People of the Philippines vs. Porferio Culas y Raga

The death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction, before final judgment, totally extinguishes his criminal liability and the civil liability ex delicto based solely on the offense, rendering the criminal case dismissible; any civil liability based on other sources of obligation may be pursued only in a separate civil action against the accused's estate.

Porferio Culas y Raga was the accused-appellant in a criminal case for statutory rape under paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B(1), Revised Penal Code, with AAA as the victim. The case reached the Supreme Court after the Court of Appeals found him guilty in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380. The governing statutory backdrop is Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for total extinction of criminal liability by death of the convict and, as to pecuniary penalties, extinguishes liability when death occurs before final judgment.

Porferio Culas y Raga was charged in Crim. Case No. BN-01-02-3754 before the Regional Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15, with statutory rape under paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B(1), Revised Penal Code, with AAA as the victim. In a Decision dated July 25, 2013, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380 found Culas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime. On July 18, 2014, the Supreme Court adopted the CA's findings and affirmed the conviction, sentencing Culas to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordering him to pay ₱100,000 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000 as moral damages, and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest at six percent per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid. Before an Entry of Judgment could be issued, the Court received a Letter dated September 16, 2014 from the Bureau of Corrections informing it that Culas had died on February 8, 2014, as evidenced by the attached Certificate of Death.

• Effect of Death on Criminal Liability: Whether the death of accused-appellant prior to his final conviction by the Court extinguishes his criminal liability and requires dismissal of the criminal case.
• Effect of Death on Civil Liability Ex Delicto: Whether the civil liability ex delicto based solely on the offense is extinguished by accused-appellant's death, and whether any surviving civil liability based on other sources may be pursued in a separate civil action against his estate.
• Setting Aside Prior Resolution: Whether the Court's Resolution dated July 18, 2014 affirming the conviction should be set aside in light of accused-appellant's death before Entry of Judgment.

• Effect of Death on Criminal Liability: Yes. Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict before final judgment, rendering the criminal case dismissible.
• Effect of Death on Civil Liability Ex Delicto: Yes. The civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished because it is grounded on the criminal action; however, civil liability based on other sources may be pursued in a separate civil action against the estate.
• Setting Aside Prior Resolution: Yes. The July 18, 2014 Resolution was set aside and Crim. Case No. BN-01-02-3754 was dismissed by reason of death; the case was declared closed and terminated.

• Effect of Death on Criminal Liability: Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict as to personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties, liability is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. Citing People vs. Layag, the Court explained that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Because Culas died on February 8, 2014, before final conviction and before Entry of Judgment, there was no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the criminal action was extinguished and the case dismissible. The July 18, 2014 Resolution was accordingly set aside.
• Effect of Death on Civil Liability Ex Delicto: The civil action instituted in the criminal case for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished because it is grounded on the criminal action. Thus, the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in the criminal case cannot stand. However, the claim for civil liability survives if it may be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict under Article 1157 of the Civil Code, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or quasi-delicts. In that case, an action for recovery may be pursued only by separate civil action, subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, against the executor/administrator or estate of the accused. AAA may file such separate civil action against Culas's estate as warranted by law and procedural rules. If the private offended party instituted the civil action together with the criminal action prior to extinction, prescription is interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case under Article 1155 of the Civil Code.
• Setting Aside Prior Resolution: Since death occurred before final judgment, the Court was required to reconsider and set aside its July 18, 2014 Resolution and enter a new one dismissing the criminal case. The Court accordingly dismissed Crim. Case No. BN-01-02-3754 and declared the case closed and terminated, with no costs.

• Extinction of Criminal Liability by Death of the Accused — Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict as to personal penalties; as to pecuniary penalties, liability is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. The Court applied this rule because Culas died on February 8, 2014, before final conviction and before Entry of Judgment, requiring dismissal of the criminal case.
• Extinction of Civil Liability Ex Delicto by Death — The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes the civil liability based solely on the offense. The civil action instituted in the criminal case for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished because it is grounded on the criminal action. The Court applied this to hold that the damages awarded in the criminal case could not stand.
• Survival of Civil Liability Based on Other Sources — If the civil liability may be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict under Article 1157 of the Civil Code, the claim survives and may be pursued only by separate civil action against the executor/administrator or estate of the accused, subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The Court clarified that AAA may file such separate civil action against Culas's estate as warranted by law and procedural rules.
• Interruption of Prescription — Where the private offended party instituted the civil action together with the criminal action prior to its extinction, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case under Article 1155 of the Civil Code. The Court cited this rule to explain that the private offended party need not fear forfeiture of the right to file a separate civil action by prescription.

• "Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;" — This is the statutory basis under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the total extinction of criminal liability and the conditional extinction of pecuniary liability upon death before final judgment.
• "Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: death pending appeal extinguishes both the criminal action and the civil action for civil liability ex delicto.
• "However, it is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules." — This clarifies the limited survival of civil liability and the proper remedy of a separate civil action against the estate when the liability rests on a source other than delict.
• "Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability [,] as well as the civil liability [,] based solely thereon." — This is the first summarized rule in People vs. Layag, cited by the Court to explain the effects of death pending appeal.

• People vs. Layag, G.R. No. 214875, October 17, 2016 — The Court cited this as the controlling precedent explaining the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on criminal and civil liabilities; the Court adopted its four-part summary.
• People vs. Egagamao, G.R. No. 218809, August 3, 2016 — Cited in People vs. Layag for the same rule on the effects of death pending appeal.

• Article 89(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides total extinction of criminal liability by death of the convict as to personal penalties, and extinguishes pecuniary liability only when death occurs before final judgment. Applied to dismiss the criminal case because Culas died before final conviction.
• Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), Revised Penal Code — Defines statutory rape, the offense for which accused-appellant was convicted. Cited in the prior Resolution.
• Article 266-B(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for statutory rape, cited in the prior Resolution sentencing accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
• Article 1157, Civil Code — Enumerates sources of obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts. Used to explain that a surviving civil claim may be pursued separately.
• Article 1155, Civil Code — Provides for interruption of prescription; the statute of limitations on civil liability is interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case where the private offended party instituted the civil action together with the criminal action.
• Section 1, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Governs the separate civil action for recovery of civil liability; the Court stated that any surviving civil action must be pursued subject to this provision.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chairperson), Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa.