People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Bitanga

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is not available to attack a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case, and counsel’s negligence does not constitute extrinsic fraud where the client’s own act of jumping bail caused the loss of his opportunity to present evidence.

Rafael M. Bitanga was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code upon complaint of Traders Royal Bank, now Bank of Commerce. The procedural dispute concerns Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes annulment of judgments or final orders in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts, and Section 18, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which enumerates the civil procedure rules suppletorily applicable to criminal cases. Rule 47 is not among the enumerated rules.

On complaint of Traders Royal Bank (TRB), now known as Bank of Commerce, an information for estafa was filed against Rafael M. Bitanga before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 103677. Bitanga pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and was allowed to post bail.

During trial on the merits, the People presented the testimonies of three TRB employees on how Bitanga duped the bank into accepting three foreign checks for deposit and encashment, which were returned to TRB by reason of “unlocated accounts.”

When it was time for the defense to present its case, Bitanga and his counsel failed to appear and adduce evidence. Upon motion of the public prosecutor, the RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Bitanga and deemed his right to adduce evidence waived. On February 29, 2000, the RTC promulgated in absentia a Decision finding Bitanga guilty as charged. The RTC sentenced him to imprisonment of four years and two months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum, ordered him to indemnify TRB ₱742,884.00, and to pay the costs.

Atty. Benjamin Razon, Bitanga’s counsel of record, later explained his absences. Atty. Razon failed to attend the hearings scheduled on December 10, 1998, February 18, 1999, April 20, 1999, and May 25, 1999. On May 25, 1999, from 7:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m., he waited for Bitanga to pick him up at his residence so they could go to court together for the defense evidence; he was not feeling well that morning due to a swollen leg. Bitanga never showed up, never contacted him, and had vacated his place of business without leaving a forwarding address. By June, Bitanga still had not contacted him, leaving Atty. Razon no alternative but to withdraw from the case. The RTC accepted this explanation and allowed Atty. Razon to withdraw his appearance even without Bitanga’s conformity, whose whereabouts could not be traced. The RTC also ordered Bitanga’s arrest and the forfeiture of his cash bond because of his continued non-appearance, and considered his right to present evidence waived.

Bitanga later filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for Other Reliefs on the ground that extrinsic fraud had been perpetrated upon him by Atty. Razon. He alleged that he received a copy of the February 29, 2000 RTC Decision only on December 13, 2001. He attributed to his counsel several acts and omissions: failure to inform him of scheduled hearings for the reception of defense evidence; failure to attend the hearing for reception of his evidence, causing the case to be deemed submitted without his evidence; failure to verify what transpired; withdrawal of appearance without his express conformity; the counsel de officio’s failure to contact him and waiver of defense evidence; failure to notify him of the adverse decision; and failure to appeal or avail of other remedies. The People opposed the petition.

• Negligence of Counsel: Petitioners maintained that the two previous counsels were not negligent in defending Bitanga.
• Extrinsic Fraud: Assuming without admitting negligence, petitioners argued that the negligence did not constitute extrinsic fraud absent allegation and evidence of malice.
• Waiver by Jumping Bail: Petitioners pointed out that Bitanga’s own act of jumping bail caused his loss of the right to present defense; had he appeared when summoned, he would not have lost that right.
• Procedural Due Process: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals did not accord the previous counsels their right to procedural due process.

• Extrinsic Fraud by Counsel: Bitanga alleged that Atty. Benjamin Razon failed to inform him of scheduled hearings for defense evidence; failed to attend the scheduled hearing; never verified what transpired; withdrew his appearance without express conformity; the counsel de officio exerted no effort to contact him and waived defense evidence; and after conviction, counsel did not notify him or appeal or avail of other remedies.
• Due Process in Criminal Cases: Bitanga defended the CA’s view as consistent with the basic rule in criminal procedure that every leeway must be given an accused to defend himself, lest he be wrongfully deprived of liberty.
• Gross Negligence as Extrinsic Fraud: He maintained that the CA correctly equated the deplorable acts and omissions of his counsel, unmitigated by the court-appointed lawyer, to extrinsic fraud.

• Coverage of Rule 47: Whether a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 may be used to annul a final judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC in a criminal case.
• Extrinsic Fraud: Whether the alleged acts and omissions of Bitanga’s counsel constituted extrinsic fraud warranting annulment of the RTC’s judgment of conviction.
• Effect of Bitanga’s Own Negligence: Whether Bitanga’s act of jumping bail and leaving his counsel without contact negated any claim of extrinsic fraud or deprivation of his day in court.

• Coverage of Rule 47: No. Rule 47 applies only to judgments or final orders in civil actions of RTCs; it cannot be invoked in criminal cases, and Rule 47 was excluded from the civil procedure rules suppletorily applicable under Section 18, Rule 124.
• Extrinsic Fraud: No. The acts and omissions attributed to counsel amounted to negligence only, not extrinsic fraud, which must be perpetrated by the prevailing party, not the unsuccessful party’s own counsel.
• Effect of Bitanga’s Own Negligence: No. Bitanga’s own act of jumping bail and making himself unavailable caused counsel’s inability to present evidence; his own negligence bars relief.

• Coverage of Rule 47: Section 1, Rule 47 limits annulment by the CA to judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of RTCs for which ordinary remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not permit such recourse; Section 18, Rule 124 enumerates Rules 42, 44 to 46, and 48 to 56 as suppletorily applicable to criminal cases, excluding Rule 47. Macalalag vs. Ombudsman held that when no law or rule provides a remedy, recourse to it cannot be allowed, and the right to appeal is a statutory privilege. Annulment of judgment is an exception to finality. Thus, the CA erroneously entertained and granted the petition.
• Extrinsic Fraud: Annulment of judgment is an exceptional equitable remedy, available only when other remedies are wanting and only if the judgment was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud must be sought within four years from discovery, alleged and proven, and the particular acts or omissions constituting it must be clearly established. Extrinsic or collateral fraud is trickery practiced by the prevailing party upon the unsuccessful party, preventing the latter from fully proving his case; it affects the manner in which the judgment is obtained. Bitanga complained of his own counsel’s abandonment, but extrinsic fraud must be perpetrated by the prevailing party, not by the unsuccessful party’s own counsel. As a general rule, counsel’s ineptitude is not a ground to annul judgment because counsel’s management binds the client. The exception is gross negligence so egregious that it prejudices the client’s interest and denies him his day in court, but the exception does not apply when the gross negligence is accompanied by the client’s own negligence or malice. Clients have the duty to be vigilant. Tan vs. Court of Appeals held that the negligence of the petitioner and his former counsel cannot be equated with extrinsic fraud; the fraud or deceit cannot be of the losing party’s own doing. Here, the acts and omissions attributed to counsel amounted to negligence only. Atty. Razon represented Bitanga during the prosecution’s evidence and cross-examined and re-cross-examined the witnesses. Problems arose only at the defense stage. Atty. Razon’s absences were justified: he waited for Bitanga, who never appeared, never contacted him, and vacated his business address without a forwarding address. The RTC accepted the explanation, allowed withdrawal without Bitanga’s conformity, ordered his arrest and bond forfeiture, and deemed his right to present evidence waived. Bitanga left Atty. Razon in the dark. Even if counsel had appeared without his client, there was no witness or evidence to present. Thus, no factual or legal basis existed for the CA’s conclusion that extrinsic fraud prejudiced Bitanga’s right to present his defense.
• Effect of Bitanga’s Own Negligence: Bitanga’s own act of jumping bail caused his counsel’s inability to present evidence and left his case in disarray. The exception for gross negligence of counsel cannot apply because it was accompanied by Bitanga’s own negligence. He has only himself to blame.

• Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is limited to civil actions — Rule 47 governs annulment by the CA of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of RTCs where ordinary remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. It cannot be extended to criminal cases; Section 18, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure excludes Rule 47 from the civil procedure rules suppletorily applicable to criminal cases. The Court applied this by holding that the CA should not have entertained, much less granted, Bitanga’s petition to annul his criminal conviction.
• Extrinsic fraud — Extrinsic or collateral fraud is trickery practiced by the prevailing party upon the unsuccessful party, preventing the latter from fully proving his case; it affects not the judgment itself but the manner in which the judgment is obtained. It must be alleged and proven, the particular acts or omissions must be clearly established, and annulment must be sought within four years from discovery. The Court applied this by holding that the alleged abandonment by Bitanga’s own counsel was not extrinsic fraud because extrinsic fraud must be perpetrated by the prevailing party, not by the losing party’s own counsel.
• Negligence of counsel binds the client; exception for egregious negligence — As a general rule, counsel’s ineptitude is not a ground to annul judgment because counsel’s management of the case binds the client; counsel has implied authority to do all acts necessary or incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit. The exception is when counsel’s negligence is so egregious that it prejudices the client’s interest and denies him his day in court. The exception does not apply when the gross negligence is accompanied by the client’s own negligence or malice. The Court applied this by finding that Bitanga’s own act of jumping bail caused the loss of his defense and barred relief.
• Right to appeal is a statutory privilege; annulment is an exception to finality — The right to appeal may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law, and there must be a law expressly granting it. Annulment of judgment is an exception to the rule on finality of judgments. The Court applied this by refusing to extend Rule 47 to criminal cases absent a law or rule authorizing it.
• Duty of clients to be vigilant — Clients have the duty to keep themselves updated on the status of their case; failing in this duty, they suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against them. The Court applied this by holding Bitanga responsible for leaving his counsel uninformed and unavailable.

• "The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case." — States the core coverage limitation of Rule 47 that disposed of the CA’s annulment grant.
• "Extrinsic fraud is that perpetrated by the prevailing party, not by the unsuccessful party's own counsel." — States the ratio decidendi on why counsel’s alleged abandonment did not qualify as extrinsic fraud.
• "For this exception to apply, however, the gross negligence of counsel should not be accompanied by his client’s own negligence or malice." — Defines the limit of the gross-negligence exception and explains why Bitanga could not benefit from it.
• "He has only himself to blame for jumping bail and leaving his case in disarray." — Summarizes the Court’s application of the facts to the extrinsic-fraud claim.

• Macalalag vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 147995, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 741 — Cited to support the rule that when no law or rule provides a remedy, recourse to it cannot be allowed, and that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege.
• Tan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157194, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 452 — Quoted for the rule that extrinsic fraud cannot be the losing party’s own doing and that the negligence of the petitioner and his former counsel cannot be equated with extrinsic fraud.
• Orbeta vs. Sendiong, G.R. No. 155236, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 180 — Cited for the principle that annulment of judgment is an exceptional remedy available only when other remedies are wanting.
• Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 140 — Cited for the four-year period from discovery within which annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be sought.
• Espinosa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128686, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 96 — Cited for the requirement that the particular acts or omissions constituting extrinsic fraud must be clearly established.
• Gacutana-Fraile vs. Domingo, 401 Phil. 604 (2000) — Cited for the rule that extrinsic fraud is perpetrated by the prevailing party, not by the unsuccessful party’s own counsel.
• APEX Mining, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 482 (1999) — Cited for the exception that counsel’s negligence may warrant relief when it is so egregious as to prejudice the client’s interest and deny him his day in court.
• Mercado vs. Security Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 160445, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 501 — Cited for the duty of clients to be vigilant in keeping themselves updated on the status of their case.
• Sps. Carlos and Erlinda Ong vs. Nieves Jacinto, et al., CA-G.R. SP No. 61777 — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the exception that gross negligence of counsel may constitute extrinsic fraud; the Supreme Court did not adopt this view because the negligence was attributable to Bitanga’s own act of jumping bail.

• Section 1, Rule 47, Rules of Court — Limits annulment of judgment by the CA to judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of RTCs for which ordinary remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Applied to hold that the remedy cannot be used against a criminal judgment.
• Section 18, Rule 124, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Enumerates Rules 42, 44 to 46, and 48 to 56 as the civil procedure rules suppletorily applicable to criminal cases. Because Rule 47 is not included, it has no suppletory application to criminal cases.
• Article 315, paragraph 2(a), Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the estafa for which Bitanga was convicted. It is the substantive offense underlying the RTC’s February 29, 2000 judgment.
• Rule 47, Sections 1 and 2, Rules of Court — Provide the grounds for annulment of judgment, namely lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud. Applied to find that neither ground was established.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Minita V. Chico-Nazario, and Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura concurred. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno signed the certification. No separate concurring opinions are recounted in the text.