of the Yasay Compound and entered the compound up to the guardhouse; and that earlier that day he had drunk beer with Daleon and others at Vamenta Boulevard, Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City, starting at about four o’clock in the afternoon on June 18, 1990, and had talked with Daleon about going to Igpit, Opol, to see a friend on that date.

The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible and rejected Raganas’s denial as unsubstantiated. The Supreme Court reviewed the records and found no reason to disregard the trial court’s credibility findings.

• Denial and Sufficiency of Identification: Appellant argued that although he was positively identified by prosecution witnesses as the one who fled from the Yasay Compound with Daleon, this alone was not enough to prove that he inflicted the injuries on Mamerto Lucion; not one of the prosecution witnesses testified that they saw him stab the victim.
• Conspiracy: Appellant claimed that the testimonies could not support a finding of conspiracy because he did not have any idea what Daleon intended to do on the night of June 18, 1990.
• Lone Assignment of Error: Appellant assigned as the sole error that the trial court erred in discrediting his defense of denial and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

• Penalty Modification: The Solicitor General, while agreeing with the basic finding of guilt by the trial court, recommended modification of the penalty to conform with Section 9 in relation to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7659, suggesting twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years and one (1) day of reclusion perpetua as maximum.

• Credibility and Denial: Whether the trial court erred in discrediting appellant’s defense of denial and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence, absent direct proof that appellant stabbed the victim, sufficed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be modified pursuant to Sections 9 and 21 of Republic Act No. 7659.
• Civil Indemnity: Whether the award of civil indemnity should be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.

• Credibility and Denial: No. The trial court did not err. Denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses; credibility findings of the trial court are accorded great weight.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. Circumstantial evidence complied with the requisites: more than one circumstance; the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of Daayata, Obsioma, and Baba formed an unbroken chain leading to guilt.
• Penalty: No. Reclusion perpetua remains an indivisible penalty despite Republic Act No. 7659 fixing its duration; Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code applies, so the penalty imposed by the trial court is affirmed.
• Civil Indemnity: Yes. The award of P30,000.00 as indemnity must be increased to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Credibility and Denial: The defense of denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence bearing no weight in law. The prosecution witnesses—Roque Obsioma, Edwin Obsioma, Isidra Daayata, and Delia Caracho—were innocent bystanders who happened to be at the right place at the right time. They did not know the appellant and had no reason to perjure themselves to implicate him. No evidence was introduced to impeach their credibility. Findings of the trial court on witness credibility are accorded great weight, even finality, on appeal, unless the trial court failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that, if considered, would materially affect the result. The trial court was in a better position to decide the question because it directly observed the witnesses’ demeanor. The records disclosed no reason to disregard this rule or reverse the trial court, and the negative defense of denial could not prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: The evidence adequately proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Isidra Daayata’s testimony established that she saw the appellant and his companion arriving from the direction of Cagayan de Oro City at about 9:00 p.m. and moving about the vicinity of the Yasay Compound, placing him at the site of the killing. Roque Obsioma identified Raganas as the man he pursued fleeing from the Yasay Compound. Reinerio Baba testified that appellant appeared at his house in Barra with a blood-stained shirt and informed him that somebody had been hit (girbahan); after Baba brought him to Barangay Captain Mabulay, appellant willingly narrated the bloody incident at the Yasay Compound. Although these testimonies did not provide direct evidence that appellant stabbed Mamerto Lucion, they constituted overwhelming circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence relates to a series of facts other than the fact in issue which, by experience, are so associated with that fact that in a relation of cause and effect they lead to a satisfactory conclusion. To be sufficient for conviction, it must comply with the requisites: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All requisites were present. The testimonies of Daayata, Obsioma, and Baba pieced together revealed an unbroken chain of events leading to but one fair and reasonable conclusion: appellant was guilty of the crime charged. The flight of appellant from the scene showed his culpability and guilty conscience. His guarded and adamant refusal to reveal the identity of his companion, whom he implicated as the assailant, was inconsistent with his self-proclaimed innocence. His attempt to exculpate himself and point to his companion as the culprit, knowing no other person was present to contradict his story, was self-serving and did not credibly support his claim of innocence.
• Penalty: The Solicitor General recommended modifying the penalty to conform with Section 9 in relation to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7659, suggesting twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty years and one day of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court rejected this. In People vs. Lucas, although Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7659 fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty years and one day to forty years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. If reclusion perpetua were reclassified as a divisible penalty, Article 63 would lose its reason and basis for existence. The imputed duration of thirty years of reclusion perpetua serves only as the basis for determining the convict’s eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties. Thus, the penalty imposed by the trial court could not be lowered.
• Civil Indemnity: The award of P30,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as indemnity for the victim’s death needed to be increased to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. The Court cited People vs. Trilles, Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. CA, People vs. Flores, and People vs. Ravelo. The dispositive portion accordingly ordered appellant to pay the heirs of Mamerto Lucion P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

