People of the Philippines vs. Punzalan

Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself, and treachery requires proof that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously chosen; where the accused merely reacted spontaneously to the victim's unlawful aggression, their acts may be justified as self-defense or defense of a relative and exempt them from criminal liability.

Cpl. Maximo de los Santos was a member of the Parañaque police force. Danilo Punzalan, Vget Ison, and Guilbert Cuison were among a group of men present at the Nordel Restaurant in Parañaque, Metro Manila, on June 11, 1978. Ramon Jumawan, a co-accused, remained at large. The Revised Penal Code provisions on conspiracy, treachery, self-defense, and defense of relative frame the criminal liability issues raised on automatic review after the trial court imposed the death penalty.

In the early evening of June 11, 1978, Cpl. Maximo de los Santos of the Parañaque Police Department was inside the Nordel Restaurant on Sucat Road, Parañaque, Metro Manila. A group of men—Ramon Jumawan, Danilo Punzalan, Vget Ison, Guilbert Cuison, Reynaldo Dandan, Angelito Bernardo, Cesar Llamas, Wally or Walfrido Punzalan, Benjamin Arciaga, and Leon Allan—occupied a round table at the restaurant drinking beer. Cpl. de los Santos approached the group and said: "Mga padres, pulis ako, ibig ko lang alamin sa inyo kung sino ang may baril." According to the prosecution, Wally Punzalan, who was seated across the table, pulled out a .45 caliber pistol that his brother Danilo had earlier slipped to him under the table. Cpl. de los Santos drew his service revolver and fired twice at Wally Punzalan before the latter could fire at him. Ramon Jumawan then hit the policeman on the head with a chair. The policeman fell to the floor, face down. Danilo Punzalan and Guilbert Cuison followed suit, hitting Cpl. de los Santos repeatedly with chairs on the head, back, and arms. Vget Ison joined in and hit the victim with a beer bottle. The attack was so violent that the chairs and beer bottles used were broken, and broken chairs and fragments of broken glass were strewn on the floor. As the policeman lay prostrate and helpless, Ramon Jumawan grabbed the victim's service revolver and shot him four times; all shots found their mark. After the group saw that Cpl. Santos was already dead, they left together, helping the wounded Wally Punzalan to the hospital, where he expired five days later. Danilo Punzalan's jacket was left on the floor.

The defense advanced a different account. At about 9:30 P.M. on June 11, 1978, a group of ten male persons was at the Nordel Restaurant for food and beer, including the four accused and Wally Punzalan. The owner, Adelaida Borinaga, and waitress Elizabeth Mendoza were present. Cpl. Maximo de los Santos, a traffic policeman of Parañaque in civilian clothes, was also in the restaurant drinking beer, seated at the counter some five meters away from the group's table. All went well until Cpl. de los Santos suddenly left his place at the counter, went to the table occupied by the accused-appellants and their companions, and with his .38 caliber pistol shot Wally Punzalan twice at close range, felling him. In the ensuing rapid succession of action, Ramon Jumawan hit Cpl. de los Santos on the head with a chair, gained possession of the policeman's gun, and used it in shooting the policeman in turn three or four times. The policeman sustained four gunshot wounds, three of which caused his death; the fourth was a mere grazing wound. He also had a lacerated wound on the head and other wounds, contusions, and abrasions. The necropsy report (Exhibit A) gave the cause of death as severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds. The defense also cited a necropsy report (Exhibit 6) giving the cause of death as peritonitis generalized, secondary to gunshot wounds.

The trial court found that one of the members of the group started the gunplay and that the appellants attacked the victim. The Supreme Court, however, found that the policeman first shot Wally Punzalan and that the incident was unplanned and spontaneous.

