People of the Philippines vs. Ponciano Mandapat

A murder conviction may be sustained on the positive identification of a credible eyewitness notwithstanding the accused's alibi and conflicting ballistics findings; alibi must establish physical impossibility, and motive is unnecessary once identity is positively established. The death penalty imposed by the trial court is reduced to life imprisonment under Sec. 19(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.

Ponciano Mandapat was a policeman stationed at Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Crispula Carino-Nonan was the victim of the shooting charged. The prosecution was for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and the case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44.

On or about October 5, 1977, in Barangay Barang, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, Crispula Carino-Nonan was shot and killed. The prosecution charged Pat. Ponciano Mandapat, a policeman, with murder, alleging that he was armed with a firearm and, with treachery and evident premeditation and intent to kill, attacked and shot Nonan, inflicting three gunshot wounds that caused her immediate death. The information was filed on March 9, 1982.

At trial, Maria Razo-Montemayor testified that at about 10:00 a.m. she saw Mandapat holding the hair of Crispula Nonan and, with a gun in his hand, shoot her on the head. She could not recall how many shots were fired, but upon hearing the first shot she hurriedly went home, terrified. Dr. Tomas Refe, an NBI medico-legal officer, recovered two slugs from the exhumed body of the deceased and submitted them to the NBI ballistics section. Mandapat's service firearm, a Tell Revolver Caliber .22 with Serial No. 66330, was also submitted. NBI ballistician Rogelio Munar reported in Ballistics Report No. B-184-1177 that comparative examinations between the evidence bullet marked "CN" and test bullets fired from the submitted revolver revealed similar class and individual characteristic markings, and that the evidence bullet was fired through the barrel of that firearm.

The record also showed that three slugs were recovered from the victim's body: one by Dr. Andaya, the Municipal Health Officer of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, and two by Dr. Refe. All three were sent to the NBI and then to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory for ballistics examination. The NBI concluded that the bullet marked "CN" was fired through the barrel of the subject firearm, but the PC-INP Crime Laboratory stated that no conclusion could be made whether the bullets marked "CN" and "CN-1" were fired from the same firearm. Mandapat admitted that the Tell Revolver with Serial No. 66330 used in killing Nonan was issued to him and was taken from him only when he was investigated by the PC in Bayambang. Munar testified that the three fired bullets were the same bullets fired from the same gun and were those taken by Dr. Refe from the three gunshot wounds during exhumation.

The defense was alibi. Mandapat testified that his tour of duty was night poblacion patrol from 8:00 p.m. on October 4, 1977 to 4:00 a.m. on October 5, 1977; that after duty he slept at the police barracks behind the Malasiqui Municipal Building with Pat. Jaime Cerezo and woke up at about 11:30 a.m.; and that he was therefore not at the scene of the crime. Cerezo corroborated him. Mandapat also testified that the police barracks was only three kilometers away from the victim's residence and that a road extending about one kilometer from the barracks led to the house of the deceased.

Montemayor testified six years, two months, and 28 days after the incident and was not included in the original list of prosecution witnesses. She explained that she did not report what she knew to the Malasiqui Police because she was afraid of Mandapat, a policeman stationed at Malasiqui, and because there were killing incidents attributed to him. She also did not report to barangay officials because the barangay captain, Dionisio Mandapat, was the accused's father. She testified only after Mandapat was detained at the Provincial Jail and she was under the protection of the court. She further stated that she had offered to testify during the investigation but Fiscal Fernandez believed the testimony of Virgilio Nonan, the real eyewitness, was sufficient; Virgilio Nonan was later killed by an unknown assailant.

