People of the Philippines vs. Peralta

A killing preceded by a two-to-three-minute heated argument, without proof that treacherous means were deliberately or consciously adopted, is homicide, not murder, even if the victim was seated and the attack proved fatal.

Gilbert Peralta y Ringor was a member of the Central District Field Force, Intelligence Investigation Unit of the Central Police District. Louise Rimando y Medina was a third-year mechanical engineering student at the Technological Institute of the Philippines, described as a civilian agent of the National Bureau of Investigation. On July 2, 1991, Peralta was dispatched under a mission order to conduct surveillance concerning rampant prostitution along Quezon Avenue near the Aberdeen Court Hotel in Quezon City.

After watching a basketball game in Pasig City in the evening of July 2, 1991, Louise Rimando together with schoolmates and Tau Gamma fraternity brothers Crizaldo Esguerra, Delfin Doriano/Soriano and Danilo Gaa proceeded to Quezon City to pick up prostitutes. At the Aberdeen Court Hotel along Quezon Avenue, Rimando alighted from their owner-type jeep driven by Esguerra and spoke with gay pimp Roberto Reyes, introducing himself as a National Bureau of Investigation agent apparently to obtain a discount. Reyes agreed to have certain young girls picked up in front of the hotel, then suddenly boarded the jeep with two girls and another gay, Sandro Lim, saying in Tagalog that CAPCOM men were extorting money from them and asking for help. Upon Rimando's instruction the jeep sped away with eight persons on board.

While traveling along Quezon Avenue, one of the pimps noticed appellant following in a taxi cab. Rimando instructed Esguerra to park in front of Dunkin Donuts at the corner of Quezon and West Avenues, where the two gays were ordered to alight and one of the women got off for fear of arrest. According to the prosecution, appellant, holding a .38 caliber firearm, alighted from the taxi parked behind the jeep and approached Rimando, who remained seated beside the driver's seat. When asked if they were policemen, Rimando answered in the negative, stated he was an NBI agent, and showed his NBI identification card. Appellant remarked "NBI ka pala," grabbed the card, and shot Rimando twice in the body before returning to his taxi and leaving. The three eyewitnesses testified they had a clear view of appellant's face under a lamppost, and Esguerra added on cross-examination that Rimando and appellant argued for two to three minutes before the shots.

Rimando was brought to the United Doctors Medical Center and later transferred to the Santo Tomas University Hospital in Manila, where he was pronounced dead on July 7, 1991. The autopsy by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr. showed a 2 x 2 cm gunshot wound of entry at the right anterior lumbar abdomen, a 1 x 1.5 cm gunshot wound of entry at the right posterior lumbar area, a gunshot wound of exit at the left antero-lateral iliac area, multiple perforating wounds involving the jejunum with two perforations of the sigmoid colon, and hemoperitoneum. The first wound, which hit the intestines and other vital organs, was deemed fatal, with the assailant positioned at the victim's right lateral side; no injuries were found on the victim's hands.

For his part, appellant testified he was in civilian attire with an authorized .38 caliber gun on mission-order surveillance at about 1:00 a.m. on July 3, 1991 when he spotted three young girls in front of the hotel whom he suspected to be prostitutes. After identifying himself as a police officer to Reyes, who shouted a warning and boarded the jeep with companions, appellant followed the jeep to effect an arrest. When the jeep stopped, he approached after identifying himself, while Rimando arrogantly retorted about being NBI and insisted the women were girlfriends, leading to a heated two-to-three-minute discussion. The girls jumped off upon hearing of the intended arrest; as appellant tried to pursue them, Rimando allegedly grabbed his right forearm and gun, and with Rimando's companions approaching, the gun accidentally fired twice. Appellant then took cover behind a concrete post, later reported to Officer-in-Charge Dante Yan at headquarters, and a spot report on the accidental firing was prepared the next day for Police Chief Senior Inspector Absalon Salboro after a follow-up team failed to identify the victim. Appellant was identified only on August 23, 1991, about one and a half months later. Defense witness Reyes corroborated a face-to-face heated argument, claiming Rimando stood up, pushed appellant, reached for his back pocket/waist, then grappled for the gun when two shots rang out.

The trial court credited the three prosecution eyewitnesses and the medico-legal findings over the defense version and convicted appellant of murder.

• Self-Defense in Performance of Duty: Petitioner argued that as a police officer engaged in performance of official duty, he acted in self-defense when he shot and killed Rimando.
• Absence of Treachery: Petitioner maintained that treachery did not attend the shooting.
• Credibility of Roberto Reyes: Petitioner argued that the testimony of Roberto Reyes, who was with the victim's group at the time of the shooting, should not have been disregarded.
• Civil Liability: Petitioner argued that the awards of P50,000.00 death indemnity, P57,000.00 actual damages, P35,000.00 moral damages, and P35,000.00 exemplary damages were erroneous.

• Credibility Best Left to Trial Court: Respondent countered through the Solicitor General that who to believe and whose testimonies to credit were best addressed by the trial judge who observed the witnesses firsthand, including their demeanor, conduct and attitude on the stand.
• Absence of Evident Premeditation: Respondent argued that appellant's act of tailing the victim's group was not an overt act reflecting determination to kill Rimando, but was done to effect arrest of women suspected to be prostitutes.

• Self-Defense: Whether appellant, who admitted killing the victim, established self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.
• Fulfillment of Duty: Whether appellant acted in fulfillment of duty as a police officer so as to incur no criminal liability.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the shooting so as to qualify the killing as murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation attended the killing so as to qualify it as murder.
• Credibility and Bias: Whether the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses should be discredited for bias as fraternity brothers, and whether Roberto Reyes should have been believed.
• Civil Liability: Whether the awards for civil indemnity, actual, moral and exemplary damages were proper.

• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression, the indispensable condition, was absent, the victim having been seated inside the jeep with no hand injuries and the bullet trajectory corroborating the prosecution.
• Fulfillment of Duty: No. Both requisites failed because no prostitution occurred in appellant's presence and shooting the victim twice was not a necessary consequence of arresting suspects.
• Treachery: No. The killing resulted from a two-to-three-minute heated argument and provocation, without deliberate adoption of treacherous means.
• Evident Premeditation: No. No proof existed of the time of determination, an overt act of resolve to kill, or sufficient reflection time.
• Credibility and Bias: No. The eyewitnesses remained credible without proper impeachment for bias, while Reyes's testimony was inconsistent and contrary to medical findings.
• Civil Liability: Partly yes. Civil indemnity and moral damages stand, actual damages were reduced to receipted funeral expenses, and exemplary damages were deleted.

• Self-Defense: One who invokes self-defense admits the killing and bears the burden of establishing it by clear and convincing evidence on the strength of defense evidence. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code requires (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of means, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation, with unlawful aggression as condition sine qua non requiring actual or imminent peril through physical force or weapon. The claim that Rimando held appellant's forearm and grabbed the gun was disbelieved: no hand injuries were found, the victim was proven seated beside the driver, and the downward trajectory from right upper abdomen entry to lower left exit plus wounds on the right side confirmed vulnerability while seated. Reyes's contrary claim that the victim alighted and stood was rejected as contrary to disinterested medico-legal findings. The plea was further belied by failure to promptly report self-defense, feigned ignorance of hitting anyone despite illumination and proximity, absence of scuffle, and deliberate second firing while retaining full control of handle and trigger.
• Fulfillment of Duty: Article 11 requires (a) performance of duty or lawful exercise of right or office and (b) that the injury be the necessary consequence of due performance. Appellant was not performing duty when shooting because the girls were committing no prostitution in his presence; at most Reyes, who offered a pick-up girl, could be arrested for vagrancy. Even then, shooting Rimando twice after heated confrontation was not a necessary consequence of arresting female suspects and exceeded any right to arrest.
• Treachery: Treachery requires (a) means giving no opportunity to defend or retaliate and (b) deliberate or conscious adoption thereof, proven as fully as the crime itself and not by presumption; suddenness alone does not establish alevosia if decided on impulse in reaction to provocation. Although the trial court relied on affidavits suggesting immediacy, Esguerra testified to a two-to-three-minute interval during which appellant sought to arrest the women and Rimando adamantly refused, claiming they were girlfriends, earning appellant's ire. The protagonists were strangers meeting only at West and Quezon Avenues, appellant visibly brandished his firearm while approaching so danger was known, and victim provocation negates treachery even if sudden.
• Evident Premeditation: Evident premeditation requires proof of (a) time of determination, (b) overt act manifesting clinging to determination, and (c) sufficient lapse for reflection. No such time was shown; appellant and victim were strangers before confrontation, and tailing the jeep to arrest suspected prostitutes was not an overt act of resolve to kill Rimando.
• Credibility and Bias: Bias exists where relation gives incentive to exaggerate or falsify, but impeachment requires laying foundation by asking the facts constituting bias. Esguerra's broad statement that he would do anything for fraternity brothers was too general, without inquiry into tenets espousing absolute fealty, and reflected personal conviction only; Soriano and Gaa were not asked the same question. Deference was due the trial judge who observed demeanor, particularly Judge Tabiolo for Reyes. Reyes was incredible: he offered a prostitute despite knowing appellant was police, contradicted appellant on who drove the taxi and where it parked, and implausibly claimed to see the shooting in an illuminated place yet see no one hit.
• Civil Liability: The mother testified to hospitalization of P16,000.00, funeral parlor P18,500.00, lot P8,000.00, mass P400.00, lost $1,200.00 monthly Kuwait employment, and grief over her eldest and only son. Only funeral expenses totaling P26,900.00, supported by receipts, were allowed; hospitalization without receipts and loss of earning capacity without documentary proof of Kuwait employment were rejected. P50,000.00 civil indemnity ex delicto and P50,000.00 moral damages were affirmed, but exemplary damages were deleted absent aggravating circumstances, there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.