• Conspiracy and Treachery: Appellants maintained that the trial court erred in finding the existence of conspiracy and treachery among them.
• Self-Defense or Defense of Relative: Appellants maintained that the trial court erred in not crediting them with the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of relative.
• Credibility of Arsenio Telmo: Appellants sought to discredit the testimony of prosecution witness Arsenio Telmo because he gave his statement implicating them to the police only four days after the incident and executed a supplemental affidavit implicating Guilbert Cuison only on August 9, 1978.
• Failure to Acquit: Appellants maintained that the trial court erred in failing to acquit all the defendants for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Conspiracy: Whether the trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.
• Treachery: Whether the trial court erred in finding treachery.
• Self-Defense or Defense of Relative: Whether the trial court erred in not crediting the accused with the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of relative.
• Credibility of Arsenio Telmo: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Arsenio Telmo.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the trial court erred in failing to acquit all the defendants for failure of the prosecution to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself; mere companionship, relationship, or joint and simultaneous action does not establish it. The incident was unplanned and spontaneous, and no common criminal design was shown.
• Treachery: No. Although the victim was attacked while down, the second condition of treachery—that the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen—was not present; the attack was the product of impulse.
• Self-Defense or Defense of Relative: Yes. All elements of self-defense and defense of a stranger were present; the policeman was the aggressor, the peril was real and imminent, the means employed were reasonable except for Jumawan's shooting, and there was no sufficient provocation.
• Credibility of Arsenio Telmo: No. The trial court did not err in crediting Telmo; his initial reluctance to volunteer information did not affect credibility, he was a disinterested witness, and his supplemental affidavit was explained by his confrontation with Cuison.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. The prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; appellants' participation in mauling was justified, and they did not intend to kill the victim.

• Conspiracy: The Court began with Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, which defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Because the act of one becomes the act of all, conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself; direct proof is not essential, but the evidence must be positive and convincing. The record showed no conspiracy: the meeting at the Nordel Restaurant was not planned, no appellant knew the victim would be there, and the encounter was accidental. The victim approached the table and was the first to fire two shots at Wally Punzalan; only after Wally was gunned down did appellants react. Their striking the victim with chairs and beer bottles was an impulsive response to a perceived threat, not the product of a common design. Mere companionship, relationship, and joint or simultaneous action did not establish conspiracy. The gunshot wounds caused death; the injuries inflicted by appellants were not fatal. Thus, absent clear proof that the killing was envisaged by them, they could not be held responsible for the death.
• Treachery: Treachery requires concurrence of two conditions: (1) employment of means, method, or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act by the offended party, giving the latter no opportunity to defend himself; and (2) that such means, method, or manner was deliberately or consciously chosen. The first condition was present because appellants delivered blows while the victim was down on the floor after being struck by Ramon Jumawan, ensuring their safety from retaliation. The second condition was absent. The rapid succession of events showed that the means employed were not deliberated upon; the assault was impelled by the instinct of self-preservation or retaliation for the shooting of their comrade. The deliberate or conscious choice of means was non-existent where the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment, where defendants made no preparation to assault the victim, where the decision to attack was accidental, and where the attack arose from a chance encounter and quarrel. Treachery was therefore not present.
• Self-Defense or Defense of Relative: Self-defense and defense of the rights of another are justifying circumstances under Article 11, Nos. 1 and 3, of the Revised Penal Code. The Court found all elements present. The policeman was the aggressor: he suddenly shot Wally Punzalan twice at close range, giving him no chance to defend himself or evade. After gunning down Wally, the policeman stood menacingly with his gun, and the peril to Wally and his companions continued. Faced with real and imminent danger, appellants mauled the policeman to immobilize him. Except for Jumawan's shooting of the already helpless victim—an act for which Jumawan, at large, must account—appellants employed reasonable means to repel the aggression. The reasonableness of the means depends on the nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor, his physical condition, size, character, and surrounding circumstances; in emergencies, human nature acts on the instinct of self-preservation, not formal reason. The final requisite, lack of sufficient provocation, was also present: Wally and his companions had done nothing to invite the policeman's aggression, and they were not motivated by revenge or evil motive. Appellants thus acted justifiably and were exempt from criminal liability.
• Credibility of Arsenio Telmo: The initial reluctance of witnesses in the country to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into a criminal investigation is common and has been judicially declared not to affect credibility. Telmo was a witness to the incident and was asked to go to the police headquarters on the night of June 11, 1978, but refrained because he was scared; he readily gave his name, address, and residence certificate to the police. There was nothing in the record to prove he had an ax to grind against appellants; he was a disinterested witness, and his presence on the night of the incident was confirmed by the restaurant owner. His supplemental affidavit implicating Guilbert Cuison for the first time on August 9, 1978 was explained by the fact that it was only on that date that he was made to confront Cuison when the latter gave himself up at Camp Crame; Telmo then readily identified Cuison as one of those who hit the victim.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The evidence showed appellants' participation in mauling the policeman, but their acts were justified. The Court was convinced that appellants did not intend to kill the victim; the circumstances provoked their action—their friend had been shot by another who happened to be a policeman, in plain clothes but holding a gun. The intense passion, fear, and apprehension at that time made the policeman, in appellants' eyes, a common enemy, killer of their friend, and a possible threat to their lives. Self-preservation is the first law of nature. Appellants should therefore be acquitted of the charges against them.