The trial court relied on Montemayor's testimony and found Mandapat guilty of murder. It found that the difference between the NBI and PC-INP ballistics findings did not militate against the prosecution because Mandapat was positively identified and admitted that the Tell Revolver was issued to him. The trial court also considered that no motive was shown, but that motive was not essential in light of the positive identification.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Petitioner/appellant argued that the lower court erred in relying heavily on Maria Razo-Montemayor because she was only a substitute eyewitness, the real eyewitness being Virgilio Nonan, who was killed by an unknown assailant; she was not included in the original list of prosecution witnesses and testified six years, two months, and 28 days after the incident.
• Ballistics Evidence: Petitioner maintained that the ballistics examination was doubtful.
• Alibi and Motive: Petitioner argued that his alibi was strong and that he had no motive to kill.
• Equipoise Rule: Petitioner invoked the equipoise rule in his favor.
• Presumption of Innocence: Petitioner argued that the presumption of innocence was not rebutted and that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Whether the trial court erred in relying on Maria Razo-Montemayor's testimony despite her not being in the original list of prosecution witnesses and testifying more than six years after the incident.
• Ballistics Evidence: Whether the conflicting NBI and PC-INP ballistics findings rendered the prosecution's evidence insufficient.
• Alibi and Motive: Whether the accused's alibi and the absence of motive negated his guilt.
• Equipoise Rule and Presumption of Innocence: Whether guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt or the equipoise rule required acquittal.
• Penalty and Civil Indemnity: Whether the death penalty and civil indemnity imposed by the trial court should be modified.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: No. The trial court's credibility finding is accorded great respect; the delay was adequately explained by fear, and the prosecution may present unlisted witnesses absent intentional bad faith.
• Ballistics Evidence: No. The conflict did not create reasonable doubt; the NBI reports were more credible, the PC-INP did not categorically deny, and the accused was positively identified and admitted the firearm was issued to him.
• Alibi and Motive: No. Alibi is inherently weak and must prove physical impossibility; positive identification prevails, and motive is not essential when identity is established.
• Equipoise Rule and Presumption of Innocence: No. Guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt; the equipoise rule does not apply.
• Penalty and Civil Indemnity: Modified. Death penalty reduced to life imprisonment under Sec. 19(1), Art. III of the Constitution; civil indemnity increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's factual findings, especially on credibility, because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses. The defense objected that Montemayor was a substitute eyewitness, was not in the original list, and testified late. The delay was adequately explained: she feared Mandapat, a policeman, and there were killing incidents attributed to him; the barangay captain was the accused's father; she testified only after Mandapat was detained and she was under court protection; and one eyewitness had already been silenced. Failure to report at once cannot be taken against a witness if adequately explained, and the natural reticence of people to get involved in criminal cases is of judicial notice. Montemayor also offered to testify during the investigation, but Fiscal Fernandez believed Virgilio Nonan's testimony was sufficient, explaining her omission from the list. The prosecution may call unlisted witnesses unless the omission is intentional and tainted with bad faith; the purpose of listing is to avoid surprise, and the defense had the opportunity to examine her character and credibility once she took the stand. The prosecution also has the privilege to present such number of witnesses as it deems sufficient.
• Ballistics Evidence: Three slugs were recovered from the victim's body, and all were submitted to the NBI and the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. The NBI concluded that the bullet marked "CN" was fired through the barrel of the subject firearm, while the PC-INP stated that no conclusion could be made whether the bullets marked "CN" and "CN-1" were fired from the same firearm. The difference did not militate against the prosecution. Mandapat was positively identified, and he admitted that the Tell Revolver with Serial No. 66330 used in killing Nonan was issued to him and was taken from him only when he was investigated by the PC in Bayambang. Munar testified that the three fired bullets were the same bullets fired from the same gun and were those taken by Dr. Refe from the three gunshot wounds during exhumation. The PC-INP report did not categorically deny that the evidence bullets were fired from the revolver. The two NBI reports, concurred in by five ballisticians who performed the examinations individually and separately, were more accurate and credible than the individual and uncorroborated finding of the PC-INP ballistician.
• Alibi and Motive: Alibi is inherently weak, easily contrived, and may only be accepted with great caution. Even if corroborated by Cerezo, Mandapat's alibi did not inspire belief; alibi may be fabricated even by those not related by blood. Alibi is unavailing where the accused is positively identified by one without motive to falsely charge him. To establish alibi, the defendant must show not only that he was present at some other place about the time of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed before, during, or after the time he was at such other place. Mandapat himself testified that the police barracks was only three kilometers away from the victim's residence and that a road extending about one kilometer from the barracks led to the house of the deceased. The defense did not show that this distance rendered it impossible for him to be present at the scene. A distance of one or two kilometers from the scene does not exclude the possibility of the commission of the crime by the accused. Although no motive was shown, motive is important only when the identity of the culprit is in doubt and not when he is positively identified by a credible witness. The absence of motive does not preclude the commission of the crime.
• Equipoise Rule and Presumption of Innocence: The appeal was devoid of merit. The assigned errors, including the invocation of the equipoise rule and the claim that the presumption of innocence was not rebutted, did not overcome the prosecution's evidence. The conviction was affirmed on the basis of the positive identification of the accused and the rejection of his alibi and ballistics challenge.
• Penalty and Civil Indemnity: The death penalty imposed by the trial court was reduced to life imprisonment pursuant to Sec. 19(1), Art. III of the Constitution. The civil indemnity was increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, and costs were assessed against appellant.