• Self-defense; burden and elements — One who invokes self-defense admits the killing and must establish it by clear and convincing evidence on the strength of defense evidence, not prosecution weakness. Article 11 requires unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of means, and lack of sufficient provocation. Applied here, admission shifted the burden to appellant, which he failed to discharge.
• Unlawful aggression as condition sine qua non — There is unlawful aggression when peril to life, limb or right is actual or imminent through actual physical force or use of weapon; without it there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete. Applied here, medical proof that the seated victim bore no hand injuries and sustained right-side downward-trajectory wounds negated grabbing or attack.
• Treachery; elements and proof — Treachery exists where means employed give no opportunity to defend or retaliate and were deliberately or consciously adopted, with sudden unexpected attack depriving an unsuspecting victim of real chance to defend without risk to aggressor and without slightest provocation. It must be proven as fully as the crime and cannot rest on presumption. Applied here, visible brandishing of the gun and a prior argument showed absence of deliberate treacherous means.
• Provocation negating treachery — A sudden attack done on impulse as reaction to actual or imagined provocation is not tainted with treachery; provocation negates treachery even if sudden and unexpected, and accidental helpless position from a sudden decision does not suffice for alevosia. Applied here, the victim's adamant interference and heated argument provoked the shooting.
• Evident premeditation; requisites — Evident premeditation requires (1) time when offender determined to commit crime, (2) overt act manifestly indicating clinging to determination, and (3) sufficient lapse between determination and execution for reflection. Applied here, stranger status, absence of time of resolve, and tailing to arrest prostitutes defeated the circumstance.
• Fulfillment of duty; requisites — Exemption requires (1) performance of duty or lawful exercise of right or office and (2) injury as necessary consequence of due performance. Applied here, no prostitution in presence justified the shooting, and double shooting was unnecessary to arrest.
• Credibility deference and impeachment for bias — Trial judges who observe demeanor are best situated to assess credibility; bias impeachment requires laying foundation by asking facts constituting incentive to falsify. Applied here, general fraternity loyalty did not impeach eyewitnesses, while Reyes's material inconsistencies destroyed his credibility.
• Exemplary damages in criminal cases — Exemplary damages require commission with one or more aggravating circumstances. Applied here, with no aggravating circumstance and only homicide established, the award was deleted while civil indemnity and moral damages were retained.

• "There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself." — States the indispensable condition for self-defense that defeated appellant's justification claim.
• "The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim." — Provides the canonical definition used to reject treachery where provocation and prior argument existed.
• "Provocation of the appellant by the victim negates the presence of treachery even if the attack may have been sudden and unexpected." — Articulates why the heated confrontation reduced the crime from murder to homicide.
• "The qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be simply deduced from presumption as it is necessary that the existence of this qualifying or aggravating circumstance should be proven as fully as the crime itself in order to aggravate the liability or penalty of the culprit." — Emphasizes the strict proof required for qualifying circumstances.

• People vs. Macucha, 310 SCRA 14, 23-24 (1999) — Cited for the essence of treachery as sudden unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim.
• People vs. Atrejenio, 310 SCRA 229, 244 (1999) — Cited for the two elements of treachery: denial of defense opportunity and deliberate adoption.
• People vs. Sabanal, 172 SCRA 430, 434 (1989) — Cited with People vs. Macaso and People vs. Ardiza for the rule that sudden attack on impulse from provocation is not treachery and provocation negates treachery.
• People vs. Aninon, 158 SCRA 701 (1988) — Cited for the rule that suddenness alone does not establish alevosia and treachery cannot rest on presumption.
• People vs. Lagarto, 196 SCRA 611, 619-620 (1991); People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642, 655 (1991); People vs. Barelano, 319 SCRA 567, 589 (1999) — Cited for the three requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700, 704 (1990); People vs. Bayocot, 174 SCRA 285, 291 (1989) — Cited for unlawful aggression as condition sine qua non of self-defense.
• People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil 257, 259 (1943); People vs. Pajenado, 69 SCRA 172, 177 (1976) — Cited for the two requisites of fulfillment of duty.
• People vs. Pinca, 318 SCRA 270, 279 (1999) — Cited for deference to the trial judge on credibility and demeanor.

• Article 11, Revised Penal Code — Provides justifying circumstances of self-defense requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity, and lack of sufficient provocation, and fulfillment of duty. Applied to reject both justifications for lack of aggression and lack of necessity.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder as killing with qualifying circumstances such as treachery and evident premeditation. Applied as the charge that failed for want of qualifying circumstances.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines homicide as killing without circumstances in Articles 246 and 248, punishable by reclusion temporal. Applied as the crime actually committed, warranting an indeterminate sentence.

Bellosillo, J., Mendoza, J., Quisumbing, J., Buena, J., concur.