• Conspiracy — Under Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Since the act of one becomes the act of all, conspiracy must be established as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself; direct proof is not required, but the evidence must be positive and convincing. Mere suspicion, speculation, relationship, association, companionship, or joint and simultaneous action does not prove conspiracy; a common design must be shown. In this case, the encounter was accidental, the victim approached the group and fired first, and appellants reacted on impulse, so no conspiracy existed.
• Treachery — Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution that insures the offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act by the offended party, giving the latter no opportunity to defend himself; and (2) that such means, method, or manner was deliberately or consciously chosen. Both must be present. Although the victim was attacked while down, the second condition was absent because the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment, without preparation or deliberation, arising from a chance encounter and quarrel.
• Self-Defense and Defense of Relative — Self-defense and defense of the rights of another are justifying circumstances under Article 11, Nos. 1 and 3, of the Revised Penal Code. The elements are unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The reasonableness of the means depends on the nature and quality of the aggressor's weapon, his physical condition, size, character, and surrounding circumstances; in emergencies, human nature acts on the instinct of self-preservation. The protective mantle of the law shields not only him who repels actual aggression but also him who prevents a real and imminent aggression. Here, the policeman was the aggressor, the peril was real and imminent, appellants used reasonable means except for Jumawan's shooting, and there was no sufficient provocation.
• Credibility of Witnesses and Initial Reluctance — The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into a criminal investigation is common and does not affect credibility. A witness's delay in giving a statement, when explained by fear or by the timing of a confrontation with the accused, does not render the testimony incredible. Telmo's initial reluctance and supplemental affidavit were satisfactorily explained, and he was a disinterested witness.

• "A close scrutiny of the records in the present case shows that there is not a shred of evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy between appellants. From the evidence presented by the prosecution it is clear that the incident at the Nordel Restaurant on June 11, 1978 was unplanned and spontaneous." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on conspiracy: the Court found no evidence of a common criminal design and characterized the encounter as accidental.
• "The first of the two conditions aforestated appears to be present in the instant case. It has been adequately established that appellants delivered blows to the victim when the latter was down on the floor after being struck by Ramon Jumawan — which fact insured their safety from any defensive or retaliatory act from the victim. However, the second condition is wanting." — This passage applies the two-condition test for treachery and explains why only the first condition was satisfied.
• "It appears that all the elements of self-defense and defense of a stranger are present under the facts and circumstances of the case at bar." — This passage is the Court's core holding on the justifying circumstance, grounding the acquittal of the appellants.
• "The initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into a criminal investigation is common and has been judicially declared not to affect credibility." — This passage states the rule on witness credibility relied on to uphold Arsenio Telmo's testimony.

• People vs. Purtugueza, 20 SCRA 901 — Cited among the cases requiring that conspiracy be proved as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself.
• People vs. Tividad, 20 SCRA 549 — Cited for the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt and for the rule that a common design must be shown to establish conspiracy.
• People vs. Sosing, 111 SCRA 377 — Cited for the rule that mere suspicion, speculation, relationship, association, and companionship do not establish conspiracy.
• People vs. Caballero, 53 Phil. 585; People vs. Bartolay, 42 SCRA 1 — Cited for the rule that joint and simultaneous action is not per se a sufficient indicium of conspiracy.
• People vs. Macalisang, 22 SCRA 699 — Cited for the rule that deliberate or conscious choice of means is non-existent where the attack is the product of an impulse of the moment or accidental.
• People vs. Clemente, 21 SCRA 261 — Cited for the rule that treachery requires deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution and that an attack arising from a chance encounter and quarrel does not establish treachery.
• U.S. vs. Singson, 41 Phil. 53, 56 — Cited for the rule that a person defending himself from a deadly assault is not required to mete out blows with calm precision and that reasonableness is measured by the situation as it appears at the time.
• People vs. Lara, 48 Phil. 153 — Cited for the rule that in emergencies, human nature acts on the instinct of self-preservation and courts should hold the actor irresponsible for the consequences.
• People vs. Kipte, 42 SCRA 199 — Cited for the rule that initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information does not affect credibility.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; applied to find no conspiracy.
• Article 11, No. 1, Revised Penal Code — Recognizes self-defense as a justifying circumstance; applied to exempt appellants from criminal liability.
• Article 11, No. 3, Revised Penal Code — Recognizes defense of the rights of another as a justifying circumstance; applied to exempt appellants from criminal liability.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder; the crime charged and the basis of the trial court's conviction, which the Supreme Court set aside.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.