• Denial as a defense — Denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence bearing no weight in law. It cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting Raganas’s denial in light of the prosecution witnesses’ positive identification and circumstantial evidence.
• Credibility of witnesses; findings of trial court — Where there is no evidence to indicate that a prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and would not prevaricate and cause damnation to one who brought him no harm or injury. Findings of the trial court as to credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight, even finality, on appeal, unless the trial court failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the result. The trial court is in a better position to decide the question because it directly observed the witnesses’ demeanor. The Court found no reason to disregard these principles.
• Circumstantial evidence — Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the fact in issue, which by experience have been found so associated with such fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead to a satisfactory conclusion. To be sufficient to convict, it must comply with the following requisites: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held all requisites present and found the testimonies formed an unbroken chain leading to guilt.
• Flight as evidence of guilt — Flight of the accused from the scene of the crime shows culpability and a guilty conscience. The Court considered Raganas’s flight from the Yasay Compound as evidence of his guilt.
• Reclusion perpetua as an indivisible penalty — Although Republic Act No. 7659 fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty years and one day to forty years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a single indivisible penalty shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. If reclusion perpetua were reclassified as divisible, Article 63 would lose its reason and basis for existence. The imputed duration of thirty years serves only as the basis for determining eligibility for pardon or for the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties.
• Civil indemnity for death — The award of P30,000.00 as indemnity for the victim’s death must be increased to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

• “Settled is the rule that the defense of denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence bearing no weight in law.” — This passage states the Court’s ratio for rejecting Raganas’s denial and is a frequently cited formulation of the rule on denial as a defense.
• “Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the fact in issue, which by experience have been found so associated with such fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory conclusion.” — This passage defines circumstantial evidence and anchors the Court’s analysis of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence.
• “However, in order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz.: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.” — This passage sets out the canonical requisites for circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict, which the Court found satisfied.
• “although Section 17 of R.A. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty.” — This passage states the Court’s holding on the penalty, rejecting the Solicitor General’s recommendation to reduce the penalty.

• People vs. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713, 727 (1997) — Cited for the rule that the defense of denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and bears no weight in law.
• Juliano vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 52, 60 (1997); People vs. Piandiong, 268 SCRA 555 (1997); People vs. Tabaco, 270 SCRA 32 (1997); People vs. Salvame, 270 SCRA 766 (1997) — Cited for the rule that where there is no evidence that a prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and would not prevaricate.
• People vs. Batidor, G.R. No. 126027, February 18, 1999, p. 10 — Cited for the doctrine that findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight, even finality, on appeal unless it failed to appreciate facts that would materially affect the result.
• People vs. Songcuan, 176 SCRA 354 (1989) — Cited for the definition of circumstantial evidence.
• People vs. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167, 178 (1996); People vs. Magana, 259 SCRA 380 (1996); People vs. Diaz, 262 SCRA 723 (1996); People vs. Verano, 264 SCRA 546 (1996) — Cited for the requisites of circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict.
• People vs. Yip Wai Ming, 264 SCRA 224, 243 (1996); People vs. Parel, 261 SCRA 720 (1996) — Cited for the principle that flight from the scene of the crime shows culpability and a guilty conscience.
• People vs. Lucas, 240 SCRA 66 (1995) — Controlling precedent holding that Republic Act No. 7659 did not alter reclusion perpetua’s classification as an indivisible penalty despite fixing its duration.
• People vs. Reyes, 212 SCRA 402, 408 (1992) — Cited for the rule that the imputed duration of reclusion perpetua serves only as basis for determining eligibility for pardon or application of the three-fold rule in service of multiple penalties.
• People vs. Trilles, 254 SCRA 633, 643 (1996); Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. CA, 246 SCRA 376 (1995); People vs. Flores, 237 SCRA 653 (1994); People vs. Ravelo, 202 SCRA 655 (1991) — Cited for increasing civil indemnity to P50,000.00.

• Article 293, Revised Penal Code — The information charged robbery with homicide as contrary to Article 293 in relation to Article 294, paragraph 1, both of the Revised Penal Code. The decision identifies Article 293 as the robbery provision invoked in the charge.
• Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7659 — Penalizes robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons with reclusion perpetua to death when homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The trial court convicted the accused under this provision.
• Article 27, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7659 — Provides that reclusion perpetua shall be twenty years and one day to forty years. The Court held this did not change its indivisible character.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance; if the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied if there is only one aggravating circumstance, and the lesser penalty shall be applied when there is a mitigating circumstance but no aggravating circumstance, or when there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, and if both are present, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another. The Court applied this provision to affirm reclusion perpetua.
• Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7659 — Cited in the decision as having fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty years and one day to forty years; the Court held there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty.

Mendoza and Buena, JJ., concurred. Bellosillo, J. (Chairman), was on official leave.