• Credibility of Witnesses; Appellate Deference — Trial courts' factual findings, especially on witness credibility, are accorded the greatest respect because the trial court can examine real evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying. The Court applied this doctrine in upholding the trial court's reliance on Maria Razo-Montemayor despite the defense's objections.
• Delay in Reporting a Crime — Failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities cannot be taken against him if adequately explained; natural reticence and fear of reprisal are recognized. The Court applied this to Montemayor, who delayed reporting because she feared the accused policeman, the barangay captain was the accused's father, and one eyewitness had been killed.
• Unlisted Witnesses — The prosecution may present witnesses not listed in the information unless the omission is intentional and tainted with bad faith; the purpose of the list is to avoid surprise, and the defense may examine the witness's character and credibility once on the stand. The Court applied this in allowing Montemayor to testify.
• Alibi — Alibi is inherently weak and easily contrived. To establish it, the defendant must show that he was present at another place at the time of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene before, during, or after. The Court applied this in rejecting Mandapat's alibi because the barracks was only three kilometers away and a one-kilometer road led to the victim's house.
• Positive Identification and Motive — Motive is important only when the identity of the culprit is in doubt; absence of motive does not preclude conviction when the accused is positively identified by a credible witness. The Court applied this in sustaining the conviction despite the prosecution's failure to show motive.
• Conflicting Ballistics Evidence — A conflict between expert ballistics findings does not necessarily create reasonable doubt where the accused is positively identified, admits the firearm was issued to him, and one report does not categorically deny that the evidence bullets were fired from the firearm. The Court applied this in preferring the corroborated NBI reports over the PC-INP finding.
• Reduction of Death Penalty — The death penalty imposed by the trial court was reduced to life imprisonment under Sec. 19(1), Art. III of the Constitution. The Court applied this provision in modifying the penalty.

• "It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the appellate courts will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court especially as to credibility of witnesses because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case." — States the appellate deference doctrine on credibility, which the Court used to uphold the trial court's reliance on the eyewitness.
• "The delay, when adequately explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness, as in the case at bar" — Rejects the defense attack on Montemayor's delayed testimony and articulates the rule that an explained delay does not destroy credibility.
• "To establish alibi, a defendant must not only show that he was present at some other place about the time of the commission of the alleged crime but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed either before, during or after the time he was at such other place" — Sets out the requisites of alibi, which Mandapat failed to satisfy.
• "motive is important only when the identity of the culprit is in doubt and not when he is positively identified by a credible witness" — Explains why the absence of motive did not prevent conviction once the accused was positively identified.

• People vs. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990) — Cited for the rule that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's factual findings, especially on credibility.
• People vs. Marcos, 185 SCRA 154 (1990) — Cited for the same credibility rule and for the principle that alibi is unavailing when the accused is positively identified.
• People vs. Nabor, 185 SCRA 615 (1990) — Cited for credibility findings and the requisites of alibi.
• People vs. Demate, 113 SCRA 353 (1982) — Cited for the rule that failure to report a crime at once cannot be taken against a witness, and for the rejection of alibi.
• People vs. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158 (1985) — Cited for the judicial notice of the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal cases.
• People vs. Martinez, 127 SCRA 260 (1984) — Cited for the rule that the prosecution may call witnesses not listed in the information unless the omission is intentional and tainted with bad faith.
• People vs. Lacson, 1 SCRA 414 (1961) — Cited for the established rule that the prosecution may call unlisted witnesses to testify.
• People vs. Perante, Jr., 143 SCRA 56 (1986) — Cited for the requisites of alibi and for the rule that motive is not essential when identity is positively established.
• People vs. Araya, 105 SCRA 133 (1981) — Cited for the rule that a distance of one or two kilometers from the scene of the crime does not exclude the possibility of the accused's presence.
• People vs. Basadre, 128 SCRA 641 (1984) — Cited for the rule that the absence of motive does not preclude the commission of the crime.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder; the accused was convicted under this provision.
• Section 19(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Cited by the Supreme Court in reducing the death penalty imposed by the trial court to life imprisonment.

Fernan, C.J.; Gutierrez, Jr., J.; Feliciano, J.; and Davide, Jr., J.